Part I — Situation overview

On 22 June 2026 the governing majority submitted the draft of the seventeenth amendment to the Fundamental Law, whose substantive provision is a single sentence: “on the day following the entry into force of the amendment the mandate of the incumbent President of the Republic shall cease”. According to the proposal, the National Assembly would elect a new head of state to the vacated office — until the entry into force of the new Constitution, but for at most five years — and during any transitional period the Speaker of the House would fill the function. In his parliamentary speech the Prime Minister cited a “grave loss of social confidence” and the mandate from the voters; the draft may be commented on for five days. Even before the text appeared, Tamás Sulyok requested a ruling from the Constitutional Court, and then — after that stalled — turned to the Council of Europe’s constitutional advisory body, the Venice Commission.

The proposal immediately provoked a constitutional debate. The Sándor Palace — the office of the head of state — in its statement “warned against the arbitrary exercise of public power”. The position of Amnesty International Hungary was nuanced: it agrees that the President of the Republic has lost social confidence, but it qualifies the accelerated procedure without guarantees as a breach of the right to a fair procedure and as “a precedent dangerous for all of us”. Part of the press frames the step as one of the stakes of the 2026 turn, another part as a “botched coup”, and yet another as the restoration of checks and balances.

MIAK’s reading is party-neutral and principled: the question is not whether the person of the current President of the Republic can be defended, but whether the mandate of a constitutional dignitary may be terminated by an ad hoc, person-specific, accelerated constitutional amendment without the procedure itself meeting the standard of rule-of-law quality. Two-thirds political legitimacy is a real mandate to govern — but it cannot be identified with the arbitrary revocability of mandates. This is not about one person but about a precedent that affects every future government and every independent institution.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Montesquieu (the eighteenth-century French legal philosopher, theorist of the separation of the branches of power) formulated the classic thesis in his work The Spirit of the Laws (1748): there is no liberty where the legislative and executive power — or the judicial and the legislative power — are concentrated in the same hands; the neutral, balancing dignity of the President of the Republic is precisely one of the safeguards of this separation. Alexis de Tocqueville (the nineteenth-century French thinker, author of Democracy in America) showed with the concept of the “tyranny of the majority” that an electoral majority is not in itself unlimited power: democracy is strong precisely when the majority too remains within institutional limits. Guriev and Treisman’s (an economist–political-scientist author pair) work Spin Dictators (2022) documents empirically that modern concentration of power typically occurs not through open violence but through “democratically” framed, accelerated constitutional amendments and the gradual hollowing-out of checks — this is a direct argument for procedural guarantees. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable procedural guarantees that serve the legitimate aim of accountability while not creating a precedent that weakens the system of checks and balances.

3.1 Awaiting an independent constitutional-law opinion (before the vote)

MIAK proposes that the National Assembly vote on any amendment to the Fundamental Law affecting the mandate of the incumbent head of state only after the opinion of the Council of Europe’s constitutional advisory body, the Venice Commission, has arrived. The Venice Commission is precisely the international standard examining the irremovability of judges and office-holders, as well as the prohibition of retroactivity. The government itself previously criticised this body — all the more credible a gesture would it be now to await its opinion. This fits within the principled frame of I4 (protection of judicial and constitutional-court independence): institutional neutrality is defensible not by the power of the government, but by that of the public and of independent review.

3.2 A fair commenting deadline (instead of five days)

MIAK objects that only five days are allowed for the social consultation of an amendment that terminates the mandate of a constitutional dignitary. We propose that amendments to the Fundamental Law affecting the legal status of the head of state, the constitutional courts and the independent institutions receive a mandatory, substantive consultation period of at least 30 days, with professional and civil hearings. Haste in itself worsens the legitimacy of the outcome: according to the logic of A6 (strengthening checks and balances), the quality of institutional decisions is given by the predictable, public procedure — not by speed.

3.3 A general, not person-specific rule (against the precedent risk)

According to MIAK, the greatest risk is the concrete person-specificity of the rule: a provision of the type “the mandate of the incumbent President of the Republic shall cease” creates a precedent for the governing majority of the day to remove any independent office-holder. We propose that if the legislator considers the regulation of presidential accountability justified, it should do so as a general, predictable, forward-looking procedure (e.g. a qualified procedural order in case of a grave legal violation) that applies equally to every future president. This is in line with the aim of I10 (constitutional stress test) and A9 (the indicator system for preventing the concentration of power).

The common principle of the three proposals is that accountability and rule-of-law quality are not opposites: the erosion described by Guriev–Treisman can be prevented precisely if the legitimate political aim (the removal of a dignitary who has lost confidence) is realised in a fair, general and internationally reviewed procedure, rather than in a single, person-specific sentence.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public law / institutional system With the guarantees observed, the democratic renewal of the new leadership can be credible and defensible by European standards too Without guarantees, the termination of a mandate becomes a precedent that can be an instrument for any future government against any institution
International perception Involving the Venice Commission strengthens rule-of-law credibility and allied trust Disregarding the body could trigger a new rule-of-law procedure and funding risk towards the EU
Domestic-political stability A predictable procedure reduces tension and makes the transition orderly The accelerated, contested procedure may cause a lasting constitutional conflict and the questioning of the new leadership’s legitimacy

The main consideration is timing and generality. The removal of a dignitary who has lost confidence may be a legitimate political aim; the risk tips over if the instrument — the person-specific, accelerated constitutional amendment — becomes lastingly embedded in the legal order. The proposal works well if the procedure now applied is one that the current majority would consider acceptable in the hands of a future, opposing governing majority too. This “veil test” is the simplest practical test of rule-of-law quality.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs) over the coming 12–24 months — these are recommendations, not government decisions:

  • Procedural guarantee index: whether the Venice Commission was involved and its opinion awaited before the vote (yes/no); whether the substantive commenting time reached 30 days.
  • Generality test: whether the final rule is person-specific or a forward-looking provision applying equally to every future president.
  • International indicator of judicial independence: the EU Justice Scoreboard’s “perceived judicial independence” index should not decrease in the next measurement cycle.
  • Institutional neutrality: the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) “rule of law” value (+0.35 in 2024) should improve, not deteriorate.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request in a single sentence: do not let the question of removing the head of state be decided by a single sentence. Accountability is legitimate, but the instrument must meet the rule-of-law standard whose restoration the governing majority itself set as its aim. Concretely: await the opinion of the Venice Commission, allow at least 30 days of substantive consultation, and make the rule general and forward-looking.

This position follows from two MIAK foundational values. Accountability requires that a dignitary who has lost confidence be removable — this aim MIAK does not dispute. Respect for checks and balances, however, requires that the very instrument of removal not weaken the institutional system: that is precisely why the two values move together here, because the stakes are not one person, but whether the limits on the exercise of power remain equally valid for every future government.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the liberal-left and public-affairs band, 444.hu highlighted the surprising brevity of the draft (“they terminate it with a single sentence”), HVG and Telex focused on the mechanics of the removal and the Sándor Palace’s reaction, while 24.hu put the rule-of-law warning in the headline. In the economic band, Portfolio brought in Amnesty International’s nuanced position — agreement on the loss of confidence, but rejection of the procedure — which was the most balanced framing. In the pro-government/conservative band, Magyar Nemzet wrote of a “constitutional crisis” and presented the step as a precedent weakening parliamentarism, while Mandiner placed the Sándor Palace’s response at the centre. It is instructive that on this day the entire spectrum — unusually — met in the concern over the procedure, even if with differing political conclusions: the liberal-left band emphasised the haste of the method, the conservative band the institutional precedent.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The proposal is formally the seventeenth amendment to the Fundamental Law; its substantive provision is the supplementation of the “Closing and miscellaneous provisions” part.
  • In the 2026 election Tisza won 141 mandates in the 199-member National Assembly (70.85%), which exceeds the 134-mandate two-thirds (constitution-amending) threshold (source: National Election Office, NVI, 19 April 2026).
  • Hungary’s rule-of-law indicator according to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) was +0.35 in 2024 — in European comparison the lower band of the middle field; every constitutional step that further worsens predictability will be measurable against this value too.
  • The President of the Republic, under Article 9 of the Fundamental Law, is an autonomous head of state, “the head of state of Hungary”, who expresses the unity of the nation — its legal status is not identical to the government’s, and the Sándor Palace’s statement is a presidential, not a governmental act.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the elements of judicial and constitutional-court independence, as well as the constitutional stress test, are directly affected;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the strengthening of checks and balances and the indicator system for preventing the concentration of power provide the institutional frame;
  • Legal foundations (background material) — the autonomous head-of-state legal status of the President of the Republic (Article 9 of the Fundamental Law) and the National Assembly’s competence to amend the constitution are the basis of conceptual precision.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

In his classic formulation of the separation of the branches of power, Montesquieu sees the condition of liberty in the separation of powers:

“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty (…). Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive.”

The neutral dignity of the President of the Republic, standing above the branches of power, is precisely the balancing point whose abolition — if the legislative majority does it with a single, accelerated move — weakens the separation of powers. In the Hungarian situation this means: not the possibility of removal, but the instrument of removal (the uncontrolled, person-specific constitutional amendment) touches the Montesquieuan balance.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: A törvények szelleméről (The Spirit of the Laws, 1748)

6.4.2 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

With the concept of the “tyranny of the majority”, Tocqueville warns that the unlimited power of an electoral majority is in itself a danger:

“The omnipotence of the majority appears to me to present such extreme perils to the American Republics (…) a great people may be oppressed by a small faction, or by a single individual, with impunity.”

The idea is double-edged here: in the Hungarian context the governing majority can rightly invoke that the concentration of power of earlier years was itself a symptom of the “tyranny of the majority” — but precisely for this reason the solution cannot be the use of the same instrument (the unlimited nature of the two-thirds) in the opposite direction. According to Tocqueville’s lesson, democracy is stable if the majority itself remains within institutional limits.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: A demokrácia Amerikában (Democracy in America, 1835/1840)

6.4.3 Guriev–Treisman: Spin Dictators

According to the empirical analysis of Guriev and Treisman, twenty-first-century concentration of power occurs characteristically through “democratic” instruments — accelerated constitutional amendments, the gradual hollowing-out of checks. The authors cite several cases where a leader “used their initial popularity to (…) cement their power with various constitutional amendments”. The lesson of Spin Dictators in the Hungarian debate is not direction-dependent: any government that removes an institutional dignitary with a single, person-specific amendment reproduces the same pattern that the book describes as a sign of democratic erosion. That is why the MIAK proposal puts the A9 indicator system at the centre: it is not intent but measurable procedural quality that must be watched.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spindiktátorok (Spin Dictators, 2022)

6.5 International comparison

In several of its opinions the Venice Commission has fixed the two relevant standards: the principle of the irremovability of office-holders and the prohibition of retroactivity. In Poland and Romania the constitutional-court and judicial reforms of the past decade attracted European criticism precisely because the majority in power reached into the institutions with accelerated, person-affecting procedures. The lesson is two-directional: dismantling the concentration of power is a legitimate aim, but the instrument of dismantling cannot be the same accelerated, uncontrolled legislation that originally made the concentration possible. The standard of credible renewal is whether the new procedure withstands independent international review.

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial and constitutional-court independence
  • I10 — Constitutional stress test
  • I5 — Protection of property rights and predictable application of law

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A9 — The indicator system for preventing the concentration of power

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 23 June 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: A törvények szelleméről (The Spirit of the Laws, 1748)
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: A demokrácia Amerikában (Democracy in America, 1835/1840)
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spindiktátorok (Spin Dictators, 2022)

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A9)
  • MIAK policy area: Legal foundations (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 23 June 2026 — topic 1, score: 87/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (rule of law, 2024)
  • Venice Commission (Council of Europe) — opinions on the irremovability of office-holders and the prohibition of retroactivity
  • Amnesty International Hungary — statement (22 June 2026)

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