The concrete measurement points, deadlines and performance indicators raised in MIAK analyses — gathered on one page, organised into clusters, refreshed weekly. Statuses are updated from the latest press monitor; new measurement points are pulled in from new analyses. Anything missing here is itself a signal: MIAK has not yet covered it.
Three of this cluster’s expired points — an owner for monitoring the lower-primary reform, the Constitutional Court’s recusal and quorum rules, and the repeal of the Category C emergency decrees — lapsed with nothing on paper, just as the election of five new constitutional judges reached the agenda. The two threads are linked. If the new members arrive without a public selection standard or a written nomination rationale, the missing recusal rules stay open at a court whose very composition cannot be tested against criteria after the fact. This week’s new education and child-protection points — scoring criteria for the school-district director calls, access to PISA microdata, a measurement duty written into the law itself — ask of public services what the selection points ask of constitutional offices: publish the yardstick before the decision, not as its justification afterwards.
Delayed: the 17th constitutional amendment and the asset-recovery act are in place, but of the five rule sets the electoral system has reportedly slipped by 18–24 months.
Whether the decision on the initiative to remove the prosecutor general — whether forwarding or rejecting it — comes with public reasoning citing legal provisions.
Does the ministry publish the weighted criteria for the 60 school-district director applications before the 20 September deadline — career record, leadership programme, local knowledge, conflict-of-interest screening — and, when results are announced, the reasoning for each district?
Does the bill the Government promised to table next week itself require annually published child protection core indicators, or does it leave measurement to an implementing decree? The law is adopted by Parliament.
Whether Parliament’s Office publishes a machine-readable, downloadable table showing each adopted act’s submission and final-vote dates, the calendar days between them, and whether a prior impact assessment and public consultation took place.
MIAK calls for a mandatory public impact assessment and genuine consultation, with a 90-day lead time, for every Fundamental Law or cardinal-act amendment. A good sign is its adoption plus routine requests for the Venice Commission’s opinion.
Whether the government publishes which duplications end with the counter-terrorism unit’s merger into the police, how operational capability is preserved, and what internal control replaces separate oversight.
Politically uncontestable handling via the joint justice–interior procedural framework; one of the cabinet’s most sensitive accountability processes.
Whether any substantive review of the State Audit Office happens within Parliament’s competence through public legislation — rather than by executive act.
Whether a public analysis appears within 60 days on how the suspended priority investments, the lifted residency restrictions, the new housing deputy state secretary post and the floated vacancy tax interact. Success means project-level supply losses, extra demand in the 29 affected municipalities and a stated sequence, all in numbers.
Whether a constitutional amendment is tabled providing that a constitutional office-holder’s mandate may end only on grounds already in force when the mandate began — effective from the next term, and therefore binding on the submitting majority too.
Instead of million-forint fines and forced appearance, a tiered, income-proportionate sanction under judicial control; compelled appearance only as a last resort. The number of concrete legislative/institutional proposals emerging from the final reports is the measure of real output.
Fulfilled when the government reviews what the second 50,000 HUF voucher arriving mid-autumn can be spent on, since it barely serves the original back-to-school purpose. The signal is a broadened, realistic list of eligible uses.
Whether a public, itemised inventory appears within 90 days showing which case types the government commissioner heading the county government office handles, on what legal basis, whether subject to instructions, and where it overlaps with local government powers.
Within 90 days, is there a documented procedure giving researchers access to the anonymised student-level PISA dataset, with settlement type, school type and family background variables, in machine-readable form?
By the end of the autumn session, do the parliamentary Rules of Procedure require, for posts filled by a two-thirds vote, a criteria-based nomination rationale of up to two pages per candidate, plus fixed procedural steps and deadlines?
Min. 80% raised to statutory rank in regular parliamentary debate, with committee debate + ex ante Constitutional Court norm-control.
Public hearings + plenary votes with opposition consultation.
Whether an itemised map appears before entry into force showing who decides today and who will decide in 2027 on financial, staffing, professional and development matters, and up to what value.
Whether the autumn session establishes an effective judicial remedy against the premature termination of a court leadership mandate, and bars organisational restructuring from serving on its own as grounds for termination.
Whether the Parliament Act and House Rules establish that no final vote on a constitutional amendment may be held within 60 days of tabling, and that the bill must pass two votes at least 30 days apart.
Whether law requires every child-protection inspection report to be published within 30 days of closure, anonymised and machine-readable, without a data request — naming the institution and its operator. Baseline: turnaround over 24 months.
Whether exit criteria with numerical thresholds appear by 31 December. In September 2026 the state of crisis is in its eleventh year — without criteria, extension stays automatic.
Whether the transport, urban design, affordability and sustainability criteria for the suspended projects are published in measurable form, and whether each project gets a decision deadline ahead of the 31 December expiry.
Whether sponsors attach an itemised statement on whether the amendment affects an objectively identifiable group on the day it takes effect — who, in what legal relationship, with what effect. Target: 100% from H2 2027.
At least 15 indicators, mandatory parliamentary debate; the institutionalised form of the annual, independent constitutional stress test (judicial independence, media pluralism, electoral integrity) raised in connection with the Sulyok case.
Whether the first term produces an assessment of after-school and supervision capacity in disadvantaged districts, followed by targeted compensation where shorter lessons open a care gap.
Are children per professional, vacancy rates, professional turnover and supervision coverage published by care type and provider, including church and foundation providers? Baseline: 17.2 per cent vacancies and turnover above 24 per cent.
10+ objective indicators on the functioning of CC, SAO, prosecution, ombudsman, media authority; 2027 H1: first public report.
Share of decrees temporarily preserved under the Melléthei-Barna legislation falls below 30%; benchmark of rule-of-law restoration.
Whether the prime-ministerial term limit (passed 15 June 2026, signed for promulgation on 19 June) is still in force 12 months on, and whether broad consultation (a substantive Venice Commission opinion) confirms it after the fact — dissolving the charge of retroactivity and person-specific drafting.
Watch whether the prime-ministerial term limit is paired with an annual public “Institutional Health Report” measuring the real independence of the Constitutional Court, State Audit Office, prosecution and ombudsman with at least 10 objective indicators, published from 2027.
Whether a single cardinal-level framework applies the same logic to the President, constitutional judges, the audit-office chief and the ombudsman: an exhaustive list of termination grounds, with any extension binding only from the next term.
Whether binding numeric minimum requirements are adopted against which findings such as ‘hazardous furniture’, ‘mouldy bathroom’ or ’no food available’ can be measured — and verified by unannounced inspection.
Whether children in residential care demonstrably reach a child-rights advocate outside the institution — and whether the volume of reports through that channel is measured. In the cases now uncovered there was no one to turn to.
Does the annual constitutional stress test gain a dedicated chapter on selection procedures for posts filled by a two-thirds vote, asking whether the process would remain acceptable in the hands of an opposing majority? The findings should be public.
Are the four core indicators available in machine-readable form for each district: value added based on competence testing, early school leaving, teacher turnover and the share of unfilled teaching posts?
Whether a campaign-spending cap and an open candidate-selection procedure are introduced before or instead of the term limit, testing the least intrusive effective tool first.
Watch whether Hungary’s Digital Services Coordinator (NMHH) gains dedicated, quantified capacity: staff able to run technical audits, algorithm-inspection competence, and predictable procedures. Fulfilled when expert headcount and the number of closed domestic cases rise measurably.
An independent expert review on whether checks and balances work both ways should run on a 12-month cycle. A good sign is the first public stress test being completed within a year.
Whether Parliament amends the national-security act so that covert intelligence gathering is authorised by a judge — or an independent body subject to subsequent judicial confirmation — as required by the Szabó and Vissy judgment.
Whether an annual public report appears on case duration, indictment and withdrawal rates by case type, the status of high-profile cases and the documentation of instruction powers.
Whether a 12-month measurement phase precedes any decision on a vacancy tax, with a single public definition of vacancy built on linked land registry, utility consumption and short-term rental data.
Does the Education Authority publish a dedicated chapter showing how the 21-point drop in reading and the rise in low performers are distributed by settlement type, region and family background? That is what reveals whether this is a uniform slide or specific groups falling behind.
Is the 2027 report published against the 2026 baseline: children persistently on the run (about 800), share returned to birth families, babies stuck in hospital (358) and time to placement, and child psychiatry waiting times?
Whether statutory-deadline notification is introduced for those whose surveillance led to no action — this is what closes the remedy loop.
Whether Parliament sets up a cross-party expert body on whether the Constitutional Court should regain a narrow, itemised power of substantive review over amendments — with minutes available within 15 days of each sitting.
Is an anonymised, aggregate report produced on five dimensions: housing, employment or education, health and addiction treatment, criminal justice involvement, and child protection involvement of their own children?
Watch whether infinite scroll, autoplay, and addiction-tuned notifications are off by default for minors, with size-proportionate guidance separating large platforms from small domestic providers. Fulfilled when coverage on big platforms hits 100% while SME burdens stay distinct.
Watch whether cyclic term limits extend to key independent offices and whether an annual constitutional “stress test” is established. Fulfilment is signalled by a public, yearly stress test and depoliticised appointments.
Whether a public competence map and short impact note accompanies every competence-reshuffling decree, retroactively including the one that moved intelligence oversight. The gazette text alone does not show who oversees what.
Whether the committee sets down in its rules that a hearing does not substitute for criminal proceedings, and how it handles documents touched by an ongoing investigation. Without it, even the final report’s legislative yield becomes contestable.
Whether an amendment establishes that only a court may order asset deprivation, after a substantive evidentiary procedure. Without it, confiscation absent proof of an offence touches the constitutional core of property protection.
Whether a published legislative impact assessment measuring the new provision against the European Court of Human Rights’ property-protection case law is produced before the final vote. A later adverse ruling costs more than a prior comparison.
Whether the National Security Committee’s scrutiny is strengthened, and how many deputy-state-secretary and agency-head appointments follow a published scored framework. The benchmark already exists: the tax-authority head selection set it.
Whether extension decrees come with public reasoning backed by indicators. Proposed target: 100 per cent of decrees issued from 2027.
Whether intelligence oversight is organisationally separated from government communication duties. Holding both in one hand was among the most sharply criticised structural flaws of the previous term.
Whether the new provision gets a five-year sunset clause and a mandatory parliamentary review. Extraordinary instruments becoming permanent is a recurring pattern of the past decade.
Whether an independent expert report is produced by end-2026 on how the checks-and-balances system performed in the head-of-state vs. majority conflict, and whether the precedent would block a future, opposite-direction concentration of power.
Whether the constitution-making promised for the autumn introduces parity-based or qualified-consensus nomination for the heads of the Constitutional Court, the judiciary and the regulatory bodies, so that no single two-thirds majority can pack them, and whether the process runs with a multi-month debate.
Whether the House Rules fix the steps for the next presidential election: a minimum interval between the nomination deadline and the vote, a mandatory public committee hearing, and publication of valid nominations before the vote.
Whether the structural-prevention anti-corruption package the government announced on 5 June 2026 is tabled and put on the National Assembly’s agenda; and whether the text builds on preventive logic (procurement transparency, machine-readable asset data, whistleblower protection, an independent anti-corruption authority) or merely on punitive logic.
Whether the number of national-security authorisations is published annually, broken down by service and legal basis — individual cases stay secret, aggregate figures should not.
Whether the new single heads of vocational training centres are selected through a public, documented professional competition on pre-set competence criteria, excluding political influence.
Whether an annually repeated, independent and public review starts on whether the system of checks and balances would block a hypothetical concentration of power under the new constitutional set-up.
Whether a pending constitutional court petition is awaited before removal proceedings begin, and whether the full reasoning of the removal motion is public.
Whether a uniform, public statutory access-criteria framework appears before 22 October that anonymises the sensitive data of non-public third parties by NAIH standards.
Whether the sharpest elements of the 17th amendment (Sulyok’s removal, 70+ Constitutional Court justices) are subjected to independent constitutional scrutiny, and whether the Venice Commission’s opinion is awaited and its recommendations built into the final text.
Whether every law adopted via fast-track gets a public ex post impact review within 12 months (did it meet its goal, how many amendments it needed).
After seven constitutional justices recused themselves on 19 June 2026 and the Monday (22 June) hearing was struck from the agenda, whether the motion on the head of state’s removability returns to the Court’s agenda and ends with a quorate panel and a reasoned decision — or stays indefinitely unresolved due to the lack of a quorum.
Watch whether constitutional amendments touching the status of the president, constitutional courts and independent institutions get a mandatory minimum 30-day genuine consultation instead of the planned five days.
Whether the announced public consultation gets fixed rules: a public platform, a summary of submissions, and documentation of what the parliamentary groups took on board.
Whether constitutional-level law-making requires a public impact assessment examining whether the proposal really creates a general rule, whom it affects and how reversible it is.
What share of the office’s records is placed, documented and inventoried, into independent archival custody (target: 100 percent), preventing records from disappearing amid the merger’s disorder.
Whether the acting head of state publishes the nomination criteria beforehand, and whether the candidate answers at a public parliamentary hearing — including on procedural guarantees in pending high-profile cases.
Whether a standalone children’s-rights specialist ombudsman and an independent monitoring role are set up, whether the Equal Treatment Authority is restored, and whether the competent ministry gives a mandatory, reasoned public response to the recommendations of the Children and Youth Participation Group (within 60 days, even in case of rejection).
Whether the parliamentary National Security Committee gains substantive information and investigation powers accessible to the opposition too, and whether independent review of special intelligence tools is operational.
In how many of the renewed public-law offices (Constitutional Court, Kúria, prosecution, head-of-state circle) a statutory, depoliticised, professional nomination procedure precedes the actual replacement; target: 100%, so that the renewal does not become a loyalty-based refill.
How many competences are altered or how many institutions are renamed during the public-law renewal to bypass a removal; target: 0 — no stripping of the head of state’s veto, no institutional-renaming trick to dodge the bound procedure.
Whether the new intelligence chiefs are selected on public, pre-set professional competence criteria and mandatory pre-appointment security vetting, not on political loyalty.
Whether nomination starts with minuted parliamentary consultation and whether candidates’ impartiality and professional fitness are tested at a public hearing — the mandate runs for twelve years.
Whether every fast-tracked market-structure provision justified by the crisis gets a mandatory 18-month review clause and a public register showing on whose proposal it entered the text.
Whether a public working paper citing specific legal provisions appears by the day of the vote on which constitutional rule makes the new head of state’s election valid.
Whether the Venice Commission issues its (urgency-procedure) opinion on the removability of the head of state, and whether the Hungarian decision takes it into account; whether the head-of-state question is settled solely within the removal procedure under the Fundamental Law (two-thirds + Constitutional Court), not by ultimatum.
Whether a public compliance table is produced for every recommendation of the October opinion (recommendation → accepted/rejected → reasoning), with a parliamentary committee hearing.
Whether a public legislative impact assessment is prepared before the final vote on suspending ongoing FX-loan lawsuits and enforcement actions (who wins/loses, fiscal and legal effects).
Whether the Constitutional Court interpretive ruling is issued before the final vote on the contested constitutional amendment, and whether the majority and the head of state commit to accepting it in advance.
Whether it becomes standard to ask of every step touching checks and balances: could a future majority reverse it — and if not, whether broad consensus should be required.
Whether the President’s Office — and the Speaker’s Office when acting as deputy — states, for every refused appointment, which limb of Article 9(6) it relies on: a missing statutory condition, or a serious disturbance to the democratic operation of the state.
Whether an independent expert body produces a public, quantified annual report on constitutional-amendment practice: days between submission and final vote, whether an impact assessment was made, whether the amendment is a general norm or touches an identifiable set of persons, and whether it triggered international proceedings.
Whether the House Rules require that substantive debate on a constitutional amendment may begin only once an independent expert analysis of abuse scenarios has been published within 15 days of tabling.
Whether the Court issues a two-page companion summary with every substantive ruling — the question, who asked it, the decision, its reasoning, and the express limits of its scope.
Whether the law sets one multiplier for the prime minister’s salary whether or not the PM holds a parliamentary seat, with a separate transparent offsetting rule and a mandatory public review every five years.
Before public consultation on the new National Core Curriculum begins, does each of the five announced programmes have a public one-page annex on the international evidence, the expected effect size and how success will be measured?
Is it set out in advance that renewing the mandate of up to five years depends on background-adjusted district indicators, with published reasoning and a developmental rather than punitive mid-term review?
The cluster’s balance worsened again this week: both the ministerial strategic action plans and the ambulance-service leadership selection lapsed without a document. The remaining points therefore no longer measure the pacing of the first 100 days but whether the cabinet retrofits the public reasoning it skipped — the transparency point on deputy-state-secretary appointments in cluster 1 is the first test of that.
Two older EU points closed badly this week. The issue-by-issue coalition map promised for the sanctions files never appeared, and ending the EUR 1 million-a-day migration fine has slipped: the government extended the mass-migration crisis situation to year-end and asylum rules are still not aligned with EU law. The new point — an itemised back-check of December’s RRF inflow — is the revenue side of the same ledger. The HUF 2,186.9bn pre-financed in August only avoids becoming a hidden deficit item if actual reimbursements can be matched against it programme by programme. Taken together, the fine and the pre-financing show that EU money and EU rule-of-law conditions are still being booked in separate accounts, although they are two entries in one balance.
Whether the constitutional stress test is produced and published together with the accession package: which constitutional provisions are engaged, what majority each element needs, where risk may remain — not after the vote.
Whether the National Assembly adopts the implementing package with an explicit split between directly applicable regulations and directives requiring transposition, fixing the competence as policing (not defence).
Whether the foreign ministry publishes competence profiles by posting category, and whether each new appointment comes with a CV and the ratio of political to career appointments is disclosed.
Whether a weekly-updated public schedule appears for the roughly EUR 10bn at stake — the 31 August milestones and the end-September payment requests. Target: 100% of eligible requests filed on time.
Whether Hungary’s position aims at quantifying the safeguard: pre-set public thresholds (import volume plus domestic price level) for the 2025 deal’s sensitive products, triggering protection automatically and lifting it automatically once breached levels recede.
Whether funding for the port and rail capacity that higher throughput would require reaches the agenda — the move that lifts the dispute out of its zero-sum frame. Measure: annual change in regional transhipment capacity in tonnes.
Whether a public Hungarian MFF mandate with a numerical floor sets out, in scenario bands, what a narrowing cohesion and agricultural envelope would mean for the national budget.
Whether 2027 budget planning incorporates rule-of-law conditionality as a quantified risk parameter — denying conditionality is not planning, it is leaving the risk out of the model.
Whether an accounting broken down by operational programme and budget line appears within 30 days, separating awarded, committed, disbursed and still-conditional amounts. This is what can close the HUF 3,650bn versus EUR 16.4bn dispute over figures.
Whether the first monthly statement on the accumulated penalty payment and the part enforced by offsetting appears within 30 days. If the debt grows with no legal step under way, that is itself a signal.
Whether a public route-by-route assessment is produced of how many hours transit times would rise and what additional haulage cost a reinstated internal border check would impose — with short-shelf-life food singled out.
Whether a public, reasoned Hungarian position on each of the five proposed EU own resources exists before the October summit — worked-out national positions beat a general call for more money.
Whether the government translates each recommendation into a responsible ministry, deadline and metric, updated quarterly — including case allocation in courts and the judicial pay path.
Whether the foreign ministry initiates talks with Austria, Slovenia, Croatia and Slovakia on the impact-assessment requirement, and whether a domestic scenario is prepared for checks reintroduced against Hungary.
Whether the post is filled through an open competition on published professional criteria with a mandate not aligned to the electoral cycle — and whether a short foreign-policy doctrine is published.
Whether Hungary submits a written proposal within the ICPDR for a drought-period water-sharing protocol: shared real-time data, prior notification of cooling-related abstractions and a rapid consultation procedure.
(a) shared procurement/asset-declaration standards with Czech-Polish-Slovak partners; (b) Western Balkans programme bundle; (c)
KP24 ‘Year of EU/NATO’ annual review week first session on the January 2027 agenda.
OBT powers restored to pre-2011 level; judicial appointment-promotion via independent professional panel; full transposition of latest Venice Commission recommendations.
Whether the government designates which Hungarian body is responsible for initiating the Article 36 and 48 crisis instruments of the digital services regulation, and by what procedure the signal reaches the Board and the Commission.
Whether the agriculture administration publishes an impact assessment recalculated for Hungarian production and consumption in three layers: exposure by product group, domestic substitution capacity, and the consumer-price effect by income decile — with a machine-readable methodology.
Hungary’s operational EPPO accession (within 180 days); from the 14 May cabinet declaration of intent to actual membership.
Of the EUR 34 bn envelope, min. 35% contracted by month 6; 65% contracted + 25% paid out by 16 May 2027.
Whether Hungary tables a proposal making it mandatory to record member-state carve-out requests raised in sanctions negotiations and publish them once the act is adopted. Target: at least five co-sponsoring states by mid-2027.
The Council of Europe Venice Commission’s substantive opinion on the tabled constitutional amendment (8-year PM term limit, abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office) — an independent professional yardstick.
Whether a public prior impact assessment precedes any accession decision — full per-person cost against the domestic procedure, expected return rate and litigation risk, in figures.
Krk terminal Hungarian quota-increase agreement; diversification framework act.
Whether it is fixed in advance that consent to be bound requires a parliamentary decision rather than a government decree, so public debate precedes the decision instead of following it.
Watch whether an MFF agreement is reached by the Council’s end-2026 target and whether the 2028–2034 cohesion envelope stays at or above the ~EUR 376bn 2021–2027 level in real terms.
Watch whether the government publishes negotiating principles by year-end on phasing in direct farm payments and on cohesion-envelope safeguards. Fulfilled when the Hungarian mandate puts both budget protections in writing.
Watch whether the government sets a transparency framework in advance for any Ukraine-reconstruction role touching Hungarian budget or state guarantees, with public project sheets, beneficial owners, and cost-benefit analysis. Fulfilled when all such projects start with public data sheets.
Whether the government publishes which EU files it pursues with which partners and to what end — and, in retrospect, what it achieved. The relaunched V4 agenda is the first test.
Whether a single public interface shows the entire EU funding envelope at project level — beneficiary, tax number, contracted and disbursed amounts, deadline, output indicator and its status — with a downloadable dataset.
Whether the October–December legislative phase produces an analysis of what share of EU-conditioned institutional safeguards rests on statutes amendable by simple majority.
Whether automatic ex-post audits of emergency procurement exemptions start in 2027, applied retroactively to 2020 and to the current government’s own procedures, with published findings.
Whether the full project lifecycle — from call to ex-post outcome measurement — moves into machine-readable open data, and whether projects above HUF 1bn get a published ex-ante impact assessment.
Whether the January 2027 data-sharing obligation and platform opening are met on time — for the Hungarian digital market and AI start-ups these are what break down entry barriers.
Whether any signed agreement carries an exit clause, a notice period and an annual public reporting duty, including guaranteed access for independent human-rights monitoring.
Whether itemised data — price, supplier, actual use — is available for at least 95% of the 19,002 ventilators by 31 March 2027, so the estimated damage of hundreds of billions can be backed by figures.
Does the Finance Ministry disclose, programme by programme, how much RRF money was reimbursed in December and how that compares with the HUF 2,186.9 billion pre-financed in August? The ex-post check is due by the end of Q1 2027.
How much of the ~EUR 19-22 bn Hungarian EU funds frozen in April 2026 became accessible; target: ≥50% (≥EUR 10 bn); 100% transparency of Hungarian EU Council votes.
Upward movement of Hungary’s 2026 position (~30%) in the EU Justice Scoreboard perceived judicial independence indicator; the 90-180 day OBT-OBH reform’s outcome metric.
From the signing of the political agreement, how much of the HUF 12 000 bn was actually drawn down in 12 months.
European Commission RRF tracker; common outcome variable of the EU accession cluster.
Whether a public jurisdiction map is produced before the 2027 criminal-procedure amendments are tabled: which body acts for each case type and offence — the national prosecution service or the EPPO — and what happens where both could.
Whether a public impact assessment is produced for at least five product groups (grain, oilseeds, poultry, eggs, honey) under three scenarios, with regional price, farm and employment estimates.
Watch whether every released EU project gets a public data sheet, 100% project checks and independent cost-benefit analysis above HUF 500m become mandatory, and clawback is built into every contract. Fulfilment signal: actual recovery cases triggered by missed targets.
Watch whether, alongside mandatory machine-readable project records and a clawback mechanism, the funding share of the most disadvantaged districts moves from today’s 12–15% toward the 25% target.
Whether risk indicators — single-bid tender share, value of contract amendments, winner concentration — are fixed before large-scale disbursements start. A benchmark set afterwards is not a benchmark.
Whether Parliament receives a briefing on the negotiating mandate before any deal on waiving the EUR 1m daily penalty. Proposed target: the daily penalty ending by H1 2027.
Whether, after closing all 33 chapters, the government holds a legally binding referendum on Ukrainian accession; whether the rejection of accelerated (without substantively closing the chapters) accession holds; with an accompanying ex ante public impact assessment of the agricultural, labour-market and fund-allocation effects.
How many of the 27 preconditions are met substantively (adopted law and a working institution, not just an announcement), and how much of the EUR 16.4bn actually arrives.
Delayed: the EUR 1 million-a-day migration fine is still running and, according to the press, has already reached about EUR 1 billion. The government extended the mass-migration crisis situation to year-end, and asylum rules have still not been aligned with EU law.
The start of the actual (not merely unfrozen) disbursement scheduled by András Kármán for Q4 2026; the payment requests go in in September. “Agreement”, “unfreezing” and “disbursement” are three separate statuses — at present the EUR 16.4bn is unfrozen, not paid out.
Whether the Hungarian transposition of the EU anti-corruption directive that entered into force on 1 June 2026 is substantive (not merely the conceptual minimum), and whether the national anti-corruption strategy contains concrete, deadlined commitments (statute of limitations, investigative toolkit, prevention) with public performance indicators; and whether it passes the rule-of-law commissioner’s (McGrath) review.
Whether the national risk assessment adds, as a standalone item, the scenario in which an information operation triggers a mass physical border event within hours — and whether it is run through at least one simulation exercise.
Whether by autumn 2026 the government submits a clear, public legislative timetable for transposing the Pact (reception, border procedure, solidarity mechanism, with a mandatory impact assessment), and whether the accruing infringement-penalty burden halts.
Whether Hungary initiates talks with the affected member states and the Commission on a pre-agreed, uniform reading of the 15 percent share threshold and the “verifiable steps” formula.
Whether, by 2027, a permanent, trained negotiating capacity is built that prepares Hungarian positions cluster by cluster for the Ukraine/Moldova accession process — so that the Hungarian interest (agriculture, cohesion, Transcarpathian rights) is pursued through issue-based coalitions rather than ad hoc vetoes.
Watch whether measurable, verifiable indicators for Transcarpathian Hungarian education and language rights enter the Hungarian assessment of the accession Fundamentals cluster. Fulfilled when the first milestones are documented rather than left as general pledges.
Whether the six or seven like-minded member states the prime minister mentioned form a formal, issue-based coalition (joint position, amendments) ahead of the qualified-majority vote.
Whether every cohesion and recovery project gets a standard machine-readable sheet (beneficiary, amount, objective, deadline, delivery) — starting with the newly opened EUR 552m energy envelope.
Whether at least 60 percent of development funds is allocated by a pre-published formula weighted on the district development index — with the formula, the weights and the input data all public.
For what share of divergent Hungarian EU votes a public, fact-based justification is produced (currently near 0 percent, target toward 100 percent), instead of a veto threat.
Whether Hungary proposes that notifications of internal border checks must contain a quantified proportionality justification, an automatic expiry date and an economic impact estimate for neighbouring member states.
Whether the proposal appears as a joint initiative of several member states — towards Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands — built around a single procedural question rather than as a standing bloc.
Whether every dismissed head of mission produces a standardised protocol on pending negotiations, Hungarian commitments, outstanding cases and institutional contacts.
Whether contracts above HUF 5bn must obtain a published expert opinion before signature on the level of competition, unit-price benchmarking, indicator measurability and beneficial-ownership transparency.
Whether a written, numbers-based Hungarian negotiating position is prepared on reception and processing capacity, the cost of expanding it and the burden-sharing formula acceptable to Hungary — carried in an issue-based coalition.
Whether official communication is required to cite the source, measurement date and exact definition for every migration figure — five different numbers circulated about Ceuta within a single day.
Whether the government transposes the recast energy-efficiency directive (the October 2025 deadline has passed, an infringement procedure is running) and notifies the implementing steps — avoiding a fine before the EU Court. Indicator: closing the running infringement procedures / avoiding the judicial stage.
The government adopted the EU Migration Pact; whether it publishes a mandatory, public, quantified impact assessment before introduction (transposition) — affected numbers, procedure types, cost, burden on border settlements. Main KPI: whether it appears (yes/no) and at what depth.
Whether the linguistic/educational/cultural commitments (restoration of the minority school system, free use of Hungarian in education, national symbols in settlements with 10%+ Hungarian population) are written into concrete Ukrainian legislation and into the action plan submitted to the EU, with deadlined milestones. Indicator: the rate of legal transposition, the number of restored schools.
Whether a public ex ante impact assessment of Ukrainian accession effects on Hungarian agriculture, cohesion-fund allocation and the labour market is prepared before chapters are substantively closed, and whether Hungary requests transitional mechanisms.
Whether the government adopts a public, itemised interest list: guarantees for the Transcarpathian minority, transitional agricultural safeguards and a labour-market impact assessment as measurable conditions.
Whether refugee-status review decisions are made in individualised proceedings, with reasoning and judicial remedy (not in a group, political frame); a low overturn rate.
Whether every return-hub agreement affecting Hungary comes with a public, IOM/UNHCR-verified human-rights assessment (target: 100 percent), with a non-refoulement guarantee and limited detention.
How many EU files see Hungary act with a documented joint position for predictable, rule-of-law competition enforcement — linking the fine to the tariff would be a bad bargain.
Whether the unblocked funds appear on a public project list from the first disbursement wave — this, not the press conference, decides the credibility of the released billions.
Whether Hungarian universities regain access to EU research and mobility programmes (Horizon, Erasmus+) once board conflicts of interest are settled, and how much funding becomes available — broken down publicly by institution and programme.
Watch whether, instead of unpredictable blocking (e.g. Ukraine accession), a public one-page data-based justification accompanies every EU Council vote. Fulfilment signal: public justification published for 100% of votes.
Whether Hungary tables, jointly with Polish, Romanian and Slovak partners, a legally drafted mechanism: quantitative steps, review points, CAP compensation and a definite sunset date.
Whether a proportionate clawback applies to projects missing their targets, and whether data-driven anomaly screening runs by linking procurement and beneficiary records.
Watch whether future China-related agreements are prepared using the
KP21 four-dimensional framework (economic sustainability, demographics, transition risk, multipolar room for maneuver) with an exit scenario. Target: 100% from the next cycle.
Whether a public cost-benefit analysis by an independent institute becomes a precondition of drawdown for every project above HUF 500m.
Whether Hungary clearly backs a unified European tariff response — proportionate, targeted counter-measures without self-defeating escalation, in coalition with member states sharing car-industry exposure.
Whether the next Commission rule-of-law report contains no new concern over the independence of anti-corruption bodies (Integrity Authority, State Audit Office, prosecution), and whether these bodies’ powers or budgets are not reduced during leadership changes.
Whether Hungary argues in the Council that a member state reintroducing internal checks must publish a standard impact sheet every 30 days: waiting times, affected lorries, commuters and persons turned back.
Whether a region-by-region cohesion impact calculation is prepared on the funding-dilution effect of Ukrainian accession, and whether Hungary tables — in coalition — a gradual phase-out proposal.
Whether the accelerated procedure observes asylum/human-rights standards (effective remedy, protection of unaccompanied minors, non-refoulement), and whether the division of competences holds (law enforcement ≠ defence task); whether the Hungarian position in the solidarity mechanism is principled and data-backed. KPI: a faster procedure without a deterioration in the remedy rate.
Whether accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is completed, and whether the division of competences with the asset-recovery authority is settled before the Commission’s year-end anti-corruption package.
Whether the government states before the Council negotiation what transition period it considers necessary, for which active substances it seeks product-specific grace periods, and what accompanying measure it proposes for involving partner countries — a position published afterwards is no longer a negotiating tool.
Whether the government publishes if it backs Kyiv’s compensation request and on what terms, whether it asks for transit-capacity financing to be built into the package, and what safeguard it requires so that grain intended for transit does not end up on the domestic market.
Whether the module — built on income and wealth data, territorially weighted, with automatic entitlement assessment — is ready and run on a sample of 100,000–200,000 households, with targeting accuracy published.
Whether the government prepares an impact summary for each EU sanctions carve-out it seeks and publishes the non-confidential part within 60 days of the decision: the exemption’s estimated annual value, those affected, the cost of alternatives.
Whether Hungarian prosecutors handling EU-budget cases are designated through an open competition on pre-published professional criteria, with the call, the assessment criteria and the reasoned decision all public. Target: by mid-2027.
Enforcement capacity became this cluster’s bottleneck this week. Both the implementation schedule for the anti-corruption package and the public spending dashboard ran out — the latter just as the press reported another HUF 2.3 trillion in EU funds could arrive. The six new points attack the gap from two sides. A case-status register and a bottleneck analysis would show where public-asset cases above HUF 1bn actually stall; a guarantee-pairing table and a bar on retroactive effect would ensure that speeding things up does not come at the expense of defence rights. The capacity plan links the two: if slowness stems from a shortage of investigators, prosecutors and forensic experts, shorter deadlines will not raise the pace — only the number of judgments open to challenge.
Delayed: the asset transfer happened, but the rule-of-law redesign of stewardship — a public management charter, conflict-of-interest rules, reporting duties — did not come with it.
Delayed: on 6 September 2026 the government announced it would wind up the 35-year concession, but the contract and the payment record have still not been published in full.
Whether the committee adopts, by its first substantive sitting, a public numerical criteria list against which the 31 December final report can be measured — otherwise success collapses into a list of witnesses.
Whether the ministry publishes which grant cases face a transparency review and against what pre-set criteria — one-off withdrawals without a list become selective enforcement.
Server access, deletion logs, physical archive review.
Whether the complete reasoning — redacted for trade secrets — is published together with each withdrawal, so judicial review is not about reconstructing the grounds after the fact.
Whether a uniform accounting protocol is promulgated before the remaining cases start — three foundations handled three different ways in one day showed that without a standard each case becomes a separate bargain.
Whether every asset and funding channel tied to the public-interest foundations appears in machine-readable form: value at establishment and today, annual budget support, and the beneficiaries of larger payments.
Whether the MTÜ ownership-rights holder orders a full, public review of the discretionary tourism subsidies granted without tender (beneficiaries, amount, delivery), and whether clawback is applied to items that failed to meet their goals.
Whether a machine-readable asset register broken down by foundation appears — asset type, identifier, book and market value, date of transfer, creditor claims — updated quarterly, replacing today’s HUF 3,000bn estimate.
Whether the framework appears before the first major transaction: open tender as the default, two independent valuations for unlisted holdings, conflict-of-interest bars on advisers, and after-the-fact publication of buyer and contract.
Whether an itemised register of non-public government decisions appears within 30 days at decree level. The HUF 500bn-plus order of magnitude stays an estimate until there is a register.
A good sign is an itemised, machine-readable public inventory of KEKVA and wound-up foundation assets within ninety days, documenting how much is redirected to public purposes such as education and healthcare.
Whether the 35-year concession contract and all its annexes are published within 30 days, without redactions claiming trade secrecy. Proposed target: 100 per cent for the toll formula and service-level sections.
Fulfilled when targeted legislation shuts the loopholes repeat winners exploit (narrowed bidder pools, single-bid tenders, unjustified technical specs) and anomaly detection runs on every large tender. Signal: a falling share of repeat winners.
Watch whether the reclaimed KEKVA assets get an itemized public inventory covering every holding, with book and market value plus old and new custodians. Fulfilled once the inventory and a management rulebook appear on the public-funds dashboard.
Watch whether the government tables a bill for a CPIB-style independent anti-corruption agency empowered to investigate even sitting cabinet members. Fulfilled when the bill reaches parliament with guaranteed independence safeguards.
Whether the transport ministry publishes, before contracts are signed, the list of projects entering the programme and the calculation behind the ranking — ridership forecast, freight data, expected journey-time gain and estimated cost per project.
Whether the government orders an independent, publicly reported risk-allocation audit of every live concession and PPP contract above HUF 10bn. The test: contract by contract, how much commercial risk the private party actually bears.
Whether the government adopts a decree-level procedure for every state-run review: a pre-set mandate, a deadline with a cap on extensions, a protected-document scope with legal basis, and full publication of the final report with itemised redaction reasons.
Whether a pre-set justification template for urgent procedures without prior notice is adopted within 60 days, recording the grounds for urgency in a form that can be checked afterwards.
Whether the new president publishes numerical first-year commitments within 60 days of election — how many cases will open, how much property will be frozen, and by what methodology delivery is measured.
Whether hearing minutes appear within 10 working days of each sitting, with full coverage — the degree of committee publicity is itself a measurement point.
Whether commissioners publish a quarterly report on the assets and on criminal complaints filed, and whether temporary state ownership in media comes with mandatory management separation and a 12-month exit deadline.
New/outgoing MPs, cabinet members, state secretaries 100% in machine-readable format by end 2026; max 14 days between appointment and upload; NAIH + parliamentary asset declaration portal.
Whether, before the bill is tabled, a public breakdown shows how long each stage of corruption and economic crime cases takes from complaint to final judgment, and how much delay stems from statutory deadlines, capacity shortages or the exercise of defence rights.
Whether the register is available as open data, free of charge and without registration, searchable by company registration and tax number, and whether the query is built automatically into bid evaluation in the e-procurement system rather than left to the contracting authority’s diligence.
180-day asset recovery package: unjust enrichment, Criminal Procedure Act § 327 forfeiture, OLAF/EU sanctions channel; relief fund for non-culpable subcontractors.
Whether Parliament passes a single asset-settlement act applying one procedure to every recovered asset: itemised registration with opening and closing values, designated purpose, and an avenue of appeal.
Whether each transferred public task can be traced to a ring-fenced budget line at the receiving body, and whether that body publishes a first-year delivery plan with numerical indicators within 90 days.
What share of the recovered property stock gets an itemised public inventory within 90 days, and whether a social-rental utilisation balance accompanies it. Without an inventory the assets’ fate cannot be traced.
Whether an itemised list of findings from the review of the 20 August event procurements is published within 15 days of closure, including if no irregularity is found.
Whether a protocol setting out objection and remedy procedures is adopted before the first public risk list — public naming without redress would cost the office its credibility.
Whether the amendment extending audit-office and Fiscal Council access to non-public decisions passes within 90 days. Access is worth something only if the oversight body actually uses it.
Whether a machine-readable register launches within 90 days tracking each case through complaint, investigation, indictment, final judgment and assets actually recovered, anonymised before indictment.
Whether legislation passed in the autumn session establishes that the general disclosure duty covers the central bank’s non-monetary operating spend — procurement, property use, advisory mandates — and how wide the exemption list is.
Watch whether an independent, public expert audit of return on investment, currency risk and contractor terms is produced within 6 months. Fulfilment: published findings from a body independent of the State Audit Office.
Watch whether the defense-ministry contract-review methodology is extended to every ministry and to state firms above HUF 100bn, including the current government’s own contracts. Fulfilled when the reviews close with public summaries.
Whether the single-bid share of state procurement is published quarterly by ministry and value band, with automatic risk flags (repeat winners, tailored specifications).
Whether the authorisation for covert intelligence gathering and coercive measures carries a sunset date with mandatory parliamentary review — extraordinary powers hardening into permanent ones is the main risk.
Whether the final report lists the specific provisions of the central bank act on foundation creation and public-money status, and traces at least 80% of the HUF 393.5bn.
Whether the 2027 budget act requires published written reasoning for every discretionary state-asset decision above HUF 500m — the missing decision trail is what the four investigations have in common.
Whether a written authority verification becomes a precondition for signing state commitments longer than ten years — the criminal complaint over the M6 concession is the symptom, the missing clause the cause.
Whether the agricultural subsidy beneficiary register is downloadable and machine-readable before the 2027 application cycle opens — together with beneficial-ownership chains.
Whether, from the 2027 budget year, decision-preparation correspondence must be disclosed retrospectively for state event procurements above HUF 500m, with redactions individually justified.
Whether the uniform disclosure regime takes effect on 1 January: open tabular format, a uniform counterparty identifier, a filled-in amount field for at least 90 per cent of items, within 30 days of signature.
Whether an encrypted, anonymous whistleblower channel with legal protection against retaliation is built (transposing the EU whistleblower directive), and whether the rate of unlawful retaliation against reporters is 0 percent.
MIAK wants a machine-readable, itemised registry within six months, showing TAO, Bethlen Gábor Fund sports payments and media rights fees in one place. A good sign is that funding no longer needs freedom-of-information requests to surface.
Whether preparation of an Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau begins with pre-set competence boundaries — the bureau investigates, prosecution stays with the prosecution service.
Whether asset transactions appear in machine-readable form within 15 days of the decision with the related-party field completed — the median delay is itself the metric.
A2 cardinal-law bill submitted within 90 days of the opening session (by 7 August 2026); operational by Q1 2027; HUF 100 bn annual recovered assets initial target; Independent Corruption Investigation Office CPIB-model draft to parliament by 10 August 2026.
Singapore CPIB model: operational independence, investigative powers, 10-year leadership mandate.
What share of assets blocked by NAV the court ultimately transfers to the budget — the conversion ratio from blocking to actual recovery.
12 months: below 25%, 24 months: below 18%, 36 months: below 15%; AI-based anomaly detector; EU acceptance threshold 10%.
Within one year, share of cases where SAO or KBH proves irregularity min. 60%; below 50% the methodology must be reviewed; state’s success rate in invalidity/nullity actions min. 70%.
Watch whether every municipal procurement contract appears in a machine-readable public database with real-time updates and an AI anomaly detector flagging single-bid tenders and benchmark deviations.
NAV audit; OLAF precedent-based minimum result for the new government’s first year.
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators; combined effect of EPPO + AMLD + recovery. Interim: 2027 +0.1 (to -0.07), 2028 above +0.15; WGI Control of Corruption +15-20 percentile by 2028.
Whether executive pay at majority state-owned companies appears company by company in machine-readable form: base salary, bonus, benefits in kind, severance and any advisory contract on a separate line — and whether the number and value of exemptions from the pay cap is public.
Whether running concessions gain a public five-yearly value-for-money audit and a linked renegotiation gate that opens automatically once deviation passes a threshold.
Watch whether an annual public rule-of-law audit operates: how many cases were opened, how much pre-trial detention was proportionately justified, and in how many cases courts ultimately convicted or acquitted.
Within 12 months every substantive sports grant should tie to a measurable target indicator, with proportional clawback of unmet funding. A good sign is the clawback existing not just on paper but being applied and documented.
Whether the first systemic report is produced on where state-protected, competition-free rents arise — and whether mandatory tendering becomes the rule for future concessions.
Whether legislation requires that ordering, approving and handing over high-profile police operations happen only in writing, with tamper-proof logging.
Whether Parliament passes a conflict-of-interest law imposing an 18–24 month cooling-off period on ministers and senior officials involved in funding decisions.
Whether the rule stays general and forward-looking — not a retroactive law written for one named person, but a universal conflict-of-interest norm following the 2010 OECD recommendation.
Watch whether, by the August 2027 transition deadline, board and supervisory members are chosen via public tender on verified professional competence rather than political or business trust. Target: 100% of new members on a professional standard.
Whether the tax authority, the national police and the investigative prosecution services publish quarterly, machine-readable procedural statistics on publicly salient cases: openings, suspensions, closures, indictments and duration. None publishes this today.
Whether central-bank contracts appear in the shared, machine-readable public-spending register in the same data structure — not on a separate site in unsearchable form. Measure: what share of contracts above HUF 5m by mid-2027.
Whether a public register of concession and PPP contracts running beyond ten years — with fee formulas, indexation rules and total exposure in present value — exists by the filing of the 2028 budget act.
Watch whether the share of single-bid municipal procedures falls toward mandatory targets (goal: under 15%) and whether “unrealistically low price” disqualifications require detailed public justification.
The proposed KPI targets over 90% of all state sports funding having a public, itemised record sheet by 2027. A good sign is the share rising markedly from today’s state, where data only surfaces via information requests.
Whether individually granted government subsidies receive a mandatory public follow-up audit: were the promised jobs created, and who later took a job at the beneficiary company.
Whether an annual public statement on a consistent methodology covers every state capital injection above HUF 10bn — the HUF 80bn routed into Paks II became a criminal case precisely for want of one.
Whether public rules are adopted on the channels and documentation duties governing contact between the government’s political staff and operational police and intelligence chiefs.
Whether a system is created recording who met whom, when and on what matter — with lobbying entries in ministerial and state-secretary diaries made public.
Watch whether the share of single-bid procurement falls from about 30% to below 15% within three years, aided by an AI anomaly detector. Fulfilled when the ratio measurably drops under the 15% target.
Whether the statute provides for an independent external performance review at the mid-point of the cycle, assessing case-referral yield and the objection indicator.
Whether the office keeps a contact log of approaches from political and business actors and publishes it annually. It is the one cheap instrument for rebutting suspicions of selective case-opening.
Whether the list of classification grounds becomes exhaustive and every non-public decision gets a mandatory expiry date. If more than half the cases cite national-security interest, the category is being read expansively.
Whether the asset-recovery office publishes the methodology annex behind its HUF 10,000–60,000bn estimate. A threefold spread stays a communications figure until a derivation stands behind it.
Whether the 150-strong staff is recruited on a published, scored set of criteria. The office’s credibility turns on whether it applies to its own hiring the benchmark it demands of others.
Whether quarterly contract publication is written into law or stays a voluntary practice. Proposed benchmark: published contracts covering more than 95 per cent of the operating expenditure lines in the annual accounts by end-2027.
Whether the annual asset-recovery report shows the aggregate value and procedural status of cases touching foreign jurisdictions, plus the number of foreign requests and average response time.
Whether Parliament receives a per-term aggregate statement of the number and financial scale of non-public government decisions. That indicator will show a year from now whether the gap closed.
Whether future concessions and road builds are put out to open, competitive tender (comply-or-explain principle), with a 12-18 month re-measurement of the expected outcome fixed before the contract.
Whether at least three machine cross-checks (property, company, income–wealth gap) are run on every asset declaration, and whether actual investigations follow unexplained wealth growth.
Within 12-18 months, media-rights fees and cross-border sports funding should be decided by pre-set public criteria with grant-based accounting. A good sign is cross-border payments no longer vanishing into items ranging from stationery to pastries.
Whether the public, machine-queryable public-spending database is operational and fully covers cohesion and recovery projects.
Watch whether trustees’ and executives’ asset declarations become available as comparable data rather than PDFs, and whether leadership pay is disclosed.
Monthly PEP reports to NAV (2025 baseline ~30); the 200+ threshold signals actual use of the AML toolkit.
The bill originally promised for end-June was deferred to public consultation on 20 June 2026 (the office’s estimated stand-up: autumn/September). The benchmark: the office’s role must be strictly preparatory-coordinating and bound to judicial approval (NOT a direct power of confiscation).
A good sign is the adoption of a uniform, pre-set conflict-of-interest regime for every publicly funded foundation, including a mandatory cooling-off gap between state and foundation leadership roles.
Fulfilled when corruption-prone areas (procurement, permitting) get mandatory five-year rotation and pre-appointment integrity checks, and a politically independent authority can investigate unexplained wealth. Signal: the corruption-control indicator actually improving.
Whether advances of around 50 percent become conditional on a bank guarantee or performance bond, and whether payment becomes milestone-based against verified delivery.
Whether the ratio of public money paid out to independently surveyed delivered value becomes available in machine-readable, real-time form. This is the most direct efficiency measure of a contract.
Whether state banks’ loans, bonds and guarantees become available at project level on machine-readable sheets: beneficiary, amount, guarantee size, risk rating, performance.
Whether the extended tax-authority powers operate under judicial control, proportionality and purpose limitation, on a machine-readable asset-declaration basis applying equally to everyone.
Whether every state grant decision appears in searchable form at the moment of the decision, with automatic anomaly alerts for unusual timing and conflicted beneficiaries.
Whether an operationally independent bureau on the Singaporean CPIB model is set up, able to investigate any official or politician, under strong legality and parliamentary control.
Whether a bureau independent of government, able to investigate any official or minister, is set up — while coercive measures remain decided by courts.
Whether the founding act sets out the standard of proof, the allocation of the burden of proof, judicial review and the boundary with prosecutorial competence.
Whether from day one the authority publishes the number of pending cases, the value of seized, secured and finally recovered assets, and its own running costs.
Whether the law governing the NVVH mandatorily includes judicial review, property protection, the presumption of innocence and public, machine-readable disclosure of every asset measure.
Whether a statutory, itemised asset freeze replacing the prime-ministerial appeal is created — one that is legally enforceable and open to legal remedy, not merely a political call.
Track whether state-funded foundations publish the grants they receive and how the money is spent in real time, in machine-readable form. A searchable public record is the sign it has been delivered.
Whether the decision-maker settles a private holding in a market he regulates through one of the three accepted forms — a party-neutral standard applying to every government.
Watch whether a public, machine-readable record (beneficiary, amount, procurement, timeline) launches for every EU-funded project, with mandatory cost-benefit analysis and a clawback clause above HUF 500m.
Fulfilled when every leadership change and asset decision rests on documented, individualized grounds and everyone affected has a right to appeal. Hands-on, discretionary restructuring with decisions successfully challenged is the bad sign.
Track whether every EU-funded project launches with a public, machine-readable data sheet (beneficiary, amount, purpose, deadline, procurement, status) and whether the irregularity rate falls. The target is 100% project disclosure.
The 16th amendment enabled reclaiming withdrawn public assets; what share of reclaimed assets is decided by a court (not an administrative/political body), and whether the fate of recovered assets is traceable on a public, itemised data sheet — otherwise the recovery becomes a mirror image of the old discretion.
Whether a mandatory, public lobbying register is introduced (who consulted whom, about what) to make trading in influence transparent; the structural-prevention pillar of the Óbuda (KNYF) investigation wave. Signal: the register’s existence and coverage.
Whether a statutory rule is enacted on removing heads of independent authorities (exhaustive grounds, fixed term, judicial review), and whether the Integrity Authority investigative activity continues even while its president is under indictment.
Whether the irregularity revealed in the tax-authority report (the gold convoy, the prosecutor-general’s procedure) is investigated with independent external control (State Audit Office, and if needed EPPO) under a documented, public procedure — so the high-profile step lands as rule-of-law accountability, not political revenge.
Watch whether the procurement anomaly detector is extended to cultural grants (flagging recurring winner pairs, company-web payments) and decisions appear on machine-readable public data sheets. Fulfilment signal: a working detector and searchable public-fund dashboard.
Watch whether the full loan and contractor agreements are published in structured, machine-readable form (interest, currency, return-on-investment inputs), not just excerpts. Fulfilment: 100% disclosure within 90 days of Chinese sign-off.
Whether real-time, machine-readable disclosure of state companies’ discretionary subsidies and board remuneration is available, and whether 100 percent of public-life asset declarations are in machine-readable, cross-checked format.
Watch whether university asset-management foundations publish, in machine-readable form, managed assets, yields, transferred and withheld sums, and decision rationales (cf. Tokaj-Hegyalja HUF 1.27bn). Target: 100% from the next fiscal year.
Whether a statutory limit covers the period between the election and the new government taking office: above a threshold, no irreversible non-repayable funding decision may be taken.
Whether the evaluation criteria of the two energy calls (HUF 540bn) are public before the application window, and whether every winner gets a public data sheet within 30 days of signing.
Whether the text gains fast-track judicial review of every substantive act of the authority, an annual case-level report to Parliament, and a time limit plus judicial approval for asset supervisors.
Whether a documented methodology for the corruption-loss estimate is published (base, year, margin of error), and what share of the Authority reports become substantive prosecutorial proceedings.
Whether the government tables the two items the report found missing: comprehensive lobbying rules (public register, meeting logs) and revolving-door rules with a cooling-off period.
Whether the authority sets out in advance and in public the tiers of exclusion periods, tied to the gravity of the offence established by final judgment, and publishes self-cleaning decisions — both upholding and removal — with anonymised but substantive reasoning.
Whether the suspension bill put to public consultation also sets the substantive conditions of the legal instrument — pre-published, measurable criteria and mandatory public written reasoning for every individual decision, naming which condition was met or breached.
Whether a short public estimate is produced with four figures: how many dwellings are affected in the 33 suspended projects, how many of these would have been completed in 2027 and 2028, the expected delay in months, and the likely effect on Budapest and suburban house and rental prices.
Whether the recent MÁV chief-landscape-architect notice becomes the minimum standard for every state and state-owned company leadership post: numerically stated eligibility requirements published in advance, a professional justification for the post, and an application deadline closing at least twenty calendar days before the decision.
Whether every refusal of a freedom-of-information request cites the specific statutory provision, the data range concerned and the date until which the restriction applies — a blanket reference to an “ongoing investigation” does not meet this.
Whether the semi-annual report appears with four figures: how many entities are listed and what contract volume stands behind them, in how many procedures it led to an actual exclusion, how many self-cleaning cases were launched and with what outcome, and what share of challenged entries survived.
Whether a machine-readable register is set up covering, retroactively to the instrument’s introduction, the date and legal source of each designation, the investor and its beneficial owner, the procedural privileges used, the project’s status, and the fact and reason of any withdrawal.
Whether a structured, machine-readable summary of every closed state review reaches the public-spending dashboard: contract identifiers and values, the type of finding, the action taken and any amount reclaimed — making visible whether a review had substantive consequences.
Whether the executive’s code of ethics states, in enforceable terms, that claims of guilt built on the substance of a pending investigation may not serve as campaign material. Target: in writing by mid-2027.
If a bill on the Singapore-style bureau is drafted, whether it carries appointment, reporting and review safeguards — a body with strong investigative powers holds exactly the discretion the gold-convoy case exposed.
Whether a rule places the cost of a successful data-access suit on the institution that withheld the data — today refusal carries no real price for the institution, while the applicant must bear the cost and delay of litigation upfront.
Whether the bill accelerating asset recovery proceedings carries an itemised annex that pairs every shortened deadline or simplified step with a named safeguard preserving equality of arms for the defence.
Whether the amendment states that tougher or rights-narrowing provisions do not apply to pending proceedings, and whether it requires investigating authorities and the prosecution service to publish annual case-group-level procedural statistics.
Whether a public plan quantifies the investigator, prosecutor and judge posts needed for economic and corruption cases, the IT cost of handling very large case files and the shortfall in forensic experts.
Whether use of interest-rate equalisation is tied to predefined sectors and policy goals, caps on subsidy content per deal and per beneficiary, and mandatory screening of beneficial owners and links to politically exposed persons.
The budget cluster’s centre of gravity has moved to the autumn fiscal package. The spending-review timetable, the monthly split of one-off and structural deficit items, a ring-fenced line for carbon-allowance revenue, the Treasury single-account breakdown and the productivity target all hinge on the 2027 budget bill or the medium-term plan, due between early and late October. That concentrates the risk: a submission without annexes would leave the deficit cut, the HUF 500bn Contingency Fund and the one-off share of August’s shortfall all impossible to derive at once. The missed exit criteria for the retail margin cap preview the pattern — emergency measures come in on a fixed date, but go out on no numerical condition at all.
Delayed: the August correction came not from a zero-based expenditure review but from raising the deficit target from 3.7% to 7.5% and rewriting the budget around a HUF 7,230bn shortfall. The targeted spending review is not abandoned but pushed into the October medium-term package.
Delayed: the government ordered an extraordinary review of critical energy systems with reports from four ministers — but that is an internal report, not the public methodology and monthly update requested.
Whether the ministries publish a one-page numerical balance: the estimated annual saving on Russian energy purchases against the sectoral value of Hungarian goods exports to the US and the employment tied to them.
Whether rail and Constanța port capacity for Hungarian grain exports is pre-contracted before the September harvest peak, through a public call published in advance stating allocated volumes, tariffs and the list of winners.
Whether the abridged minutes of the next rate decision carry the vote split and an itemised summary of dissents — without visible deliberation a change of framework cannot be judged.
Whether the independent data-quality council is set up, and for how many key indicators (income, poverty, inflation, employment) it conducts a methodological review before publication, with a duty to give reasons.
IMF IFI-standard 90-day rule-based operation; first quarterly report.
Whether a statutory, claimable targeted programme is in place for the 19,000 vulnerable debtors at the 30 September phase-out; target: at least 80% receive a claimable offer.
Whether the methodological basis and impact analysis for changing the target appear alongside the September Inflation Report — reasoning published after the announcement is post-hoc justification, not consultation.
Whether the legislation on phasing out the interest subsidy appears by 30 September, together with a public impact assessment. Two hundred thousand households’ loans are expiring; postponing the decision is itself a decision.
First reading; wealth-tax package and Drucker audit result quantified; annual deficit at 4.5% of GDP by year-end.
Whether the 2027 budget sets a multi-year, numerical deficit and debt path bound by an expenditure rule, and whether the State Audit Office is given an annual mandate to review compliance.
Whether the 2027 budget act ring-fences EU revenues that remain conditional — Romania paid EUR 770m for spending, in advance, money tied to milestones it had not yet met.
Does the 2027 budget bill come with a public timetable showing which budget chapters are reviewed when, by whom, and when results are due? Without it, the promised deficit cut cannot be checked.
Whether the phase-out schedule is accompanied by a breakdown of today’s beneficiaries by firm size, sector, region and coverage ratio, together with an estimate of what share would have obtained credit without a guarantee.
Starting with the October flash report on the third working day, does the Finance Ministry publish one-off timing items, recurring flows and interest spending as separate data series? Full delivery means the series is backfilled for at least five years.
Whether the traffic calculation behind the decision and the derivation of the HUF 76bn saving are published within 30 days. Without the derivation it cannot be decided whether this was a sizing decision or a budget constraint.
Whether the two-page quarterly sheet appears with three layers: a world-price range for milling and feed grain, the effect on domestic purchase prices and on pig and poultry feed costs in forint, and the estimated meat, egg and bakery price effect with a one-quarter lag.
Whether the 2027 budget bill carries a distinct, named line for drought and aridity damage that is a modelled estimate rather than an average of past ex-post payouts — and whether the explanatory note names the scenario used.
Whether an itemised list shows on which budget lines and through which measures the announced roughly HUF 700bn in savings arises, so it can be checked against the final accounts.
Whether a sector-level exposure map is produced of which industries and how many jobs depend on US demand — and whether the most exposed SMEs receive time-limited support tied to measurable commitments.
Whether the October medium-term plan names a year for bringing the deficit below 3% and the annual adjustment in percentage points — without a date, raising the target is not an exception but a new baseline.
Whether the drafting states what happens to disability and reduced-work-capacity benefits pegged to the minimum pension — silence here means automatic erosion.
Does the 2027 budget proposal show allowance auction revenue on its own revenue and expenditure lines, with a pre-set split between industrial decarbonisation and targeted household energy compensation?
Do the Ministry of Finance and the debt management agency publish, alongside monthly fiscal data, the change in the Treasury Single Account broken down by deficit, net forint and FX issuance and EU items, plus the remaining net financing need and a stated buffer target?
Does the medium-term plan due in the second half of October set a numerical baseline and a path to 2030 for GDP per hour worked relative to the V4-plus-Romania average, with productivity-oriented spending items flagged?
At the baby-loan childbearing deadline extended to 1 November, how many contracts meet the condition and how many families face lump-sum repayment; whether an instalment alternative opens.
Whether the finance ministry and the statistical office assemble a joint calculation module with four inputs — heat-alert days, monthly industrial output, agricultural yields and healthcare load — and publish the calculation method so the estimate can be contested and compared year on year.
Only a basic-food basket (bread, milk, eggs, margarine, sugar, flour); rest market-priced.
Whether a wage council with government, employers and unions is constituted, and whether it issues its first public annual wage guideline before the 2027 bargaining round.
Whether the enacted statute carries an automatic indexation rule — HUF 120,000 stays a one-off raise if maintaining its value is a political decision taken afresh each year.
Whether the next planning round rules that conditional EU revenue may cover only deferrable expenditure — as cover for commitments creating lasting obligations the proposed target is zero.
Whether public, data-backed qualification criteria and mandatory reasoning appear within 90 days. Proposed target: reasoning attached to 100 per cent of designations issued from 2027.
Whether a uniform review protocol — criteria, independent valuation and an exit-cost estimate — is produced within 90 days. Without it the net balance of termination — annual saving minus compensation, procedural and transitional operating costs — cannot be computed.
Whether a public formula for differentiating the 13th and 14th month pension appears before the 2027 budget debate — an announcement that not everyone gets the same is unpredictable without one.
Whether a detailed, public account of how the flawed income and poverty indicators arose is published by end-2026, and whether the flawed data are withdrawn from the Eurostat database by then.
3 MNB + 3 PM + 3 independent economists (two-thirds parliament vote); quarterly convergence report; deficit path 2026: 4.5-5.0%, 2027: 3.5-4.0%, 2028: below 3.0%.
Whether the framework reform is accompanied by an explicit, simultaneous amendment of Article 44 — otherwise statutory and constitutional rules diverge and create legal uncertainty.
Whether each spending item notified under the escape clause receives a sunset date in domestic law — expiring automatically absent a fresh decision, by end-2028 at the latest. Target: 100% from 2027.
Whether the four documents are public before the debate on rates opens, starting with a valuation methodology built on a mass appraisal model — a base derived from actual transaction data rather than case-by-case estimates, and not left to a later implementing decree.
Whether a conditional rate path with an uncertainty band is published quarterly from Q4 2026, and whether the bank releases an annual accuracy record for its one-year inflation forecast.
How much of the fund is left at year end, and does no more than 20 per cent of its use fall in the last six weeks of the year? A late-December surge would show the fund was run as a leftover pot rather than a crisis reserve.
Progressive (0.5%/1%/1.5%) wealth tax on net assets above HUF 500 M takes effect; NAV-led machine-readable asset register; top 1% supplying at least 80% of revenue.
HUF 18 M annual revenue cap; max 50% from one client; NAV revision audit; kata employment-test methodology by 1 September 2026.
Whether the metro extension and every element of the HUF 400bn concession package receive a public cost-benefit analysis (expected ridership, unit cost, alternatives).
Government investment as a share of GDP (Eurostat ESA10) above 5.5% by Q1 2027.
Whether a regular public series tracks the gap between Hungary’s price level and wage level relative to the EU average — price convergence alone does not show where catch-up actually stands.
Is a rule adopted whereby outage costs from risks already recorded in official documents are borne by the company and its owner, while unforeseeable costs go only to a named budget line and never into universal service prices?
EUROMOD-based microsimulation impact assessment (NAV+KSH data join) of HUF 50 000/month universal child transfer; bottom three income deciles access ≥95% (vs. <50% for doubled family allowance).
Hungarian sovereign yield spread vs. Czech-Polish: from 200-250 bp → below 100 bp; 10-year HU-DE yield spread min. 80 bp lower within one year; CDS spread -30 bp by 2028.
Whether the savings from the stronger forint and lower spreads go to debt and deficit reduction rather than new spending; KPI: the 10-year government-bond spread stays durably low versus German and regional peers (amid the S&P negative outlook and the excessive-deficit procedure).
Watch whether the government commissions a public energy-sector rent audit mapping which regulatory features generate rents for whom. Fulfilled when the findings reach parliament to underpin a rules-based windfall-tax mechanism.
Is there a published estimate, by income and age group, of the retirement savings lost through the HUF 105 billion paid out in 2025, using the 6.4 per cent 20-year median return?
Whether a zero-base review of larger budget items, working on the principle of organised discontinuation, is launched, with a mandatory re-measurement within 18 months for items above HUF 50 bn (Drucker audit).
From the 2026 ~6.8% state; fiscal consolidation path.
New municipal/state social rental units registered on the housing data platform (EP2) annually; Otthon Start supply expansion instead of demand stimulation.
Previous cycle’s utilisation rate: ~75% — that is the reference.
Whether revenue lines not backed by contract get a conditional flag by the detailed debate. Without it the deficit path cannot be checked, because it is invisible how much is planning and how much is hope.
Whether a sensitivity annex with base, adverse and favourable scenarios is attached before the final vote, and whether the Fiscal Council’s and the audit office’s opinions are available at the same time.
Whether a mandatory checklist is introduced for every state investment above HUF 20bn: ex-ante cost-benefit analysis, traffic or demand forecast, options appraisal. Proposed target: 100 per cent by 2028.
Whether the successor model’s competition rules are fixed before termination is declared. With no model ready, the concession is simply replaced by another equally opaque construction.
The recovery rate on the state’s claim and the settlement rate of subcontractor claims will show whether the intervention was worth it. If the state becomes an owner instead of a creditor, the risk shifts to the budget.
Whether the multi-year funding path is published, with annual review. With a one-off budget line, the pay scale’s second year becomes the risk, not its first.
Whether it is fixed in advance when the strategic designation ends, and whether an assessment follows twelve months after the composition closes. The average duration of designations signals the risk of getting stuck.
Whether a single pay schedule covering every public-service sector appears by the time the 2027 budget bill is filed, with per-sector target pay, target dates and named funding. It needs a separate line for the job categories left out of earlier career-path raises.
Whether lawmakers set a pre-announced indexation formula for public-service pay that replaces annual ad hoc bargaining. A bad sign if raises stay announcement-driven.
Whether actual traffic is measured against the forecast in the third year after opening, and whether the HUF 76bn can be traced item by item into road-renewal projects, naming the road sections. Proposed target: 100 per cent in the first two years.
Whether the aggregate actual cost of the sign replacement (est. ~HUF 50 M), stamps and IT systems is disclosed, and how far it deviates from the prior estimate (target: ±15 percent).
Whether firms whose working capital rests on guaranteed credit get a published, uniform transition period, and whether a mandatory 12–18-month ex-post review of rejected applications and SME credit stock follows.
Watch whether EU funds are tied to measurable green and digital targets, whether expected versus actual results are compared after 12-18 months, and whether a clawback mechanism applies to underperforming projects.
Whether the irregularity rate of EU-funded projects falls towards the 0.5% Estonian benchmark, and whether a machine-readable public spending database is operational.
Watch whether a public platform mapping permits, developments and rental stock by settlement is set up, and whether issued building permits and completed new homes rise meaningfully.
Fulfilled if the one-off audit becomes a real-time, public, machine-readable budget (open data standard) that also exposes revenue assumptions. Signal: the count of later-discovered hidden outlays falling to zero.
Partial → medium → full phase-out; targeted housing loan support for the bottom 30%.
Whether a public error log is available that records the origin, detection and correction of every data error, and whether the turnaround time of corrections, from detection to fix, falls.
Every new/expanded benefit (back-to-school, pensioner support, pensioner SZÉP card, income-tax relief) gets an itemised, public funding disclosure on the public-money map; the savings from the public-sector pay cut as a separate, trackable item.
Whether the August back-to-school benefit gets an income/life-situation targeting filter, while eligibility remains automatic (without separate application) for the poorest households.
Track whether the freed-up fiscal space goes toward cutting the debt path and rebuilding buffers rather than new permanent spending, and whether the primary balance improves.
A good sign is a pre-announced, multi-step schedule for phasing out special taxes with a mandatory impact assessment before each step. Quietly introducing a new special tax mid-year is a bad sign.
A good sign is a primary balance (excluding interest) improving each year as a share of GDP, with debt-to-GDP turning downward and no new permanent spending commitments. A sudden procyclical austerity package is the bad sign.
Fulfilled when a ceiling on the FX-debt share of total public debt is announced and the spread on subsequent issuances narrows versus the current midswap +80 / +125 bps. Signal: machine-readable disclosure of every issuance’s terms.
Fulfilled when breaching a statutory debt threshold triggers an automatic, pre-announced spending cap and an independent fiscal institution vets revenue plans in advance. Signal: uncollectable revenue can no longer enter the budget.
Fulfilled once an annual public debt-sustainability report is published and an automatic fiscal brake tied to a debt/GDP threshold takes effect. Signal: a published, numeric threshold plus an early-warning system.
Mid-city house-price index monthly change vs. KSH inflation; the overheating risk gauge of the Otthon Start program.
Signal of improving market confidence; falling budget financing cost.
Whether scoring every tax against Adam Smith’s four maxims (certainty, convenience, economy, proportionality) becomes routine, with the worst performers publicly identified.
Whether the GDP-proportionate deficit (currently above 8% without EU funds) falls to the target path without cutting essential services, and whether a realistic euro-accession timetable emerges.
Whether an annual public debt report, an early-warning system and an automatic fiscal brake tied to a debt threshold are introduced, balanced by a counter-cyclical stabiliser.
Whether a multi-year numerical expenditure rule, an annual Debt Sustainability Report and an automatic consolidation trigger above a debt threshold are introduced.
Whether a minimum share (8–10%) of the plan’s annual spending is reserved for cycling networks and feeder or branch-line development — often the most cost-effective investments.
Whether every institution gets its own small procurement and maintenance budget, and whether operating cost cover is ring-fenced from staff pay — in both directions.
Whether the 2% GDP growth committed by the PM is achieved within one year, per KSH quarterly data.
Watch whether the country absorbs at least 95% of the opened EU envelope by the relevant deadlines under the n+3 rule, without losing funds. Fulfilled when the absorption rate reaches 95%.
Whether a proportionate, itemised implementation impact assessment and public cost estimate (affected signs, stamps, IT systems, real price, lead time) is produced concurrently with the legislative amendment restoring the county name.
Whether income-tested compensation starts alongside the first phase-out stage, indexed automatically to the statistical office’s cost-of-living data rather than set by discretionary decision.
Whether the margin cap ends product group by product group, each stage carrying a sunset date fixed in law — the first stage covering groups where actual margins stayed persistently below the regulatory cap.
A good sign is half of MFB’s governing board being independent experts with fixed mandates, a public balance sheet, an independent audit, and parliament holding genuine oversight of the bank’s EU-fund management.
Watch whether the central bank actively deploys loan-to-value and debt-service caps alongside rate cuts and launches a quarterly public housing overvaluation index by region. Falling overvaluation from ~22.5% signals progress.
Watch whether the government refrains from overt or covert pressure on the rate path and stops claiming credit for the favourable inflation turn. The Monetary Council deciding on its own is the marker.
Whether the announced public review takes place, and whether the order of rail development is decided by passenger-traffic / passenger-km data rather than political bargaining.
Whether, before the first disbursement round, the most disadvantaged districts get free grant/project-management mentoring and a pre-financing bridge, so funds do not get stuck in better-off regions.
Watch whether foreign reserves stay at a level satisfying the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, covering at least the external debt maturing within a year. Fulfilled if reserves do not fall below that threshold from their record high.
Watch whether the debt-to-GDP path is stable or falling, within the sub-70% band targeted by the sustainability framework. Fulfilled if the debt ratio durably trends toward that band.
Watch whether a targeted, income-proportional and automatic energy-price compensation framework emerges instead of a universal price cap. Fulfilment: codification of a time-limited, targeted support mechanism.
Whether the introduced wealth tax is built with a high threshold, a moderate (non-confiscatory) rate and pre-set rules; how many constitutional/legal objections arise, and whether actual revenue approaches the planned figure — the precondition for the structural wealth tax’s constitutional durability.
Whether the government publishes, in machine-readable settlement-level form, where each forint of the released funds goes, and whether every large project has a pre-set, accountable target indicator.
Whether export promotion shifts towards higher value-added sectors serving several independent markets — so no single country’s tariff decision can tip the system.
Quarterly substantive progress reported on the unfrozen EUR 16.4bn envelope (projects approaching contracting, actual disbursement, bottlenecks), with a real-time, machine-readable public interface (beneficiary, amount, procurement ID, drawdown status). Risk: the government itself flagged that ~HUF 800 bn of support was lost earlier — whether a recurrence can be structurally ruled out.
Whether a public, machine-readable analysis is produced of which sectors, with what revenue and how many jobs, depend on the affected export chains — kept separate from the competition case.
Public, run by NAV’s independent research unit — precondition of the funding debate.
Whether, in exchange for losing its veto, the council gains a statutorily protected budget line, its own analytical staff, access to ministry models and a comply-or-explain duty on government.
Whether the government publishes the distribution of instalment increases across the 216,000 affected contracts by income decile, loan-size band and maturity (a distribution, not an average) before the final vote.
Whether the government publishes an itemised assessment: how many taxpayers are affected, what the five-year revenue effect is, and what administrative burden ends or arises.
Whether the ministry publishes the ranking score and underlying calculation for every project above HUF 50bn, explaining deviations on a comply-or-explain basis.
Watch whether an annually refreshed public euro-readiness scorecard is produced, quantifying Hungary’s convergence across four dimensions: HICP inflation, deficit and debt path, and exchange-rate and interest-rate stability. Fulfilled when the first edition appears with figures in every dimension.
Whether state investment incentives are tied to measurable commitments (local-supplier share, R&D content, export integration, net employment), time-limited, with an annual public review and clawback on non-performance — drawing on the lesson of the battery-industry exposure (the halted CATL expansion).
Whether every sectoral levy must have a tax base tied to an external market indicator, a statutory sunset date and an annual public review.
Whether targeted, income-scaled compensation with clear eligibility rules replaces the universal price cap, while prices stay at real market levels.
Whether the risk chapter of the next budget bill contains a separate, quantified heat-impact item — the revenue shortfall and extra spending a summer like this year’s could cause, and with what probability — and whether the Fiscal Council’s opinion addresses it separately.
Whether the protocol is produced, mapping per-litre price thresholds to measures in four columns: which instrument activates, how long it stays in force with a mandatory sunset date, its monthly cost to the budget, and the source of funding — the fourth column is exactly what the Polish case lacked.
Whether every bill amending the budget act is accompanied by a public impact note of at most two pages: which appropriations change and by how much, the effect on the annual deficit and the debt path, and the commitment that justifies the amendment.
Whether the government publishes the non-confidential summary of its application at the moment of filing — not after the Council decides: which measures, at what amount, against what energy-security output indicator, for which year.
Whether, within 12 months of launch, the take-up rate, total budget cost, distribution across income deciles and effect on diesel consumption are published.
Will the government publish, within 30 days of the amended budget act being promulgated, the trigger thresholds for the HUF 500 billion fund and a cap on what a single decision can reallocate? The sign of delivery: every payout disclosed in machine-readable form, by beneficiary and legal basis.
Two expired energy points — exit rules for the restriction levels and the pre-winter reserves report — were missed in precisely the week gas prices hit a four-year high and a Russian supply retaliation was floated. The new Paks outage and diesel subsidy points translate the same gap into cost terms: who carries the extra cost of an outage, how long the subsidy lasts, and who gets it. The common thread is the absence of any expiry or cost-bearing rule. Restrictions have no exit threshold, the diesel subsidy has no fixed end date, and nobody is designated in advance to pay for a shock — which is why the annual cost table in an energy-shock preparedness plan would give the rest of this cluster a shared set of books.
Whether the Hungarian atomic energy authority formally approaches Egypt’s Nuclear Power Plants Authority and the IAEA about construction and safety-culture findings on the VVER-1200, and whether a summary of the reply is published.
Watch whether the regulated price converges to market levels via a pre-announced 60-90 day stepped schedule instead of a sudden fast-track removal. Fulfilment signal: predictable, gradual price moves rather than a one-off jump.
Watch whether independent stations receive competition-neutral bridge measures (liquidity credit line, non-discriminatory supply) instead of mass closures. Fulfilment signal: no rise in large-network market concentration after the phase-out.
Whether the consumer order, the extent and duration of curtailment, the objective technical triggers and industrial compensation are put in legal form before any curtailment happens.
MÉH coordination; IEA 90-day target restored; gas-storage fill >90% (autumn start).
Whether stock data appear broken down by product — crude, petrol, diesel — in days and tonnes, regularly updated. The aggregate 87-day figure and refined-product cover are two different things.
Whether a public version of the project’s risk register appears: schedule status per unit against the earlier plan, a summary of the penalty and guarantee regime, and the main contractor’s documented performance on other projects.
Whether the government publishes a monthly, machine-readable exposure schedule: how much gas, crude and fuel arrived, through which entry point and route, the storage level, and strategic stocks expressed in days of cover.
Whether a roadmap for cutting Russian oil and gas dependence appears with annual targets, Adria capacity-expansion and LNG-booking milestones, and semi-annual review.
Is the report due on 11 September released, with justified redactions, covering MVM’s actual replacement cost against the HUF 37.4 billion REKK estimate, the channel through which the cost is borne, whether the low-water risk was foreseeable, and root causes?
LNG-Krk, Adria pipeline, Danube refinery Ural-dependency reduction; concrete schedule.
Whether a four-part public accounting appears within 60 days of the intervention’s completion: the full cost of the sill and barge sinking by source, lost generation per unit, the volume and cost of replacement imports, and the model-versus-measured deviation.
Whether a public stress test of the diesel supply chain is run, and whether the share of crude arriving via the Adria pipeline grows, with refined diesel from several sources and real strategic stocks.
Whether a submission-ready timetable with dated milestones is produced: when and at what capacity alternative routes come online, by how much the Russian source share falls each quarter, and which authority certifies the figure.
Is the plan annexed to the 2027 budget proposal, built on a severe Red Sea disruption scenario, with a single table showing what the year’s energy shocks cost and who paid: the state company, the budget or consumers?
Whether the next energy strategy contains a standalone storage target in gigawatt-hours and a separate figure for contracted demand-side flexibility, both expressed as a share of the prevailing evening peak load.
Whether a public regional simultaneity calculation is produced showing what happens to the Hungarian evening peak when a heatwave hits every neighbouring system at once — replacing today’s tacit assumption of spare capacity next door.
6-month orderly phase-out with monthly price steps, targeted compensation (bottom 2 income deciles HUF 5-12 000/month + professional sector); GVH+MEKH joint HHI-based market concentration monitoring.
The government + MOL phased non-Russian crude conversion schedule (CPC-Blend / brent / Libyan-Algerian), with 60-day accelerated environmental permitting; EUR 250-450 M CAPEX; framework talks within 6 months.
Temporary, SAO-audited Druzhba-conversion price cap (max 18 months) + targeted heating support (~HUF 30k/month, 200k households, ~HUF 30 bn/year); phase-out 31 March 2028.
Whether the government publishes a volume and price forecast for the refill still to come before the heating season: how much gas is missing against the fill target, at what expected price, and the total volume and average price of positions already hedged.
Whether the 2027 legislative package carries the threshold, formula and sunset date for automatic industrial energy-cost relief — replacing the shifting terms of after-the-fact, case-by-case rescue packages.
Whether a public, numeric exit-scenario summary is produced on four items: sums already paid, sums recoverable under contract, penalty value, and the replacement capacity needed by 2035.
Whether the annual capacity booked at the Croatian and Greek terminals, the weighted average price and the remaining term are published — replacing the storage-fill percentage, which the current European situation shows is not the decisive factor. Route concentration is measured too.
Whether the security-of-supply report and the grid development plan carry a numeric operating boundary: at what Danube flow and level every unit remains operable without riverbed intervention, and at which level derating or shutdown becomes mandatory.
Binary indicator: did the cap (and de facto price accord) end on 9 May 2027, or was it extended? Fuel market HHI below 2500 by end 2027.
Whether the government moves to attach a sunset date or a public review date, with annual assessment, to the exemption for Russian crude via the Druzhba pipeline — open-ended since 2022.
Is there a legal basis for the mechanism that, once the energy price index exceeds its 12-month average by 30 per cent, pays automatic support within 48 hours to households in the bottom 40 per cent income band, funded from the allowance revenue line?
Whether an exposure audit is produced for every river-cooled plant, and whether cooling towers, renegotiated thermal limits and partial capacity replacement are compared in an open cost-benefit analysis.
Measured at MOL refinery input; 2025 baseline: ~60%.
The released 575 million litre refill schedule over 24 months; 90-day import equivalent reached.
The Russian crude import share falls from the 2025 ~58% to ≤25% by 2028 (28 pp); based on MEKH time series and JANAF capacity reporting.
Long-term diversification target; depends on LNG infrastructure capacity.
Whether an average saving figure backed by sampled measurement is available for closed renovation programmes before the next call. Without it the new call repeats the same blindness to impact.
Fulfilled when a pre-defined price-shock threshold is set that automatically triggers targeted, temporary compensation without discretion. Signal: a published threshold and a built-in phase-out rule.
Whether time-of-use tariffs become available on an opt-in basis to every smart-metered household, with mandatory extension only after measured effects — smart meters currently cover 11 percent of households.
Whether capacity planning includes an annually reviewed water-scarcity scenario in three bands (normal year, prolonged drought, extreme drought with heat), with numerical assumptions for nuclear, renewable, gas and import capacity.
Whether a mandatory annual public security-of-supply stress test enters law with at least three scenarios (heatwave without Paks, low import capacity, prolonged low wind) and a duty to report to Parliament.
Whether the competition authority runs continuous public margin monitoring, and whether price regulation squeezes out small operators — does the number of independent stations fall.
Whether the electrifiable transport segments (urban public transport, short-range fleets) are electrified on schedule without harming supply security.
Fulfilled when the emergency gas reserve reaches at least 90 days of consumption. Signal: published reserve-level data staying consistently above the threshold.
A good sign is a falling share for the single largest supplier in energy imports alongside a rising domestic renewables share. Continued reliance on one source and one route is the bad sign.
Watch whether the EUR 1.5bn grid upgrade and HUF 480bn integration programme are scheduled in step with the wind tenders, and whether energy-storage capacity is built alongside.
Whether the government states, on adopting the legislative programme, that wholesale market structure and residential price regulation will reach Parliament in separate bills on separate timetables.
Whether every subprogramme above HUF 50bn gets a published forecast check before signature, drawing on the actual cost and schedule data of comparable completed domestic and European projects, with the gap explained in writing.
Whether a data-governance framework appears before the rollout wave: at what granularity (15, 30 or 60 minutes) consumption is recorded, how long it is stored, who may access it and for what purposes.
Whether the government publicly itemises the strategic reserve (target: a 90-day gas reserve), and whether consumer compensation can be activated within 48 hours of a price spike.
Following Rosatom’s 5 June 2026 letter, whether the government decides on continuation/modification on the basis of a pre-fixed, public, four-factor criteria set (lifetime cost, supplier dependency, supply security, climate-target fit), and whether it makes the findings of the independent due diligence public (except for classified business/national-security data).
As a condition of the unfrozen EUR 16.4bn, the EU asks for the phase-out of the utility cuts / price cap (including the protected fuel price). MIAK benchmark: whether, instead of the general price cap, an income-proportionate transfer targeted to the lowest income deciles and a phased phase-out timetable with pre-announced expiry dates is created. Indicator: energy-support spending as a share of GDP, on a falling path.
Whether a pre-drafted mechanism is prepared that activates only above a defined threshold — targeted help instead of universal price support, with a mandatory expiry date.
Whether energy-storage capacity grows enough to cover the summer demand peak with a reserve, so that an output drop like the Paks curtailment does not create a supply risk.
Watch whether annual storage expansion reaches the proposed 200-500 MW band so the evening cooling peak (duck curve) can be managed via storage. Fulfilment: measurable yearly growth from the current ~50 MW.
Whether the Paks cooling package is extended with an equally detailed plan for the temperature limit: continuously updated publication of measured Danube temperature at the gauge, the monthly output loss in megawatts caused by the limit, and a cost comparison of deeper water intake, a cooling tower and keeping the status quo.
Whether every investment or lifetime-extension decision on a water-cooled plant above 300 MW will require a public, quantified water-availability forecast to the end of the planned lifetime, across several climate scenarios, naming the flow threshold below which the plant cannot operate.
Whether the decision is published together with a precise definition of who qualifies, a per-recipient cap, and automatic payment based on linked state registers without a separate application.
Whether the legislation sets a calendar expiry date plus publicly reasoned reviews 30 days after the Százhalombatta refinery returns to full capacity and at the end of the heating season.
Last week’s open question in this cluster has been settled: on 8 September Parliament elected the Independent Public Media Board with no opposition nominees, so the point on a party-neutral composition is missed. That feeds back into the cluster’s other points. Pre-set grounds for dismissal and disclosure of how media acquisitions are financed were meant to be policed by an independent body; if that body was filled by a single majority, enforcing the rules depends on that majority’s goodwill. The stakes of the delayed media freedom framework act have therefore risen — only statutory nomination and conflict-of-interest rules can now repair what was left out when the board was set up.
Delayed: the 120-day deadline passed without a framework act, yet the process has not stalled — the new Media Council reached the agenda of an extraordinary parliamentary sitting, while nominations to the Independent Public Media Board collapsed into disarray and the vote slipped to the following week.
Fulfilled when public media is run not by a single government-appointed CEO but by a board chosen with a two-thirds majority, multiple nominating actors and conflict-of-interest rules. Persisting one-person control is the bad sign.
Whether the government adopts an all-ministry procedure with four mandatory elements: open accreditation with refusals given in writing and with reasons; pre-set questioning rights; publication after the event of who attended and in what capacity; and release of the full, uncut recording.
Whether the file is turned into a database that is searchable, filterable by period, category and decision level, and aggregable. Target: 100% of the 266 documented cases in structured form by end-Q4 2026.
Whether a public appointment rulebook is adopted for news leadership posts: mandatory publication of the call and a minimum deadline, publication of the professional programme, and a fixed composition for the selection panel.
The budget commissioner’s appointment must not erode the NMHH’s autonomous status; the legal basis should be clean and EMFA-compliant — otherwise an EU media-freedom risk (the NMHH itself disputes the legality of the appointment).
Whether grounds for dismissing executives are fixed within 90 days, with mandatory written reasoning. Proposed target: public reasoning naming a ground for 100 per cent of dismissals.
Watch whether political ads non-compliant with the new media law (hate-inciting, dignity-violating) are removed by year-end. Fulfilment signal: the actual dismantling of banned ad carriers by the deadline.
Fulfilled when MTVA’s full budget and production contracts are public in machine-readable form and news editing is bound by a balance-of-coverage code. Signal: an independent media monitor measuring editorial neutrality.
Whether 2026 baseline values are recorded for source diversity and the mix of voices given airtime, so the first 2027 comparison is measurable — the relaunch of the news programme being the most easily reversible step.
Whether ministries start quarterly reporting on the number of information requests received, granted and refused and the average handling time, and whether a fast, time-bound review route opens at the data-protection authority ahead of the court stage — so that plainly unfounded refusals do not turn into years of litigation.
Whether a rule holds that by end-2027 no single ownership group reaches 15% of external production spend — and whether a quarterly, machine-readable production procurement register exists, naming ultimate beneficial owners.
Whether a quarterly advertising register starts with the 2027 budget year, and whether the combined share of the three largest recipients of state advertising spend falls. The direction matters, not the absolute value.
Measurable after the framework bill is implemented.
High → medium-low; annual EU measurement.
Independent editorial board on at least 4 channels (government, parliamentary opposition, MTA, civil umbrella); RSF Press Freedom Index +20 places by 2029 vs. 2025 reference.
Watch whether funding arrives via a law-fixed, GDP-proportional automatic formula and whether quarterly public impartiality metrics appear (uncut airtime, source diversity). Fulfilment: independently maintained metrics from Q1 2027.
Whether the first public, indicator-level Hungarian media-pluralism report appears — built on the Media Pluralism Monitor’s indicator structure with domestic adaptation — and whether its methodology is public.
Whether any competent authority makes disclosure of the funding source and ultimate beneficial owners a condition of clearance — and when. Without it the EMFA media-pluralism test stays formal.
How many of the six seats are filled by the time the board is constituted. The governing majority has signalled it can be constituted without opposition nominees — a short-handed start is the first test of the institutional guarantees. Proposed target: full complement within six months.
Whether a statutory ban is adopted excluding the use of state funds to acquire media businesses. The measure of ownership transparency is how many providers meet machine-readable ownership disclosure.
Whether an annual, public, segment-by-segment media-concentration (HHI) measurement is launched; whether the TV market’s HHI falls below 2500 within three years, and whether at least five independent national newsrooms operate — the pluralism benchmark after the Mediaworks wind-down (closure of Bors, Ripost, Metropol).
Whether the next media law amendment fixes two limits: a news leadership mandate may be revoked only with written, published reasons and only on a pre-defined ground.
Watch whether the final public-media leader is chosen by broad parliamentary consensus (opposition veto or qualified majority), with a diverse board on cycle-independent mandates. Fulfilment: a documented process with opposition participation.
Watch whether the interim leadership’s limited powers are publicly itemized: no contracts longer than one year, no mass layoffs, no restructuring of newsrooms. Fulfilment signal: zero irreversible decisions during the transition.
Whether the public-media budget is set for several years ahead by an objective formula fixed in law (ruling out funding withdrawal as a pressure tool), with a mandatory public impact assessment — the financial guarantee of editorial autonomy.
Watch whether the nine-member Board’s political-professional ratio becomes balanced, members are elected by a two-thirds majority, and conflict-of-interest screening is mandatory. Fulfilment signal: the end of the 6:3 political majority.
Whether the planned 180–190-person layoff at Mediaworks runs as a fair collective procedure under the Labour Code, with statutory severance and retraining support, separated from the political dispute.
Whether the Press Fund is allocated by a pre-set, objective, public formula and a reasoned application process, with a mandatory published beneficiary list — so allocation cannot become a lever of pressure.
Whether the statute establishes that content instructions may be given only in writing, with an identifiable sender and a registered file number, that acting on an oral request is a breach, and that a complaint route exists outside the newsroom. Target: 100% written in the first full year.
Whether statute fixes objective, pre-published criteria for the nominating professional organisations, a two-thirds confirmation of professional nominees, and terms offset from the parliamentary cycle — or whether it stays mere practice.
The era of the public-interest asset management foundations (KEKVA) closed, but not in the way this cluster’s measurement point asked: the Schmidt foundation network moved to the Cultural Asset Manager and Városliget Zrt., so ongoing public functions do have a legal owner — yet the rule-of-law redesign of stewardship, with a management charter and conflict-of-interest rules, did not come with it. The same distinction shows in education: term started, but not undisturbed, after the Education Office and Déryné Programme contracts were terminated and the board of the University of Theatre and Film Arts (SZFE) replaced. What the cluster measures today is two completed formalities and two missing guarantees.
The attack on a German airport and power plant, then the Leipzig attribution and the sabotage at a Polish drone plant, turned hybrid threat into a question of legal classification within one week — and it is here that neither the capability nor the procedure turns out to be mapped on the Hungarian side. The two new points are therefore each other’s precondition: the drone-defence audit of critical infrastructure tells us how long detection-to-intervention takes, and the attribution protocol tells us who may speak about it and at what evidentiary threshold. Without the audit the protocol is an empty declaration; without the protocol the audit’s findings never turn into a decision.
Whether a written Hungarian position is prepared for regional airspace-violation scenarios: who represents Hungary, on what criteria, and what counts as a proportionate allied response.
Whether a public decision document comparing the SAFE loan with alternative financing in numbers appears at least 30 days before the second round’s rules are finalised.
Whether an itemised list is produced of the critical enabler capabilities (air-to-air refuelling, strategic lift, ISR, missile defence, precision munitions) where planning rests wholly on allied assets — with columns for European alternative, cost and lead time.
Whether a mandatory risk-based access and aircraft-securing standard for all public landing sites appears within 90 days — scrambling a Gripen after a stolen Cessna is the costliest answer to a cheaply closable gap.
After the 29 May 2026 Russian drone strike on Galați (Romania, a NATO member), whether a formalised Hungarian–Romanian joint alert and airspace-monitoring cooperation is established; KPI: whether it operates (yes/no) and the reaction time in a border incident.
Whether it is set down in writing within 90 days who may speak about a hybrid incident on Hungarian territory and at what evidentiary threshold, and whether it is tested annually in a simulation exercise.
Pentagon monthly data; if it falls below 25k by year-end 2026, the 20-25k withdrawal scenario is operationalising — Hungarian doctrine escalation trigger.
Watch whether the defense ministry’s parliamentary state secretary delivers the review report on all 2022-2026 procurement and ministry contracts tied to the arms-development program. Fulfilled when the report is completed on schedule.
Whether the airspace-policing escalation ladder is put in writing and annual figures show what share of incidents closed at the lowest rung — that ratio, not the raw number of scrambles, shows the system’s maturity.
Whether a plain-language summary appears on the detection threshold, who decides on scrambling jets and on weapon use, and when and through what channel the public is informed.
Whether a Hungarian firm appears as supplier or subcontractor in at least one SAFE joint procurement contract within 60 days of the second call opening.
Whether the screening of airports and high-voltage substations is completed within 180 days, with a cost estimate for missing capabilities. For detection-to-intervention time the relevant order of magnitude is minutes, not hours.
Whether a facility-type responsibility matrix is enacted in law — not in internal rules — naming the primary detector, the primary responder, who may order neutralisation, and the threshold at which a case passes to the other agency; treating military, civilian-critical and mixed sites separately.
Whether an annual public report shows what share of defence procurement went to domestic manufacturers — Poland’s 90% is an upper reference, not a target, but without a metric the debate runs without numbers.
Whether an inter-ministerial geostrategic analytical unit with semi-annual situation assessments is created, and whether a pre-developed, scenario-based crisis-management protocol (energy-price shock, refugee wave, regional escalation) is produced — so that Hungarian foreign policy becomes predictive and procedurally documented rather than reactive.
Whether a public, machine-readable database of restricted zones around critical facilities exists by mid-2027, in a form flight-planning applications and onboard devices can ingest.
Munitions + air defence + counter-drone on a joint regional (V4+RO+HR) procurement platform; EDF Hungarian drawdown 2026-2030 cycle at least EUR 600 m; 30-50% unit-cost reduction.
Whether a standardised quarterly report starts on events affecting Hungarian and neighbouring allied airspace: date, nature, response, attribution and the outcome of closed investigations.
Track whether defence spending climbs toward 2.5% of GDP by 2027 on the proposed multi-year, pre-set path rather than as a yearly political bargaining chip.
Full drone-detection/airspace-monitoring coverage of the critical eastern border sections within 24 months, ideally within a joint European (HV4) procurement framework — the border-defence benchmark after drone strikes on NATO members.
A public Defence Budget Dashboard; the publicly accessible share of the budget rising from ~30% to above 70% (procurement contracts, NATO capability targets made visible); productive-investment share above 40%.
Per NATO-standard annual report; given Pentagon-documented arms shortages, the upper band is more realistic; Poland’s 4.7% reference point.
Share of domestic production in Hungarian defence procurement; 2026 baseline reviewed and locked; defence R&D 12-15% of total R&D by 2030.
A good sign is the domestic R&D and manufacturing share of defence spending growth reaching 40%, meaning the money flows into home-grown development and jobs rather than pure imports.
Whether a risk analysis with a clear legal basis and independent oversight is prepared on where the Russian and Chinese ties of post-2010 senior officials carry knowledge-transfer or influence risk.
Whether a defence spending path expressed as a share of GDP enters law with measurable annual capability targets — 2.5 percent by 2027, 3.5 percent by 2030, with at least 40 percent of the increment going to productive domestic investment.
Whether from the 2027 report the alliance credibility audit carries four figures: share of capability targets met, average procurement lead time, critical stock fill rate, and the share of joint European procurement in total purchasing.
Watch whether Hungary’s vetoes and blockages in joint EU and NATO decisions decline, and whether Hungary stays a reliable, predictable ally on the decisive questions.
Whether the defence contribution (drone financing, NATO 2%) is decoupled from the national position taken on other issues — that is, does not appear as a package deal that erodes alliance credibility.
Whether an aggregate public report on domestic hybrid incidents appears: case numbers by type (airspace, cyber, sabotage, influence), the sectors affected, the average time from detection to notification, and the state of attribution — without operational detail or data from ongoing investigations.
Whether an eligibility framework is published for service heads and their deputies: minimum professional experience in years and field, verifiable management experience, completion of security vetting and conflict-of-interest screening before nomination, and the procedural order of submissions.
The hydraulic model for the Danube riverbed sill was again not published ahead of the second phase, while the week’s debate turned on the Austrian ministry’s proposal and a joint Danube-states position — so international talks are proceeding without figures for backwater or riverbed erosion. It is the same lag seen with the water-balance dashboard: adaptation works get built, but the data to measure their effect does not follow. The metering and enforcement regime for the irrigation ban is therefore the cluster’s next test. If abstraction by large water users still rests on self-reporting, the ban will be as impossible to verify as the sill’s impact.
Delayed: the drought crisis entered its operational phase and the JÉGER report is due in October, but the daily public water-balance dashboard has not launched.
Whether large non-residential water users must report and meter their own abstraction, with the readings entering the official register and graduated sanctions replacing today’s self-declaration.
Whether every heat-based exemption — lifting the lorry ban, exceeding a thermal limit, an abstraction permit — comes with a short public impact assessment, so a one-off exception does not become routine.
Whether the full data series of the hail-suppression system is published by county and generator, and whether the independent panel’s mandate, data access and deadline are set out publicly.
Whether a nationally uniform priority order is adopted setting the sequence of restrictions by level (recreation, non-cooling industrial abstraction, irrigation, finally households), with health and social exemptions.
Whether the government adopts a public negotiating mandate towards the upstream states (Germany, Austria, Slovakia) for a scarcity-period allocation and minimum-flow protocol, using the Danube commission and the EU water framework.
Realistically available irrigation water at 2026 autumn sowing min. 120k ha (current 100k); 5k farmers relief channel within 6 months.
Whether a single-methodology balance is published for five sectors — agriculture, energy, logistics, drinking water and industry — with losses quantified in forint and an uncertainty range, in one comparable table.
Whether a public task map appears showing who currently measures and models what across the water directorate, the research network, university faculties and the national laboratory — and whether scattered time series enter a single catalogue.
50 ha+ mandatory base insurance (drought, frost, hail) + state catastrophe-risk pool (within 180 days); insurance penetration to 75% by 2028 (current 40%).
Whether a machine-readable joint data sheet is set up publishing daily discharge, water level and temperature at least at the Nagybajcs, Budapest, Paks and Mohács gauges, a quarterly sediment balance, in a uniform format with a downloadable historical series.
Paid amount / reported damage claims ratio min. 60% within 6 months; below 40% the implementation capacity must be reconsidered.
Whether the water authority publishes pre-set levels stating which user groups take priority in a scarcity period and at which measured water-level or flow threshold each restriction takes effect.
With Commission approval, reallocation of min. 25% of Hungary’s EUR 2.5 bn CAP Pillar II (~EUR 625 m) to climate adaptation priority. CAP climate-adaptation utilisation rate: 2026: 15%, 2027: 20%, 2030: 30%.
Whether the hail-suppression operating log and rainfall data for the same periods appear in one place in downloadable form — replacing the two opposing press-statement claims now standing over whether operation and drought are linked.
Whether the water directorates publish valid industrial abstraction permits in a single register: permit holder, location and source of abstraction, licensed annual and daily volumes, and any restriction condition — the register prohibits nothing, it only makes visible.
Whether the whole damage-claim process runs through the agricultural data platform, and whether the platform publishes anonymous municipality-level aggregates: hectares affected, damage assessed and amounts actually paid — available by mid-2027.
Track whether a uniform, pre-published heat-alert action plan is drafted within six months, tying accountable measures to HungaroMet’s alert levels, with its first live season next summer.
Whether the rail development programme’s planning documentation includes a dedicated chapter on how many train paths can be added at short notice on the main freight corridors, where the bottlenecks are, and what maintenance scheduling preserves that reserve during the summer months.
Whether an impact protocol for the hail-suppression system appears before the 2027 hail season — comparing the four counties still covered with those switched off, a natural experiment the current decision created by accident.
Whether the 133-station drought and water-scarcity monitoring network receives the protection status due to critical assets, with a physical-security minimum and on-site signage explaining what each device measures. Measure: stations operating at season start, and vandalism cases.
Sectoral (agriculture, water, health, construction, energy) action tables with deadlines/owners; monthly public climate dashboard; annual Climate Adaptation Report to parliament (UK Climate Change Act 2008 model).
Whether the government takes an express decision before the next low-water season on whether the stone sill built into the riverbed is temporary or permanent — with an exit criterion or a full impact-assessment duty, and cross-border consultation.
Whether a pre-agreed drought protocol is adopted: distribution rules, a priority order (drinking water, irrigation, industry) and graduated restriction thresholds — instead of decisions taken mid-crisis.
Whether river, lake and groundwater stock data become available on a single machine-readable platform, together with drought-monitoring indicators and aggregate abstraction-permit data.
Whether a municipality-level — in cities district-level — map is produced of heat-island intensity, social exposure and local health capacity, with weekly excess-mortality reporting by age group.
Whether a regularly updated map launches combining satellite vegetation data, soil-moisture measurements and reported damage on one platform — this is what makes relief targeted.
VAT Act amendment + 60 small reservoirs + 200k ha water-conserving tillage (no-till, mulch, cover crop); target: irrigated area ~100k ha → +80-120k ha by end 2027.
Watch whether community self-governed management of watershed regions (Tisza system, Lake Velence catchment) launches in 5 pilot regions by 2027, with transparent rules, monitoring and graduated sanctions.
Whether at least five self-governing catchment-level irrigation communities form with working local rules, and whether development funds are allocated against drought-damage data.
Whether drought-tolerant varieties and water-efficient, data-driven farming spread, and whether the domestic integrated climate-economy model delivers sector-level damage estimates.
From current 100k ha to 250k ha; reservoir expansion along Tisza and Hortobágy; precision irrigation for <50 ha farms.
MG1 program point (1000 soil-sensor stations) scheduled build-out; real-time public API + Drought dashboard. 300 stations by end 2026, 700 by end 2027, 1000 by end 2028.
Currently ~1500 wells → 3000 with real-time public data; target: share of wells below 2022 historical minimum ~22% → <10% by 2030.
A good sign is the climate act due this year carrying binding, deadline-bound, annually accountable adaptation targets rather than vague principles, paired with a working drought-damage insurance scheme.
Whether a three-tier alert system tied to the meteorological service’s thresholds is created with a pre-defined package of measures, and whether cooling of schools, hospitals, nurseries and care homes begins.
Watch whether a real water-retention system starts building from the next budget year: restored streams and reservoirs, channel reconstruction, and a rising number of catchment regions covered.
Whether a tier-by-tier mandatory, quantified, cross-sector action package (health, schools, workplaces, transport) is produced with a public real-time data interface, replacing ad hoc prime-ministerial announcements with a pre-published rule set.
Whether the HUF 3.6 billion hospital climate retrofit continues through the announced 2027-2029 programme’s scheduled, accountable steps, and whether the number of rail sections under heat-related speed restrictions falls.
Whether each of the three alert levels triggers an automatic statutory package — outdoor work rules, institutional procedures, water distribution, transport cooling — with normative state funding.
Whether the campaign effect is built into durable feedback: whether water bills start showing a comparison with similar households, and whether utilities publish their annual network-loss trend.
Whether the support system’s centre of gravity shifts: water-retaining agronomy as a condition of area payments, simplified irrigation licensing with abstraction caps, and index-based insurance products.
Watch whether each heat-alert tier gets a pre-defined, numeric cross-sector action package (hospital reserve capacity, work schedules, active outreach to vulnerable groups). Fulfilment signal: a public, real-time, auditable data interface.
Whether above-threshold abstraction applications must obtain the centre’s published written opinion, with a duty to give reasons for departing from it — and whether the centre publishes the hit rate of its own past forecasts.
Whether a per-municipality water-security index appears from four public data points: network loss ratio, reserve capacity relative to daily peak demand, water-base type and exposure, and restriction days over the past three years.
Whether the founding act carries an itemised annex on compulsory publication — daily water-level and temperature series, the register of abstraction permits, the restriction list, a national drought index — in a fixed format.
Whether every water-management plan above HUF 10bn — including rescue plans such as the Lake Velence one — is placed in a public, version-controlled repository.
Whether the water service starts annual, uniformly measured and cross-section-published monitoring of riverbed incision on the main river reaches, and whether an intervention plan with cost and impact estimates follows.
Watch whether real-time public data on water pressure, reserve levels and quality becomes available for every municipality on a single national platform. Growing data coverage signals fulfilment.
Whether Hungary initiates a binding prior notification and consultation procedure among the Danube states ahead of any riverbed intervention that durably alters water sharing.
Whether a public ex-post assessment answers four questions: did the gauge stay above the minus 90 cm level; what did the works cost item by item against the HUF 6bn order of magnitude announced; is there a measurable environmental effect diverging from the Natura 2000 review’s forecast; and how much lost generation was avoided — including the accounting of the HUF 6.2bn drought-relief fund.
In a single week Hungarian healthcare saw the institution-level infection database go live, a HUF 500bn pay settlement arrive, and the shift to outcome-based funding begin — measurement and the money riding on it opened at the same time. That sequence is itself the risk: on raw, unadjusted infection rates the hospital treating complex cases looks worse, and the funding rewards patient selection. This is why side-effect monitoring belongs with the pay-scale points: the quarterly vacancy statement and microbiological testing intensity together show whether things improved or we are simply measuring less.
Delayed: several regulatory pieces moved on a single day — the return of mandatory chamber membership, a new nursing pay scale — but no unified reform bill reached Parliament.
Whether a baseline survey with published methodology precedes the programme — without it, a fall in the lists cannot be told apart from patients removed for administrative reasons.
Whether the held, unreleased quality reports (like the 2015 review withheld for 10 years) are released in full, and whether publication becomes the default rather than withholding.
Whether waiting times and reasons for removal are machine-readable by institution and procedure — median waits hidden behind institutional averages cannot be tracked.
Whether the 2027 budget carries a public, purpose-by-purpose allocation plan for the announced annual HUF 500bn in additional health funding, with a duty to account for it yearly.
Joining EU4Health 2025 joint procurements (vaccine, rapid test, PPE) and an independent IHR compliance audit along the 13 core capacities, with a public report (within 180 days).
Reduction in Batthyány-Strattmann László Foundation turnaround from current 60-90 days to below 30.
An independent professional body conducts an institution-by-institution capacity review (by care volume, quality indicators, geographic access) — the professional answer to the MOK’s “hospital closure” warning; KPI: a fall in the share of waiting lists over 30 days.
Watch whether within 12 months a comprehensive nurse-retention package (competitive pay, clinical career path, minimum staffing) and real-time waiting-list publication launch. Fulfilment signal: falling nurse shortage (the ~64/10,000 ratio approaching the EU ~85 average) and shorter waiting lists.
Whether institution-by-institution, uniform-methodology, risk-adjusted public reporting of hospital infection rates becomes a statutory obligation, rather than depending on ministerial goodwill.
2027 budget shows healthcare GDP share at 7.1% (or higher); trackable on the Fiscal Council dashboard.
Reduction in hip prosthesis, cataract surgery, cardiology specialist care waiting lists; 2027-01-01 baseline, 2027-12-31 measurement.
The proposed KPI targets the unified patient-satisfaction and quality platform covering 100% of public and private providers by 2027. A good sign is the private sector being included in the shared measurement.
MIAK proposes raising the nurse minimum wage to 65% of the doctor minimum within three years, alongside a clinical (non-managerial) career path. A good sign is the pay gap actually closing and the career track launching.
The nurse minimum wage rises in steps over three years to 65% of the medical level; KPI: nurse emigration halves by 2030 and the nurses-per-10,000-population ratio moves from ~64 towards the EU’s 85.
Rising GDP path from 6.8% to 8%: 2027: 7.1%, 2028: 7.4%, 2029: 7.7%, 2030: 8.0%.
Whether institution-level infection data is displayed primarily in risk-adjusted form. On raw rates the hospital treating complex cases looks worse, which creates an incentive for patient selection.
Whether the data appears in machine-readable time-series form and whether side effects are tracked: microbiological testing intensity and shifts in case mix. If the infection rate and testing intensity fall together, that is missing measurement, not improvement.
Whether the new nursing pay scale is accompanied by non-pay retention measures — shift design, training, mentoring for new entrants — with measurable targets. MIAK’s E6 point proposes halving attrition by 2030.
Whether outcome indicators are attached to the extra funding: average waiting time for elective procedures and the share of out-of-pocket health spending. The latter should converge on the EU average of 15 per cent.
Whether the reference basket is published before the next price round, and whether it is disclosed in aggregate for what share of subsidised products the Hungarian net price exceeds the basket average. A 2.5-fold gap is currently a single known case.
Whether the first quarterly statement of vacant nursing posts by institution appears in Q1 2027. It directly shows whether the system can replace those who leave.
Whether a provider-independent, performance- and case-mix-based, pre-fixed resource-allocation formula for hospitals delivering the same public task (state and church) is published and applied, instead of case-by-case bargaining.
The minister promised a state-private settlement by autumn; MIAK asks for a data-based public framework with itemised separation of public and private funding flows. A good sign is a public, separated accounting launching in autumn.
Whether institution-level, comparable infection reporting starts in autumn 2026 (target: at least 80 percent of active inpatient hospitals in the first year), not merely a national average.
Whether the share of cases starting cancer treatment within 14 days reaches 90 percent, and whether the share waiting beyond 30 days halves within three years.
Whether the shutdown of hospital facial recognition extends into a principled framework: documenting purpose limitation and reviewing further biometric systems, making data security the starting point of design.
Whether the law establishes that the chief medical officer’s epidemiological/public-health professional decisions cannot be overridden for political reasons, and that the position is tied to a fixed, predictable term and professional conditions — the institutional safeguard of the durability of the Oroszi Beatrix appointment.
Whether the making/revoking of healthcare legislation (such as the heartbeat decree) is accompanied by a mandatory, public professional-body opinion; indicator: what share of legislation had such an opinion.
A full review of the waste-management system began with HUF 90bn at stake, in a data situation where the most recent known recycling rate dates from 2024 (33.6 per cent) and the landfill rate stands at 53.2 per cent. A contract cannot be controlled on a two-year data lag: cutting the publication delay below twelve months is therefore a precondition for the public performance benchmark and the automatic sanctions — without it the benchmark cannot be tied to measured data. The cash refund channel is the household end of the same chain: if it narrows before the winter season, collection rates fall and the benchmark shows a worse number at the very moment it is introduced.
The committee investigating the clemency case opened with the threat of coercive measures, and that is exactly what makes this cluster’s points interdependent: a hearing held without procedural guarantees makes its own findings contestable, and contestable findings never turn into a protocol that can be raised to statutory level. The annual anonymised report is the third step, and it holds the cluster’s only backward-looking indicator: how often the final decision departs from the professional recommendation, and how many of those departures carry a separate explanation. That is the number measuring the structural cause of the 2023 case, not its cast.
Strike threats surfaced in three sectors at once this week — teachers, social care, law enforcement — and all three show the same structural cause: there is no forum where a pay dispute runs on data rather than ultimatums. The new point therefore measures not the size of the raise but the quality of dispute resolution: how many announced strike-readiness surveys turn into actual walkouts. It shares a root with the missing data on hours worked under heat alerts — both arise where labour-market decisions get made without data.
This cluster’s new point — a review of the state’s cyber attack surface after the diplomatic expulsions — turns the question the Közhang platform raised about consultation into a security question. Just as the method that filters citizens’ submissions is a public matter, so is where state IT systems suffered confirmed intrusions and where fixes are complete. In both cases there is a measurable middle ground between full secrecy and full disclosure: aggregated reporting without naming institutions, or a registered methodology. If neither materialises, the trustworthiness of the digital state rests on the government’s word alone.
The expulsion of Russian diplomats and Hungary’s blocking stance on the emissions trading system pose the same question from opposite directions: does Hungarian foreign policy run on principles fixed in advance, or is every move a one-off bargain? The doctrine document and the retaliation scenario would test whether criteria stand behind the expulsions; the climate coalition map would test whether the blocking position can actually muster allies covering the 35 per cent of EU population a blocking minority requires. Together with the earlier veto-justification standard, the cluster builds a single yardstick — a Hungarian position is strong when it can be written down beforehand, and weak when it can only be explained afterwards.
Missed: no public 2021–2026 time series of state celebration costs, broken down by cost item and with unit-cost indicators, had appeared by 13 September.
Missed: no government report on reserves and diversification had appeared by 13 September. The press reported only that storage was about 71 per cent full, while MVM’s procurement costs and the winter supply scenarios are still not public.
Missed: by the 12 September deadline there was no report that all Category C emergency decrees, the ones incompatible with the rule of law, had been repealed, nor of a phase-out schedule for the Category B decrees.
Missed: no public issue-by-issue coalition map for the sanctions files was produced by 12 September, and no jointly pre-agreed package with other member states emerged; the V4-plus-Ireland summit in Bratislava focused on Ukraine’s accession clusters.
Missed: no hydraulic model of the riverbed sill had been published by 12 September; the week’s coverage was about the Austrian ministry’s proposal and a joint position of the Danube states, not about figures for backwater, water temperature or riverbed erosion.
Missed: the Constitutional Court had not published a public recusal and quorum procedure by 11 September; the week’s news about the Court concerned Parliament’s election of five new justices and the tender-based election of its president, not this procedural rule.
Missed: no public spending portal listing recovery and cohesion funds item by item had launched by 9 September, even though the press reported that a further HUF 2.3 trillion in EU funds could arrive within weeks.
Missed: Parliament elected the Independent Public Media Board on 8 September, and it could be constituted without any opposition nominees after the KDNP nominee withdrew. Its make-up therefore does not rule out capture by a single political majority.
Missed: by the 7 September deadline the ministry had not named the body responsible for continuously monitoring the lower-primary reform rollout or set a reporting cycle; no announcement appeared in the week’s press.
Missed: no itemised implementation schedule for the anti-corruption package was published by the deadline, with no figures on new investigator posts, a ring-fenced budget or data access for the Integrity Authority. The week’s accountability news covered individual criminal cases only.
Missed: the two economic ministries had not published a numerical, automatically triggered set of exit criteria for the retail margin cap by 7 September, and no decision on it was reported that week.
Missed: no decree has set entry and exit thresholds for all four energy restriction levels in a single document, even as gas prices hit a four-year high and a possible Russian cut-off of gas supplies was floated.
Missed: no daily public reporting of evening import exposure began.
Missed: in the days around the deadline the Mandiner CEO and editor-in-chief were dismissed and the M5 channel director removed — with no self-restraint code in place.
Missed: no daily public reporting of the evening-peak flexibility reserve began.
Done: the 31 August 2026 government decree assigned the affected foundations to the Cultural Asset Manager and Városliget Zrt., so ongoing public functions have a legal owner.
Missed: no compensation band was set for producers bearing losses in the system’s interest.
Missed: urban green space was not reclassified as heat-protection infrastructure — after the hottest Hungarian August on record.
Missed: the benefit did not become automatic by term start; the application requirement remained, leaving the risk of administrative non-take-up unchanged.
Missed: the 2026/27 school year began without substantive media-literacy content going beyond optional club level.
Done: Péter Polt’s constitutional-court mandate expired, along with those of three further justices. Replacement now falls to Parliament, requiring a two-thirds vote.
Missed: neither an outcome-indicator plan nor a spring 2026 baseline appeared before term started — the reform’s effect will not be separable from normal cohort variation even in retrospect.
Missed: no public confirmation arrived by the deadline that the open call had closed and the new leadership had taken office.
Missed: no itemised public assessment of the ban’s effect on producers and consumers was produced.
Missed: the justice package moved the other way — it would introduce confiscation without proof of a criminal offence and an accelerated procedure, without strengthening judicial reservation.
Missed: no uniform compensation rule was adopted as the counterpart to the excluded damages claim.
Missed: no public confirmation arrived by the deadline that individual medicine requests had been taken over.
Missed: neither a baseline nor a closing dataset was published for the 30-day operation, so the result cannot be measured.
Missed: no final public criterion setting the income threshold, the eligible children, the amount and the payment schedule appeared before term started.
Missed: no ministry-by-ministry strategic action plans with measurable targets and deadlines were published by 31 August.
Missed: the amended funding plan was filed by the deadline; parliamentary adoption of the reform package was not.
Done: the government filed the amended plan hours before the 31 August 2026 deadline and announced that the drawdown conditions had been met. An itemised, budget-line-level accounting is still not public.
Done: per the government’s announcement the committed milestones were met by the 31 August deadline; independent confirmation awaits the Commission’s assessment.
Done: the drawdown phase reportedly closed without loss of funds. Reconciling the disputed figures — HUF 3,650bn, EUR 16.4bn, EUR 10bn — is left to the itemised accounting.
Missed: no clarifying legal position appeared on which instrument and whose competence could introduce the pay cap.
Missed: the amended budget was submitted without an itemised statement of the deficit’s origin, so the increment cannot be traced source by source.
Done at the tender stage: the first 700 MW wind tender was published on 31 August 2026. The real test of the transparency benchmark now shifts to the evaluation phase.
Missed: neither a contractual framework nor a compensation rule for voluntary demand reduction appeared.
Missed: no public outcome indicators were attached to the energy programme’s sub-programmes, so the return on HUF 868bn will not be measurable.
Missed: no public economic justification accompanied the mandatory state ownership share.
Missed: no ex-ante impact assessment was published on the day the 700 MW tender opened.
Missed: the 60-day deadline expired on the day of this run with no itemised, auditor-certified closing balance or public-money accounting for the Sovereignty Protection Office, and the week’s press record reports no accounting facts about its wind-down.
Done: four parallel investigations into NER-linked cases opened in a single week — the HUF 80bn routed into Paks II, the MÁV debt write-off, contracts of companies tied to Győző Orbán and Lőrinc Mészáros, and the HUF 25bn Fradi-town project — alongside criminal complaints over Covid-era ventilator procurement and the HUF 28bn Kommentár Foundation. The review has begun: late against the prime-ministerial deadline, but with documented enforcement steps.
Missed, and the gap showed at the worst possible moment: on 28 August the official gazette published the distribution of nationalised foundation assets across ministries with no auditor-certified itemised opening inventory — one of the grounds on which the Blue Planet foundation went to court.
Missed: the hearing opened on 26 August but the selection continued behind closed doors, the committee refused to release the scoring sheets, and on 28 August Parliament elected the president without public hearings for the other four leadership posts. The office’s first controversy thus became the transparency of its own selection.
Missed: the committee did not publish scored eligibility criteria before the vote, the hearing continued behind closed doors, and release of the scoring sheets was subsequently refused.
Missed: no candidate’s asset or conflict-of-interest declaration was published before the vote — at the very office that will be examining other people’s holdings.
Missed: no EPPO cooperation implementation plan appeared by the 90-day deadline — neither the number and appointment rules of delegated prosecutors nor the case-transfer protocol was published, and the week’s press record contains no factual reporting on it.
Missed: the 90-day deadline expired with no published criteria-based rulebook and no aggregate statistics on diplomatic and service passports — the topic did not surface in the week’s press record at all.
Missed: the week’s water balance split in two — the government announced a water-retention turn and completed the first phase of the Paks riverbed sill, while the Tiszalök hydro plant shut down, Lake Tisza all but dried out and Lake Balaton is short 260 million cubic metres. Yet no graded drought regime tied to measured trigger thresholds was promulgated.
Done: from 20 August the Paks cooling-water crisis response moved to a scheduled, multi-week mode — a unit-by-unit restart timetable tied to a published water-level threshold (231 m) instead of daily announcements.
Done: on 20 August 2026 the professional nominees to the Independent Public Media Board were made public, with the confirming parliamentary vote set for end-August. Raising the nomination rules to statutory level, however, is still outstanding.
Missed: by day 100 after taking office there was no ministry-level dashboard with measurable KPIs on kormany.hu — cabinet performance remains traceable only through press releases.
Missed: the three-scenario automotive contingency strategy was not published, even as on 23 August the VW group described the European industrial base as in a ‘more than critical’ state.
Missed: instead of full SEVESO disclosure a single case surfaced — the HUF 100m fine on the Iváncsa battery plant on 20 August, with missing air-pollution measurement and unreported nickel exposure.
Done: on 20 August 2026 the tax authority’s criminal directorate closed the case for lack of a criminal offence — decided on the authority’s own assessment, with no documented trace of external instruction. The procedural-statistics context of the closure, however, remains unpublished.
Missed: the closing data-management statute due alongside the Office’s abolition did not appear by the deadline, and no public account was given of what happens to the data holdings.
Missed, and moved the other way: the 18 August 2026 amendment loosened the requirements for school-district directors, and the call opened on 22 August — with no scored, pre-published criteria and no disclosed panel composition.
Missed: the actual recovery of the foundations’ assets began without a forensic review or a published launch schedule — the sequence is the reverse of what the measurement point required.
Missed: no cardinal-law amendment on a pre-election public-money embargo was passed, while the week brought three parallel official proceedings over procurement for the 20 August events.
Missed: no negotiating mandate was launched on expanding JANAF’s Hungary-bound capacity; the week’s Adriatic item surfaced only at the level of booking terms at the Croatian terminal.
Missed: the cardinal-level codification of a clemency justification duty did not happen — with Baka András taking office on 20 August, the new practice therefore starts without a written standard.
Missed: the 90-day deadline expired, none of the five committees published a first interim report, and the week’s press record contains no factual reporting on their work at all.
Missed: no self-restraint communication protocol was adopted by the deadline — the 20 August closure of the gold-convoy investigation showed precisely that official proceedings and their political framing still are not kept apart.
Missed: no witness-protection framework act was tabled, so the legal backdrop to the inquiry committees’ fact-finding is still absent — of a piece with those committees’ missing interim reports.
Missed: no signed four-pillar Hungarian–Polish document with measurable commitments materialised by the deadline; bilateral contact during the week narrowed to consular handling of the M3 bus disaster.
Missed: no package expanding the Integrity Authority’s powers was submitted within 90 days of the EU agreement, even though the week’s cohesion and recovery-fund decisions are exactly what would require reinforced control capacity.
Missed: the mandatory attorney-stakeholder declaration alongside clemency petitions was not introduced, even though the 20 August handover of the presidency was the natural moment to fix the rules.
Missed: by the 100-day deadline there was no published assessment separating politically targeted from professional investigations, no depoliticisation roadmap and no competitive county police-chief system.
Missed: the Foreign Ministry published no formal conditional-alliance doctrine, while the week’s sanctions and ICC files demonstrated exactly the absence of a predictable, pre-committed voting position.
Missed: the quarterly machine-readable ESA-2010 disclosure did not appear by the deadline — the week’s fiscal news (a HUF 300bn ministry clawback, a VAT cut, wealth-tax preparation) still cannot be tracked in a single data structure.
Missed: no quarterly counter-guarantee and expected-loss report appeared alongside the guarantee-reduction commitment, so the exposure still cannot be seen broken down by legal title.
Missed: by the deadline the government had not stated what type of procedure is under way, which body conducts it or under what authority — the week’s information-refusal practice shows the same pattern.
Missed: no daily public energy-saving dashboard was launched; the week’s energy data came from press analyses rather than official publication.
Missed: the GP pandemic protocol update and the ≥90 per cent feedback-measurement rate were not achieved by the 90-day deadline.
Missed: the exemption list for the rotational curtailment order was not published at decree level with institution types named — the pledge remained at press-conference level.
Missed: instead of an irrigation expansion timetable came HUF 106bn in drought compensation and a “super-advance” — ex-post compensation rather than structural change.
Missed: no waiting-list reduction plan and no risk-adjusted, institution-level public dashboard were ready by 15 August; the week’s progress — a hospital-infection database from September — concerns a different data set.
Missed: no timeline-based public record of the transition steps was produced; the legal bases can only be reconstructed afterwards from press replies and constitutional-court submissions.
Missed: the legislative package for a support and procurement moratorium in the 90 days before an election did not reach Parliament by the deadline.
Missed: no itemised statement or recovery schedule appeared for the advance paid for the 20 August celebration; a criminal complaint was filed over the communications payments, but no accounting followed.
Missed: fuel prices rose again from 15 August; no targeted, mileage-based commuter compensation was introduced, and no instrument with a pre-set expiry date was adopted.