Part I — Situation overview

On Monday, 13 July 2026, the National Assembly votes on the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law, submitted at the weekend by prime minister Péter Magyar (45 years old, head of government since 30 April 2026). With the Tisza Party’s comfortable two-thirds majority of 141 seats (in the 199-member National Assembly the two-thirds threshold is 134 seats), the outcome of the vote can be taken as almost certain. The most direct effect of the amendment concerns the position of the sitting President of the Republic, Tamás Sulyok: according to press reports, on the day following the promulgation of the legislation the head of state’s mandate would cease. The package would also introduce an age-band limit on the parliamentary mandate, and it affects the office of the president of the Constitutional Court (CC), Péter Polt, as well — he and three constitutional judges likewise over the age of 70 would have to leave as of 1 September.

The amendment came barely a week after the adoption of an earlier constitutional amendment, and the submitted text was criticised on several points for its rushed preparation. The prime minister publicly warned the head of state: if he does not sign the law terminating his own mandate, the removal procedure may be initiated against him — that is, the special procedure under Article 13 of the Fundamental Law aimed at removing the President of the Republic from office. The political situation is the reverse of that of a few years earlier: today Tisza governs, Fidesz–KDNP is in opposition, and the former governing party organised a demonstration in support of the head of state. For MIAK it is precisely this reversal that makes the topic a test of principle.

In MIAK’s reading, the question is not whom the amendment favours, but whether the procedure meets the rule-of-law minimum. The separation of powers is a two-way principle: the same yardstick applies to every majority of the day. The termination of a sitting head of state’s mandate through a single, tailor-made constitutional amendment — even if two-thirds stands behind it — is a precedent whose procedural cleanliness is at least as important as its content. The character of the problem is therefore not party-political but institutional: the tool of today may be in anyone’s hands tomorrow.

Part II — Literature foundation

The interpretive frame of the topic emerges from two mutually complementary sources. Montesquieu (Charles-Louis de Secondat, the state and legal philosopher of the French Enlightenment) set out the doctrine of the separation of powers in his work The Spirit of the Laws (1748): there is liberty only where the legislative, executive and judicial powers are not concentrated in the same hand — this is the basic structure of modern constitutional democracies, and a direct yardstick for judging the present amendment. The positive-law frame is provided by the Fundamental Law of Hungary: Article 13 precisely regulates under what strict guarantees — a motion by one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly, a two-thirds secret vote, then a substantive decision by the Constitutional Court — the President of the Republic may be removed, while the cardinal act (adopted by two-thirds) and the order of amendment also show where the formal limits of the two-thirds majority lie. The two together form the basis of MIAK’s proposal: the theory fixes the why, the norm in force the how. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that strengthen the procedural cleanliness of decisions of constitutional significance — regardless of which political force is in government.

3.1 Mandatory prior procedural and impact-assessment package (for future amendments, with a 90-day lead time)

Every amendment affecting the Fundamental Law or a cardinal act should be linked to a mandatory, public prior impact assessment and a genuine — not a few-day — social consultation period. The impact assessment should cover what institutional consequences the change brings, whom it directly affects, and whether it is consistent with the logic of the constitutional framework in force. In the frame of the Montesquieu-style separation of powers (see 6.4.1) this ensures that the legislative power does not reshape the room for manoeuvre of the other two branches with a single sentence, “by fiat”. The proposal builds directly on MIAK’s legislative impact assessment programme point (I3), which already today prescribes a mandatory, public impact assessment for every bill. For amendments of constitutional significance MIAK proposes in addition seeking in advance the opinion of the Venice Commission (the advisory body of the Council of Europe acting in constitutional-law matters).

3.2 Respecting the guarantees of the head-of-state removal and the precision of the normative text (immediate)

Any step affecting the head of state’s mandate should remain within the system of guarantees of Article 13 of the Fundamental Law (see 6.4.2): the one-fifth motion, the two-thirds secret vote and, above all, the substantive decision of the Constitutional Court are the substantive brake — this is what separates rule-of-law accountability from political reckoning. MIAK also draws attention to the fact that several elements of the submitted text (for example the wording of the parliamentary mandate limit) contain, according to press reports, a contradictory, legally hard-to-interpret half-sentence — such imprecision in itself breeds legal uncertainty. MIAK asks for an unambiguous normative text free of internal contradiction, because judicial and constitutional-court independence (I4) prevails only alongside predictable rules.

3.3 Annual constitutional “stress test” and institutional decision audit (12-month cycle)

MIAK proposes institutionalising an annual, independent expert review that measures whether the system of checks and balances works in both directions: whether it would prevent a hypothetical concentration of power, whoever is in government. This is MIAK’s constitutional “stress test” programme point (I10); let the result of the review be public. The regular, external screening of the decision-making routines of the key institutions (KI11) complements this, so that not only the text of the legislation but the actual institutional functioning is also auditable.

The common principle of these three proposals is that the separation of powers does not depend on who happens to exercise power. Procedural guarantees — prior review, unambiguous normative text, independent control — are brakes even when they are inconvenient for a comfortable two-thirds; that is precisely their purpose.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule-of-law institutional system Strengthening the procedural guarantees makes constitutional changes more predictable If a strong majority formally circumvents the guarantees, a precedent arises for future abuses
Political culture A factual, substantive debate can replace person-directed confrontation A further deterioration of the parliamentary tone undermines trust in institutions
Public administration and international assessment The prior impact assessment and independent control can improve the international rule-of-law indicators Rushed, ad hoc amendments worsen predictability and external perception

The main question to weigh is whether the comfort of the constitutional majority and the speed of the decision stand against procedural thoroughness. In a crisis situation speed may be justified, but for an amendment with lasting effect affecting a sitting head of state’s mandate, thoroughness is the more important: here it is precisely time and public debate that are the guarantee that the decision is not the product of a single political moment. The proposal tips towards the risk side if the procedural requirements are degraded into empty formality — which is why the actual, not merely on-paper, role of independent control (Constitutional Court, Venice Commission) is of key importance.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested performance indicators)

The success of the proposal is worth tracking along the following performance indicators (KPIs) — these are suggestions, not government decisions:

  • The number of days elapsed between submission and the final vote for amendments affecting the Fundamental Law or a cardinal act (worth tracking: let there be genuine consultation time, not a few days).
  • The rate at which the Venice Commission’s opinion is sought in advance for amendments of constitutional significance (suggested target: approach 100%).
  • The international assessment of judicial independence (EU Justice Scoreboard perceived judicial independence, and the World Bank rule-of-law indicator) — suggested direction: a substantive improvement from the current level.
  • The annual number of substantive (not merely procedural) decisions of the Constitutional Court — worth tracking whether the body’s actual control role is strengthening.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is simple and not party-political: let decisions of constitutional significance — especially those affecting the head of state’s mandate — be made alongside a prior impact assessment, genuine consultation, an unambiguous normative text and actual independent control. From the decision-maker MIAK asks that the comfort of the two-thirds majority should not override the procedural guarantees, and from the public that the substantive question (whether the checks and balances work) should not be obscured by the daily political confrontation. This position follows directly from MIAK’s foundational values of being ideology-free and accountable: ideology-free, because we apply the same yardstick to every majority of the day, regardless of which force governs; accountable, because the separation of powers and independent control ensure precisely that decision-makers remain answerable after the fact as well.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The economic press (Portfolio) foregrounded the mechanics of the process and the sequence of announcements: the course of Monday’s vote, the prime minister’s weekend social-media announcements, in a factual, event-centred register. The public-affairs band (24.hu) sharpened onto the direct personal consequences: that on the day following the promulgation Tamás Sulyok’s mandate would cease, that the CC’s president, Péter Polt, and three constitutional judges over the age of 70 would also have to leave, and that in the event of a refusal to sign a removal procedure looms. On the left-liberal, public-affairs side HVG formulated legal-technical criticism: in its view a “confused, contradictory” half-sentence found its way into the parliamentary-mandate limitation, which is legally hard to interpret, and it signalled the rushed preparation.

The now-opposition conservative band (Mandiner, Magyar Nemzet) approached from two directions: on the one hand, with the “threatened” framing it placed at the centre the prime minister’s action against the head of state, and on the other, in its opinion column it made a topic of the deterioration of parliamentary culture — according to former MP Gábor Fodor, “we are living through one of the low points in the history of Hungarian parliamentarism” as regards mutual relations and the giving of respect. To this was added the news value of the demonstration organised by Fidesz–KDNP in front of the Sándor Palace in support of Tamás Sulyok. Looking at the spectrum as a whole, the outlets differ in whether they emphasise the mechanics, the personal consequence, the legal imprecision or the political culture; from each of these MIAK retains the institutional, procedural dimension.

6.2 Facts and data

Item Value Source
Total membership of the National Assembly 199 (106 individual + 93 list) Act CCIII of 2011
Two-thirds threshold 134 seats (66.84%) calculation
Tisza Party’s seat count (2026) 141 (70.85%) NVI, 19 April 2026
The amendment’s ordinal number 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law press reports, July 2026
Day of the vote 13 July 2026 (Monday) Portfolio / 24.hu, July 2026
Hungary’s rule-of-law indicator +0.35 World Bank WGI 2024 (rule of law)
Control of corruption −0.17 World Bank WGI 2024
Government effectiveness +0.42 World Bank WGI 2024

The constitutional order of the removal procedure (Article 13 of the Fundamental Law): one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly may propose it, a two-thirds secret vote is required to initiate the removal procedure, and the substantive decision is made by the Constitutional Court. Both the constitutional amendment and the cardinal act are adopted by the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority — the Government only submits them.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the protection of judicial and constitutional-court independence, the constitutional “stress test”, and the mandatory legislative impact assessment are the gravitational centre of the topic;
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the independent audit of institutional decision-making routines and measurable, accountable state functioning provide the implementation frame of the proposal.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

In the famous chapter of the work Montesquieu fixes that the condition of liberty is the separation of the three branches of power. Where the legislative and executive powers are united in one hand, there is no liberty, because the same body can make and execute tyrannical laws; and he separately emphasises the necessity of detaching the judicial power:

“Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control.”

In the frame of the present amendment this means that when the legislative majority, with a single act, reshapes the situation of another constitutional actor (the head of state, and indirectly the Constitutional Court), it is precisely the balance described by Montesquieu that is put to the test — which is why MIAK regards the preservation of the procedural brakes as the guarantee of liberty.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.2 The Fundamental Law of Hungary

The Fundamental Law in force ties the removal of the President of the Republic to a strict, multi-stage system of guarantees. According to Article 13, if the head of state intentionally violates the Fundamental Law or a law connected with the exercise of his office, one-fifth of the members may propose the removal; a secret vote of two-thirds of the members is required to initiate the removal procedure; during the procedure the president may not exercise his powers; and the substantive decision is made by the Constitutional Court. Article 12 enumerates the grounds for the cessation of the mandate (expiry of the term, death, lasting incapacity, incompatibility, resignation, removal). To this the order of amendment adds that the cardinal act is “a law for the adoption and amendment of which the votes of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly present are required” — that is, the qualified majority is itself the formal limit, not its absence. In the Hungarian situation this frame provides the yardstick: the removal is in accordance with the rule of law if these guarantees are respected substantively, not merely formally.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force on 17 April 2026)

6.5 International comparison

The practice of the Venice Commission has for years represented the principle that constitutional amendments must be based on wide-ranging consultation, sufficient time and public debate — a tailor-made constitutional change directed against a specific office-holder (“ad hominem”) is questionable from a rule-of-law standpoint. The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) also sets a substantive limit on amendment with the so-called eternity clause (Article 79(3)): certain fundamental principles cannot be changed even by a two-thirds majority. As a negative example, the Polish process of 2015–2023 shows what happens when the constitutional court is brought under political control: the EU court condemnations and the temporary freezing of funds signalled the economic price of the rule-of-law risk as well. The lesson is two-way: the majority mandate is legitimate, but independent control and the procedural minimums cannot be sacrificed on the altar of speed.

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I5 — Property protection (the principle of institutional predictability against political decision)
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Public administration and e-government

  • KI3 — Bureaucracy reduction, measurably
  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration
  • KI11 — Organisational behaviour audit

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 12 July 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature, legal sources):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force on 17 April 2026) — Articles 12–13, and the rule on the cardinal act

Note: in the blog’s visible text the local file path of the book does not appear — only the author and the title. The Hungarian legal sources in force (Copyright Act, Section 1(4)) are freely quotable.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI11)
  • MIAK press monitor, 12 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 90/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 — rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness
  • Council of Europe, Venice Commission — constitutional-amendment procedural standards (earlier opinions)

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