Part I — Situation overview

One of the sharpest institutional disputes of Hungarian public law unfolded in June 2026 around the position of the President of the Republic (that is, the head of state — Hungary’s neutral public-law dignity, separated from the executive power). The background: on 11 June 2026 President of the Republic Tamás Sulyok submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court (the AB — the supreme organ for the protection of the Fundamental Law, not part of the ordinary court hierarchy) for the interpretation of the Fundamental Law. According to his reasoning, those political statements aimed at the removal of certain public-law dignitaries — among them himself — raise constitutional-amendment possibilities that may be directed not at general rule-making but at handling a concrete, individual situation; he asked for the constitutionality of this to be interpreted.

The turn came on Friday, 19 June 2026: of the fifteen constitutional judges, seven declared grounds for recusal citing their personal and direct involvement, so the full sitting did not become quorate, and Péter Polt, the president of the Constitutional Court, took the case off Monday’s agenda. The next day, Saturday, Tamás Sulyok gave an interview to the Brussels news portal Politico, in which — according to the Portfolio report — he stated: he will fight to stay by applying legal means too, and accused the prime minister of “weaving a conspiracy” to gain control over state institutions. Prime Minister Péter Magyar, by contrast, spoke of a “failed constitutional coup attempt”; Fidesz alleged a “secret pact” between the prime minister’s brother-in-law and a constitutional judge, which the person concerned, Tisza deputy faction leader Márton Melléthei-Barna, firmly denied, calling the petition “legal nonsense”.

In MIAK’s reading the key question is not which political actor is “right” in the communication battle, but whether the institutional dispute is closed by rule-of-law means, in a predictable procedure. The labels “coup”, “pact” and “conspiracy” are for now political rhetoric, not proven facts — without a concrete procedure and evidence, the public should treat these in quotation marks, as claims and not as statements of fact. The test of democratic quality is precisely that we measure the suspicion of power concentration by the same benchmark, regardless of who is in government.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the conceptual frame. The starting point of Hungarian positive law is clear: in Article 9 the Fundamental Law of Hungary defines the head of state as an independent power factor separated from the executive, who “watches over the democratic functioning of the state organisation”, and in Article 24 it fixes the Constitutional Court as the supreme organ for the protection of the Fundamental Law — that is, the dispute takes place not in a legal vacuum but in a clear public-law frame. The principled background is supplied by the classic Democracy in America (1835–40) by the French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville: he analyses the danger of the “omnipotence of the majority” — that in a democracy the electoral majority may become unlimited if there are no independent institutional counterweights. Precisely for this reason checks and balances are not the enemies of democracy but its conditions: the mandate of the majority is legitimate, but not unlimited. The detailed literature treatment — with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK formulates three institutional proposals reaching beyond the concrete day-to-day politics, which strengthen rule-of-law predictability under any government.

3.1 Institutional disputes can be settled only in a constitutional procedure (an immediate principle)

MIAK’s basic position is that the only legitimate way to close a dispute among the President of the Republic, the Constitutional Court and the governing majority is the constitutional procedure — not a war of press statements, and not political pressure. This is the direct application of the A6 reinforcing checks and balances programme point: the constitutional institutions (the Constitutional Court, the ÁSZ — State Audit Office, the prosecution service, the ombudsman) must fulfil their control function with genuine, not merely paper, independence. The recusal procedure is in itself a regular legal institution; the problem arises if any party — government or head of state — tries to influence the outcome of the procedure by political force. MIAK therefore proposes: the dispute should return to the constitutional channel of constitutionality review, with a reasoned, public decision.

3.2 Depoliticising the status of public-law officeholders (throughout the whole cycle)

The deeper cause of the present conflict is that the filling and removal of key positions (constitutional judges, the president of the Constitutional Court, the prosecutor general) is tied too closely to the political will of the prevailing majority. In the spirit of the I4 protection of judicial independence programme point, MIAK proposes the depoliticisation of appointments: the mandate of public-law officeholders should be predictable, the selection should be based on professional criteria and a transparent procedure, and removal should be possible only under the narrow conditions fixed in the Fundamental Law. This also places one of the declared aims of the Tisza programme (the replacement of officeholders appointed by the previous government) within a rule-of-law frame: the aim is not to install “the other side’s people” but the lasting, politics-free filling of positions.

3.3 An annual constitutional stress test (institutionalisation)

So that crises like the present one can be prevented, MIAK proposes the introduction of the I10 constitutional “stress test” programme point: an annual, independent examination of whether the system of checks and balances would actually prevent a hypothetical concentration of power — whoever exercises power. The result is public. Such a regular, data-driven self-examination would show the resilience of the institutional system independently of the political cycle, and would reduce the chance that a given dispute escalates immediately into a constitutional crisis.

The common principle of these three proposals is that the question of power concentration is tied not to a person or a party but to the institutional structure — in the Tocquevillean sense that independent counterweights are not the enemies of majority democracy but the guarantees of its lasting functioning.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law The dispute closes within the constitutional channel; predictability strengthens In the case of political pressure, a precedent for future power concentration
Society Trust in the impartiality of institutions grows A lasting erosion of trust if the dispute closes as a “winner-loser” political fight
Public administration Depoliticised, professionally based selection of leaders The repoliticisation of appointments, only with a different sign

The main consideration is the renewal versus institutional continuity dilemma. After a change of government there is a legitimate demand to renew institutions interwoven by the previous regime; the risk tips over if the renewal itself becomes a political tool, and turns the independent institutions into executors of the will of the prevailing majority instead of their control function. The proposal works if depoliticisation is two-way: it means not only the replacement of the old appointees but also the professional, transparent order of the new appointments.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

The following performance indicators (KPIs — Key Performance Indicators) are worth tracking:

  • the manner of closing the public-law dispute: whether it closes in a constitutional procedure, with a reasoned and public decision (a yes/no milestone);
  • the transparency of filling key positions: the share of public tendering or transparent nomination procedures among the new appointments;
  • the independent monitoring indicators of checks and balances (e.g. the regular assessment under A6);
  • the evolution of Hungary’s international rule-of-law indicators (e.g. the World Bank governance-quality indices that measure the rule-of-law dimension).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the public alike: the public-law dispute can be legitimately closed only in a constitutional procedure, and the suspicion of power concentration must be measured by the same benchmark for every government. MIAK asks that the parties bring the dispute back to the constitutional channel of constitutionality review, and that the public treat the unproven “coup”/“pact” labels as claims, not as facts.

This approach moves two MIAK foundational values. Accountability stands at the centre because the system of checks and balances ensures precisely that power — anyone’s — remains accountable. And ideology-free conduct, because the benchmark of assessment is not the political side concerned but the quality of institutional functioning: the same benchmark applies to the outgoing and to the new power.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The topic moved the whole Hungarian media spectrum, with sharply differing framing. The left-liberal and public-affairs band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu, 24.hu) highlighted primarily the procedural questions of the constitutional-judge recusals and the content of the Politico interview; 24.hu set out in detail the personal opinion of Péter Polt, according to which the Fundamental-Law interpretation petition “does not breach the constitutional order but is part of the constitutional dialogue”. The economic band (Portfolio) put Sulyok’s sharp formulation into its headline: the President of the Republic says the prime minister “is striving for a greater concentration of power in sixteen weeks than Fidesz in sixteen years”. The pro-government/conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) placed the “secret pact” accusation and its rebuttal at the centre, and presented the Tisza government as the initiator of the power concentration. ATV highlighted the “conspiracy” narrative. The spectrum shows well: the same set of facts — a submitted petition, seven recusals, an interview — appears with radically different role-assignment depending on which band sees whom as the defender of the rule of law. Precisely this justifies MIAK’s ideology-free, institution-centred reading.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The Constitutional Court consists of 15 members; at the 19 June 2026 sitting seven declared grounds for recusal, which rendered the body unable to act in the given case.
  • Submission of the petition: 11 June 2026 (a Fundamental-Law interpretation petition).
  • Publication of the Politico interview: 20 June 2026 (Saturday).
  • Fundamental-Law frame: the competence of the head of state is fixed by Article 9, the competence of the Constitutional Court by Article 24; the members of the Constitutional Court are elected by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the protection of judicial and constitutional-judge independence (I4) and the constitutional stress test (I10);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — ensuring the genuine independence of checks and balances (A6);
  • MIAK legal foundations (background material) — the demarcation of competence among the branches of power and constitutional organs (head of state ≠ head of the executive; Constitutional Court ≠ ordinary court).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Fundamental Law of Hungary

The Hungarian constitution in force clearly governs the status of the two institutions in the dispute. Article 9(1) provides that “the head of state of Hungary is the President of the Republic, who expresses the unity of the nation and watches over the democratic functioning of the state organisation” — and the reasoning expressly formulates that the head of state is “an independent power factor separated from the executive power”. The reasoning attached to Article 24 on the Constitutional Court:

“The Constitutional Court is the organ that is ultimately responsible for ensuring that legislation — both in its procedure and in its result — is realised in accordance with the Constitution.”

In the present case this means that the head of state’s petition is the regular use of the Constitutional Court’s constitutionality-review competence; the substantive decision of the dispute belongs to the Constitutional Court, not to the communication of the political actors.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force, Articles 9 and 24)

6.4.2 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Tocqueville considers the “omnipotence of the majority” the greatest internal danger of majority democracy: if the electoral winner brings all public power under its control, the system without counterweights may turn into the oppression of the minority. In his classic formulation:

“a great people may be oppressed by a small faction, or by a single individual, with impunity.”

In the frame of the Hungarian public-law dispute this supports not the cause of one side or the other but the principle MIAK represents: the mandate of the majority is legitimate, but the existence and genuine functioning of independent institutional counterweights (the Constitutional Court, the head of state) is the condition of lasting democracy — whichever political force exercises power.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

6.5 International comparison

The question of independent constitutional adjudication and the neutrality of the head of state is not only a Hungarian matter: according to the recommendations of the Venice Commission (the constitutional-law advisory body of the Council of Europe), the transparency of filling key positions and the guarantees of irremovability are basic conditions of constitutional stability. The experience of several European democracies shows that, after a change of government, institutional renewal strengthens the rule of law only if it too takes place in a regulated, predictable procedure — otherwise it creates a reversible precedent at the next change of government.

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Reinforcing checks and balances

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 21 June 2026 — topic 1):

  • [Portfolio] Sulyok Tamás keményen beleszállt Magyar Péterbe: tizenhat hét alatt nagyobb hatalomösszpontosításra törekszik, mint a Fidesz tizenhat év alatt — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260620/sulyok-tamas-kemenyen-beleszallt-magyar-peterbe-tizenhat-het-alatt-nagyobb-hatalomosszpontositasra-torekszik-mint-a-fidesz-tizenhat-ev-alatt-844634
  • [24.hu] Polt Péter szerint a magukat kizárató alkotmánybírák nem foglaltak állást — https://24.hu/belfold/2026/06/20/polt-sulyok-alkotmanybirosag-magyar/
  • [Mandiner] Magyar Péter sógora tagadja a titkos paktumot — a miniszterelnök bukott alkotmányos puccskísérletről beszél — https://mandiner.hu/belfold/2026/06/magyar-peter-sogora-tagadja-a-titkos-paktum-megletet-a-miniszterelnok-bukott-alkotmanyos-puccskiserletrol-beszel
  • [Telex] Sulyok Tamás a Politicónak: küzdeni fog, hogy köztársasági elnök maradhasson — https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/06/20/sulyok-tamas-azt-mondta-kuzdeni-fog-hogy-koztarsasagi-elnok-maradhasson (the article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Magyar Nemzet] Sulyok a Politicónak: jogi eszközökkel védi meg pozícióját — https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/2026/06/sulyok-tamas-a-politiconak-nem-fogadja-el-hivatalanak-megszunteteset-jogi-eszkozokkel-vedi-meg-poziciojat

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force)
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Note: the local file path of the book does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK legal foundations (background material) — the demarcation of competence among the branches of power and constitutional organs
  • MIAK press monitor, 21 June 2026 — topic 1, score: 86/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Venice Commission recommendations — the independence of constitutional institutions
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators — rule-of-law dimension

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