Defence

In-depth analysis

HV1 — Cyber defence capacity building

• Mechanism: Developing the National Cyber Security Operations Centre (SOC) into 24/7 operation, integrating the cyber defence units of NBSZ (the Special Service for National Security) and HM Elektronikai, Logisztikai és Vagyonkezelő Zrt. (the Ministry of Defence’s Electronics, Logistics and Asset Management Company). Practical elements: (1) an annual “Cyber Shield” exercise with NATO partners, (2) a bug bounty programme for critical infrastructure, (3) training civil-military cyber reservists (200 IT professionals per year on a voluntary basis, with a tax allowance in return). Detection and response times (MTTD/MTTR) are publicly measured KPIs.
• Quantified target: By 2029, 90% of critical infrastructure systems are covered by SOC monitoring; average incident detection time <24 hours (current estimate: days to weeks); 1,000 trained cyber reservists.
• International precedent: Estonia — after the 2007 Russian cyber-attack it established the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn and introduced the world’s first cyber-reserve system (Küberkaitseliit). During the 2022 Ukrainian conflict, the Estonian model proved the effectiveness of engaging civilian IT experts.
• Trade-off / risk: Building cyber defence capacity pulls talent from the already tight domestic IT market — if defence pushes up IT wages, the private sector suffers. Estonia resolved this partly through the reservist model (not full-time employment but training + standby pay).

HV2 — Defence-spending transparency

• Mechanism: Creation of a public “Defence Budget Dashboard” making the defence budget (~2% of GDP, ~HUF 1,800 billion) available in the following breakdown: (1) personnel costs vs. equipment procurement vs. operations vs. R&D; (2) a public register of procurement contracts (contracting party, amount, performance); (3) the fulfilment status of NATO Capability Targets. The “comply or explain” principle: what cannot be disclosed for national-security reasons is reviewed in closed session by the Parliament’s Defence Committee.
• Quantified target: 70% of the defence budget becomes publicly detailed (currently <30%); the procurement register is comprehensive by 2028; an annual comparative analysis of V4 defence spending.
• International precedent: Sweden — the FMV (Försvarets Materielverk — Swedish Defence Materiel Administration) system is one of the EU’s most transparent defence-procurement regimes: every contract above SEK 10 million is public, and the agency publishes an annual performance report on procurement efficiency.
• Trade-off / risk: There is genuine tension between transparency of defence procurement and national-security interests: publicising capability gaps creates strategic vulnerability. The solution is the “classification minimalism” principle: public by default, classified only in specific, justified cases — not the reverse.

HV3 — Defence innovation programme

• Mechanism: Creation of a “Hungarian Defence Innovation Hub” within the framework of the Zrínyi 2026 programme, with three focus areas: (1) drone systems (domestic development and production of reconnaissance and logistics UAVs), (2) AI-based decision support (C4ISR systems with artificial-intelligence modules), (3) development of cyber-offensive capabilities. The Hub operates on a PPP model: the armed forces provide the requirement and the test range, universities and start-ups develop the technology, and the state provides venture capital (from GINOP/HOP funds). The Rheinmetall plant (Zalaegerszeg) integrates into the supplier network as an industrial anchor tenant.
• Quantified target: By 2030, 3 domestically developed drone systems in service; defence R&D spending rises from 2% to 5% of the defence budget; 50+ defence-technology start-ups drawn into the supply chain.
• International precedent: Israel — MAFAT (Administration for the Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure) has for decades integrated academia, start-ups and the armed forces. Iron Dome, Trophy APS and drone swarms all grew out of this ecosystem. The key: the military requirement reaches developers directly, not through bureaucratic procurement channels.
• Trade-off / risk: Developing a domestic defence industry is only worthwhile if there is an export market — the Hungarian market alone is too small to recoup development costs. The Czech and Estonian examples show that defence innovation in small countries succeeds only when it is developed for NATO-level interoperability and exported to the NATO market. The ethical risk (autonomous weapon systems) requires explicit regulation.

HV4 — EU defence industrial base and joint procurement

• Mechanism: (1) Joining EU joint defence procurement initiatives: joint procurement of ammunition, spare parts, fuel and personal equipment with EU member states. According to EC report IP328, intra-European consolidation can yield unit-cost reductions of up to 50–90%. (2) Supporting the defence extension of EU IPCEIs (Important Projects of Common European Interest): microelectronics, robotics, drones, hypersonic technologies. (3) A Hungarian contribution to expanding EU defence-industrial production capacity: the Rheinmetall plant (Zalaegerszeg) as a node of the EU defence industrial network.
• Quantified target: By 2028, at least 20% of Hungarian defence procurement through joint EU procurement; the Rheinmetall plant’s annual output reaches HUF 100 billion; 30+ Hungarian defence SMEs integrated into the European supply chain.
• International precedent: According to EC IP328, by 2024 the market capitalisation of the EU defence industry had risen to 65% of that of the five largest US defence firms (2022: 35%). The historical precedent for joint procurement: wartime cooperation during World War II produced 50–90% cost reductions on identical weapons systems. The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) is a working example of joint procurement.
• Trade-off / risk: Joint procurement can put the national defence industry at a competitive disadvantage: if EU-level procurement favours the larger (German, French) manufacturers, Hungarian industry can be crowded out. Required: a guaranteed minimum domestic-supplier share in offset agreements. EU defence-industrial consolidation is politically sensitive: the tension between national sovereignty and EU-level efficiency is real. 📖 Source: EC: 2026 European Macroeconomic Report (IP328)

HV5 — Scheduled increase in defence spending

• Mechanism: A scheduled GDP-based increase: 2025: 2.0% (NATO minimum), 2027: 2.5%, 2030: 3.5%. The composition of the increment is critical — according to EC IP328, the GDP impact (economic multiplier) is greatest when 40%+ of spending goes to productive investment: (1) domestic defence production (not imports), (2) R&D, (3) infrastructure (barracks, logistics bases), (4) training. Minimising the import share: 30%+ of procured weapons systems from domestic or EU manufacturers.
• Quantified target: Defence spending at 2.5% of GDP by 2027 and 3.5% by 2030; the defence R&D share rises to 5% of the defence budget (currently ~2%); the share of domestic/EU procurement grows from 30% to 50%.
• International precedent: According to the EC IP328 model, if EU member states channel 40%+ of the spending increase into productive investment, it can induce GDP growth of 0.5–1% by 2028. Poland: in 2023 it raised defence spending to 3.9% of GDP, with a large share going to domestic production (the PGZ group) — the domestic defence industry’s revenue grew by 40%.
• Trade-off / risk: Rapid spending increases cause fiscal strain: if funds are diverted from other sectors (health, education), public acceptance falls. EC IP328 warns: raising defence spending is only sustainable if it goes hand in hand with fiscal consolidation. Defence inflation is a risk: if all member states raise spending simultaneously, asset prices rise and actual capacity growth is smaller than planned. 📖 Source: EC: 2026 European Macroeconomic Report (IP328)

HV6 — Defence R&D and spillover strategy

• Mechanism: (1) Defence R&D spending is explicitly designed so that research results can be carried over into civilian applications (dual-use). According to EC IP328, the “crowding-in” effect of defence R&D is stronger in countries where the innovation ecosystem is already well developed. (2) Institutionalising defence–civilian R&D partnerships: joint research programmes of the Ministry of Defence, universities and the private sector (drones → logistics; cyber defence → IT security; artificial intelligence → industrial automation). (3) A defence innovation fund of HUF 15 billion a year, from which 30% of projects must have a documented civilian application plan.
• Quantified target: By 2030, documented civilian spillover from 40% of defence R&D projects; 10+ dual-use patents a year; each HUF 1 of defence R&D investment induces HUF 0.5 of private-sector R&D co-investment.
• International precedent: US DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) developed the internet, GPS and autonomous-vehicle technology from defence research into civilian applications. Israel’s Unit 8200: veterans of this cyber-security unit founded a significant share of the global tech industry. The key: institutionalising the knowledge transfer between defence research and the start-up ecosystem.
• Trade-off / risk: Exporting dual-use technologies is a security risk: if technology flowing into civilian applications ends up in the hands of adversary states, it erodes defence capability. Required: export control and a technology-classification regime. EC IP328 also signals that the defence R&D crowding-in effect is not automatic: if the domestic innovation ecosystem is weak, defence investment remains an “enclave” without civilian spillover. 📖 Source: EC: 2026 European Macroeconomic Report (IP328)

HV7 — Societal defence resilience (“Clausewitzian trinity”)

• Mechanism: Based on Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity”: the success of war depends on the passion of the people, the capabilities of the army and the political wisdom of the government. Programme: (1) embedding defence knowledge in public education (basic civil-protection skills), (2) an annual “National Resilience Survey” (the population’s preparedness for crises), (3) a civil-military cooperation framework for disasters and hybrid threats.
• Quantified target: By 2030, a civil-protection module in 100% of secondary schools; the annual Resilience Survey published openly; 10+ civil-military joint exercises a year.
• Trade-off / risk: “Defence education” must not become militarist propaganda. The educational content is public and agreed with civil-society organisations. 📖 Source: Clausewitz: On War (Book I, section 28)

HV8 — Deterrence on the “winning without fighting” principle

• Mechanism: Sun Tzu: “the best of the art of war is to win one’s victories through easy victories.” A credible deterrence strategy: (1) built on NATO membership but with national capabilities, (2) selective transparency, (3) making the automaticity of responses unambiguous. A defensive, not offensive, doctrine.
• Quantified target: A deterrence doctrine publicly published by 2028; 100% readiness of NATO-compatible capabilities; an annual public defence-capability report. 📖 Source: Sun Tzu: The Art of War (chapters III–IV); Clausewitz: On War (Book VI)

HV9 — Self-reliant defence capability — “own arms” doctrine

• Mechanism: Machiavelli: “no principality is secure without its own arms.” Programme: (1) national self-sufficiency in critical defence capabilities (ammunition production, drones, cyber defence), (2) development of the domestic defence industrial base, (3) parallel strengthening of the NATO alliance AND national capabilities.
• Quantified target: By 2030, 60% of ammunition demand from domestic production; 3+ domestic drone manufacturers; defence-industry exports double. 📖 Source: Machiavelli: The Prince (chapters XII–XIII)

HV10 — Modernising the reserve force

• Mechanism: A comprehensive reform of the Hungarian reserve system: (1) a 20,000-strong volunteer reserve force by 2030 (currently ~5,000), (2) making service attractive (competences recognised in civilian careers, tax allowance), (3) integrated operation of the civil-protection system and the military reserve.
• Quantified target: 20,000 active reservists by 2030; 2,000+ new volunteers a year; 80% of reservist training NATO-compatible. 📖 Source: Clausewitz: On War (Book III); Sun Tzu: The Art of War (chapter IV)

HV11 — Strategic communication and information defence

• Mechanism: (1) A StratCom unit inside the Ministry of Defence: defence against hybrid warfare (disinformation, influence operations), (2) developing society’s media-literacy skills, (3) a proactive strategic narrative: credible communication of Hungary’s defensive intentions.
• Quantified target: The StratCom unit operational by 2027; 100+ disinformation campaigns identified a year; the media-literacy programme reaches 50,000 people a year. 📖 Source: Sun Tzu: The Art of War (chapters I, XIII); Clausewitz: On War (Book I)

HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

• Mechanism: Hungary sits in the Carpathian Basin, on the western rim of the Eurasian “inner crescent”. Defence-planning implications: (1) taking the east-west fault line into account, (2) planning defence infrastructure to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank, (3) integrating the Carpathian Basin’s natural defensive features.
• Quantified target: A geostrategic review by 2028; doubling the logistics contribution to NATO’s eastern flank; 2 new regional logistics bases. 📖 Source: Mackinder: The Geographical Pivot of History; Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

HV13 — Multi-model crisis decision-making

• Mechanism: Allison and Zelikow’s analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis showed that the autonomous logic of organisational routines (Model II) can override political intent — military units follow their SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures), not the tactical instructions of the political leadership. Kissinger’s Diplomacy identified the same pattern in Cold War decision-making: the internal logic of the alliance system created its own dynamic. Defence application: (1) integrated into the HV7 (Societal defence resilience) framework: crisis simulations (KP7, HV7) must mandatorily include analysis through all three Allison models, (2) an “organisational routine audit” in the Hungarian Defence Forces: where do SOPs distort strategic intent? (3) institutionalising the “devil’s advocate” role in every defence crisis decision — the opposing view must be presented.
• Quantified target: By 2028, three-model analysis in 100% of defence crisis exercises; an annual organisational routine audit; the “devil’s advocate” role 100% institutionalised in the crisis-management protocol.
• Trade-off / risk: Three-model analysis is time-consuming — in an acute crisis a fast decision matters more than analysis. The solution: peacetime simulations prepare decision-makers, so the analysis does not have to be done in the middle of the crisis. 📖 Source: Allison & Zelikow: Essence of Decision; Kissinger: Diplomacy