Part I — Situation overview

On Monday, 22 June 2026, the Constitutional Court (the special body charged with guarding the Hungarian constitutional order, which performs interpretation of the Fundamental Law and norm control) hears the motion of President of the Republic Tamás Sulyok. The question is whether the office of head of state can be abolished — or whether the president can be removed — by an amendment to the Fundamental Law. The background to the process is that Prime Minister Péter Magyar, already during the campaign and then repeatedly after the two-thirds victory, called on the President of the Republic, the prosecutor general, and the leaders of the Curia, the National Office for the Judiciary, the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), the Hungarian Competition Authority and the National Media and Infocommunications Authority to resign. According to his signal, if those concerned do not leave voluntarily by 31 May, the National Assembly will remove them by an amendment to the Fundamental Law. Tamás Sulyok “fled forward” and himself turned to the Constitutional Court, to try to stop the process through an interpretation of the currently effective text of the Fundamental Law.

The other development that surfaced in the same week is that 42 legal scholars — among them department-head university professors and associate professors — published an open letter (with 181 signatories already by the time Portfolio reported on it), in which they argue for the removal of the public-law leaders, but expressly ask the two-thirds majority to restrain itself. The central claim of the letter is twofold: on one hand “the National Assembly may amend the Fundamental Law with a two-thirds majority, and no other institution may override the amendment on substantive grounds”; on the other hand “even the power of the two-thirds majority is not unlimited” — the removal of the public-law office-holders is “an unprecedented step that may be taken on exceptional grounds, for justifiable aims and by an appropriate legal instrument”, and the exceptional ground is “the restoration of the democratic rule of law”. Among the signatories are János Kis (emeritus professor of the CEU, a defining philosopher of the regime-change opposition), Gábor Halmai (professor emeritus of ELTE) and the economist Péter Róna.

By MIAK’s reading, what is being decided here is not simply a personnel question, but the methodology of restoring the rule of law. The stake is not whether the public-law leaders of the NER (System of National Cooperation, the self-designation of the post-2010 governmental order) can be replaced, but whether the swap itself strengthens or weakens the system of checks and balances — that is, the institutions that mutually limit power. A mere swap of persons leaves the instrument of the concentration of power untouched; the substantive reform is the transformation of the nomination and election guarantees.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the conceptual frame. According to the classic thesis of Montesquieu (1689–1755, French Enlightenment-era legal philosopher), “when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body, there can be no liberty” — the separation of the branches of power is not a formality but the condition of liberty; this is a direct argument that a swap of persons should not entail the drawing of competences into one hand. H. L. A. Hart (1907–1992, British legal philosopher), with the concept of the rule of recognition, shows that the legitimacy of an institution depends not on the person sitting in it but on the rule internally accepted by the community — therefore a change of leaders does not in itself restore the authority of the institution if the rules and procedures are not credible. Joseph Raz (1939–2022, legal philosopher) grasps the essence of the rule of law in the fact that “the government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it” — which is precisely the requirement of self-restraint. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that turn the renewal of public-law offices into an instrument of restoring the rule of law — not into a new form of the concentration of power.

3.1 A public, professional nomination procedure for every public-law office (fixed before the swap)

The most emphatic proposal of the open letter is that the new public-law leaders be elected “in a public procedure, with the involvement of professionally recognised bodies and taking ethical considerations into account”. MIAK would institutionalise this along the logic of the I4 protection of judicial independence programme point: for every office concerned (head of state, prosecutor general, leader of the Curia, ÁSZ, Competition Authority, media authority) the depoliticised nomination procedure — competition, public hearing, ranking by a professional body, ethical filter — must be fixed before the removal. The order is not incidental: if the removal happens first and the nomination reform only afterwards, the two-thirds majority gains the very appointment monopoly that it made the object of criticism. The procedure is credible if the next parliamentary majority, no longer a two-thirds one, also cannot turn it into the will of a single person.

3.2 Leaving the competences and the structure of the state untouched — a ban on tricks

The legal scholars expressly warn against “tricky” solutions: removal carried out by renaming institutions, taking away the head of state’s veto power, or the hasty introduction of direct presidential election. MIAK turns this into compulsory self-restraint within the A6 strengthening of checks and balances programme point: a swap of persons may not be accompanied by a change in the competence of the office, the legal status of the institution or the electoral order. Here one must be precise in public-law terms: the amendment to the Fundamental Law is adopted by the National Assembly — the government only submits it — and no other institution may override such an amendment in substance. The President of the Republic is the head of state, not a governmental actor; in the case of an amendment to the Fundamental Law he cannot exercise a substantive veto, at most he may refer it to the Constitutional Court if a procedural error is suspected. Precisely for this reason the self-restraint of the two-thirds majority is not an external constraint but its own, voluntarily undertaken discipline — and this is what must be turned into a guarantee.

3.3 An annual constitutional stress test — so that the restoration cannot turn into its opposite

To check whether the renewal of offices really served the strengthening of checks and balances, MIAK proposes the I10 constitutional “stress test” programme point: an annual, independent examination of whether the system of checks and balances would prevent a hypothetical future concentration of power — the result being public. The logic of the test is party-neutral: it measures not who happens to sit in the office, but whether the institutional structure resists anyone’s single-person power. This is the guarantee that links the present, exceptional transition with a lasting rule of law: if the stress test, even after the swap, shows that a next two-thirds majority could dominate the institutions just the same, then the restoration has not been completed.

The common principle of the three proposals is that legitimacy — within Hart’s conceptual frame — stems from the credible rules of the institution, not from the person sitting in it; therefore a lasting rule of law can be restored only by strengthening the procedures, leaving the competences untouched and through continuous, public oversight.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law / institutions More credible operation of checks and balances if the nomination is depoliticised The removal precedes the nomination reform → the appointment monopoly is inherited
Society Growing trust if the renewal of offices is transparent and professional The impression of “collective guilt” divides public opinion, may undermine legitimacy
Public administration More stable, more predictable institutional operation “Tricky” solutions (renaming, removal of competences) breed legal uncertainty

The main point to weigh is the tension between speed and durability. The political logic wants a quick, unambiguous swap of persons; the rule-of-law logic wants a slower, procedure-based renewal. Where the two collide, the risk is that the “unavoidable” swap comes with an ill-considered change of competences — precisely what the open letter forbids. The proposal tips to the risk side if the two-thirds majority treats its own self-restraint not as a legal guarantee but as a revocable promise. The counterargument raised by Péter Hack (lawyer) — that making leaders collectively responsible evokes the principle of collective guilt — is a real warning here: the ground for removal cannot be belonging to the group, but the provable loss of institutional integrity, justified individually.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

The success of the proposal is worth tracking with the following performance indicators (KPIs):

  • In how many cases the public, professional nomination procedure preceded the actual swap among the renewed public-law offices (goal: 100%).
  • The number of competences changed / institutions renamed during the renewal of offices (goal: 0 — the competences untouched).
  • The performance and publication of the annual constitutional stress test (goal: annually, publicly).
  • The proportion of non-two-thirds cross-party / professional agreement in the election of the new office-holders (goal: the broadest possible consensus).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message is that the renewal of public-law offices is a restoration of the rule of law if it strengthens the procedure, not if it merely swaps the persons. MIAK asks the two-thirds majority to fix the depoliticised, public nomination procedure before the removal, and to leave the competences, the head of state’s veto power and the electoral order untouched — because only thus can the system of checks and balances not be reversed in a next cycle. Two MIAK foundational values move together in this: accountability, because the authority of the institution stems from the credible, verifiable procedure, not from the will of power; and ideology-free governance, because the constitutional stress test examines not who sits in the office, but whether the structure protects against anyone’s single-person power — this party-neutral standard is the only safeguard of a lasting rule of law.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal band focused on the constitutional-law content: 444.hu, on one hand, reported factually that “on Monday Tamás Sulyok’s removal comes before the Constitutional Court”, and on the other, quoting the open letter of the 42 legal scholars in detail, highlighted the duality of removal and self-restraint. In an earlier analysis the outlet also published the opinion of constitutional lawyer János Mécs, according to whom Sulyok’s move is “creative”, but a decision favourable to the president is unlikely, because it would create a new role for the body. Népszava (the article URL pointed to the portal’s home page, a title-level reference only) carried Péter Hack’s sceptical position.

The economic band gave an objective, procedure-centred frame: Portfolio, under the title “The lawyers have spoken: this is how the most important Hungarian leaders can be lawfully removed”, put the legal logic of the open letter — the right of the two-thirds majority and its limits — at the centre, and precisely quoted the list of the offices concerned.

The conservative band built a counter-frame: Mandiner presented the open letter partly as a step “reviving the principle of collective guilt” (following Péter Hack’s argument), while Magyar Nemzet treated the process within a “coup attempt” rhetorical frame. ATV’s public-affairs band highlighted the resignation proposal of András Baka, former president of the supreme court. From the spectrum as a whole it is apparent that the facts (the Constitutional Court hearing, the open letter) are shared, but the meaning — restoration of the rule of law, collective guilt or a power coup — sharply divides the sources; precisely for this reason it is worth keeping the debate at the level of procedural guarantees, not the attribution of intent.

6.2 Facts and data

Fact Value Source
Day of the Constitutional Court hearing 22 June 2026 (Monday) 444.hu / Constitutional Court website, 18 June 2026
Number of signatories of the open letter 42 → 181 (at the time of publication of the article) 444.hu / Portfolio, 18 June 2026
Offices called on to resign 8 (head of state, prosecutor general, Curia, OBH, Constitutional Court, ÁSZ, Competition Authority, media authority) Portfolio, 18 June 2026
Deadline given for voluntary departure 31 May 2026 444.hu, 18 June 2026
Two-thirds threshold out of 199 134 mandates (66.84%) Act CCIII of 2011
Hungary WGI 2024 — rule of law +0.35 World Bank WGI

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the independence of the judicial and constitutional organs, the depoliticisation of the nomination procedure;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the strengthening of checks and balances as an anti-corruption guarantee;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the selection and rotation order of the public-law office-holders.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu’s central thesis is that the condition of liberty is the separation of the branches of power. In the classic formulation of the work: “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.” The thesis is a direct argument for proposal 3.2: the renewal of public-law offices would endanger liberty precisely if, on the pretext of removal, the competences ended up in one hand — in the hands of the two-thirds parliamentary majority. The swap of persons may be legitimate; the merging of competences is not.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.2 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

Hart, with the concept of the “rule of recognition”, shows that a legal order and its institutions derive their authority not from mere sanction but from the rule internally accepted by the community: officials and the majority of citizens follow the rule not because they fear punishment, but because they accept it — “from the internal point of view” — as a standard of behaviour. It follows that the credibility of an institution cannot be restored merely by replacing the leader if the procedures by which they are appointed and overseen are themselves not credible. In the case of the Hungarian renewal of public-law offices this means: the authority of checks and balances returns if the nomination and accountability rules — not only the persons — become accepted.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

6.4.3 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

Raz defines the rule of law such that it “literally means what it says: the rule of the law” — in the political sense, that “the government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it”, this being the principle of “government by law and not by men”. Raz emphasises that the primary role of the legal standards applying to high-ranking state officials is not to predict their behaviour but to guide the conduct of officials — that is, the voluntary subordination of power to the rule. This is a direct argument for the self-restraint of the two-thirds majority: the restoration of the rule of law is credible precisely if the most powerful actor — the two-thirds majority — also proceeds according to a self-limited, transparent procedure, not according to the logic of mere force.

📖 Source: Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

6.5 International comparison

The experience of democratic transitions is unanimous in that the replacement of the old regime’s office-holders consolidated the rule of law where the swap came with a depoliticised, rule-based procedure, and not where the victorious majority simply took over the appointment power. The constitutional-court and prosecutorial reforms of the former socialist countries show: where the nomination was tied to a professional body and a broad parliamentary consensus, the institution remained resistant to the next government as well; where the removal came with a simultaneous reshaping of competences, the new majority inherited the old instruments. The recurring recommendation of the Venice Commission (the constitutional-law advisory body of the Council of Europe) is exactly this: exceptional, transitional swaps of persons must be accompanied by a transparent procedure fortified with guarantees.

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening of checks and balances

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 19 June 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law
  • 📖 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

Note: the book’s local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 19 June 2026 — topic 2, score: 87/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • The Fundamental Law of Hungary (effective text); Venice Commission recommendations; Constitutional Court rules of procedure; World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024

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