Part I — Situation overview

On 11 June 2026 President of the Republic Tamás Sulyok submitted a motion for abstract constitutional interpretation to the Constitutional Court, based on Section 38 of the Act on the Constitutional Court (ABtv.). By the Sándor Palace’s statement, the motion was needed because “the political declarations aimed at removing high public dignitaries also raise the possibility of amendments to the Fundamental Law which, instead of regulation of a general character, are directed at settling individual situations” — the head of state thus asks the body to interpret the constitutional function of the provisions on adopting and amending the Fundamental Law: can a substantively individual, non-general act fit within the conceptual scope of a Fundamental Law amendment. The antecedent is well known: Prime Minister Péter Magyar gave the head of state until 31 May to depart, then, after the resignation failed to come, announced that he would be removed by an amendment to the Fundamental Law. The Prime Minister reacted to the motion the same day, in a public comment: “This is now truly the pity category” — he wrote, qualifying the head of state’s move as personally motivated. Sulyok also signalled that he awaits the opinion of the Venice Commission, the constitutional-law advisory body of the Council of Europe.

The key to the public-law situation is that the President of the Republic is not a governmental actor but a self-standing constitutional institution independent of the executive — the present conflict is therefore not a dispute within the government but the open confrontation of two constitutional organs. The Constitutional Court’s room for manoeuvre is also particular: by Article 24(5) of the Fundamental Law the body may review the Fundamental Law and its amendment not substantively, but exclusively from the viewpoint of the procedural requirements relating to its making and promulgation — its public-law validity. Decision 45/2012 (XII. 29.) AB, however, pronounced the so-called incorporation requirement (“beépülési parancs”): an amendment must be incorporated into the unified system of the Fundamental Law, and the decision — by the constitutional-law analysis quoted on Mandiner — left open the possibility of examining the prevailing of democratic rule-of-law values. The political analyst Gábor Török put it this way on 24.hu: the case “carries more and more political risk for the Prime Minister with every day”.

MIAK’s reading: the real subject of the dispute is not the person of Tamás Sulyok, but the question of whether the constituent power — the two-thirds (parliamentary) majority, that is, the political force above 134 mandates in the 199-seat National Assembly, sufficient even for amending the constitution — recognises any self-restraint. The instrument of a person-tailored amendment to the Fundamental Law is exactly the technique that drew the most criticism in the public-law practice of the past decade and a half; if the new majority reaches for the same, it legitimises the instrument — in anyone’s hands.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. The Fundamental Law of Hungary — the dispute’s direct legal subject — may be amended with a two-thirds voting ratio, and the Constitutional Court, under Article 24(5), may review the amendment only from the viewpoint of public-law validity (procedure): the essence of the present motion is exactly whether the “packaging of an individual act into a Fundamental Law amendment” can be raised as a procedural-conceptual question. By The Concept of Law of H. L. A. Hart (British legal philosopher, a defining figure of 20th-century legal theory), the ultimate foundation of every legal system is the rule of recognition — the practice by which courts, offices and citizens identify what counts as valid law; if a dispute arises about the criteria of validity at the top of the legal order, at the constitutional level itself, that is not one legal dispute among many but an uncertainty touching the system’s foundations. And The Spirit of the Laws, the classic of Montesquieu (18th-century French thinker on the state), gives the original argument for the separation of powers: liberty is lost where the same organ makes and executes the rule — the constitutional amendment tailored to one person blurs exactly that borderline. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures for the institutional — not person-centred — settlement of the conflict.

3.1 A general rule instead of an individual act (before the amendment is submitted)

If the government majority wants to change the legal status of high public dignitaries, it should do so as a general rule applying equally to everyone and prospectively: a mandate cap, a conflict-of-interest rule, a status-review procedure — not as a provision tailored to the removal of a single person. In Hart’s frame (see 6.4.2) the difference is not stylistic: the general rule becomes part of the legal order and creates predictability, while the individual act degrades the constitution into an ad-hoc political instrument. This coincides with the conceptual question of the Sándor Palace’s motion — but it is the right yardstick independently of what the Constitutional Court says.

3.2 A mutual undertaking to accept the interpretive decision in advance (until the Constitutional Court’s decision)

The government and the President of the Republic should publicly undertake that they will treat the Constitutional Court’s interpretive decision — whichever way it goes — as authoritative for themselves, and until the decision the government majority does not adopt the disputed amendment. Abstract constitutional interpretation has no statutory deadline, but in such cases the body typically proceeds out of turn — the wait is therefore measured in weeks or months, not years. By the logic of the programme point on reinforcing checks and balances (A6), the value of an institutional conflict lies exactly in its being decided in a legal channel: if either side holds out the prospect of disregarding the decision, the dispute turns from a legal question into a trial of strength — by the constitutional-law analysis quoted in Magyar Nemzet, disregarding a strong Constitutional Court decision could bring about a constitutional crisis.

3.3 A constitutional stress test on the conflict (first report by the end of 2026)

The present situation is a live case of the constitutional stress-test programme point (I10): an independent expert analysis should examine and publicly document how the system of checks and balances performed — was a Constitutional Court decision born in time, did the affected organs observe it, at what point was the system gameable. The mandate-stability principle of the programme point on protecting judicial independence (I4) receives concrete content here: the legal status of the heads of constitutional institutions should not depend on the grace of the current majority — this guarantee will hold in reverse too, when the present majority finds itself in the minority. By Montesquieu’s argument (see 6.4.3) the question is never whether the given majority uses concentrated power for a good end, but whether the structure permits the concentration.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: “the institution should be stronger than the momentary majority”. MIAK does not ask the government majority to renounce the right to change — it asks that the change happen in a general rule, with a waited-out norm control, with documented lessons.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public law The Constitutional Court’s interpretive decision can clarify for the long run the conceptual limits of amending the Fundamental Law If the decision is born after the amendment’s adoption, its weight becomes symbolic; if it is disregarded, constitutional crisis
Political stability A dispute kept in a legal channel sets a precedent for conflict management between branches of power Escalation — mutual delegitimisation, parallel legitimacy claims — leaves lasting public-law uncertainty behind
International standing Involving the Venice Commission and waiting strengthen the rule-of-law reform narrative A person-tailored amendment can undermine exactly the rule-of-law credibility underpinning the fund unlocking
Institutional culture The general regulatory route (mandate cap, conflict of interest) binds every later government Normalising the individual act: the next majority will use the same instrument — in the opposite direction

The main question to weigh is time. From the government majority’s viewpoint waiting is a political cost — the unfinished case stays on the agenda, and by Gábor Török’s analysis it carries more and more risk. From the viewpoint of the constitutional order, however, the waiting is itself the test: if the majority is able to wait for the decision of the very institution it itself invokes, that gives any later step stronger legitimacy than speed would. The other tipping point is the Constitutional Court’s position: the body is itself affected — the plans aimed at removing high public dignitaries may touch the Court’s leadership too —, so the credibility of its decision hinges on answering strictly the conceptual-procedural question and not stepping onto the terrain of political expediency.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

Four performance indicators (KPIs) are worth tracking over the next 6–12 months:

  • Order of decisions: whether the Constitutional Court’s interpretive decision is born before the final vote on the disputed Fundamental Law amendment — the simplest indicator of keeping the matter in a legal channel;
  • Regulatory form: whether the amendment eventually submitted contains a general (prospective, person-neutral) provision or one tailored to an individual situation;
  • Decision-following: whether the affected constitutional organs follow the findings of the Constitutional Court and the Venice Commission in their declarations and acts;
  • Perceived judicial and institutional independence: the 2027 movement of the perceived-independence indicator of the EU Justice Scoreboard (the European Commission’s annual justice scoreboard) — the way the conflict is handled affects it directly.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the decision-maker can be summed up in a single sentence: any change concerning the legal status of high public dignitaries should be born as a general rule, with the Constitutional Court’s interpretive decision waited out and respected. The President of the Republic’s motion — independently of the personal motivations that may be sensed behind it — chose a lawful and institutional route; the yardstick of the response is whether the other actors stay on that route too.

Of MIAK’s foundational values the topic touches accountability and non-ideology most deeply: accountability because the system of checks and balances — the head of state and the Constitutional Court within it — exists precisely so that the power of the majority of the day remains accountable; and non-ideology because MIAK applies to the present government majority the same procedural yardstick it applied to the person-tailored public-law solutions of the previous decade and a half — the yardstick does not depend on who is in power.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The topic’s framing on this day shows an unusually sharp spectrum reflection. The conservative band builds the motion’s legal soundness: Mandiner publishes the Sándor Palace’s reasoning and, in a separate analysis — with former constitutional judges and constitutional lawyers speaking —, projects that “Sulyok may break Péter Magyar’s knife”, that is, the Constitutional Court may bar the individual amendment; by Magyar Nemzet the body has “not only the right but also the duty” to examine laws that disrupt the legal system, and it ties the possibility of a constitutional crisis to the decision’s eventual disregard.

The left-liberal and public-affairs band highlights the political dynamics: HVG reconstructs the Prime Minister’s immediate, belittling reaction (“This is now truly the pity category”) and the antecedents; 24.hu, through Gábor Török’s analysis, stresses the risks of a case turning “from a reward play into a double-edged weapon”; 444.hu walks around with constitutional lawyers whether the President of the Republic can be replaced with rule-of-law instruments — the very framing of the question signals that for that camp replacing the high public dignitaries appointed under NER is a legitimate goal, and the lawfulness of the instrument is the disputed point. The economic band (Portfolio) reported on the motion in a fact-reporting register, confining itself to quotations; ATV brought the head of state’s move with the framing of “asking for help”.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Submission of the motion 11 June 2026 Sándor Palace statement (Mandiner, HVG)
Legal basis ABtv. Section 38 — abstract constitutional interpretation Mandiner, 11 June 2026
Constitutional Court review limit Fundamental Law Article 24(5): only public-law validity (procedural) review Fundamental Law of Hungary
Key precedent Decision 45/2012 (XII. 29.) AB — “incorporation requirement” Mandiner constitutional-law analysis, 11 June 2026
Threshold of a Fundamental Law amendment 134 mandates in the 199-seat National Assembly (two-thirds) Act CCIII of 2011; calculation
Size of the government majority Tisza: 141 mandates (70.85%) NVI, 19 April 2026
Antecedent ultimatum resignation deadline: 31 May 2026 HVG, 11 June 2026
International thread Venice Commission opinion in progress Sándor Palace statement (Mandiner)

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the Constitutional Court’s competences and mandate stability as a guarantee of independence (I4), the constitutional stress test (I10);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the institutional-independence index of checks and balances (A6), measuring democratic resilience (A9);
  • Legal foundations (background material) — the precise description of the President of the Republic’s self-standing constitutional status and the Constitutional Court’s norm-control function.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Fundamental Law of Hungary

The dispute’s direct legal frame is the Fundamental Law itself. An amendment requires the votes of two-thirds of the Members of Parliament; the adopted amendment is signed by the Speaker of the National Assembly and sent to the President of the Republic, who — if he perceives a breach of the procedural requirements — may initiate the Constitutional Court’s review. By Article 24(5) the body may review the Fundamental Law and its amendment exclusively with regard to the procedural requirements laid down in the Fundamental Law for its making and promulgation — there is no place for substantive norm control. The fine but essential question of the present motion: if an act is formally a Fundamental Law amendment but substantively an individual decision, does it belong to the conceptual scope of “amendment” at all — that is, can the question of the conceptual limit itself be treated as a procedural question. The text in force gives no express answer to this; that is exactly why the abstract interpretation makes sense.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (consolidated text)

6.4.2 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

By Hart’s theory the foundation of a legal system is the rule of recognition: the — typically unspoken — practice on whose basis the courts, the offices and the citizens identify what counts as valid law. The rule is ultimate: the validity of every other norm can be derived from it, while its own is no longer a question of norm but of fact — “its existence can only be an external statement of fact” about the concordant practice of courts and officials. Hart also signals that there are situations in which the precise content and scope of this rule “gives no clear or determinate answer”. Translated to the Hungarian situation: if there is no agreement among the constitutional actors on whether an individual act adopted with two-thirds is a valid Fundamental Law amendment, then the dispute is about the content of the rule of recognition — and the longer it stays unsettled, the more it is raw political force, not law, that decides it. That is why MIAK puts the waiting-out and mutual acceptance of the interpretive decision at the centre of proposal 3.2.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

6.4.3 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

By Montesquieu’s classic argument, the condition of political liberty is that the branches of power separate and limit each other: “when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty” — because the same organ can make a tyrannical law and execute it in a tyrannical manner (as rendered in the work’s English edition). The Fundamental Law amendment tailored to one person blurs exactly that borderline: the legislative majority creates not a general rule but a concrete act of execution — the removal of an office-holder — raised into constitutional form, withdrawing it from the control of every other branch of power. In this frame the present Hungarian dispute is not the duel of the head of state and the Prime Minister, but the test of whether the structure — in Montesquieu’s sense — permits the constituent and the executive function to slide together.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (A törvények szelleméről)

6.5 International comparison

The international examples referred to by Mandiner as well give a mixed picture. In Romania, the 2012 attempt to suspend the head of state and remove him by referendum drew the European Union’s sharp criticism and ultimately failed; in Poland, the Tusk government has been trying from 2024 to bring the central-bank governor to account, so far without result; in Brazil, the 2016 presidential impeachment ran in a formally regulated procedure but with strongly contested political content. The common lesson in MIAK’s reading: where removal happened under pre-fixed, general procedural rules, the institutional system — even if wounded — remained operational; where an ad-hoc, person-tailored solution was attempted, the attempt either failed or left a lasting legitimacy wound. The practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court is the counter-direction: the “eternity clause” (the unamendable core of the separation of powers and human dignity) sets an expressly substantive limit before the constituent power — the Hungarian Fundamental Law knows no such thing, which raises the stakes of the present dispute.

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Reinforcing checks and balances
  • A9 — Spin-dictatorship prevention index

Proposed new programme point: Moratorium on changing the legal status of high public dignitaries — for the Justice area: a Fundamental Law amendment touching the legal status of high public dignitaries should be adoptable only as a general rule effective from the next term.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 12 June 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature, legal sources):

  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (consolidated text)
  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law
  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (A törvények szelleméről)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A9)
  • MIAK legal-foundations background material — the legal status of the President of the Republic and the Constitutional Court
  • MIAK press monitor, 12 June 2026 — topic 2, score: 85/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • EU Justice Scoreboard — perceived judicial independence indicator
  • Relevant opinions of the Venice Commission (procedure in progress)

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