Part I — Situation overview

The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making body, discussed Black Sea security in Brussels on Tuesday, 20 October. After the meeting Colonel Martin O’Donnell, the Alliance’s spokesperson, announced that allies have sent or will send additional maritime patrol aircraft, radar systems, explosive ordnance teams, intelligence analysts and drones to the region. He added that the most important thing is to improve situational awareness, i.e. more sensors and more data sharing (Al Jazeera, Portfolio). On the same day Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, told the European Parliament that presumably Russian drones had carried out six attacks in ten days. In her view this is a dangerous and unacceptable escalation, and the Union should send a naval mission to protect commercial shipping (EUobserver). Two tankers caught fire near the Romanian coast, and seven sailors are missing. On Saturday, 17 October, Romanian F-16s shot down two drones over Romanian territorial waters (Rapporteur, Euractiv’s Brussels newsletter). According to Kallas, the attacks deprive Ukraine of 60 million euros a day in grain and fertiliser export revenue. Siegfried Mureșan, a Romanian EPP Member of the European Parliament, said the number of incidents is more than four times last year’s. He therefore called for a separate Black Sea security envelope in the EU budget for 2028–2034 (Rapporteur). NATO, Romania and Bulgaria have not officially attributed the attacks to any country, and the Kremlin denies responsibility (Al Jazeera).

On 15 October MIAK proposed conditional Hungarian support for a joint NATO Black Sea command, accession to the ban on attacks against ships, and Danube data exchange. On 18 October it called for a concrete Hungarian counter-drone offer in response to the Romanian and Bulgarian request. This piece does not repeat these. The current development is new on three points. NATO is no longer planning but deploying. The Union’s High Representative is publicly urging a naval mission. And Black Sea defence has been put on the agenda of the EU budget negotiations.

MIAK’s reading: the target of the attacks has changed. According to an analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the London defence think tank, Russia is no longer targeting the cargo but the people, because the threat to life deters shipping more effectively (EUobserver). Against such pressure, what protects is not one spectacular asset, but a common situational picture, fast decisions and predictable long-term financing. Hungary sits among the decision-makers on all three points.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework. Under the Treaty on European Union, the Council decides unanimously on launching common security and defence policy missions. A member state may abstain by making a formal declaration. In that case it is not obliged to apply the decision, nor does it have to contribute to the costs of military operations, but it does not obstruct the decision. The Treaty also states that expenditure arising from operations with military implications is, as a general rule, not charged to the EU budget. A 2013 study by the Danish political scientist Kristian L. Nielsen builds on a concept of the British scholar Christopher Hill, the capability-expectations gap. According to it, the Union regularly promises more than it can deliver with its means, and this damages its credibility. The European Union’s 2016 Global Strategy (Shared Vision, Common Action) holds that European security hinges on shared threat assessment. This requires investment in intelligence, surveillance and drones, and defence cooperation must become the norm. The detailed discussion of the literature — source by source, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first concerns Hungary’s contribution to NATO’s actual reinforcement, the second Hungary’s vote on the EU naval mission, and the third the Black Sea envelope of the next EU budget. MIAK maintains its proposals of 15 and 18 October; these build on them.

3.1 A Hungarian analytical and data-sharing contribution to NATO’s Black Sea situational picture, with a public summary (within 30 days, by 20 November)

According to NATO’s spokesperson, the most important element of the reinforcement is not any single weapons system, but situational awareness: more sensors and more data sharing. This is an area where landlocked Hungary, too, can make a meaningful contribution. MIAK proposes that the Government decide on the Hungarian contribution within 30 days, on a joint submission by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its focus should be intelligence and situational-assessment analysts, unmanned reconnaissance assets and allied sharing of existing air-picture data. The contribution could include linking air and shipping data from the lower Danube region into the allied situational picture, since the European People’s Party also counts the Danube Delta among the areas to be protected. The counter-drone offer requested on 18 October does not replace this, but complements it. If the contribution qualifies as a deployment of the Hungarian Defence Forces based on a NATO decision, the Government decides on it and reports to the National Assembly without delay. MIAK asks that, alongside the report, a public, unclassified summary also be prepared. It should show what Hungary offered, with how many personnel, for how long and at what cost — or, if it offered nothing, why not. According to the thesis of the EU Global Strategy (see 6.4.3), European security hinges on shared threat assessment. The proposal serves programme points HV12 geostrategic defence planning and HV2 transparency of defence spending, and, through the register of allied commitments, KP23 the alliance credibility audit.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 46 (3) and (4)

3.2 A written Hungarian position on the EU Black Sea mission: no veto, formal abstention if needed, and a comparative mandate analysis (before the first Council debate, by 30 November at the latest)

According to EUobserver, the chances of an EU naval mission are slim. It would require a much larger force than the existing EU operation in the Red Sea, and air policing might be more effective. The Council decides unanimously on launching the mission (see 6.4.1), so a single member state can prevent it. MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the Ministry of Defence, set out the Hungarian position in writing before the first substantive Council debate, by 30 November at the latest. It should have three elements. First: Hungary does not prevent the launch of the mission if the other member states support it. Second: if Hungary does not wish to take part, it should choose the route the Treaty provides for this. This is abstention accompanied by a formal declaration — in the literature, constructive abstention. In this case Hungary is not obliged to apply the decision, nor does it have to contribute to the costs of military operations, but it does not hold back the others. Third: Hungary should request that, before the decision, a comparative analysis of the possible mandates be prepared. The analysis should compare ship escort, coastal air policing and a combination of the two in terms of cost, effectiveness and Turkey’s cooperation. The Treaty also allows the Council to entrust the implementation of the mission to a group of member states willing to take part. According to Nielsen’s analysis (see 6.4.2), an undeliverable promise harms the Union’s credibility more than a more modest commitment that is actually carried out. The proposal applies programme points KP17 issue-based coalition building and KP23 alliance credibility audit.

3.3 Conditional Hungarian support for the EU Black Sea budget envelope, with an impact sheet (before the next negotiating round, by 30 November at the latest)

Mureșan’s proposal has three elements: using Romania’s and Bulgaria’s unused SAFE loan allocations (funds of the EU defence investment loan programme) for regional security, putting a Black Sea maritime security centre into operation, and a separate envelope in the next EU budget (Rapporteur). The first element is a route without a Hungarian budgetary burden, since it concerns the Romanian and Bulgarian loan allocations. The third, however, is common money, from which Hungary also benefits and to which it contributes. Under the Treaty, expenditure arising from operations with military implications is, as a general rule, not charged to the EU budget (see 6.4.1). Realistically, therefore, such an envelope can be spent on sensor networks, port and infrastructure protection, joint procurement and dual-use (civilian and military) developments, while member states bear the costs of operations. MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepare a Hungarian impact sheet before the next negotiating round, by 30 November at the latest, and present it to the National Assembly’s Committee on European Affairs. The impact sheet should set three conditions for Hungarian support. First: the envelope should not take from cohesion (catching-up) funds, but should sit in the defence and security heading. Second: the money should be used through joint, competitive and public procurement. Third: the envelope’s geographical scope should cover the lower Danube section and the approaches to Danube ports. According to the EU Global Strategy (see 6.4.3), no single member state can sustain the necessary capabilities on its own, so defence cooperation must become the norm. The proposal applies programme points HV4 EU defence industrial base and joint procurement, G1 data-driven budgeting and KP10 regional resilience building. On 9 October MIAK called for a 48-hour impact sheet on the whole EU budget proposal; this proposal unpacks a new item of it.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: in the Black Sea crisis Hungary is not an outsider, but a voting and paying member. It must therefore tie its contribution, its vote and its money to public conditions set in advance. The EU Treaty (see 6.4.1) provides a ready procedural route for this. Nielsen’s lesson (see 6.4.2) is that credibility rests on commitments delivered, not on announcements.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Security A common situational picture enables faster alerts and more precise identification of the attacker Hungarian analytical capacity is scarce; deployment may draw on other tasks
Foreign policy Avoiding a veto and a public offer improve Hungary’s credibility as an ally Participation in the mission may appear as escalation in Moscow’s eyes
Budget The option of abstention protects Hungary from unaffordable operational costs A poorly delimited EU envelope could squeeze cohesion funds
Economy and agriculture Safer shipping reduces transport, insurance, fertiliser and food-price risks If the attacks continue, fertiliser and food prices may rise before the spring season
Public administration The public summary and the impact sheet make the decisions verifiable Overly detailed public data could reveal military capability gaps

The most important question to weigh is the price of abstention. Formal abstention is a legally clean route, and it saves money. But if Hungary chooses it regularly while coastal allies pay for their own security, its credibility as an ally declines. It may need that credibility precisely when it asks for support for its own interests. MIAK therefore regards abstention as a last resort, not a default behaviour. The proposal becomes risky if the mission’s mandate remains vague and the cost of neither escort nor air policing is calculated in advance.

The second dilemma is financing. An EU Black Sea envelope would in principle also protect Hungarian Danube trade. But if it is created at the expense of the other spending headings, the Hungarian budget may lose out. The proposal therefore only works if the impact sheet shows the Hungarian contribution and the expected Hungarian benefit item by item.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • A government decision and a public, unclassified summary of the Hungarian Black Sea contribution. Target: by 20 November 2026. Worth following: the number of analysts and assets offered, and the duration and cost of the commitment.
  • A written Hungarian position on the EU mission. Target: before the first substantive Council debate, by 30 November 2026 at the latest. Worth following: whether, in the vote on the mission, Hungary supports the decision, formally abstains or blocks it.
  • A Hungarian impact sheet on the EU Black Sea budget envelope and a committee hearing. Target: by 30 November 2026. Worth following: which spending heading the envelope ends up in, and whether it covers the lower Danube section.
  • The number of incidents against Black Sea shipping per quarter. Worth following: whether the frequency of attacks falls after the reinforcement.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the Government. It should offer analysts and data to NATO’s common Black Sea situational picture, and report on this publicly. It should not block the EU naval mission, and if it does not take part, it should choose formal abstention as provided by the Treaty. It should support the EU Black Sea budget envelope on conditions: it should not come from catching-up funds, it should go to joint, transparent procurement, and it should also protect the lower Danube.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, accountability and transparency are at stake here. Accountability, because the allied commitment, the Council vote and the EU contribution are all decisions for which the Government is responsible. They can only be held to account if they are made under conditions set in advance. Transparency, because without the public summary and the impact sheet, voters cannot see what Hungary commits and how much it pays for the security of the neighbouring sea.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the international press, Al Jazeera put the NATO announcement at the centre and highlighted the spokesperson’s sentence on situational awareness. It also stressed that neither NATO nor Romania and Bulgaria had officially named the attacker. EUobserver looked at Kallas’s mission proposal from the angle of feasibility, casting doubt on it already in its headline. The article also quoted the RUSI analyst’s finding that the attackers are now targeting crews (most of the article is behind a paywall; only the introduction was available). Politico Europe approached the topic from the angle of the peace talks. Romanian President Nicușor Dan told the paper that allies are discussing the Black Sea attacks in the North Atlantic Council.

In the EU policy press, Rapporteur, Euractiv’s Brussels newsletter, put the budget thread — the EPP’s funding request — in its headline. Of Kallas’s warning on food supply, it published only the headline and subheading publicly (the article was not publicly downloadable). In the domestic press, Portfolio framed the NATO announcement as a reinforcement of the eastern flank, among news of the war in Ukraine. According to MIAK’s domestic press monitor, the other outlets did not make the Black Sea thread a separate topic that day, carrying the news alongside reports on the peace talks and Hungarian–Ukrainian relations.

What the framings have in common is that the international outlets saw the military step in the news, the Brussels press the money, and the domestic press the great-power negotiations. That the three threads concern the same decision situation, and that all three require a Hungarian vote, was not made the backbone of any source’s article.

6.2 Facts and data

The timeline (according to the sources):

Date Event Source
Mid-October 2026 (no exact date in the sources) Two tankers catch fire near the Romanian coast; seven sailors go missing Rapporteur, EUobserver
17 October 2026 (Saturday) Romanian F-16s shoot down two drones over Romanian territorial waters Rapporteur
20 October 2026 (Tuesday) The North Atlantic Council discusses Black Sea security; NATO’s spokesperson announces the deployment of additional assets Al Jazeera, Portfolio, Politico Europe
20 October 2026 (Tuesday) Kallas urges an EU naval mission in the European Parliament; Mureșan calls for a separate Black Sea budget envelope EUobserver, Rapporteur
26–30 October 2026 (“next week”, according to Rapporteur) A group of MEPs, on an EPP initiative, travels to the Bulgarian coast Rapporteur

The figures of the crisis:

Data Value Source
Number of drone attacks in ten days 6 (presumably with Russian drones) Kallas in the European Parliament (Al Jazeera, EUobserver)
Sailors missing after the attack on the two tankers 7 Kallas (Rapporteur, EUobserver)
Ukraine’s lost grain and fertiliser export revenue 60 million euros a day Kallas (EUobserver)
Change in the number of incidents compared with the previous year more than fourfold Mureșan (Rapporteur)
Drones shot down over Romanian territorial waters on 17 October 2 Rapporteur

Assets announced by NATO (Colonel O’Donnell’s list, Al Jazeera): maritime patrol aircraft, radar systems, explosive ordnance teams, intelligence personnel, drones. According to the spokesperson, allies have already sent or will send these. Which ally committed what is not clear from the sources.

Discrepancies and uncertainties in the sources:

Question Claim 1 Claim 2
Who is the attacker according to military analysts almost certainly Russia; Zelensky accuses Moscow (Al Jazeera) NATO, Romania and Bulgaria have officially named no one; the Kremlin denies it (Al Jazeera)
Is the EU mission feasible according to Kallas the Union must send a mission (EUobserver) according to EUobserver the chances are slim, and air policing may be more effective

The EU legal framework: Under Article 42(4) of the Treaty on European Union, the Council decides unanimously on launching common security and defence policy missions. Article 31(1) regulates abstention accompanied by a formal declaration. Under Article 41(2), expenditure arising from operations with military implications is not charged to the EU budget. It is borne by the member states in accordance with the gross national product scale, except for those that have formally abstained. Under Article 44, the Council may also entrust the implementation of a mission to a group of member states willing to take part.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Defence (programme points) — planning the contribution to the reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank (programme point ID: HV12); public disclosure of the cost of commitments (programme point ID: HV2); joint procurement under the Black Sea envelope (programme point ID: HV4);
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the Hungarian vote on the mission and coalition building (programme point ID: KP17); measuring credibility as an ally (programme point ID: KP23); the resilience of coastal neighbours (programme point ID: KP10);
  • Economy (programme points) — the Hungarian impact sheet on the Black Sea budget envelope (programme point ID: G1); preparing for transport and price risks (programme point ID: G25);
  • Agriculture (programme points) — tracking fertiliser and grain market effects on a data platform (programme point ID: MG2).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 European Union: Treaty on European Union

Article 42 of the Treaty defines the common security and defence policy as an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It builds missions on capabilities made available by the member states. Under paragraph (4),

“Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously…”

Article 31(1) offers a way out for a member state that intends to stay outside. It may abstain by making a formal declaration, and

“In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union.”

In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the abstaining member state undertakes to refrain from any action likely to impede the common action. Under Article 41(2), expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications is not charged to the EU budget. It is borne by the member states in accordance with the gross national product scale, but member states that have formally abstained are not obliged to contribute. Under Article 44, the Council may also entrust the implementation of a mission to a group of member states willing to take part.

For the Black Sea mission this yields two conclusions. First: Hungary can stay outside a mission it considers unacceptable without blocking the others and without paying for the operation. The veto is therefore not the only instrument for defending Hungarian interests (3.2). Second: an EU budget Black Sea envelope cannot, as a general rule, cover the costs of operations. The debate on the envelope is therefore really about sensors, infrastructure protection and joint procurement (3.3).

📖 Source: European Union: Treaty on European Union (consolidated version, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012), Article 31(1), Article 41(2), Article 42(4), Article 44

6.4.2 Kristian L. Nielsen: EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap

In his study published in the Journal of Contemporary European Research in 2013, Nielsen takes up Christopher Hill’s 1993 concept. The capability-expectations gap means that the Union raises greater expectations than the policies it is actually able to deliver. Nielsen examines whether the Union’s “soft”, attraction-based influence can make up for this gap. His answer is a firm no. He concludes that

“The irony of soft power is that it so often requires hard power policies to become effective.”

in other words, soft power is often ineffective precisely without hard instruments. According to Nielsen, the gap can be narrowed in only two ways: with more capabilities, or with lower expectations. But if the Union regularly falls short of its own promises, that also erodes its credibility.

The Black Sea situation is a textbook case of this. The High Representative is publicly urging a naval mission, while according to the specialist press the member states’ forces and political will for it are doubtful. MIAK’s proposal 3.2 therefore does not primarily ask for a stance for or against the mission, but for a realistic comparison of mandates before the decision. That way the Union can commit to what it can actually deliver, and Hungary does not widen the gap with its vote.

📖 Source: Kristian L. Nielsen: EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap, Journal of Contemporary European Research 9 (5), 2013, pp. 723–739

6.4.3 European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action

In its security chapter, the Union’s 2016 Global Strategy regards shared assessment of threats as the first condition of European security:

“European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges.”

According to the strategy, this requires investment in intelligence, surveillance and remotely piloted aircraft. Among the goals of the partnership with NATO, the strategy specifically mentions countering hybrid threats and promoting maritime security. The defence industry chapter states that defence policy remains a national competence, but no single member state can sustain the necessary capabilities on its own. Deeper defence cooperation, it argues, increases the efficiency of defence spending.

The NATO spokesperson’s sentence of 20 October, that situational awareness and data sharing are what matter most, repeats the same thesis ten years later. Proposal 3.1 therefore places the focus of the Hungarian contribution on analysis and data, because in this area even a landlocked country can add meaningful value. The joint, competitive procurement condition in proposal 3.3 is the budgetary application of the strategy’s thesis on defence cooperation.

📖 Source: European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)

6.5 International comparison

The closest EU example is the naval operation in the Red Sea. The Union launched it in 2024 in response to attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on commercial ships, with a purely defensive mandate: it escorts and protects, but does not strike targets on land. According to EUobserver, a Black Sea mission would require a much larger force. One reason is that the attacker here is a major military power, not a non-state armed group. Presence in the Black Sea is also limited by the 1936 Montreux Convention regulating the regime of the straits: warships of non-littoral states may stay in the Black Sea only for a limited time and with limited tonnage. An EU naval mission could therefore in practice rely only on the Romanian and Bulgarian navies and on Turkey’s cooperation. This explains why EUobserver considers air policing more effective. In the airspace of coastal states, allied fighter jets can operate without legal obstacles, and defence against drones is primarily an air-defence task.

The second example is the agreement on freedom of navigation. According to Kallas, the Union is working with Turkey and India on an agreement that would guarantee free navigation in the Black Sea. Ukraine proposed one; Russia rejected it (Rapporteur). Experience shows that military presence and negotiated regulation are not alternatives to each other. The ban on attacks urged by the coastal states — which MIAK proposed Hungary join on 15 October — and the current military reinforcement can serve the safety of shipping at the same time.

Defence

  • HV2 — Transparency of defence spending
  • HV4 — EU defence industrial base and joint procurement
  • HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

Foreign policy

  • KP10 — Regional resilience building
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition building in the EU
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budgeting
  • G25 — Energy price shock preparedness plan

Agriculture

  • MG2 — Agricultural data platform

Proposed new programme point: A public register of allied commitments: an unclassified summary of every NATO and EU military offer, mission vote and formal abstention, with the task, personnel, cost and justification — for the Defence area.

6.7 List of sources

International press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 21 October 2026 — topic 1):

Domestic press source (MIAK press monitor, 21 October 2026 — topic 4):

Knowledge-base references (literature, legal sources):

  • 📖 European Union: Treaty on European Union (consolidated version, 2012)
  • 📖 Kristian L. Nielsen: EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap (2013)
  • 📖 European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 46

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Defence (background material; programme points; programme point IDs: HV2, HV4, HV12)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point IDs: KP10, KP17, KP23)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point IDs: G1, G25)
  • MIAK policy area: Agriculture (programme points; programme point ID: MG2)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 21 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 87/100
  • MIAK press monitor, 21 October 2026 — topic 4, score: 82/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (1936)

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