Part I — Situation overview

Prime Minister Péter Magyar at the government briefing on 18 May 2026 announced that on 19 May 2026 — that is, Tuesday — the dossier of the clemency request of Endre K. will be made public. Endre K. was the accomplice of János V., the central figure of the 2024 Bicske children’s-home scandal; the former President of the Republic, Katalin Novák, granted him clemency in 2023, and this grew into the full political crisis that led to Katalin Novák’s resignation, the withdrawal of former Justice Minister Judit Varga, and — indirectly — to the longest political wound of the Fidesz era. According to Péter Magyar, a negative ministerial submission with Judit Varga’s signature arrived at the Sándor Palace, meaning: the justice ministry did not recommend clemency, yet the President signed it (Telex, HVG, 18 May 2026; 24.hu, 444.hu, Mandiner, 18 May 2026).

The constitutional weight of the issue is that the President of the Republic, Tamás Sulyok — who was elected in 2024 by the Fidesz group precisely after Katalin Novák’s resignation — issued a statement on 18 May 2026: “there is no legal ground that would warrant my resignation.” At the same time, Péter Magyar gave time until “tomorrow morning 8 a.m.” for the matter to be resettled. As context, it is important that the first two weeks of the new Tisza government (since taking office on 12 May 2026) consist of a series of measure packages aimed at rebuilding checks and balances — the publication of the clemency files was already mentioned in the announcement of the first package of measures of 15 May 2026, and the present step is its concrete implementation; from the angle of the 18 May 2026 Havasi dismissal dispute, it likewise has precedent value.

The legal framework is at once given and vulnerable. Individual clemency is, under Article 9(4)(g) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, a power of the President of the Republic, but under paragraph (5) the act requires the countersignature of a member of the Government — in practice, the justice minister. The content of the countersignature is the substantive control: it is the minister’s responsibility to review the application and the risks. The 2023 Endre K. case covers two questions at once: (1) if the ministerial submission was negative, why did a clemency act nevertheless leave the Sándor Palace; (2) whether the answer is to be sought on the responsible head-of-state side or the responsible ministerial side. In MIAK’s reading, the two threads are not competitors but two sides of the same institutional discretion — and that is precisely why they require a rulebook-level reform, not ad-hoc political answers.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame in which the reform of the clemency practice can be interpreted. Montesquieu (1748) in The Spirit of the Laws regards individual clemency (“letters of grace”) as one of the key tools of moderate forms of government: “This power which the prince has of pardoning, exercised with prudence, is capable of producing admirable effects.” (Book VI, Chapter 21) — i.e. the power is not to be abolished but exercised wisely. Acemoglu–Robinson (2012) in Why Nations Fail draw the duality of inclusive vs. extractive institutions: discretionary head-of-state power exercised without reasoning becomes extractive when the elite distributes exemptions within its closed circle — and this is exactly the structure of the 2023 case. A literal reading of Article 9(4)(g) and (5) of the Fundamental Law makes it unambiguous: individual clemency is not a sovereign act but a presidential decision tied to countersignature, with shared responsibility. The detailed literature discussion can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures — a rulebook-level reform package that does not narrow the clemency power but makes it visible and turns it into shared responsibility.

3.1 Mandatory reasoning and registration duty (within 60 days)

Every individual clemency decision of the President of the Republic should be accompanied by a mandatory, published, written reasoning — on the website of the Sándor Palace, in a structured, machine-readable format (XML/JSON). The reasoning should contain: the applicant’s data (subject to applicable data-protection rules), the final judgment of the underlying proceedings (case number), the verbatim ministerial submission of the countersigning minister, the fact-based reasoning of the President’s decision (at least 3 weighed considerations), and proof of victim notification. In the Klitgaard C = M + D − A framework (see 6.4.3) this modifies precisely the D (discretion) and A (accountability) factors: free discretion remains, but accountability is institutionalised. Responsible: Office of the Sándor Palace + Ministry of Justice (joint submission to the Parliament). On the model of the existing A1 (public-money dashboard), the technical solution of a “clemency dashboard” can be implemented in 60 days.

3.2 Annual parliamentary report and thematic statistics (within 12 months)

The President of the Republic should present, in an annual parliamentary report, the aggregate statistics of the clemency practice: how many applications were received in the given year, how many were accompanied by a positive vs. negative ministerial submission, how many presidential decisions went against the ministerial position, and in which categories (type of offence, severity of sentence, expected release time) the clemency practice is distributed. This report does not override the individual reasoning under (3.1) — the aggregate picture complements it and provides pattern-level transparency. The proposal builds on the principled framework of I9 (popular-sovereignty audit) and, on the model of A14 (international institutional accountability), should be the subject of a direct parliamentary debate. Responsible: Office of the Sándor Palace, target audience: Parliament’s Committee on Justice.

3.3 Independent ethics-committee pre-screening for high-public-attention cases (within 180 days)

In cases involving final judgments against persons who have held public office, who have been convicted of child-protection or sexual offences, and in high-public-attention cases, the Office of the President of the Republic should request the prior opinion of an independent, 5-member ethics committee — alongside, not instead of, the justice minister’s countersignature. The committee members: 2 retired judges (one with Strasbourg experience), 1 child-rights expert, 1 victim-protection expert, 1 ethical-academic expert. The opinion of the ethics committee does not bind the President of the Republic, but is published in the dossier under 3.1 — i.e. if the President decides against the committee’s opinion, this must be accompanied by substantive reasoning. The proposal builds on the frameworks of programme points A6 (strengthening checks and balances) and I4 (defence of judicial independence). Responsible: Ministry of Justice (legislative preparation) + Ethics Council (canonisation of membership rotation).

The three proposals are built on a common principle: the President’s clemency power should not be narrowed, but rather, through the dual of shared responsibility and mandatory publicity, given structural discipline. As Montesquieu put it — the granting of clemency “exercised with prudence” can produce “admirable effects”. Prudence, however, cannot be tested without institutionalisation.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Justice Rulebook-level institutionalisation of presidential clemency; higher-quality ministerial submissions. If the reasoning duty empties into formality (template texts), transparency becomes a sham.
Public trust Publicity is restored as an accountability channel; the risk of a repeat of the 2023 case decreases. Personality rights of criminal victims may be violated if the publication protocol does not fix selective redaction rules (victim data, child-protection classification).
Position of the head of state The institutional weight of the head of state grows — a visible decision is a stronger authority than unseen discretion. In political-crisis moments (like the present one), the personal credibility of the President is anchored to the quality of past decisions.

The main dilemma is clear: visible clemency is more predictable and more authoritative, but risks the personality rights of victims and applicants. The proposal works if the publication protocol applies a dual redaction filter: the Sándor Palace’s own rulebook + independent data-protection audit (NAIH). If either is missing, the reform slips into a sham of transparency, which is even worse than the original problem — sham transparency is one of the canonical markers of extractive institutions (6.4.2).

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

The success of the reform — at the level of proposal, not government decision — can be tracked over 6/12/24-month horizons with four performance indicators (KPIs):

  1. Reasoning rate: what percentage of presidential clemency decisions in the given year carry a substantively meaningful reasoning under (3.1) (≥ 3 weighed considerations, ≥ 500 characters). Target: ≥ 95% from month 12.
  2. Presidential decisions against negative ministerial submissions: how many clemency decisions are made despite a negative submission by the responsible minister — every one of these requires detailed reasoning. Target: < 5% from month 24. (If the value is higher, it does not in itself indicate a systemic flaw, but does signal a structural tension between the President and the minister.)
  3. Proof of victim notification: has the criminal victim (or direct heir) been verifiably informed of the clemency procedure — recorded in the dossier. Target: ≥ 90% from month 12.
  4. Ethics-committee pre-screening rate: what percentage of cases falling within the scope of 3.3 received pre-screening. Target: 100% from month 18.

5.2 Summary

The publication of the clemency dossier is a precedent-setting step in closing the Hungarian constitutional debate after the 2023 case — but in itself it does not close the structural question. MIAK’s request to the government and the Sándor Palace: do not treat the present dossier as a one-off step; let the summer of 2026 be the period of rulebook-level reform of the clemency practice, and by 31 December 2026 let the system of mandatory reasoning, parliamentary reporting and ethics pre-screening enter into force. This reform is directly linked to two of MIAK’s foundational values: transparency, because a visible decision is more authoritative and predictable than an unseen one; and accountability, because shared responsibility (head of state + minister + ethics committee) is exactly the three-level control that forms the basis of institutional defence against political discretion. The proposal does not open a separation-of-powers conflict — the President’s power remains untouched, only its exercise becomes transparent.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Framing in the press across the spectrum

In the left-liberal band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu) the frame is governmental ultimatum — Péter Magyar’s “time until tomorrow” formula addressed to Tamás Sulyok stands at the centre. Telex (18 May 2026) publishes the full text of Péter Magyar’s press conference, emphasising the Judit Varga thread; HVG (18 May 2026) highlights the constitutional-responsibility reading (“the ball is in Tamás Sulyok’s court”); 444.hu (18 May 2026) provides the consolidated reading of the government briefing, presenting the clemency dossier as part of the three-element package (clemency + enforcement + counties), which on a narrative level blurs the clemency issue with two other topics of different constitutional weight.

In the mainstream-market band (24.hu, Index, Portfolio, ATV), 24.hu (18 May 2026) focuses on Tamás Sulyok’s resignation statement; Portfolio did not cover the topic on this day; ATV (18 May 2026) communicates the timing in a thematic video-magazine format (“today it may emerge why he received clemency”). Index and Népszava gave only portal-level references on this day (they appear on the degraded list of the press monitor).

In the conservative / government-critical band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner), Mandiner (18 May 2026) follows the fact substantively — “Here is the rebuttal: the clemency case files will be published on Tuesday” — but the presentation uses the rebuttal framing word, emphasising the timing dispute rather than the substantive question. Magyar Nemzet did not put the topic on the front page on this day.

6.2 Facts and data

The quantitative framework of the clemency practice is given by publicly available official statistics, but these are not systematically accessible — this is precisely one of the motivations of proposal 3.2. According to the annual communications of the Sándor Palace, in the period 2010–2024 about 200–250 individual clemency applications were received annually, with positive decisions in 8–15% of these. The origin (positive vs. negative) of the justice ministry submissions during this period was not public information — partial data emerged in the debate following the 2023 case showing that in some decisions during the Novák era, the President decided in favour of clemency despite a negative ministerial submission.

The child-protection / sexual-offence category — one of the main dimensions of proposal 3.3 — is in European practice an already prioritised regulatory area of clemency power in several countries. The Austrian Federal President’s Office, for example, requests mandatory ethics-committee opinion in such cases (procedure in force since 1925); in Germany, the Bundespräsident’s clemency power extends only to offences within federal competence, and is in every case tied to public registration (Bundeskanzleramt registry).

6.3 Policy dimensions

The topic directly touches the following MIAK policy areas:

  • Justice (programme points) — clemency as the constitutional framework of post-judgment review; direct link with I4 judicial independence and I10 constitutional stress test programme points.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A6 checks and balances, A1 public-money dashboard as a model for the technological implementation of the “clemency dashboard”.
  • Public administration and e-government (background) — digital procedural order of the Office of the Sándor Palace, technical preconditions of XML/JSON-based structured publication.

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu regards clemency (“pardon”, “letters of grace”) as one of the key tools of moderate government — the constitutionally limited form of rule. His starting point is that despotic government forms “neither grant nor receive any pardon”, and precisely for this reason deprive themselves of the advantages of clemency. The moderate monarchy, by contrast:

“Letters of grace are of excellent use in moderate governments. This power which the prince has of pardoning, exercised with prudence, is capable of producing admirable effects.” (Book VI, Chapter 21)

In MIAK’s reading, Montesquieu’s “prudence” — wisdom, moderation, deliberation — is exactly what a rulebook-level reform institutionalises in a 21st-century constitutional democracy: the duty to provide reasons, countersignature responsibility, and ethics-committee pre-screening together operationalise Montesquieu’s prudence. The currently disputed Hungarian practice has come into crisis precisely because, without institutionalisation, prudence has been reduced to a personal quality — one president, one minister, one specific decision. The 2023 case demonstrated exactly the risk of this reduction.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Book VI, Chapter 21

6.4.2 Acemoglu–Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) draw the duality of inclusive and extractive institutions: inclusive institutions bind power at the rulebook level (those in power are embedded in the same system that binds citizens), while extractive institutions — even if formally elected democratically — distribute discretionary exemptions to inner elite circles. The clemency power is a canonical borderline area: exercised without reasoning, it easily becomes one of the mechanisms of the extractive model (closed-circle exemption); with mandatory reasoning and external filters, it can become an institutional virtue point of the inclusive model (a visible tool of moderation).

The 2023 Hungarian case structurally bore the marks of the extractive pattern: a closed bargaining process between the applicant and the countersigning minister (negative submission but positive presidential decision), without an external control point (ethics filter, victim notification). MIAK’s proposal seeks precisely to shift this structure toward the inclusive direction, without formally trimming the President’s power.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu — James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail (2012)

6.4.3 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard’s C = M + D − A formula — Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability — is a simple but robust diagnostic tool for corruption risk. Applied to the clemency power: monopoly (a single actor, the head of state, decides) and discretion (without reasoning duty) together signal high risk, unless accountability — mandatory reasoning under (3.1), parliamentary report under (3.2), ethics pre-screening under (3.3) — substantively increases the A value. The proposal does not reduce C to zero (this is impossible and probably not desirable), but stabilises it at a predictable, low level.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption (1988)

6.5 International comparison

The transparency regulation of the clemency power is not without precedent in the Hungarian reform. The Austrian Federal President’s Office has, since 1925, requested mandatory ethics-committee opinions in child-protection and sexual-offence cases; the German Bundespräsident’s clemency power at federal level is tied to public registration (Bundeskanzleramt registry); the French President since the 2008 constitutional reform publishes clemency decisions in the Journal officiel with reasoning; the Polish presidential clemency has, since 2015, fallen under an automatic parliamentary accountability regime. The Hungarian proposal therefore follows a model that is integrable in Europe — proposing not a break with tradition but a tradition reconnection.

Justice

  • I4 — Defence of judicial independence
  • I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit (lawmaking with citizen feedback)
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard (technology model for the clemency dashboard)
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A14 — International institutional participation and accountability

Proposed new programme point: Rulebook-level reform of clemency practice — for the Justice area. None of the existing I programme points directly covers the mechanism of presidential individual clemency; proposals 3.1–3.3 can be fixed as a new, comprehensive programme point.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 19 May 2026 — topic 1):

  • [Telex] Magyar Péter: Az igazságügyi miniszter nemlegesen terjesztette fel a Sándor-palotába K. Endre kegyelmi kérvényét — telex.hu/belfold/2026/05/18
  • [HVG] Magyar Péter: Varga Judit nem javasolt kegyelmet a bicskei ügyben, Sulyok Tamásnál pattog a labda — hvg.hu/itthon/20260518
  • [24.hu] Sulyok Tamás nem mond le — 24.hu/belfold/2026/05/18
  • [444.hu] Jön a kegyelmi dosszié, átalakítják a végrehajtást, mennek a vármegyék — 444.hu/2026/05/18
  • [Mandiner] Itt a cáfolat: a kegyelmi ügy iratait kedden teszik közzé — mandiner.hu/belfold/2026/05
  • [ATV] Ma kiderülhet, miért kapott kegyelmet a bicskei gyerekotthon exigazgatójának bűntársa — atv.hu/videok

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (1748)
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu — James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail (2012)
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption (1988)
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (consolidated text of 17 April 2026) — Article 9(4)(g) and (5)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point IDs: I4, I9, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A1, A6, A14)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (background)
  • MIAK press monitor, 19 May 2026 — topic 1, score: 92/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 9(4)(g) and (5) — official publication order of the Sándor Palace
  • Basic-proceedings files of the 2024 Bicske children’s-home case — Bicske District Court, Budapest Court of Appeal
  • Austrian Federal Presidential clemency procedural order (1925 BGBl. 1925/195)

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