Part I — Situation overview

One of the rarest situations of Hungarian public law arose in the final days of May 2026: the freshly inaugurated prime minister and the sitting head of state got into an open constitutional dispute. Prime Minister Péter Magyar gave the President of the Republic, Tamás Sulyok, and seven further public-law office-holders a deadline of 31 May to leave their offices voluntarily. The prime minister’s motive is publicly known: he wants to prevent the head of state from using his veto power to delay the promulgation of the laws needed for the release of the EU funds owed to Hungary. Two days before the deadline, on 29 May, Tamás Sulyok issued a statement in which he made clear: he does not wish to leave, and has turned, because of the political pressure, to the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional law, the Venice Commission. After the ultimatum expired, on Sunday 31 May, the prime minister announced that on Monday morning, together with the justice minister, he will personally visit the president at the Sándor Palace.

The affair has a grave historical stake. Since the change of régime there has not been a single instance of the President of the Republic being deprived of his office; the post — alongside all earlier political tension — has remained one of the symbolic elements of the system of checks and balances. The present conflict is sharp because it coincides with a rare political constellation: the force that won the 2026 election, with 141 seats (70.85 percent of the 199-seat National Assembly, according to the NVI’s finalisation of 19 April 2026), is above the two-thirds threshold needed for a constitutional amendment (134 seats). The dispute is therefore not merely a conflict of two persons, but the question of where a strong parliamentary majority draws the limits of its own room for manoeuvre.

In MIAK’s reading the most important feature of the situation is not which political side happens to be in government, but that an institutional precedent is being born. If the executive power — in possession of any democratic mandate — can, with an extra-constitutional tool (an ultimatum, personal pressure, the after-the-fact rewriting of the removal rules), remove an autonomous constitutional actor, then the problem is not about the present actors but about the durability of the Hungarian constitutional order.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame in which the situation can be interpreted. Montesquieu (Enlightenment-era French legal philosopher, creator of the doctrine of the separation of powers), in his work The Spirit of the Laws (1748), expounds that where the legislative and the executive power are concentrated in the same hand, liberty ceases — the present dispute is precisely about whether the head-of-state (and indirectly the legislative) process can come under the disposal of the executive power. Alexis de Tocqueville (19th-century French thinker, classic analyst of the workings of democracy), in his work Democracy in America (1835/1840), describes the danger of the unlimited power of the majority: in his view even the most solid democracy needs institutional counterweights, otherwise “even a great people can be oppressed by a small group, or even by a single man, with impunity”. This dual frame — the separation of powers and the self-restraint of the majority — gives the precondition of the proposal. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three mutually building measures that serve to keep the conflict within a constitutional channel — regardless of which political force comes to government in the future.

3.1 A constitutional self-restraint commitment on the removal rules (within 30 days)

MIAK proposes that the new parliamentary majority make a public, written commitment: it will not touch, in the Fundamental Law, the conditions and procedure for the termination and removal of the President of the Republic’s mandate during the present cycle. The “simpler and faster” route that has surfaced in the press — that the two-thirds majority simply rewrite the removal rules in the Fundamental Law — is, in the opinion of constitutional lawyers too, hard to reconcile with the rule of law. Such a step would create a precedent for the sitting government majority to shape, for its own convenience, the removability of independent office-holders. In the Montesquieuan separation-of-powers frame (see 6.4.1) this would mean precisely the blurring of the boundary line between the executive and the legislative power. The commitment is the concrete, immediate application of programme point A6 (strengthening checks and balances).

3.2 Settling the head-of-state question exclusively within a constitutional channel

If the new majority has a real, constitutional reason concerning the head of state’s holding of office (unworthiness or deliberate breach of law), it can assert that exclusively in the removal procedure under the Fundamental Law: the motion is initiated by a defined fraction of the members of the National Assembly, a two-thirds majority is needed for the decision, and the final word — as a constitutional guarantee — is spoken by the Constitutional Court. If there is no such reason, then the head of state’s mandate is to be waited out; the genre of the “ultimatum” and “personal pressure” is meaningless in public-law terms, because the President of the Republic is not the government’s subordinate. MIAK stresses: the logic of programme point I4 (protection of judicial independence) — that the holders of independent positions cannot be removed at the will of politics — applies to the head of state just as to judges. The question of the Constitutional Court also belongs here: the members of the body cannot be removed simply even by a two-thirds majority, while a “packing” through changing the headcount of the Constitutional Court would empty out the same guarantee.

3.3 The institutionalisation of the “constitutional stress test” (in the first year of the cycle)

Beyond the concrete conflict, MIAK proposes the introduction of an annual, independent constitutional stress test: an expert body should examine yearly, publicly, whether the system of checks and balances would prevent the emergence of a hypothetical concentration of power. Such a mechanism would flag situations similar to the present one in advance, and institutionally tie the hands of the sitting majority. This is the content of programme point I10 (constitutional “stress test”) — the annual report, consisting of 15+ indicators (judicial independence, media pluralism, electoral integrity), would give a yardstick for whether the system’s resilience is worsening or improving.

These three proposals are tied together by a single principle: the voluntary self-restraint of power. The system of checks and balances works if the sitting majority does not stretch its room for manoeuvre to the maximum, but places the guarantees of liberty before its own convenience — exactly what Tocqueville describes as the constraint of the majority (see 6.4.2).

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Constitutional order The precedent that independent office-holders cannot be removed at political will is strengthened; institutional predictability grows If the majority does rewrite the removal rules, that causes a lasting, irreversible weakening of the system of checks and balances
International perception The involvement of the Venice Commission and a patient, lawful settlement strengthen Hungary’s rule-of-law reputation in meeting the conditionality of the EU funds A fast, contested removal could give birth to a new rule-of-law concern, precisely at the moment of the funds’ release
Domestic politics The correct procedure reduces polarisation and authenticates the new government’s “rule-of-law-restoring” message The impression of pressure could undermine this message and trigger a “does the same thing while saying something else” charge

The main point of deliberation is the clash of time and principle. The government hopes for a fast expansion of room for manoeuvre (smoother promulgation of laws, the unobstructed start of the EU funds), while the patient, constitutional route is slower in the short term. The proposal tips to the risk side if the urgency (the funds’ deadline) overrides principled consistency — then the short-term gain becomes a long-term institutional loss. The proposal works if the new majority accepts that its own credibility is proved precisely by self-restraint.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes watching the following performance indicators (KPIs) over the next 6–24 months — these show whether the process is going in the right direction:

  • The public appearance of the Venice Commission’s opinion and its consideration in the Hungarian decision (yes/no).
  • Whether the new majority touches, in the Fundamental Law, the rules for removing the head of state / public-law office-holders (yes/no) — “no” is the good outcome.
  • The annual number of the Constitutional Court’s substantive decisions should rise from the current level (the target under programme point I4: from 80 to above 120), signalling the working of the norm-control function.
  • The EU Justice Scoreboard’s “perceived judicial independence” indicator should approach the EU average — an indirect indicator of trust in independent institutions.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message in a single sentence: the question of the President of the Republic must be settled within a constitutional channel, and the new parliamentary majority must publicly commit not to rewrite the removal rules for its own convenience — because the precedent created now binds every future government. This request connects directly to two MIAK foundational values. The first is accountability: the system of checks and balances is the mechanism through which power remains accountable — if the executive power can remove the control bodies, accountability itself ceases. The second is ideology-free operation: MIAK demands of the new government now the same constitutional precision it would earlier have expected of the old — respect for the separation of powers does not depend on which side comes to government. It is precisely this consistency that gives MIAK’s position its credibility.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal and public-affairs band approaches from the angle of the constitutional concern and the pressure: Telex discusses, “after the ultimatum expired”, the prime minister’s personal pressure on the president “clinging to his office”, while HVG and 444.hu highlight the president’s rejecting statement and the turning to the Venice Commission. The economic band (Portfolio) places the question factually in the broader context of the release of EU funds — stressing the economic stake of the resignation dispute. The pro-government, conservative band this time chose a protective frame: according to Magyar Nemzet, “President Tamás Sulyok does not yield to intimidation”, while Mandiner quotes a régime-change politician’s warning that the removal of the head of state “could bring a constitutional crisis”. The difference in framings shows well the nature of the dispute: what in one narrative is “the removal of a remnant of the old system” is in the other “the constitutional protection of the independent head of state”. This is precisely why MIAK focuses on the substantive, public-law question, not on the framing.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The final result of the 2026 election (NVI, 19 April 2026): the winning force has 141 seats in the 199-seat National Assembly (70.85%), Fidesz–KDNP 52, Mi Hazánk 6 seats.
  • The two-thirds threshold needed for a constitutional amendment: 134 seats (66.84%) — the majority is above this, so it can in principle amend the Fundamental Law.
  • Hungary’s institutional indicators (World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024): rule of law +0.35, control of corruption −0.17 — the improvement of these indicators is a declared aim of the new government, and is measurable precisely through the strengthening of institutional guarantees.
  • The termination and removal of the President of the Republic’s mandate is regulated by Articles 9–14 of the Fundamental Law; the National Assembly decides on removal by a two-thirds majority, and the final decision falls within the competence of the Constitutional Court.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — the principle of the irremovability of independent office-holders (judges, constitutional judges, head of state); the protection of the Constitutional Court’s norm-control function.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — checks and balances as the institutional condition of the accountability of power.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu formulated the basic structure of modern constitutional democracies: the separation of the legislative, the executive and the judicial power. The work’s classic thesis is that the merging of the powers means the end of liberty:

“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”

In the Sulyok affair this frame is directly applicable: if the executive power (the prime minister) is able, by ultimatum or by the after-the-fact rewriting of the rules, to dispose of the fate of an autonomous constitutional actor (the head of state, who is part of the law-promulgation process), then it is precisely that boundary line that blurs whose preservation, according to Montesquieu, is the condition of liberty.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.2 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Tocqueville saw one of the fundamental risks of democracy in the unlimited power of the majority. According to his observation, as soon as one party gains the upper hand, “all public power comes under its control”, and the minority needs institutional tools in order to be able to set its own moral authority against it. His most quoted warning:

“The omnipotence of the majority holds such extreme dangers that […] even a great people can be oppressed by a small group, or even by a single man, with impunity.”

In the Hungarian situation this means: a parliamentary mandate above 70 percent does not in itself give a constitutional entitlement to reshape checks and balances. On the contrary — the stronger the majority, the greater its responsibility for self-restraint, because the actual institutional protection arises not from the numerical ratio but from the respect for the rules.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

6.5 International comparison

In settling the question of the President of the Republic, a key role belongs to the Venice Commission — the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional law, which gives expert opinions in the constitutional disputes of member states. The involvement of the commission is not weakness but a sign of the European embeddedness of Hungarian constitutional culture: in European practice the termination of a head-of-state mandate is everywhere tied to a strict, guarantee-laden procedure (a qualified parliamentary majority and/or constitutional-court control), precisely so that the post cannot be used as a daily political tool. The Hungarian solution meets this norm if it awaits and takes into account the Venice Commission’s opinion — which is at the same time, within the conditionality of the EU funds, proof of rule-of-law commitment.

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence (the principle of the irremovability of independent positions)
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 1 June 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Note: the book’s local file path does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 1 June 2026 — topic 2, score: 90/100

Additional public data sources (if used):

  • World Bank — Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 (rule of law, control of corruption)
  • NVI — final result of the 2026 parliamentary election (19 April 2026)

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