Part I — Situation overview

The parliamentary group of the currently governing political force announced on 30 June 2026 that, on the basis of a majority position, it will vote for limiting the length of an MP’s mandate. Under the government’s proposal the upper limit up to which someone may be an MP would be set at twelve years — three consecutive parliamentary terms; the rule would apply to the current MPs as well. An important clarification that the press headlines often blur: a law or a constitutional amendment is not “voted through” by a party but adopted by Parliament — a parliamentary group can only declare its own intention, while the final decision is the parliamentary act. Prime Minister Péter Magyar himself indicated on Monday that two positions had come in during the public consultation: one proposed eight, the other twelve years, and there were even some who held that, because of the value of experience, there should be no such limit at all. (MIAK press monitor, 1 July 2026.)

The topic is not without precedent. On 16 June 2026 MIAK already analysed the sixteenth amendment to the Fundamental Law, which limited the prime-ministerial term to eight years. The present proposal, however, concerns a different subject: it affects not the head of the single-person executive power but the MPs — and it is precisely this difference that gives the debate its edge. The prime minister exercises concentrated, chancellor-type power, where a long term of office carries the risk of a concentration of power; an MP, by contrast, is the delegate of a circle of voters, and restricting their re-electability directly narrows the electoral freedom of the voters. The jurist and former state secretary Csaba Tordai, together with the political philosopher Zoltán Miklósi, opened a substantive debate about whether the restriction is proportionate — and according to MIAK this is exactly the right question.

MIAK’s reading is one of principle and of proportionality, not party politics. The “setting in concrete” of the political class is a real risk, and regular renewal is a legitimate democratic value. At the same time the passive right to vote — that we may elect anyone the community deems worthy — is a fundamental right that may be restricted only to a necessary and proportionate degree. The character of the problem is therefore not whether the term limit is “good or bad”, but whether the tool now chosen (a general, permanent limit submitted after a few days of consultation) is proportionate to the goal, and whether it would survive a constitutional test.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the conceptual frame within which the question can be judged. Alexis de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French thinker, names in his work Democracy in America (1835/1840) the tyranny of the majority as the chief internal danger of democracy: trouble arises when the majority’s power is “checked by no obstacle”, and so it can impose its will on the minority without restraint — a warning that a two-thirds majority does not in itself legitimise the shaping of fundamental rights at the majority’s pleasure. Montesquieu’s classic thesis in The Spirit of the Laws (1748) — “power should be a check to power” — gives the principle of limitation, but at the same time also the yardstick of moderate government: the limit itself may be excessive, and liberty is where there is no abuse of power. Finally, the Hungarian Fundamental Law and the European Convention on Human Rights protect the passive right to vote as a fundamental right, and demand proportionality of any restriction of it — this is the legal basis of Csaba Tordai’s argument. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that concern not the goal of the term limit but its procedure and its proportionality.

3.1 A constitutional stress test before submission (within 30 days)

Every form of MP mandate limit — whether eight or twelve years — should, before submission, be subjected to an independent constitutional examination that measures specifically the proportionality and the consistency with Strasbourg case law. This is the concrete application of MIAK’s existing I10 programme point (constitutional “stress test”): the body would examine whether the restriction reaches a goal that could be attained by a milder tool as well, and whether it would withstand a norm-control review. The result of the examination is public. If a proposal fails this test, the legislator either amends it or takes on the public justification. In Montesquieu’s frame (see 6.4.2) the principle is simple: a rule limiting power must not itself be gratuitously excessive — the limit too must be proportionate.

A rule affecting the passive right to vote cannot be assessed in a few days. MIAK proposes that the mandate limit — if it is introduced at all — be born as part of the final, new constitution, after a structured public consultation lasting months. Its tool is the I9 programme point (popular-sovereignty audit): a public platform where the legislator answers citizens’ contributions substantively — not formally. The goal is not to delay the decision but to base its legitimacy not on the two-thirds but on the quality of the procedure. Tocqueville’s warning (see 6.4.1) is tangible here: it is precisely such a structured check that gives the will of the majority its durability.

3.3 The milder tools first: transparent nomination and a campaign cap (within 12 months)

The renewal of the political class can be advanced by less restrictive tools as well. MIAK proposes that the legislator try these first: transparent, open nomination procedures within the parties, and a cap on campaign spending under the A12 programme point (transparency and an upper limit on campaign financing), which reduces the material advantage of “entrenched” candidates. If these do not bring renewal, then — and only then — may a stronger tool, one that directly restricts a fundamental right, arise. This is the essence of the proportionality logic: the least intrusive effective tool must be chosen first.

These three proposals are bound together by a common principle: the goal of renewal is legitimate, but the tool must be proportionate, and legitimacy is given by the quality of the procedure — not by the mere strength of the majority. The A6 programme point (strengthening of checks and balances) serves precisely this: it does not weaken but strengthens democratic renewal if the restricting rule itself also passes through the filter of the checks.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Constitutionality The proportionality test reduces the chance of a Strasbourg defeat, a more durable rule If it is permanent and general rather than transitional, the European Court of Human Rights may find against it
Political system Regular renewal, the loosening of “entrenchment” The loss of experienced, competent MPs; the devaluation of expertise
Voter freedom Candidate competition may be refreshed The passive right to vote is narrowed — the voter cannot re-elect whom they wish

The main consideration stretches between renewal and voter freedom. The term limit tips to the risk side if it (1) is of general scope and permanent — not set for a pre-defined, transitional period — and if (2) it is introduced with a few days of consultation, bypassing the ordinary constitution-making process. According to Csaba Tordai it is precisely these two elements that are questionable by the Strasbourg yardstick: the court has accepted a similar restriction only during the transition from dictatorship to democracy, as a temporary exclusion of those who collaborated in the oppression (in the case of Latvia, for example), not as a general, permanent rule. The proposal works well if it is transitional, targeted, and preceded by a genuine debate — and it becomes harmful if, instead of the substantive goal, it is driven by momentary political popularity.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

The following suggested performance indicators (KPIs) will show in 6–24 months whether the direction is good:

  • The length of the public consultation: it is worth tracking whether the final text is born after at least several months of structured debate (not in a few days).
  • The existence of a constitutional examination: it is suggested to watch whether a public proportionality and Strasbourg-consistency analysis is prepared before submission.
  • The introduction of the milder tools: it is worth tracking whether the campaign-spending cap and the transparent nomination procedure are introduced before or instead of the mandate limit.
  • Strasbourg exposure: it is suggested to watch whether the rule is challenged before the European Court of Human Rights, and with what outcome.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the renewal of MPs is a legitimate goal, but restricting eligibility to stand touches a fundamental right, and therefore it may be done only with a proportionate tool, a genuine public debate and a prior constitutional stress test. MIAK asks the decision-maker to try the milder tools first (transparent nomination, a campaign cap), and to let the mandate limit — if at all — be born as part of the final constitution, after a long consultation, not by a few days of assessment. This proposal moves two MIAK foundational values: accountability, because the public proportionality test and the structured audit make the legislator verifiable; and ideology-free judgement, because MIAK measures not the party-political sign of the proposal but the quality of the procedure and the proportionality — irrespective of who submits it.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The liberal-left and public-affairs band placed legal proportionality at the centre. 444.hu (Judit Windisch, 30 June 2026) recorded the group’s intention factually, and highlighted that the restriction would also “halve” the current opposition groups, as well as quoting Csaba Tordai’s prediction of a Strasbourg defeat. Two pieces in 24.hu carried the expert debate further: one Csaba Tordai’s legal argument (“the parliamentary term limit will most likely not survive the next election”), the other the opinion piece of the political philosopher Zoltán Miklósi (“disproportionate, unnecessary, harmful”). This band’s framing therefore problematises not the popularity of the goal but the legal tenability of the tool.

The public-economic and conservative band raised the topic less into the top focus on this day, typically framing rather in a way that presents both sides of the balance — HVG’s hvg360 compilation (“entrenched positions or MPs growing idle”) already juxtaposes the for-and-against arguments in its very title (the article was not publicly downloadable in full). This framing brings out the democratic-theory dilemma: the promise of renewal and the risk of losing expertise at once.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The current Parliament has 199 members (106 single-member-constituency + 93 list mandates). The two-thirds threshold required for a constitutional amendment is 134 mandates (66.84%). (Source: Act CCIII of 2011.)
  • At the 2026 election the distribution of mandates: Tisza 141 (70.85%), Fidesz–KDNP 52, Mi Hazánk 6. (Source: NVI, finalisation of 19 April 2026.)
  • The proposed limit: 12 years (3 terms) for the MP mandate; the 8-year variant also arose in the public consultation. The sixteenth amendment to the Fundamental Law adopted on 16 June 2026 is distinct from this: it capped the prime-ministerial term at 8 years.
  • In Europe there is currently no state with a general term limit applying to parliamentary MPs. (Source: Csaba Tordai’s article, Institute for Legal Studies blog, 30 June 2026.)

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the question of the proportionate restriction of the passive right to vote and of constitutional control; it directly affects the popular-sovereignty audit and the constitutional stress test;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the quality of the legislative procedure, the depth of the public consultation and the practice of legislative impact assessment;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the system of checks and balances, and the milder tools of political renewal (a campaign cap, transparent nomination).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Tocqueville identifies the tyranny of the majority as the chief internal danger of the democratic order: the threat is not power in itself but unchecked power. In his view some social power must always rise above the others, but liberty is endangered precisely when this power is held back by nothing:

„…liberty is endangered when this power is checked by no obstacles which may retard its course, and force it to moderate its own vehemence."

In the term-limit debate this is a double-edged lesson. On the one hand it defends the argument that the majority’s two-thirds strength does not in itself legitimise the restriction of a fundamental right — the limit must pass through an institutional check. On the other hand it demands precisely that the renewal rule itself be born in a proportionate, checked form: it is the structured procedure that gives the majority’s will its durability, not mere speed.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

6.4.2 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu’s classic thesis holds that every man vested with power is apt to abuse it, and therefore “it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power”. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments, and there too only when there is no abuse of power:

„…every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits? To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power."

In the case of the mandate limit this is a double yardstick. The demand for renewal is legitimate — the long-term possession of power can lead to abuse. But Montesquieu’s warning also applies to the restricting rule itself not being disproportionate: by the yardstick of “moderate government” the tool must fit the goal, not overshoot it.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.3 The Fundamental Law of Hungary and the European Convention on Human Rights

The passive right to vote — the right to stand for election — is protected as a fundamental right by both the Hungarian Fundamental Law and the European Convention on Human Rights. The article on free elections of the Convention’s first additional protocol states:

„The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature."

The core of Csaba Tordai’s argument is precisely this: while there is no Convention-based right to hold the office of prime minister, the right to be elected as an MP is protected by the protocol. Therefore the temporal restriction of an MP’s mandate — even by two thirds — can be introduced only if it meets the Convention’s requirement of proportionality; a general, permanent limit hardly meets this.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force as of 17 April 2026); European Convention on Human Rights, first additional protocol, Article 3

6.5 International comparison

The international balance of the MP term limit illustrates the book frame above. Strasbourg case law has accepted a similar restriction exclusively during a democratic transition, in a targeted way — in countries freed from foreign occupation or emerging from dictatorship, where the eligibility of those who collaborated in the oppression was restricted for a transitional period (in the case of Latvia, for example). There is no established example in Europe of a general, permanent limit extending to all MPs: currently no European state applies a term limit to parliamentary MPs. This also weighs from the point of view of the Strasbourg assessment, since the court examines whether the disputed practice fits into the common European constitutional tradition — a singular Hungarian rule hardly stands up to this yardstick.

Justice

  • I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit, lawmaking with citizen feedback
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening of checks and balances
  • A12 — Transparency and an upper limit on campaign financing

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 1 July 2026 — topic 7):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America
  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force as of 17 April 2026)
  • 📖 European Convention on Human Rights (first additional protocol, Article 3)

Note: the local file path of the books does NOT appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I9, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A12)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 1 July 2026 — topic 7, score: 74/100

Additional public data sources:

  • NVI — final result of the 2026 parliamentary election (19 April 2026)
  • Act CCIII of 2011 — the 199-member composition of Parliament and the two-thirds threshold

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