1. Procedural urgencies and legal deadlines
This cluster measures the direct procedural pressure on the new government. The renegotiation of cardinal laws, appointment procedures for independent institution heads, and parliamentary working reforms are all parts of the same logical frame — a two-thirds government can act with democratic legitimacy only if its procedural capacity does not lag behind its political weight. The new blogs (28 April — opening session, 1 May — Melléthei-Barna case, 2 May — PM handover) layered three operational requirements on top: a six-month professional consultation period before any constitutional amendment, an institutionalised conflict-of-interest protocol for cabinet members, and a joint justice–interior procedural framework for accountability cases. If the cabinet submits a constitutional amendment within the first 90 days, that is not just a political mistake but a procedural one — the cardinal-law reform sequence and institutional appointments only become legitimately walkable after the first six months.
Melléthei-Barna Márton’s structured written conflict-of-interest declaration: closure of legal mandates, excluded case types, named substitute decision-maker; target: ≥5 documented substitutions over 12 months.
Tisza caucus’s written commitment: 6-month consultation before any Fundamental Law / cardinal-law change (civil society / opposition / Venice Commission), 60-day public comment. KPI: 100% documented consultation rate.
10 standing + 1 ethics committee, with House Rules amendment.
For each minister-designate: career CV + conflict-of-interest declaration.
Public protocol for spousal / partner / lineal / in-law relations of cabinet members; mandatory declaration at every new appointment; target: 100% declaration rate by day 100 (Venice Commission + OECD Public Integrity 2017 model).
Which public institutions retain biometric systems; EU AI Act-compliant risk classification.
Itemised inherited liabilities and unfunded promises in a comprehensive audit.
Public procedure: opening of secret-service files on 22 October 2026, asset recovery (only on final court ruling), professional cleanliness of active bribery cases; blind case allocation; formal dialogue with the Hungarian Judges’ Association.
Reversal of post-2010 amendments: electoral system, Constitutional Court composition, independent institutions.
In the new National Assembly’s first 90 days the Tisza caucus tables zero constitutional / cardinal-law changes; focus on RRF milestones, AML strengthening, fiscal impact analysis.
Politically uncontestable handling via the joint justice–interior procedural framework; one of the cabinet’s most sensitive accountability processes.
Public hearings + plenary votes with opposition consultation.
At least 15 indicators, mandatory parliamentary debate.
2. Cabinet first-100-day actions
The 100-day horizon is not a political slogan — it is the legitimacy window of the new government: public introductions of department heads, slimming the cabinet structure (from 40+ to <25 staff per ministry), and the civil-service retention package are all preconditions for bureaucratic continuity. The new blogs (29 April — Tarr Council, 30 April — formation crew, 1 May — Pósfai-Melléthei-Barna appointments) layered three new measurement types: a 100-day KPI package per ministry (8 August), a portfolio-overlap protocol for combined ministries (29 June), and a 100-day police professional review (17 August). The slippage of ministerial appointments to the opening session (9 May) is not in itself problematic — but it does signal that the political announcement cadence (Friday-Saturday) has run ahead of the Presidential Office Gazette schedule.
In the Presidential Office Gazette; 16 sectoral ministries. Slippage: per the 2 May blog, effective date pushed to after the 9 May opening session.
Publicly published staffing structure with explicit ceiling.
18-month dismissal moratorium + career framework for non-managerial civil servants.
Advisors and state secretaries appointed and operational.
5 new ministries (16 sectoral areas) effectively up and running.
Published decision-and-responsibility protocol for every two-ministry area (NCF, public-media board, HUN-REN/MTA); target: 100% publication.
Share of ministries with KPI packages published on the government portal — 3-5 measurable goals per new ministry, with deadlines and accountability; target: 100%. The operational frame of the Drucker audit.
Separation of politically targeted vs. professional investigations over the past 5 years; competence-based transferability assessment; depoliticisation roadmap + competitive selection of county police chiefs.
Foreign affairs, justice, defence; published 100-day action plans on ministerial websites.
Versus April 2026 NEAK baseline, at least a 10% reduction in average hospital waiting times — a 100-day priority-matrix item for Hegedűs Zsolt’s health ministry.
Whether Lannert Judit’s professional-autonomy framework cuts teacher turnover in the 100 most disadvantaged primary schools — a Schleicher-style KPI.
A four-body assessment panel (HAS + Engineers’ Chamber + Fiscal Council + Asset Recovery Office) for every ministry; publicly submitted report + ministerial rebuttal.
3. EU obligations and accession processes
This is the most interconnection-sensitive cluster: the EPPO accession ladder (30-day intent statement → 60-day filing → 12-month active membership), 6th AMLD operational rollout (90 days), Magyar Péter–vdL signing of the political deal on the €12 trillion frozen funds (25 May 2026), and the monthly conditionality dashboard (8 July) are not separate projects — they form mutually conditional procedural chains. Without an AMLD-compliant legal framework, the EPPO mandate stays formal only; AMLD without EPPO leaves no international enforcement pressure. The 50% absorption target by 25 May 2027 and the ≥70% RRF release target by 30 June 2027 are therefore the cluster’s shared outcome variables — if either falls short, one weak link in the chains above is to blame. The Subcarpathian conditions package (8 July) and the EU-internal alliance-building track (Bucharest, Bratislava, Vilnius — 8 June) are not sanctioning instruments but accession-shaping tools — and so is the +5 pp EU Justice Scoreboard improvement (1 May 2027), which is the outcome KPI of the OBT-OBH reform (5 November 2026).
The political agreement that activates the release of HUF 12 trillion in frozen EU funds, signed as Prime Minister; binary milestone.
Political intent statement to the Council of the EU within 30 days; sequence: intent statement → model legislation → filing → ratification → active membership (12 months).
Hungarian-Romanian-Slovak(-Lithuanian) bilateral visits (Bucharest, Bratislava, Vilnius) start; by May 2027 at least two member states substantively endorse the Hungarian position (joint statement / Council intervention).
Justice Ministry official statement + Council letter; multiple analyses cite the 60-day window.
Hungarian-Norwegian-Icelandic-Liechtensteiner agreement, with a fund-manager list.
Monthly-refreshed public dashboard on kormany.hu with 27 super-milestones: condition name, deadline, status (green/amber/red), linked EU funding in HUF, payment status; KPI: 12/12 monthly refreshes on time.
Structured Hungarian + English package for opening Ukraine’s EU accession: affected provisions of the Ukrainian language law / 2017 education act, Venice Commission CDL-AD recommendations, measurable indicators, negotiating chapter.
Justice-Ministry draft motion implementing the CJEU ruling.
NAV-ORFK-MNB daily data-exchange protocol; Finance-Ministry organisational notice.
How much of the €10.4 bn Hungarian RRF Covid envelope is actually drawn down by the deadline — the toughest measure of the 100-day cabinet outcome.
Three pillars (corruption / EPPO / independence); von der Leyen’s August final deadline.
(a) Joint procurement / asset-declaration standards with Czech-Polish-Slovak partners; (b) Western Balkans programme on judicial / anti-corruption institution-building; (c) “Year of EU/NATO” annual review week first session on the agenda for January 2027.
Reverting OBT powers to pre-2011 levels; judicial appointments and promotions before an independent professional panel; full transposition of the latest Venice Commission recommendations. One of the central super-milestones.
Hungarian quota increase agreement at the Krk terminal; diversification framework law.
Of the ~€19-22 bn of Hungarian EU funds frozen as of April 2026, how much has become accessible; target: ≥50% (≥€10 bn).
Every Hungarian Council vote is accompanied by a public, data-driven justification on kormany.hu within 30 days.
Hungary’s 2026 position (~30%) starts moving up on the EU Justice Scoreboard’s perceived judicial independence indicator; the metric for the 90-180 day OBT-OBH reform.
From the signing of the political agreement, what share of the HUF 12 trillion was actually drawn down over 12 months.
European Commission RRF tracker; the cluster’s shared outcome variable.
4. Anti-corruption measures and asset-flight blocking
Asset-flight blocking operates on a dual time horizon: the immediate procedural package (NAV suspensions, AMLD rollout, six-month retroactive PEP review, public reporting of house searches) decides within moments whether already-moving capital leaves the country; the structural reform (10-year retroactive asset declaration, EPPO accession, Asset Recovery Office, independent CPIB-style agency) only delivers real recovery capacity in 18-24 months. The new blogs (28 April — Romanowski ultimatum, 29 April — Asset Recovery Office, 30 April — MNB external audit, 1 May — NCF scandal) added three KPI-level metrics: monthly PEP reports of 200+ (Q3 2026), final court forfeiture rate ≥25% (12 months), UBO completeness ≥95% (mid-2027). The “how many billion HUF frozen” indicator (target HUF 50-150 bn) therefore says little on its own — it has to be read together with the UBO, PEP and forfeiture metrics, because only the four together show that the new government acts not by political revenge but by regulation.
Case count, companies affected (29 NER-linked per the 444.hu article), amounts.
Cross-running of Hungarian State Treasury, EKR and NEAK data.
Justice Ministry decision; 500-1000 cases audited in the first six months.
Government decree to credit institutions on six-month retroactive review of PEP customers and reporting of unusual transactions over HUF 5 million to NAV; bank 30 days, NAV 60 days.
Big Four Vienna/Zurich offices or international consortium publish a public MNB audit report: 4iG / Tiborcz / Mészáros / Pallas Athéné private-equity-fund structure to UBO; 2014-2025 asset-management balance; documented banking pressure.
Justice-Ministry bill: 2010-2026, public office holders, in force by mid-2027.
Public UBO register at MNB supervision for every Hungarian-licensed private-equity fund; 30-day filing requirement on transfer of ownership; KPI: UBO completeness ≥95% by mid-2027.
Monthly PEP reports filed with NAV (2025 baseline ~30); the 200+ threshold signals real use of the AML toolkit.
Server access, deletion logs, physical archive review.
Cardinal-law bill submitted within 90 days of the opening session (by 7 August 2026); operational by Q1 2027; initial annual recovered-asset target HUF 100 bn.
Singaporean CPIB model: operational independence, investigative powers, 10-year leadership mandate.
What share of NAV-frozen assets the courts ultimately transfer to the state budget — the conversion rate from freezing to actual recovery.
NAV audit; based on OLAF precedents, the new government’s first-year minimum result.
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators; combined effect of EPPO + AMLD + asset recovery. Intermediate milestone: +0.1 by 2027 (−0.07), above +0.15 by 2028.
5. Budgetary and economic milestones
The fiscal cluster’s logic is about managing the gap between inherited liabilities and new promises: the 2026 deficit at 6-7% of GDP can only be cut below 4.5% by end-2027 if (a) the Independent Fiscal Council really operates independently, (b) the rate-cap and margin-cap are phased out gradually and in a targeted way, and (c) the new PIT package’s microsimulation model is public. The new blogs (28 April — Otthon Start + universal child benefit, 30 April — MNB-Forint, 2 May — Trump 25% EU auto tariff) added three new measurement types: supply-side housing policy (public rental housing: 5,000 + 10,000), Forint risk premium <100 bp (30 April 2027), and the Kurzarbeit package against the auto-industry shock (1 June 2026). All three together determine whether Q1 2027 market confidence (one-year T-bill yield <6%) materialises and whether the Trump tariff shock keeps the sub-4.5% deficit target out of reach.
Short-time work support (60-70% of net wage) for Győr-Moson-Sopron, Komárom-Esztergom, Bács-Kiskun, Hajdú-Bihar counties because of Trump’s 25% EU auto tariff; SURE model.
Binary success metric: do Hungarian auto data appear in the European Commission’s counter-package negotiating folder; pre-negotiation of an exemption procedure for Hungarian plants.
IMF IFI-standard 90-day rules-based operation; first quarterly report.
Partial → mid → full phaseout; targeted housing-loan support for the bottom 30%.
Only the basic-food basket (bread, milk, eggs, margarine, sugar, flour); rest at market price.
Public simulation by NAV’s independent research unit — precondition for the funding debate.
Monthly mid-city house-price index vs. KSH inflation; the Otthon Start overheating-risk metric.
Indicator of market-confidence improvement; reduction of fiscal financing cost.
EUROMOD-based microsimulation impact assessment of HUF 50,000 monthly universal child transfer (NAV+KSH data run); access in the bottom three income deciles ≥95% (vs. <50% with the doubled family allowance).
Hungarian sovereign-yield spread vs. Czech-Polish: current 200-250 bp → below 100 bp; the litmus test of MNB reform and cabinet transparency.
From the 2026 ~6-7% level; fiscal consolidation path.
New municipal/state public rental units registered on the housing-construction data platform (EP2) annually; supply expansion rather than the demand stimulus of Otthon Start.
Previous-cycle utilisation rate: ~75% — that is the reference.
6. Energy security and diversification
This cluster has the longest time horizon of the core sections (2028-2032), yet it also contains the shortest reaction-time indicator: in case of a Hormuz closure, the six-week European kerosene window means a strategic decision (LNG-Krk + Adria + OMV framework) must be launchable within hours. The Friendship-pipeline incidents and the two closures of the Strait of Hormuz in April 2026 together forced any new government to make “diversification” not a PR slogan but a quarterly metric. Slippage: the 1 May deadline for publishing the strategic energy-stockpile inventory could not be met because of the cabinet formation slippage — this is not an additional risk but a direct consequence of the Section 2 Ministerial appointments take effect slippage.
Crude oil, kerosene, natural gas in import-equivalent terms; weekly refresh. Slippage: due to cabinet-formation slippage; expected publication after the Pósfai ministry becomes operational.
MÉH coordination; restoration of the IEA 90-day target.
5 pp above the EU target; MEKH monitoring.
LNG-Krk, Adria pipeline, Danube refinery Ural-dependency cuts; concrete schedule.
Measured at MOL refinery input; 2025 baseline ~60%.
Long-term diversification target; depends on LNG infrastructure capacity.
Media-freedom indicators (EU Media Pluralism Monitor, Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, Eurobarometer trust) are slow-moving indices on their own — they are annual-frequency and only show real change over a longer horizon. That is why the 60-day framework-bill draft and the 120-day adoption demand fast political decisions, while the trust and pluralism indices to be measured 12 months later only deliver feedback by end-2027 — meaning that in the intervening year the “independence of the board composition” (10/15 non-political) remains the most usable quick signal.
Administrative-level consultation; draft publication.
After the transitional regulation period; conditional on completing the board renewal.
Measurable after implementation of the media-freedom framework.
Decline from high to medium-low; annual EU measurement.
The 1 May and 3 May NCF blogs (Hankó’s hidden HUF 17 bn frame + Vidnyánszky-Both resignations) elevated to a stand-alone cluster what until then looked like a sub-question of anti-corruption: the structural separation of cultural funding from political discretion. The reform’s four interlocking steps — 30-day itemised audit, 60-day PEP exclusion, 90-day blind collegiate jury, 12-month asset recovery ≥HUF 50 bn — together show that the problem is not one or two “bad calls” but the political controllability of the nomination-jury-funding chain. Statutory exclusion of the parallel funding channel (the HUF 17 bn hidden frame from the Molnár leak) here is a system-level metric — only valid when read together with the Section 2 portfolio-overlap protocol.
Public publication of beneficiary itemisation; legal review of items above HUF 50 m; mapping of parallel funding channels (per the Molnár leak). Carried out by the State Audit Office + an independent auditor.
Bill tabled by Tarr Zoltán’s culture ministry: independent professional body (sectoral nomination + conflict-of-interest declaration), every NCF item above HUF 5 m on the Public Funds Dashboard, statutory exclusion of parallel funding channels (hidden frames).
Anonymised application platform; the review view automatically removes identifiers; every decision public on the Public Funds Dashboard within 30 days. KPI: publication-deadline adherence >95% (currently <60%).
Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) excluded from future tenders; 4-year retrospection window for 2010-2025 NCF items; separate PEP-share chapter in the SAO annual report; PEP share among recipients <2% target (currently estimated 15-20%).
Civil asset-recovery proceedings on 2010-2025 NCF items; the Hungarian State Treasury is the litigant; only on final court rulings. Full HUF 100-300 bn over 3-5 years.
9. Defence and the European defence pillar
The 2 and 3 May Trump blogs (5,000 US troops withdrawn from Germany, withdrawal escalation + Tusk’s NATO-collapse warning) jointly forced defence not to be a 100-day press-release-level item but a scenario indexed to escalation thresholds. The Pentagon’s munitions-shortage admission (after the 2026 Iran campaign report) also shows that the American shield falters not on political will but on industrial capacity — so raising defence spending to GDP (2.5% → 3-3.5%) is not enough on its own, only if the domestic-production share rises to ≥40% by 2030. V4+ joint procurement (ammunition + air defence + counter-drone) is the operational test of regional response capacity: if at least three framework agreements are not signed by mid-2027, the construction of the European defence pillar is in doubt.
Defence minister-designate Gajdos Tamás launches: Hungarian response measures indexed to 5k/10k/15k/20k/25k US withdrawal thresholds across cyber-defence / reservist forces / strategic communications / societal resilience.
Pentagon monthly data; if the figure goes below 25k by year-end 2026, it signals the operationalisation of the 20-25k withdrawal scenario — Hungarian doctrine escalation trigger.
Ammunition + air defence + counter-drone on a joint regional (V4+RO+HR) procurement platform; EDF Hungarian drawdown at least €600 m over the 2026-2030 cycle; 30-50% unit-cost reduction.
Per the NATO-standard annual report; the Pentagon shortage makes the upper band more realistic; Polish 4.7% benchmark.
Domestic share within Hungarian defence procurement; 2026 baseline locked in via review; defence R&D’s GDP share to 12-15% of total R&D by 2030.
10. Climate adaptation and water management
The 3 May drought blog (Magyar Péter action plan, the driest April since 1901) elevates climate adaptation to a stand-alone cluster: the 2025 drought damage of HUF 600-800 bn and the cyclic drought of 2022-2024 together show that this is not a weather anomaly but a structural economic factor. The response has three layers: 60-day emergency damage compensation (HUF 25-30 bn, 45-day payout) → 12-month Tisza-Alföld watershed strategy (60 small reservoirs + 200,000 ha water-conserving tillage) → 24-36 month NKACT-2030 (modelled on the UK Climate Change Act 2008). The ≥25% climate reallocation of CAP Pillar II (~€625 m) is the financing layer; the National Agro-Sensor Network (1,000 soil sensors by 2028) is the data foundation; the 3,000-borehole groundwater-monitoring grid by 2029 is the verification layer. If any layer falls behind, the drought-damage payout median (currently 8-14 months) will not move below 45 days.
Tisza-government supplementary compensation envelope for the HUF 30 bn vine frost damage; 45-day payout cycle; simplified form (KI12). Median-day KPI: 8-14 months → <45 days by end-2027.
Emergency coordination centre in commissioner form; daily situation report based on HungaroMet / water-management directorates / chambers of agriculture; central tracking of compensation requests.
With Commission approval, reallocate at least 25% (~€625 m) of Hungary’s €2.5 bn CAP Pillar II to climate-adaptation priority. CAP climate-adaptation utilisation share: 2026: 15%, 2027: 20%, 2030: 30%.
Sectoral (agriculture, water, health, construction, energy) action tables with deadlines / responsible ministries; monthly public climate dashboard; annual Climate Adaptation Report to Parliament (UK Climate Change Act 2008 model).
Amendment of the VAT Act (CXXVII of 2007) by Parliament + implementing regulation; target: irrigated area ~100,000 ha → +80-120,000 ha by end-2027.
Integrated water-governance plan; channel rehabilitation; 60 local reservoirs; subsidised introduction of water-conserving tillage (no-till, mulch, cover crop) on 200,000 hectares.
Phased build-out of MG1 programme (1,000 soil-sensor stations); real-time public API + Drought dashboard. By end-2026: 300 stations, end-2027: 700, end-2028: 1,000.
Currently ~1,500 boreholes → 3,000 with real-time public data; target: share of boreholes below the 2022 historical low ~22% → <10% by 2030.
The watchlist refreshes weekly, every Sunday at 16:00. Measurement points are sourced from concrete deadlines and performance indicators called out in MIAK analyses. Every row links to its source analysis.