Part I — Situation overview

In recent weeks a sharpening constitutional conflict has unfolded around the President of the Republic, Tamás Sulyok. Prime Minister Péter Magyar called on the head of state to leave already on election night, then repeatedly, and earlier even named a 31 May deadline for vacating the office. Tamás Sulyok did not accept this, and on 7 June 2026 announced: his case is being examined by the Venice Commission — the Council of Europe’s expert body dealing with constitutional questions — in an accelerated procedure. On that same Sunday a sympathy demonstration of a few hundred people in support of the state leaders took place in front of the Sándor Palace; reacting to the demonstration, the Prime Minister wrote, “Clinging to position versus the unity of the Hungarian nation. Take your pick!”, and sent a message to the President: “Mr President, you too know that it is over.”

The essence of the dispute is not who is likeable and who is not. Under the Fundamental Law the President of the Republic is an independent public-law dignitary, not a member of the government and not subordinate to it; some of his acts require prime-ministerial countersignature, but the office itself is separated from the executive power. During his mandate the head of state may be removed only in a strictly binding procedure — by removal, with the involvement of the Constitutional Court — and only if he deliberately violates the Fundamental Law or some statute, or commits an intentional criminal offence. A simple majority will, a deadline-bound call or street pressure are not sufficient for this. It can also be read from the press that the governing majority, as an alternative, wishes to achieve its aim by a constitutional amendment — for which 134 mandates are needed in the 199-seat National Assembly, which the government side holds.

MIAK’s reading therefore begins at the level of substantive position: the character of the problem is not who should sit in the Sándor Palace, but that in a state under the rule of law the self-restraint of power binds even when the majority would have the faster, more convenient route available. This is the real test of checks and balances.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Montesquieu (Enlightenment-era French thinker, founder of the theory of the separation of powers) in his work The Spirit of the Laws (1748) laid down that the concentration of legislative, executive and judicial power in a single hand is the very seed of tyranny — the guarantee of liberty is precisely the separation of these powers and their mutual checking. Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman (an economist and a political scientist, the developers of the “spin dictator” model of modern authoritarian regimes) in their book Spin Dictators (2022) add the contemporary warning to this: today’s concentration of power rarely advances through open violation of the law, but rather, building on popularity, hollows out independent institutions through formally lawful constitutional amendments — the authors show, precisely on the example of Tunisia and other “battered democracies”, how a popular leader uses their mandate to weaken checks and balances. The two works together give MIAK’s frame: the legitimacy of power stems not from the size of support but from respect for procedures — a concentration of power carried out in the name of a good cause also remains a concentration of power. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three mutually reinforcing steps that strengthen procedural guarantees — none of them is about who should stay or go, but about how the question should be decided.

3.1 The exclusivity of the constitutional procedural order (immediately)

Every step concerning the mandate of the President of the Republic must proceed from the rules of the Fundamental Law on the presidential legal status: the cases of termination of the mandate are exhaustive, and removal may take place solely on the qualified initiative of the National Assembly, by a substantive decision of the Constitutional Court. MIAK’s position is that any instrument beyond this — a deadline-bound public ultimatum, the exertion of street pressure or an ad hoc statute aimed at hollowing out the office — is incompatible with rule-of-law logic. In Montesquieu’s framework of the separation of powers (see 6.4.2) this means: the legislative majority may not take over the function of the judicial–constitutional-court role by “deciding” itself the fate of an independent public-law dignitary. The responsible parties are the National Assembly and the Government, and the deadline is continuous self-restraint. This fits the I4 (Protection of judicial independence) and A6 (Strengthening checks and balances) programme points.

3.2 Awaiting the Venice Commission’s opinion (until the review is concluded)

Since the Venice Commission is examining the case in an accelerated procedure, MIAK proposes that every final political decision affecting the head of state’s legal status — especially a possible constitutional amendment — wait for the publication of this opinion. The commission is not a court, its position is not binding, but it is a weighty European rule-of-law yardstick; disregarding it would cause exactly the credibility cost that a government promising a rule-of-law turn cannot afford. In the logic of the spin-dictator model (see 6.4.1) awaiting the independent external yardstick is the point where a democracy distinguishes itself from sham legality. The responsible parties are the Government and the National Assembly, and the time frame is the appearance of the commission’s opinion.

3.3 A constitutional “stress test” on the precedent (within 90 days of the dispute’s conclusion)

The conflict, regardless of how it ends, creates a precedent. MIAK proposes that an independent expert body subsequently examine, in a public report: would the procedure now applied prevent a future concentration of power in the opposite direction? That is, could the instruments now used be deployed in the hands of another majority, against another head of state? This is the direct application of the I10 (Constitutional “stress test”) programme point. The responsible party is an independent legal-expert panel, and the deadline is 90 days after the dispute’s conclusion.

The three steps are bound together by a single principle: the primacy of procedure over outcome. The lesson of the literature frame — from Montesquieu to Guriev–Treisman — is precisely that institutions must be protected not when it is convenient, but when the majority would have an interest in bending them.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law The principle is strengthened that a public-law dignitary can be removed only in a binding procedure If the procedural order is overridden now, the precedent can later be used in the hands of any majority
Foreign policy Awaiting the Venice Commission’s opinion strengthens Hungarian rule-of-law credibility in the EU Disregarding the opinion could restart the rule-of-law dispute with Brussels
Domestic politics The calm, procedure-centred route reduces polarisation Prolonged uncertainty could cause a political stalemate around the presidential office

The main consideration is one of timing: the governing majority has the political strength to act quickly, by constitutional amendment, but it is precisely the speed that carries the greatest long-term credibility cost. The proposal works if the majority accepts that self-restraint now is an investment in its own future protection — for the precedent created today can be turned against it tomorrow. It tips to the risk side if the uncertainty paralyses for months the acts tied to the presidential office (the promulgation of laws, the countersignature of appointments).

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following suggested performance indicators (KPIs) worth tracking over the next 6–12 months:

  • Did the government side wait for the publication of the Venice Commission’s opinion before taking a final step affecting the head of state’s legal status (yes/no).
  • Was any decision affecting the presidential office made in a procedure according to the Fundamental Law’s rules on the presidential legal status, or by a different ad hoc route.
  • Was the public constitutional “stress test” report on the precedent, under 3.3, prepared.
  • Did the external metrics of Hungary’s rule-of-law standing (e.g. World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGI — rule of law sub-index; 2024 baseline: +0.35) move onto an improving or deteriorating path.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message in a single sentence: the question should not be who wins, but whether the procedure is clean. MIAK asks decision-makers to settle the dispute around the President of the Republic solely under the constitutional procedural order, awaiting the Venice Commission’s opinion, and to refrain from accelerated instruments aimed at hollowing out the office. This position stems directly from two of MIAK’s foundational values: from being ideology-free, because MIAK defends the binding procedure even when the office-holder concerned can be tied to an earlier system — the principle is no respecter of persons; and from accountability, because checks and balances are worth something precisely when the prevailing majority also subjects itself to them. The credibility of a rule-of-law turn is measured not by the speed of removals, but by the cleanliness of procedures.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The sources chose sharply differing narratives by band. The left-liberal and public-affairs band (Telex, HVG) put the emphasis on the size of the demonstration and the Prime Minister’s communications offensive: Telex recalled the Prime Minister’s post (“Mr President, you too know that it is over”), while HVG focused on the fact of the show of support at the Sándor Palace. The conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner), by contrast, highlighted the frame of constitutional risk: according to the Magyar Nemzet article the President of the Republic “stands in the way of Tisza’s bids for excessive power”, and it emphasised that the government side wishes to circumvent the head of state’s constitutional irremovability with a constitutional amendment. ATV confined itself to factual reporting: the head of state’s announcement of the Venice Commission’s accelerated procedure. The divergence of the framings shows well why MIAK’s procedure-centred reading, aligned with neither camp’s narrative, is justified: the size of the demonstration and the political rhetoric are a day-to-day question, while the cleanliness of the procedural order is structural.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The President of the Republic is an independent public-law dignitary; during his mandate he can be removed by removal, with the involvement of the Constitutional Court, solely on the grounds laid down in the Fundamental Law (intentional violation of the Fundamental Law/a statute, or an intentional criminal offence).
  • A constitutional amendment requires 134 mandates (the two-thirds threshold) in the 199-seat National Assembly; the government side won 141 mandates (70.85%) at the 2026 election.
  • The Venice Commission is the advisory body of the Council of Europe; its opinion is weighty but legally non-binding.
  • Hungary’s rule-of-law standing according to the World Bank WGI 2024 data: rule of law +0.35; control of corruption −0.17 (source: World Bank WGI).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the legal status of the President of the Republic, the binding nature of the removal procedure, judicial and constitutional-court independence as the guarantee of the procedural order;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the actual, not merely on-paper, functioning of the system of checks and balances;
  • Foreign policy (background material) — the involvement of the Venice Commission lifts the case into a European rule-of-law frame; the handling of the opinion is a credibility question in the EU.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

According to the authors, contemporary authoritarian rule advances not by open violence but, building on popularity, through formally lawful steps. One of the book’s recurring patterns is that leaders turn their electoral mandate precisely to weakening independent institutions. The authors note:

“In Tunisia, President Kais Saied used his initial popularity to dissolve parliament and to cement his power through various constitutional amendments.”

In the present case this lesson urges caution: support and lawful form in themselves — for example a constitutional amendment — do not make the removal of an independent public-law dignitary legitimate if it points toward the hollowing-out of checks and balances. This is precisely why MIAK proposes awaiting the independent external yardstick (the Venice Commission): this is the point that distinguishes a rule-of-law turn from sham legality.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.4.2 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu’s classic thesis is that liberty ceases where the branches of power come into a single hand. In the work he precisely distinguishes the three basic functions:

“[The prince or magistrate] enacts temporary or perpetual laws […]; makes war or peace […]; punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we call the judiciary power, the former simply the executive power of the state.”

In the Hungarian situation this means: the legislative majority may not take over the judicial–constitutional-court function by “settling” the fate of a public-law dignitary with a political decision. The binding procedure of removal is precisely the safeguard of this separation — MIAK’s proposal 3.1 makes this Montesquieuian principle operative.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.5 International comparison

The involvement of the Venice Commission is not exceptional: the body regularly gives opinions in member-state constitutional disputes, and its recommendations have served as a check in the practice of several countries against overly rapid, majority-based transformations. The pattern described by Guriev–Treisman — a popular leader, constitutional amendment, institutional weakening — was observable in several Central European and Mediterranean democracies over the past decade; the lesson is uniform: the government that waits for and takes seriously the independent European yardstick builds stronger rule-of-law credibility in the longer run than the one that circumvents it.

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 8 June 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators
  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 8 June 2026 — topic 1, score: 88/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2024 — rule of law, control of corruption sub-indices

Generation metadata