On 19 June 2026 one of the most unusual turns of Hungarian public law unfolded: of the fifteen members of the Constitutional Court, seven recused themselves on grounds of concern from hearing the submission of President of the Republic Tamás Sulyok, whereupon Péter Polt, the body’s president, took the case scheduled for Monday off the agenda. Prime Minister Péter Magyar said the “constitutional court has rebelled against the President of the Republic”. The question is not which political side the turn favours — but whether the dispute remains within the channel of constitutional procedure.

Part I — Situation overview

The President of the Republic (the Hungarian head of state, a neutral, integrative public-law role, not the head of the executive) turned to the Constitutional Court on 11 June 2026 — to that independent constitution-protecting organ which, under Article 24 of the Fundamental Law, examines the constitutionality of laws, and which is not the same as the Kúria standing at the apex of the ordinary courts. The submission posed the question whether the tailored constitutional amendments aimed at “settling individual situations” really qualify as constitutional amendments. Seven constitutional judges recused themselves from the case; the body thus did not remain quorate at the urgently scheduled sitting, and Péter Polt took it off the agenda.

The procedural turn is part of a broader public-law tension. On 18 June an open letter by legal scholars — the initial 42 signatories later growing to 181 — urged the removal of public-law leaders and argued for two-thirds self-restraint. Péter Magyar called on Tamás Sulyok to resign voluntarily, otherwise — in his words — “the parliamentary majority will find a way” to remove him. On the other side, constitutional lawyer Péter Hack criticised the logic demanding removal: in his view it “would revive the principle of collective guilt”, because it makes boundless the question of who else played a “significant role” in the earlier system. András Baka, the former president of the Supreme Court, meanwhile called on the head of state to resign.

In MIAK’s reading, the stake is not who wins this particular clash, but whether the dispute between the branches of power is settled by rule-of-law means — in a bound procedure, by predictable rules — or whether the will of the prevailing majority overrides the institutional guarantees. The latter may in the short term turn against one side, and in the long term against any.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame in which the dispute can be interpreted. Montesquieu (the 18th-century French legal philosopher, founder of the theory of the separation of powers) held in his classic thesis that if judicial power is not separated from the legislative and executive, freedom ceases — that is, independent constitutional protection is precisely the brake against the will of the majority. Alexis de Tocqueville (the 19th-century French thinker, one of the first systematic analysts of democratic order) warned of the danger of the “omnipotence of the majority”: where the will of the majority is checked by no institution, even a great people can be made oppressible by a single faction — the precise frame for the risk of removing officeholders by a parliamentary two-thirds majority. H. L. A. Hart (the 20th-century British legal philosopher, one of the founders of modern legal theory) and his rule of recognition show that the essence of the present dispute is not substantive but a matter of validity and competence: what qualifies as a valid constitutional amendment, and who is entitled to decide this. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that keep the public-law dispute within the channel of constitutional procedure and build institutional guarantees more lasting than changes of persons.

3.1 A bound procedure for the removal of officeholders (an immediate legislative principle)

MIAK proposes that the removal during mandate of public-law leaders — among them constitutional judges and the President of the Republic — may take place only in a bound procedure fixed in advance in the Fundamental Law and in statute, with individual, evidence-based accountability. In the logic described by Hart (see 6.4.3) this is a question of validity: whoever holds an office by election with a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly cannot, during their mandate, be legally instructed or removed by a free majority decision. The principled aim of the open letter demanding removal may be legitimate, but the execution must not slide into the logic of collective responsibility — this boundary is fixed by the programme points I5 rule-of-law predictability and A6 reinforcing checks and balances.

3.2 A depoliticised, transparent appointment regime (within 12 months)

MIAK’s programme point I4 proposes the depoliticisation of judicial and constitutional-judge nomination: a public procedure tied to professional criteria and forcing a two-thirds consensus, in which no single political force can fill a body unilaterally. The present situation — where the body’s composition and the recusals receive political framing (“sabotage”, “rebellion”) — shows precisely why it is risky if appointment depends on the day-to-day balance of force. The aim is not to reverse the body’s political direction but to reshape the appointment procedure so that it resists hands-on control in later cycles too.

3.3 Institutionalising a constitutional stress test (from the next cycle)

MIAK’s programme point I10 proposes an annual, independent constitutional “stress test”: a regular examination of whether the system of checks and balances would prevent a hypothetical concentration of power. The present public-law crisis is exactly the kind of scenario modelled live — an institutional dispute that tests the boundary between the majority and the independent organs. The test’s result should be public, and together with the I3 mandatory, independent legislative impact assessment it should ensure that the risk of tailored legislation becomes visible in time.

The common principle of the three proposals is that a change of persons is not in itself a reform: the institutional legacy of the NER is not dismantled by who sits in the seats, but by the procedure resisting political pressure in the future too — from whichever side it comes.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law The bound procedure makes officeholders’ status predictable and reduces the possibility of political revenge The “slow, formal” procedure may seem like inertia to a majority pressing for change, and breeds pressure to bypass it
Institutional trust Depoliticised appointment can in the long term restore the authority of the independent organs In the short term both sides may attack the transition with the charge that “the other’s people stayed in”
Political culture The precedent that the dispute is settled by constitutional means strengthens the norm of self-restraint If the precedent becomes the tailored solution, it is reversible and becomes the instrument of any future majority

The main consideration is the balance between the speed of change and rule-of-law guarantees. The proposal tips towards risk if the majority experiences the bound procedure as a sign of inertia and looks instead for a political fast lane — then the guarantee itself becomes the first casualty. The proposal works if the depoliticised procedure is genuinely transparent, and if the side pressing for change also recognises that it builds its own future protection by restraining itself today.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following performance indicators (KPIs) worth tracking over a 6–24-month horizon:

  • Procedural bindingness: every removal of a public-law officeholder should take place in a documented, pre-fixed statutory procedure — the number of extraordinary, procedure-bypassing solutions should be zero.
  • Appointment transparency: the share of new judicial and constitutional-judge nominations made along a public, professional set of criteria and a two-thirds consensus.
  • Individual vs. collective responsibility: accountability proceedings should begin in an individual, evidence-based form — the share of group removals by office should be zero.
  • Constitutional stress test: whether the first independent, public examination of the load-bearing capacity of checks and balances is produced.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the public alike is that the public-law dispute must be settled within the channel of constitutional rules — by a bound procedure, individual responsibility, depoliticised appointment. The concrete request: officeholders’ status should depend not on the parliamentary balance of force but on a pre-fixed statutory procedure, and the emphasis should be on lasting institutional guarantees, not on changes of persons. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values: accountability, because responsibility is individual and evidence-based, not a group stigma; and openness, because the depoliticised, transparent procedure remains checkable under every future government. Here the two values secure the predictability without which today’s winner may tomorrow become the victim of their own instrument.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal and public-affairs band, Telex and 444.hu focused on the procedural fact (the recusal of seven judges, the removal from the agenda) and refrained from judgement — Telex also carried the Sándor Palace’s restrained reaction (“the President of the Republic has taken note”). 24.hu similarly highlighted the mechanism of the loss of quorum. In the pro-government/conservative band, Mandiner framed the same event as “sabotage”, and from the prime minister’s side Telex quoted it as “rebellion” — that is, the emphasis was on attributing intent. Magyar Nemzet elevated a lawyerly counter-voice to a leading theme: Péter Hack’s “collective guilt” argument, which points to the dangers of the removal logic. ATV brought a third viewpoint: András Baka’s call to resign, which shows that professional judgement too is not one-directional. Across the whole spectrum it emerges that the same procedural fact is embedded in radically different narratives — which is precisely why the precise, legal-language recording of the facts matters.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Of the fifteen members of the Constitutional Court, seven recused themselves from hearing Tamás Sulyok’s submission (source: Telex, 24.hu, 19 June 2026).
  • The President of the Republic’s submission arrived on 11 June 2026, its subject being the qualification of the constitutional amendments aimed at “settling individual situations” (source: Telex, 20 June 2026).
  • The number of signatories of the legal scholars’ open letter urging the removal of public-law leaders grew from 42 to 181 (source: HVG, 18 June 2026).
  • The members of the Constitutional Court are elected by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly and, during their mandate, cannot be instructed or removed by a free political decision (source: Fundamental Law, Article 24).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — judicial and constitutional-judge independence, depoliticised nomination and constitutional control; affected: I4, I10, I3, I5.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the actual independence of checks and balances and the role of publicity; affected: A6, A7.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu formulated the classic thesis of the separation of powers: where legislative and executive power come into one hand, or where judicial power is not separated from the other two, freedom ceases. In his own words: “there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive” — that is, there is no freedom if judicial power does not separate from the legislative and the executive. In the Sulyok case this is precisely the stake in reverse: the preservation of independent, judicial-type constitutional protection against political will — constitutional adjudication fulfils its role if it operates as a reviewable limit on majority intent, not as its executor.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (1748)

6.4.2 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Tocqueville saw the greatest danger of democracy in the “omnipotence of the majority”: if the will of the majority is checked by no intermediate institution, then — in his words — “a great people may be oppressed by a small faction, or by a single individual, with impunity”. Judicial power and the independent constitutional organs are precisely such brakes against majority or executive overreach. In the Hungarian situation this is a direct argument that the parliamentary two-thirds should not be able freely to remove public-law officeholders — the point of brakes is precisely that they operate independently of the momentary majority.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

6.4.3 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

In Hart’s theory the validity of a legal system depends not on a single command but on the “rule of recognition”: on whether the officials of the law follow recognised, secondary rules from a shared, internal point of view. The core of the Sulyok submission is exactly such a Hartian secondary question: what qualifies as a valid constitutional amendment, and who is entitled to judge this — that is, the dispute is one of competence and validity, not about the content of the amendment. This frame helps to separate the political rhetoric (“rebellion”, “sabotage”) from the actual legal question: that a body applies its own conflict-of-interest rules is not in itself a political act, but precisely procedural rule-following.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

6.5 International comparison

The independence of constitutional judges and the bound-procedure removal of officeholders is also a question of international standard. The Strasbourg precedent associated with the name of András Baka (Baka v. Hungary) fixed precisely that a premature, procedure-bypassing removal from a judicial office violates rule-of-law guarantees — in the present dispute this lesson is directly applicable. The recommendations of the Venice Commission (the constitutional-law advisory body of the Council of Europe) likewise highlight two-thirds, consensual appointment and mandate stability as guarantees of the independence of constitutional courts. The common principle: the legitimate settlement of institutional disputes is a function not of majority will but of the pre-fixed procedure.

Justice

  • I4 — Judicial and constitutional-judge independence, depoliticised nomination
  • I10 — Constitutional stress test
  • I3 — Mandatory, independent legislative impact assessment
  • I5 — Rule-of-law predictability and independent legal remedy

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Reinforcing checks and balances
  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 20 June 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (1748)
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America
  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

Note: the local file path of the book does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 20 June 2026 — topic 2, score: 85/100

Additional public data sources:

  • The Fundamental Law of Hungary (Article 24 — the Constitutional Court); Venice Commission recommendations
  • European Court of Human Rights — Baka v. Hungary judgment

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