Justice

In-depth analysis

I1 — Judicial transparency

• Mechanism: A central judicial dashboard (birosag.hu/dashboard) showing in real time: average turnaround time by case type, caseload per judge (anonymised, but broken down by court), appeal rate, rate of decisions overturned. The data is loaded through an automated pipeline from the Judicial Information System (BIR). A quarterly quality report is validated by an independent statistical expert.
• Quantified target: By 2027, 95% of all first-instance judgments are available in anonymised form in the online database (currently ~40%); monthly unique visitors to the dashboard reach 20,000; the average civil litigation duration falls from 200 days to below 150 days.
• International precedent: The Netherlands’ Rechtspraak.nl: since 2000 every judgment has been public and searchable in an online database. Transparency alone reduced the appeal rate by 15%, because lawyers could more accurately predict the verdict. But the Dutch system is the result of 20 years of development — a realistic 5–7 year schedule is needed for the Hungarian implementation.
• Trade-off / risk: Per-judge performance measurement (efficiency metrics) can distort judicial behaviour: incentivising “fast judgments” may reduce careful deliberation in complex cases. After the Key Performance Indicator system was introduced in the courts of England and Wales, the rate of enforced settlements rose — not necessarily in the interest of justice.

I2 — Digital litigation procedure

• Mechanism: A three-phase rollout: (1) mandatory electronic submission for every legal person (extension of the obligation on lawyers), (2) the option of online hearings in non-evidentiary procedures (order for payment, simplified procedure, appeal), (3) introduction of a fully digital case file (e-file). A videoconferencing platform is integrated into the judicial system with end-to-end encryption. The option of physical appearance is preserved in every case.
• Quantified target: By 2028, 60% of proceedings start fully digitally (currently ~25%); the share of online hearings reaches 30% in non-criminal cases; the e-file is introduced at 100% of all courts.
• International precedent: China’s “smart court” system: by 2020 the number of online litigation proceedings exceeded 10 million, and turnaround time fell by 40%. But the system was automated at the expense of judicial discretion — AI-based “judgment suggestions” exerted conformity pressure on judges. A more realistic model: Austria (webERV system), where digitalisation focuses on submission and case-file management, not on judgment-making.
• Trade-off / risk: Digital proceedings increase access inequality: low-income, elderly or digitally non-competent litigants are disadvantaged. At the UK’s HMCTS online divorce system, 30% of users abandoned the online procedure. Required: a mandatory court IT help-desk at every county seat.

I3 — Regulatory impact assessment

• Mechanism: A mandatory annex to every bill at submission: (1) cost-benefit analysis over a 5-year horizon, (2) identification of those affected and a proportionality test, (3) a cognitive bias audit (Kahneman-based) — which behavioural assumptions the rule rests on and whether a nudging alternative exists, (4) a sunset-clause proposal — the date of automatic review. An independent Impact Assessment Board (not belonging to the sponsoring ministry) reviews the impact assessment, and Parliament cannot vote on the bill if the Board rates it “inadequate”.
• Quantified target: By 2027, 100% of all bills have a public impact assessment (currently ~30% are formal, without substantive analysis); introduction of the cognitive bias audit for priority laws (~20–30 bills per year); application of a sunset clause to every non-constitutional-level law.
• International precedent: UK Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC): an independent body that has been reviewing impact assessments since 2009. The “red flag” (inadequate) rating is public — ministries are motivated to redraft. According to the RPC’s evaluations, 40% of impact assessments are initially of inadequate quality, but the iterative process improves the final output.
• Trade-off / risk: Mandatory impact assessment slows legislation — in a crisis (pandemic, economic shock) speed may matter more than perfect analysis. Required: an emergency procedure (fast-track), under which the impact assessment can be filed afterwards within 90 days, but the law automatically ceases to have effect if it is not produced.

I4 — Protection of judicial independence

• Mechanism: (1) Strengthening the powers of the National Judicial Council (OBT): judicial appointments, promotions and disciplinary proceedings come under the exclusive competence of the OBT (currently powers are shared with the president of the National Judicial Office — OBH). (2) Composition of the OBT: 2/3 judges (elected by judges), 1/3 external experts (nominees of the Bar Association, academia and the Ombudsman). (3) Restoration of Constitutional Court powers: restoration of the reviewability of budgetary and tax matters. (4) Automatic indexation of judicial remuneration, tied to 2.5 times the average wage.
• Quantified target: The EU Justice Scoreboard’s “perceived judicial independence” indicator should rise from the current ~30% to above 50% by 2030 (EU average: ~55%); the annual number of substantive decisions of the Constitutional Court should rise from 80 to above 120; judicial position occupancy should reach 95% (currently ~88%).
• International precedent: Poland — a negative precedent: between 2018 and 2023 the judicial reform placed the disciplinary chamber under political control — the Court of Justice of the EU ruled against Poland several times, which led to the freezing of EU funds. A positive precedent: Portugal’s Conselho Superior da Magistratura — fully judicial self-governance, with the highest perception of independence EU-wide (~75%).
• Trade-off / risk: Full judicial self-governance can create a “guild-like” closed system in which internal corporate interests override the public interest (e.g. a rarity of disciplinary proceedings, protection of unfit judges). In Italy, the self-governing judicial council (CSM) splintered into political factions. Required: the presence of external members and public disciplinary proceedings.

I5 — Protection of property rights

• Mechanism: (1) Strengthening of the constitutional-level guarantee: expropriation only for a public interest defined by law, with immediate and full compensation and independent judicial review. (2) Introduction of a “regulatory taking” doctrine: if a regulatory change reduces the value of property/a business by more than 30%, it qualifies as a restriction of property and gives rise to a claim for compensation. (3) Protection against politically motivated proceedings targeting businesses: if an official inspection finds no infringement within 90 days, the authority is obliged to reimburse the costs of the proceeding.
• Quantified target: In the successor survey to the World Bank’s Doing Business, the “registering property” indicator should improve from the current ~60th place into the top 40; the average duration of expropriation-compensation cases should fall from 3 years to under 1 year; the share of official inspections followed by cost reimbursement (proceedings without an infringement) is publicly trackable.
• International precedent: Germany: property protection under Article 14 of the Basic Law is paired with strong case law of the Federal Constitutional Court — the “Junktim clause” (an expropriation is valid only together with a statutory compensation provision) is a model. But the German system too struggles with drawing the limits of “regulatory taking” (e.g. property-market regulation, rental-price caps).
• Trade-off / risk: Overly strong property protection can block public-interest regulation: environmental restrictions, health rules and zoning plans may all qualify as “restrictions of property”. US “takings clause” case law shows that finding the balance between property rights and the public interest is decades of judicial work — it cannot be legislated in a single statute.

I6 — Lowering the citizen’s threshold for enforcing rights

• Mechanism: Free or nominally priced legal aid and an online dispute-resolution platform for small-value cases (below HUF 500,000). According to Locke, civil government’s raison d’être is that it provides equal legal remedy to all. The online platform, with AI-supported mediation, reduces the courts’ caseload while ensuring that the enforcement of rights is not determined by financial status.
• Quantified target: By 2029 the online dispute-resolution platform handles 50,000+ cases per year; the average litigation turnaround of small-value cases falls by 50%; the number of those with access to free legal aid doubles. 📖 Source: Locke: Second Treatise of Government (Section 13)

I7 — Legislative simplification programme (regulatory guillotine)

• Mechanism: A systematic review and repeal of outdated, overlapping laws. Hobbes warns: the inflation of laws can undermine legal certainty. In a 4-year cycle, a coherence audit of every sector’s laws, with the target of a 20% reduction in the number of laws in force.
• Quantified target: A 20% reduction in the number of laws in force within 4 years; every sector passes through a coherence audit; laws are available in machine-readable format. 📖 Source: Hobbes: Leviathan (Chapter XXVI)

I8 — Mandatory mediation before litigation

• Mechanism: In certain case types (neighbour disputes, small-value claims, employment disputes) a compulsory mediation procedure before the lawsuit. According to Aristotle, justice is the connective tissue of society — mediation is a faster and cheaper path to justice. A nationwide network of trained mediators, with a procedure of no more than 60 days.
• Quantified target: Mandatory mediation leads to agreement in 40% of the case types concerned; the courts’ caseload falls by 15%; the average dispute-resolution time falls from 9 months to 3 months. 📖 Source: Aristotle: Politics (Book I)

I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit — legislation with citizen feedback

• Mechanism: A system based on Rousseau’s principle of the general will (volonté générale): for every major bill, a public, structured feedback platform where the legislator substantively answers the contributions. Not a referendum, but structured deliberation — citizens’ opinions are part of the decision-making process, but do not replace representative decision.
• Quantified target: 20+ bills per year pass through the consultation platform; 100,000+ contributions per year; a rate of substantive responses of 80%+. 📖 Source: Rousseau: The Social Contract (Book II, Chapter 6)

I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

• Mechanism: Starting from Plato’s Republic: forms of state can degenerate (aristocracy → timocracy → oligarchy → democracy → tyranny). An annual “constitutional stress test”: an independent expert body examines whether the system of checks and balances would prevent a hypothetical concentration of power. The result of the examination is public.
• Quantified target: Annual stress-test report; 15+ indicators (judicial independence, media pluralism, civic space, electoral integrity); within 5 years the share of “at-risk” indicators falls below 30%. 📖 Source: Plato: The Republic (Book VIII)