Part I — Situation overview

On Saturday 4 July 2026 the Government submitted to the National Assembly the proposal on the seventeenth amendment to the Fundamental Law — announced Prime Minister Péter Magyar. The package would rewrite the constitution at several points: it would terminate the mandate of President of the Republic Tamás Sulyok, narrow the scope of cardinal laws (those requiring a two-thirds adoption), restore to the Constitutional Court the powers previously taken from it, introduce a seventy-year upper age limit and a shorter, non-renewable mandate for constitutional judges, cap a member’s mandate at twelve years (three cycles), create the constitutional basis of the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office (NVVH), abolish the veto right of the Fiscal Council, delete the constitutional concept of public money, and restore the designation “vármegye” (county) to “megye”. An important public-law clarification that the headlines often blur: a constitutional amendment is not “adopted” by the Government but by the National Assembly (Fundamental Law, Article 6) — the Government submits, the two-thirds adoption is a parliamentary act. In the 199-member National Assembly this requires 134 seats; the governing Tisza holds 141 seats. (MIAK press monitor, 5 July 2026.)

The proposal is not without precedent. On 23 June 2026 MIAK already analysed the earlier initiative that would have removed the President of the Republic by constitutional amendment, and on 1 July the proportionality question of the members’ mandate limit. The package now submitted combines these into a single act announced under the name “Purgatory”. On the Government’s website a five-day public consultation was held, to which, according to the announcement, more than 23,000 proposals arrived; according to the prime minister some 90 per cent of those who commented supported the draft. In connection with the process Tamás Sulyok turned to the Constitutional Court and to the Venice Commission (the constitutional-law advisory body of the Council of Europe), whose delegation held talks in Budapest this week. Certain elements of the amendment — thus the removal of Sulyok and the present inclusion of the members’ mandate limit — were also criticised by Amnesty International and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ), primarily from the side of fair procedure and proportionality.

MIAK’s reading is procedural and rule-of-law based, not party-political. The President of the Republic is, under Article 9 of the Fundamental Law, a head of state, not a government actor; closing the mandate of a sitting president by constitutional amendment is therefore the subject of a sharp rule-of-law debate, regardless of who holds the office. Likewise: restoring the independence of the Constitutional Court, the return of powers and the narrowing of the cardinal scope may in themselves be a justified institutional correction — the question is not whether one or another element is “good or bad”, but whether the package as a whole strengthens or merely rearranges the system of checks and balances, and whether its legitimacy rests on the quality of the procedure or purely on the strength of the two-thirds majority.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals it is worth fixing the conceptual frame in which the package can be judged. John Locke, the 17th-century English philosopher, one of the founders of liberal state theory, in his work Second Treatise of Government (1690) derives the separation of the legislative and the executive power from the fact that it is “too great a temptation to human frailty” for the same hand to make and to execute the law — and where all power is concentrated in a single actor, the subject has nowhere to appeal. Alexis de Tocqueville, the 19th-century French thinker, in his work Democracy in America (1835/1840) names the omnipotence of the majority as the chief internal danger of democracy: if the majority’s power is “held back by no obstacle”, it threatens not only the minority but makes the law itself unstable. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics; in 2024 they received the Nobel memorial prize in economics) in their book Why Nations Fail (2012) show that lasting prosperity is provided by inclusive, pluralist institutions, in which checks and balances “distribute power fairly broadly” — the guarantee is not the persons but the structure. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures which are concerned not with the goal of the constitutional amendment but with its procedure, its rule-of-law guarantees and its structural durability.

3.1 Prior constitutional stress test and awaiting the independent opinions (before the vote)

The most sharply contested elements of the package — above all closing the mandate of a sitting President of the Republic and the departure of the constitutional judges named by the seventy-year age limit — should, before the final vote, be subjected to an independent constitutional review, and the position of the Venice Commission awaited. This is a concrete application of MIAK’s existing I10 programme point (constitutional “stress test”) and I9 programme point (popular-sovereignty audit): the review would measure whether the removal meets the requirement of fair procedure and proportionality, and whether the goal is attainable by a milder means. Tocqueville’s warning (see 6.4.2) is tangible here: the omnipotence of the majority makes precisely the law unstable if no obstacle slows it — and the independent expert opinion is exactly that obstacle. The result of the review is public; if an element fails it, the legislator either amends it or accepts the public justification.

3.2 The asset-recovery office with rule-of-law guarantees (at the establishment of the institution)

The goal of the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office — the recovery of unlawfully siphoned-off public assets — is, from a transparency point of view, supportable in principle. MIAK, however, proposes that the law regulating the NVVH mandatorily contain rule-of-law brakes: prior or immediate judicial review of every asset measure, the guarantee of property protection and the presumption of innocence, and the public, machine-readable publication of the procedures and results. This is the joint application of the I5 (property-rights protection) and the A1 (public-money dashboard) programme points, within the conceptual frame of A6 (checks and balances). Locke’s argument (see 6.4.1) is the standard: where the same power that also makes the rule decides on the confiscation of assets, and there is no impartial forum to which one can appeal, there the measure — however legitimate its goal — follows the logic of unchecked power. Recovery strengthens the rule of law if it too stands under judicial control.

3.3 Structural, not personal guarantee in filling the key positions (within the framework of the autumn constitution-making)

The package at several points replaces the persons (a removed president, departing constitutional judges, new office heads), while in the filling of the key positions the final decision typically continues to rest with the two-thirds of the National Assembly. MIAK proposes that the comprehensive constitution-making process promised for the autumn should transform the nomination structure: it should introduce parity-based or qualified-consensus nomination procedures for the heads of the Constitutional Court, the judicial leadership and the independent regulatory bodies, so that a single political majority cannot fill them. This builds on the A6 (checks and balances) and the I4 (judicial independence) programme points. Acemoglu and Robinson’s thesis (see 6.4.3) is the guiding principle here: the durability of an inclusive institutional system is provided not by who happens to sit in the positions, but by the structure itself distributing power — otherwise the next two-thirds majority can occupy the institutions in the same way.

These three proposals are linked by a common principle: the goal of rule-of-law reform — that the state should not be able to become anyone’s captive — is legitimate, but legitimacy is provided not by the strength of the two-thirds majority but by the quality of the procedure and the structural guarantees. The A6 programme point serves precisely this: it does not weaken but strengthens democratic renewal if the reform that limits power itself passes through the filter of the brakes.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Constitutionality / rule of law The return of powers to the Constitutional Court and its autonomous election of a president may strengthen the brakes Removing a sitting head of state and named judges by constitutional amendment may fail on the standard of fair procedure and proportionality
Political system / institutions The shorter mandates and the narrowing of the cardinal scope loosen the “concreting-in”, improving alternation If the nomination structure remains unchanged, the next two-thirds majority can occupy the institutions in the same way (super-parliamentarism)
Public administration The restoration of “megye” and, in place of the lord-lieutenant (főispán), the government commissioner simplify the designations The actual transition (sign swap, legislative transposition) carries cost and transitional uncertainty

The main consideration is stretched between the real content of the rule-of-law correction and the instrumental character of the change of power. The package tips to the risk side if (1) its most sharply contested elements (president- and judge-removal) are adopted without awaiting the independent opinions — including that of the Venice Commission — with a few days of consultation, and if (2) the reform stops at the replacement of persons, without addressing the structural cause of two-thirds “occupiability”. The proposal works well if the return of powers is paired with real institutional strengthening, the asset recovery with judicial control, and the nomination with parity guarantees — and it becomes harmful if it is driven by momentary majority strength instead of the substantive goal.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

The following suggested performance indicators (KPIs) will show, in 6–24 months, whether the direction is good:

  • Integration of independent opinions: it is worth tracking whether the recommendations of the Venice Commission’s position appear in the final constitutional text (how many of how many recommendations are built in).
  • Judicial control of the NVVH: it is suggested to watch what share of the office’s asset measures fall under actual, substantive judicial review, and whether every procedure is public.
  • Structural nomination guarantee: it is worth tracking whether the autumn constitution-making introduces parity-based or qualified-consensus nomination for filling the key positions.
  • Length of the constitution-making consultation: it is suggested to watch whether the promised new constitution is born after at least several months of structured public debate, not in a few days.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: dismantling the “state capture” is a legitimate goal, but the legitimacy of a constitutional amendment rests not on the two-thirds majority but on the quality of the procedure and the structural guarantees. MIAK asks the decision-maker, for the most sharply contested elements, to await the independent constitutional and Venice Commission opinions, to tie the asset recovery to judicial review and property protection, and, in the autumn constitution-making, instead of personnel changes to transform the nomination structure, so that no single future majority can occupy the institutions. This proposal moves two MIAK foundational values: accountability, because the public stress test, the judicial control and the parity-based nomination make the exercise of power verifiable and reversible; and ideology-freedom, because MIAK measures not the party-political sign of the proposal but the durability of checks and balances — regardless of who submits it and against whom it is directed.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal and public-affairs band broke down the package in detail and factually. Telex (Balázs Cseke and Péter Ignácz, 4 July 2026) itemised the points being amended, and highlighted Amnesty International’s criticism that Tamás Sulyok too has a right to fair procedure. 444.hu, with an ironic title (“de-vármegye-fication and de-lord-lieutenant-ification”), but substantively, quoted the closing provisions of the bill and the justification, including the explanation of the deletion of the public-money concept. 24.hu went through in a separate piece which laws lose their cardinal status (committees, the MNB — the Hungarian National Bank —, the national flag, the pension system, the operation of the ÁSZ, that is the State Audit Office). Népszava carried the topic as a lead story, but the public URL of the article was not available, so only a title-level reference is available (title-level reference only).

The economic-analytical band carried the deepest institutional critique. Portfolio (4 July 2026) presented the dual picture in a “super-parliamentarism or future minefield” frame: some elements represent real institutional correction, while elsewhere the change is rather of a personal nature, and the final decision in filling almost every key position remains with the two-thirds of the National Assembly. According to the paper, if the promised constitution-making does not address this structural cause, operational disturbances may arise at the institutions intended to be independent, such as in the first two decades after the regime change.

The conservative and pro-government band placed the power motive in the foreground. According to Magyar Nemzet the prime minister would decapitate the opposition and topple the head of state by “legal manoeuvring”. Mandiner quoted Gergely Gulyás, according to whom the package is “not an injury to the rule of law, but its end”. ATV reported on the development in a fact-stating frame, focusing on the fact of the submission. This band’s framing highlights the risks of the process and the power goal, in contrast to the left-liberal band’s itemised substantive breakdown.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The current National Assembly has 199 members (106 individual + 93 list mandates); the two-thirds threshold needed for a constitutional amendment is 134 seats (66.84%). (Source: Act CCIII of 2011.)
  • At the 2026 election: Tisza 141 (70.85%), Fidesz–KDNP 52, Mi Hazánk 6. (Source: NVI, that is the National Election Office, finalisation of 19 April 2026.)
  • Under the submitted proposal the members of the 15-member Constitutional Court would in future be elected for 9 years (instead of the previous 12), without re-election; with a seventy-year upper age limit; the president of the Constitutional Court would again be elected by the members of the body from among themselves, for three years. The president of the National Office for the Judiciary (OBH) and of the Curia would be elected for 6 years. (Source: the bill, 4 July 2026.)
  • The members’ mandate limit is, under the final text of the proposal, 12 years (3 cycles), and does not affect the members of the current National Assembly — it takes effect from the next election. (Source: the bill, 4 July 2026.)
  • The amendment would move a significant part of the currently 36 cardinal laws to the level of ordinary law. (Source: 444.hu, 4 July 2026.)
  • The preceding, sixteenth amendment to the Fundamental Law was adopted by parliament on 15 June 2026 (in force from 06-22); it fixed, among other things, the eight-year limit of the prime-ministerial office.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the independence and powers of the Constitutional Court, the depoliticisation of judicial-leadership election, property protection and prior constitutional control; the gravitational centre of the topic;
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the implementation and cost implications of the transposition of the designation of territorial administration (vármegye→megye) and of the lord-lieutenant institution, as well as the quality of the legislative procedure;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the institutionalisation of asset recovery (NVVH), the question of the public-money concept and the durability of the system of checks and balances.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 John Locke: Second Treatise of Government

Locke derives the separation of the legislative and the executive power not as an abstract principle but as a realist insight into human nature: whoever makes the law is led by the temptation to adjust its execution too to his own interest. Therefore in a well-organised state the two powers must be placed in separate hands:

“…it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them…”

And where a single actor holds both the legislative and the executive power, there — says Locke — there is no impartial judge, there is nowhere to appeal, and the subject is exposed to the arbitrariness of power. From the point of view of the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law this is a double standard. On the one hand it supports those elements of the package that return the Constitutional Court’s control function — since precisely the absence of the impartial forum is the danger. On the other hand it warns: asset recovery or the removal of a head of state slides into the logic of unchecked power if the same majority decides on it that also made the rule, without independent judicial review.

📖 Source: John Locke: Second Treatise of Government (Értekezés a polgári kormányzatról)

6.4.2 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Tocqueville identifies the omnipotence of the majority as the chief internal danger of democracy. In his view, where no obstacle slows the will of the majority, not only does the minority come into danger but so does the predictability of law: the law becomes unstable, because the momentary majority can rewrite it at any time.

“The omnipotence of the majority… has not only the effect of rendering the law unstable, but it exercises the same influence upon the execution of the law and the conduct of the public administration.”

In the debate over the constitutional amendment this is a direct lesson. A two-thirds majority does not in itself legitimise a decision affecting a fundamental right or a public-law mandate — legitimacy requires such an institutional brake (independent expert opinion, constitutional review, involvement of the Venice Commission) that slows and moderates the process. This is precisely what gives the decision its durability: the structured procedure, not the speed.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: A demokrácia Amerikában (Democracy in America)

6.4.3 Acemoglu and Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Acemoglu and Robinson’s central thesis is that lasting prosperity is provided by inclusive, pluralist political and economic institutions, as opposed to the extractive institutions serving the interest of a narrow elite. The essence of the inclusive system is not who happens to be in power, but that power is broadly distributed and limited by brakes. The authors put it thus on the example of the Roman Republic:

“In the institutions of the republic there worked checks and balances, that is the system of mutual control, which distributed power fairly broadly.”

In judging the amendment to the Fundamental Law this structural standard is decisive. A reform that only replaces the persons — seats other leaders in the key positions, but does not change the mode of filling (two-thirds “occupiability”) — does not, in the authors’ logic, make an institutional system more inclusive. The real guarantee is if the structure itself distributes power: parity-based nomination, qualified consensus, independent control bodies. Otherwise the next majority can reproduce the same extractive pattern.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Miért buknak el a nemzetek (Why Nations Fail)

6.5 International comparison

The principle of the structural guarantee can also be illustrated with international examples — it is precisely these that the super-parliamentarism critique refers to. In Italy the selection of constitutional judges is split three ways: one third are nominated by the President of the Republic, one third by parliament, one third by the highest judicial forums — so that no single political majority can occupy the body. In Germany, in the supervision of public-service media, state-political actors may not be in a majority, under the 2014 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. The common element of these models is that independence is ensured not by the length of the mandate or the replacement of persons, but by the split character of the nomination structure. The Hungarian proposal is strong where it restores the collegial self-governance (the Constitutional Court’s election of its own president), and remains exposed where the final decision is concentrated at a single two-thirds majority.

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I5 — Property-rights protection
  • I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit, lawmaking with citizen feedback
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A5 — Whistleblower reporting system
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Public administration and e-government

  • KI3 — Bureaucracy reduction, measurably

Proposed new programme point: Structural, parity-based nomination guarantee at the key positions of independent institutions — to the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 5 July 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 John Locke: Second Treatise of Government (Értekezés a polgári kormányzatról)
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: A demokrácia Amerikában (Democracy in America)
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Miért buknak el a nemzetek (Why Nations Fail)

Note: in the blog’s visible text the local file path of the book does NOT appear — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I5, I9, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A5, A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI3)
  • MIAK press monitor, 5 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 93/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Venice Commission (Council of Europe) — constitutional-law positions
  • Fundamental Law of Hungary (current text, Magyar Közlöny)
  • NVI — final result of the 2026 parliamentary election (19 April 2026)
  • Act CCIII of 2011 — the 199-member composition of the National Assembly and the two-thirds threshold

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