Part I — Situation overview

In the so-called gold-convoy case, a new turn occurred on 25 June 2026: 444.hu obtained a recording of an internal prosecution document dated 9 June 2026, produced in the investigation conducted by the Budapest Investigating Prosecutor’s Office on suspicion of unlawful detention and abuse of office. According to the document, the investigation should primarily clarify the criminal liability of four high-ranking former officials — former prime minister Viktor Orbán, former state secretary Örs Farkas, János Hajdu, former director-general of the Counter-Terrorism Centre (TEK), and Tamás Demeter, former deputy criminal-affairs president of the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) (MIAK press monitor, 27 June 2026 — 24.hu, 444.hu, HVG). Citing the investigation, the prosecution service did not comment on the merits, but did not deny the authenticity of the document either. The next day, on 26 June, Lóránt Horváth, the lawyer of the Ukrainian money couriers involved in the case, citing the press report, moved for the persons concerned to be taken into custody and arrested, on the basis of Section 304 of the Criminal Code (Btk.) on unlawful detention.

The topic is one of the legally weightiest cases of the period following the change of government, because raising the criminal liability of a former head of government is the equality test of the rule of law. This requires public-law precision. In Hungary the prosecution service is an autonomous constitutional body (Article 29 of the Fundamental Law), the holder of public prosecution and the guardian of legality — strictly speaking it is not part of the judiciary, which is the branch of power of the courts (Article 25). Everyday language often conflates the two concepts, but the procedural logic differs: the prosecutor decides on the suspicion and on moving for a coercive measure, whereas the ordering of an arrest is solely for the court. The Prosecutor General — currently Gábor Bálint Nagy — accepts instructions from no one in a concrete case, not even from the head of government; politics legally has no influence on the direction of the investigation. It is also part of the frame that every actor in the case — including the former prime minister — is entitled to the presumption of innocence.

According to MIAK’s reading, the question is not what the substantive outcome of the case will be, but whether the procedure stays clean. In a functioning rule of law the law applies to everyone equally — under the “no exceptions” principle no one is above the law — but it is just as important that no one be held to account as a political gesture, but solely under the guarantees of an independent, non-instructable procedure. These two requirements are not opposed: together they give the rule of law its credibility.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame. Montesquieu (the eighteenth-century French legal philosopher, author of the theory of the separation of powers) laid down in his work The Spirit of the Laws that there is liberty only if the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers are separated — the independence of the judicial power is the precondition of political liberty. The work Controlling Corruption by the American economist Robert Klitgaard provides the structural explanation: corruption flourishes where a monopoly position and discretionary (deliberative) power meet an absence of accountability — this is the famous C = M + D − A formula (corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability). The book Corruption and Government by the American legal scholar-economist Susan Rose-Ackerman treats the relationship between high-level corruption and accountable implementation: abuse committed at the top of power can be ended if impunity is replaced by genuine accountability. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that move the case from political skirmishing to the terrain of rule-of-law guarantees.

3.1 Effective protection of the procedural independence of the prosecution service

The most urgent task is that the investigation proceed separately from political pressure — from any side. On the basis of its A6 (strengthening checks and balances) programme point, MIAK proposes that the independence of the prosecution service prevail not only as a legal proposition but as a measurable practice: governmental and party-political actors should refrain from statements of an instructive nature regarding the concrete investigation. When the prime minister publicly presses for the departure of the Prosecutor General, that may be a political opinion, but it has no legal influence — and cannot have one — on the direction of the investigation; it is precisely this boundary that must be protected institutionally. Independence is a two-directional guarantee: it protects against the pressure of the present government just as it should have protected during the time of an earlier government.

3.2 Transparent, reasoned prosecutorial decisions and respect for judicial review

The source of trust is a reasoned decision that can be followed in public as well. In the spirit of its I4 (protection of judicial independence) programme point, MIAK proposes that the prosecution service communicate its motions for coercive measures and the turning points of the investigation as transparently as possible within the procedural limits, and that the arrest — within the frame of the Be., that is, Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure — be decided solely by the court, with substantive reasoning. The separation of the suspicion (a prosecutorial competence) and the arrest (a judicial competence) is not a formality: it is what prevents a coercive measure from becoming a political instrument. The presumption of innocence must be maintained throughout the communication — suspicion is not a verdict.

3.3 Treating the structural cause: independent corruption investigation

Beyond the individual case, the durable answer is the reduction of structural risk. MIAK’s A10 (Independent Corruption Investigation Bureau, on the model of the Singaporean CPIB) proposal sketches a directly accountable investigative body independent of political cycles, which can proceed against any public figure — in office or former — and in case of unjustified enrichment the burden of proof is reversed. In Klitgaard’s formula: this is the missing “A” (accountability) that counterbalances the corruption risk of monopoly and discretion. Such an institution would make systemic what is now unfolding off an individual press report and a lawyer’s motion.

These three proposals are bound together by a single principle: the credibility of the rule of law does not hang on whom it holds to account, but on holding everyone to account by the same independent, accountable procedure — the “no exceptions” principle makes sense only together with the guarantees.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law An independent, equal procedure strengthens the principle that “the law applies to everyone” If the procedure takes on a political colouring, it undermines its credibility — whatever the outcome
Society A reasoned decision that can be followed in public as well strengthens public trust Media publicity may run ahead of the final decision, and the presumption of innocence may be harmed
Institutions The effective protection of prosecutorial independence creates a durable guarantee Political pressure (from any side) could set a precedent for future cases

The main trade-off is whether the case tips towards the strengthening of the rule-of-law procedure or towards the impression of a political reckoning. The proposal tips to the risk side if politics — from the government side or the opposition — tries to influence the direction of the concrete investigation: then, regardless of the outcome, the credibility of the rule of law is harmed, because the procedure does not seem clean. The proposal works, by contrast, if every actor respects the separation of competences — the prosecutor investigates and charges, the court judges, and politics keeps its distance from the concrete case.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

A few suggested performance indicators (KPIs) from which, in 12–24 months, it will be visible whether the direction is good:

  • Whether the prosecution service proceeds on its own, with documented procedural steps, with no trace of outside instruction.
  • Whether coercive measures (custody, arrest) are decided by the court, with substantive, public reasoning.
  • Whether political actors refrain from statements of an instructive nature regarding the concrete investigation.
  • Whether the number of final corruption convictions rises (in 2024 it fell back by 27 percent).
  • Whether the idea of an independent corruption-investigation institution advances in the Hungarian legal system.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and to the public alike: the stake of the gold-convoy case is not the fate of one person, but the credibility of the equality of the rule of law — the law applies to everyone, but solely under the guarantees of an independent, non-instructable procedure. MIAK asks every political actor to respect the separation of competences and to refrain from influencing the concrete investigation; and it asks the prosecution service for a transparent, reasoned procedure. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values: accountability — because not even at the top of power can anyone be above the law — and ideology-freeness — because MIAK calls the same independent procedure to account whoever is in power, and does not press for a verdict but for a guarantee. The two are not abstract labels here: the credibility of the Hungarian rule of law hangs on them.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The topic showed a sharp difference across the spectrum. The liberal-left and public-affairs band (444.hu, 24.hu, HVG, ATV) presented the news in detail, focusing on the prosecution document and the lawyer’s motion, and put the question of the former prime minister’s liability at the centre; HVG’s analysis also unpacked the political balance of power between the Prosecutor General and the prime minister. The economic-professional band (Portfolio) was more restrained, concentrating on the institutional and legal aspect of the case. Statements close to the conservative side that went into opposition after the change of government (for example the quoted statement by Bertalan Havasi) reversed the framing: by this account “the Ukrainians want to dictate to the Hungarian judiciary”, that is, they presented the procedure as externally, politically motivated. The Népszava article was available only at headline level (a headline-level reference only). Looking at the spectrum as a whole, there is little dispute over the facts — the document exists, the motion was filed — but in the interpretation the gap is sharp: “the law finally catches up with the powerful” versus “a political-foreign-policy reckoning”. According to MIAK it is precisely for this reason that the cleanness of the procedure is decisive: only an independent, reasoned procedure can decide which framing holds up.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Date of the prosecution document 09/06/2026 444.hu / 24.hu
Legal title of the procedure suspicion of unlawful detention, abuse of office 24.hu, 25/06/2026
Legal basis of the motion Section 304 of the Criminal Code (Btk.) (unlawful detention) 444.hu, 26/06/2026
Named persons concerned 4 former high-ranking officials 444.hu / 24.hu
Change in final corruption convictions (2024) −27% European Commission rule-of-law report 2025
Hungary WGI rule of law 2024 +0.35 World Bank WGI
Hungary WGI corruption control 2024 −0.17 World Bank WGI

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the protection of judicial independence (I4) provides the guarantee of the judicial decision on coercive measures;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the strengthening of checks and balances (A6) is the instrument of prosecutorial independence, and the Independent Corruption Investigation Bureau (A10) the instrument of structural accountability.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

The French legal philosopher Montesquieu saw the precondition of political liberty in the separation of powers. By the classic formulation of his thesis, the merging of powers necessarily leads to the loss of liberty:

„When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty…"

Montesquieu treats the judicial power as a separate category and regards its independence as the cornerstone of liberty. In the gold-convoy case this is directly operative: the coercive measure is decided not by the executive power or politics, but by the independent court — which is why MIAK builds the I4 and A6 programme points on the strict separation of competences.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

The American economist Robert Klitgaard provides the structural explanation of corruption with the formula C = M + D − A: corruption flourishes where a monopoly position and discretionary power meet without accountability.

„Consider the conditions under which corruption flourishes: monopoly plus discretion, and an absence of accountability."

A high-ranking position of power is exactly such a risk intersection: great discretion, concentrated power, and — in the absence of control — weak accountability. The lesson of the gold-convoy case in this frame is that supplying the missing “A” (accountability) is the solution — this is what MIAK’s A10 independent corruption-investigation proposal targets, which would create control operating even at the top of power.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.3 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

The American legal scholar-economist Susan Rose-Ackerman analyses the relationship between high-level corruption and accountable implementation. By her argument the economic approach to corruption identifies where the distorting incentives are greatest and where their impact is largest:

„Economics is a powerful tool for the analysis of corruption. … an economic approach is fundamental to understanding where corrupt incentives are the greatest and have the biggest impact."

At the top of power both the stake and the impact are greatest, which is why the elimination of impunity — genuine, institutional accountability — is the key. In the Hungarian case this means that the solution is not favouritism in one direction or the other, but the guaranteeing of an equal, independent procedure — in line with MIAK’s A6 programme point.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

6.5 International comparison

For the accountable handling of corruption committed at the top of power, several proven models exist. In Singapore the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is a directly accountable, politically independent office that can proceed against any public figure — this provides the model for MIAK’s A10 proposal. On the side of procedural guarantees, the common standard of continental rule-of-law states is that the suspicion and the ordering of a coercive measure lie in separate hands: the prosecutor investigates and moves, the court decides. The essence is common to every model: a high position does not exempt, but holding to account is legitimate solely within the frame of an independent, reasoned procedure — any form of political influence is precisely what destroys the credibility.

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Bureau (CPIB model)

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 27 June 2026 — top-10 topics, ranked 3rd):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A10)
  • MIAK press monitor, 27 June 2026 — topic 3, score: 85/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Communications of the Prosecutor General’s Office; court press releases; Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure; World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024

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