Part I — Situation overview

On the Wednesday sitting of 27 May 2026 the National Assembly debated, in a general debate, the sixteenth amendment of Hungary’s Fundamental Law — the package of proposals that public discourse calls “lex Orbán”. The amendment touches three elements: it would maximise the prime-ministerial mandate at two terms (eight years), it would abolish the Sovereignty Protection Office (the body set up by the departing government in 2023, invoking the investigation of “foreign influence”), and it would enable the abolition of the public-interest asset-management foundations performing public tasks (KEKVAs — foundations managing universities and significant public assets). Following an earlier correction, the Fundamental Law sentence on the protection of Christian culture stays in the text.

What is new in the current analysis — compared with the review of the 26 May 2026 “parliamentary super-week” and our 27 May entry focusing on the ICC return and the term limit — is a separate, weighty public-law dimension: the governing majority would settle, by constitution-making means, the office of the Prosecutor General, the President of the Kúria (the highest judicial forum of the ordinary judicial organisation) and the President of the Republic too. According to the ATV report, these three office-holders would be “removed by constitution-making”, and Bence Rétvári (KDNP) spoke in the debate of also wanting to remove the President of the Republic via a related amending motion. This is a sharp question precisely because all three office-holders were elected by the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority, and under the Fundamental Law they hold office for nine and five years respectively, are legally not instructable, and their mandate cannot be revoked for political reasons.

In the debate the submitter, Márton Melléthei-Barna, justified the amendment as a “constitutional guarantee”: in his view it is not directed against persons, but states that “the republic must be stronger than any political leader”. By contrast Gergely Gulyás (Fidesz) called it retroactive legislation “tailored to Viktor Orbán”, and warned that in a parliamentary form of government nowhere in the European Union has a prime-ministerial term limit been introduced. András Schiffer, a former constitutional-judge candidate — a constitutional lawyer who earlier led the LMP — argued, while also correcting his own earlier position, that the question of retroactivity cannot be brushed aside, and that the matter could even come before the Constitutional Court (the body that reviews the constitutionality of laws and certain judicial decisions). In MIAK’s reading the stake is not the direction — the limiting of the concentration of power is a correct aim — but whether the very instrument limiting power also meets the rule-of-law standard: is it general, predictable and forward-looking, or tuned to a single situation.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive framework. Montesquieu (French legal philosopher of the Enlightenment) identified, in his work The Spirit of the Laws, the condition of political liberty in the separation of powers — his thesis carries a double lesson: it justifies the strengthening of checks and balances, but it also warns that even the constituent power itself is not unlimited, that hasty, uncontrolled constitution-making is itself a concentration of power. John Locke (the English thinker of classical liberal political theory) distinguished, in his work Second Treatise of Government, the “standing rule” — the general, predictable rule applying equally to everyone — from an individual’s “inconstant, uncertain, arbitrary will”, that is, the case-tailored, unpredictable will: the condition of liberty is the former. From this the essence of the dispute around lex Orbán can be derived: a power-limiting rule is in conformity with the rule of law if it is general and forward-looking, not if it is tuned to a single person or moment. The Fundamental Law of Hungary, as a primary source of law, sets out the order of the amendment procedure (Article S): a two-thirds vote) and the fixed-term, non-instructable legal status of the independent office-holders (Kúria President, Prosecutor General) — this is the direct normative frame of the debate. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that the right aim of limiting power is also procedurally flawless, and the precedent does not become a reversible weapon.

3.1 The prime-ministerial term limit as a clean, forward-looking, general rule (with textual clarification within 30 days)

MIAK supports limiting the prime-ministerial term of office as an institutional check against the concentration of power — but in such a way that the rule is also unassailable in legal technique. The term maximum must be formulated unambiguously as a rule acting forward from entry into force, which takes no already-acquired right from anyone, only limits the future acquisition of a mandate, and applies identically to every future prime minister. According to Locke’s frame (see 6.4.2) the “standing rule” is a rule precisely because of this: it is predictable and general. This at the same time resolves the dispute about retroactivity raised by both András Schiffer and Gergely Gulyás, and handles the technical gap too (what happens if the eight years run out but there is not yet a new election) that was flagged in the debate. This approach is reinforced by the A6 (strengthening checks and balances) programme point.

3.2 The legal status of independent office-holders can be settled only by a general, pre-set rule — not by individual, ad hoc constitution-making

MIAK firmly distances itself from reshaping the offices of the Prosecutor General, the President of the Kúria and the President of the Republic by an individual, person-targeted constitutional amendment. These office-holders were elected by the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority, and under the Fundamental Law they hold office for a fixed term (the President of the Kúria and the Prosecutor General for nine years), are legally not instructable, and their mandate cannot be revoked for political reasons — this is precisely the essence of their independence (see 6.4.3). The political composition of the two-thirds election and instructability in office are two different public-law categories: the fact that an office-holder was earlier elected by a politically sympathetic majority does not make them removable by today’s majority. If institutional legal status can be overridden by case-by-case constitution-making, that creates exactly the precedent that the amendment in principle seeks to eliminate: the next two-thirds could remove anyone in the same way. MIAK therefore proposes that any transformation of office-holder legal status take place exclusively by a general, forward-looking rule applying identically to every future office-holder, and that the legal status of the President of the Republic (the head of state, not a governmental actor) be debated not via a related amending motion, but in a separate, adequately prepared procedure. This fits the logic of I4 (protection of judicial independence).

3.3 Mandatory, public impact assessment and constitutional pre-screening for every Fundamental Law amendment

The constitution is the foundation of the legal order, so its amendment cannot fall under the logic of urgency. MIAK proposes that every Fundamental Law amendment — including the sixteenth — pass through a mandatory, public impact assessment and structured consultation before the vote: what it solves, whom it affects, what legal risk it carries, whether it withstands the test of the Constitutional Court or an international forum. This is what the I10 (constitutional “stress test”) and the I9 (popular-sovereignty audit, i.e. structured citizen feedback into legislation) programme points describe. The “easy circumventability” flagged by lawyers is precisely a symptom of the absence of a prior impact assessment: a carefully modelled text leaves fewer loopholes.

The shared principle of the three proposals is that the restoration of the rule of law cannot be achieved by neglecting the instruments of the rule of law: the correct direction of the content is irreversible only if the procedure is also flawless — this is confirmed by all three sources of the scholarly frame.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law The strengthening of institutional checks against the concentration of power, a more predictable constitutional frame If the amendment is individual and of contested validity, it may collapse before the Constitutional Court or an international forum
Institutional system The clarification of the legal status of independent office-holders by a general rule In the case of ad hoc removal, the precedent of independence is damaged, and a reversible weapon is born
Society The strengthening of the “no one is irremovable” principle, the enforcement of political rotation The appearance of being “tailored to a person” breeds division and a legitimacy dispute

The main judgement question is the tension between speed and procedural soundness. The political demand for limiting power is understandably urgent, but the quality of constitution-making depends on soundness. The proposal tips to the risk side if political symbolism overrides legal-technical precision, and the removal of independent office-holders becomes a case-by-case decision; and it works if the term limit and the settlement of legal status are alike general, forward-looking rules grounded in an impact assessment.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

On the basis of the following performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) it will be possible to judge in 6–18 months whether procedurally clean limiting of power has succeeded:

  • whether the prime-ministerial term limit withstood any constitutional-court or international review (yes/no);
  • whether a mandatory, public impact assessment was introduced for Fundamental Law amendments;
  • whether the legal status of the independent office-holders (Prosecutor General, Kúria President, President of the Republic) was settled by a general, forward-looking rule, not a case-by-case decision;
  • whether the proportion of public consultation on constitutional amendments grew, and whether hasty, accelerated legislation moderated.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message: we support the aim — the limiting of the concentration of power and stating the “no one is irremovable” principle — but we ask the decision-maker that the term limit and the settlement of the legal status of independent office-holders be alike a general, forward-looking rule grounded in an impact assessment and public consultation, not an act tuned to a single person or moment. This request stems from two MIAK foundational values: from accountability, because the real strengthening of checks and balances is lasting only alongside a predictable institutional legal status; and from being non-ideological, because we propose formulating the limiting of power not as a political reckoning, but as a neutral constitutional guarantee applying equally to everyone. Without these two values, the rule-of-law turn may reproduce the very unpredictability it seeks to eliminate.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The liberal and public-affairs lane (444.hu, 24.hu, HVG, ATV) highlighted the drama of the parliamentary debate and the procedural stake: 444.hu the clash of Tisza and Fidesz and Melléthei-Barna’s “constitutional guarantee” argument, and ATV in a separate article that the Prosecutor General, the Kúria President and the President of the Republic would be “removed by constitution-making”, as well as that, according to lawyers, the amendment is “easily circumventable”. The economic lane (Portfolio) discussed the waves stirred up by “lex Orbán”, concentrating on the legislative process. The conservative lane (Mandiner, Magyar Nemzet) emphasised the critique: Mandiner brought András Schiffer’s legal argument (the retroactivity and the constitutional concern) to the fore, and in the parliamentary speeches of the debate Gergely Gulyás highlighted the “retroactive, Orbán-tailored” character and the absence of precedent in a parliamentary system. The common point of the spectrum is the facts (the Wednesday debate, the three elements of the amendment); the difference is the emphasis: legal-technical concern, the dimension of office-holder removal, or the political stake of the turn.

6.2 Facts and data

  • On the agenda of the Wednesday sitting (27 May 2026): the general debate of the sixteenth amendment of the Fundamental Law (444.hu, Portfolio, 27 May 2026).
  • The elements of the amendment: maximising the prime-ministerial mandate at eight years (two terms); the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office; enabling the abolition of the KEKVAs (444.hu, 27 May 2026).
  • New element: the constitutional reshaping of the legal status of the Prosecutor General, the President of the Kúria and the President of the Republic, partly via a related amending motion (ATV, 27 May 2026 — the article is a video page, only a title-level reference).
  • Under the Fundamental Law the National Assembly elects the President of the Kúria and the Prosecutor General with a two-thirds majority, for nine years; these office-holders are not instructable (Fundamental Law, Articles 26 and 29).
  • According to András Schiffer’s four-point legal argument, the question of retroactivity cannot be brushed aside, and the matter could come before the Constitutional Court (Mandiner, 28 May 2026).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — I4 (protection of judicial independence), I10 (constitutional “stress test”), I9 (popular-sovereignty audit): managing the risk of independent office-holder legal status and emergency constitution-making;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A6 (strengthening checks and balances): the term limit and office-holder independence as an institutional check;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — settling the legal status of the Sovereignty Protection Office and the KEKVAs touches the structure of the executive power.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu identified the condition of political liberty in the separation of powers: “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty… there is no liberty either if the judicial power is not separated from the legislative and executive power.” The thesis carries a double lesson: it strengthens the argument for checks and balances, but it also warns that the constituent power too is not unlimited. In the case of lex Orbán this means: the separation of the independent office-holders (the President of the Kúria, marking the apex of the judicial organisation, the Prosecutor General exercising public prosecution) from the political majority is precisely the guarantee that must not be dismantled by case-by-case constitution-making — otherwise the separation of powers is impaired.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.2 John Locke: Second Treatise of Government

According to Locke, the essence of liberty under government is that there is “a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society… and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man”. The distinction is the core of the topic: a power-limiting rule is in conformity with the rule of law if it is a “standing rule” — general, predictable, applying to everyone equally and acting forward — and not if it is an “arbitrary will” tailored to a single person or moment. The prime-ministerial term limit and the settlement of office-holder legal status therefore meet the rule of law only in a forward-looking, general formulation; the case-by-case, person-targeted reshaping approaches precisely the arbitrary will in Locke’s sense.

📖 Source: John Locke: Second Treatise of Government

6.4.3 The Fundamental Law of Hungary

The Fundamental Law, as a primary source of law, provides under Article S) that the vote of two-thirds of the Members of the National Assembly is required for amendment; and Articles 26 and 29 set out the fixed-term (nine-year), two-thirds-elected, non-instructable legal status of the President of the Kúria and the Prosecutor General. This legal status is the essence of independence: the political composition of the two-thirds election and instructability in office are two different public-law categories. The lawfulness of the amendment is decided at this point: office-holder legal status can be shaped by a general, forward-looking rule, but by case-by-case, person-targeted constitution-making the constitutional guarantee of independence is damaged.

📖 Source: The Fundamental Law of Hungary

6.5 International comparison

The Venice Commission — the constitutional-law expert body of the Council of Europe — has warned in several recommendations about the risks of accelerated constitution-making: a constitutional amendment is legitimate with adequate time, public debate and broad consensus. The prime-ministerial term limit is indeed rare in a parliamentary form of government (it was said in the debate that nowhere in the EU has such a thing been introduced), while in presidential systems — for example the two-term US presidency — it is an established, forward-acting check. This illustrates that MIAK’s 3.1 proposal places at the fore not the aim but legal-technical cleanliness and the fit with the form of government. These practices are operative realisations of Montesquieu’s and Locke’s thesis: the limiting of power is stable when it is cast into a general, predictable rule.

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”
  • I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 28 May 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 John Locke: Second Treatise of Government
  • 📖 The Fundamental Law of Hungary

Note: the visible text of the blog does not show the sources’ local file path — only the author and title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I10, I9)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 28 May 2026 — topic 1, score: 92/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Council of Europe — Venice Commission recommendations on accelerated constitution-making
  • The Fundamental Law of Hungary (Articles 26, 29 and S))

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