Part I — Situation overview

On Wednesday, 14 October 2026, the Yara J, a chemical and oil tanker sailing under the flag of the Comoros, caught fire while at anchor in Romanian territorial waters. Territorial waters are the belt extending up to 12 nautical miles from the coast, which is already part of the state’s territory. The crew was rescued. According to a Reuters report published by Al Jazeera, Romanian Defence Minister Radu Miruță said it was not yet known whether the ship had been hit by a drone; the investigation is ongoing. On the same day, several drones violated Romanian airspace near the Ukrainian border. One day earlier, on 13 October, two merchant ships were hit by drone attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone. The exclusive economic zone is the belt beyond territorial waters, up to 200 nautical miles wide, in which the coastal state has rights over natural resources, but the zone is not part of the state’s territory. The HS Dignity, flying the flag of Guinea-Bissau, sank, and according to the sources ten or eleven of its crew are missing. The Maltese-flagged, Ukrainian-owned Chelsea 3 was damaged and its crew rescued. According to Telex, the sunken ship was heading for the Danube port of Brăila in Romania, and the Chelsea 3 for the Danube port of Giurgiulești in Moldova. According to Rapporteur (the Brussels newsletter of Euractiv), on the same day Miruță proposed setting up a joint NATO Black Sea command and offered his Bulgarian counterpart a joint letter to the Alliance. Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye, meanwhile, are urging a moratorium, that is, a ban on attacks against civilian ships.

On 7 October MIAK wrote about the sinking of a ship bound for the Danube mouth, and proposed a monthly Danube exposure report as well as a written Hungarian position for the EU summit starting today. Analyses were published on 31 July on a pre-prepared Hungarian position for allied consultation, and on 13 August on the loss of grain exports. The current development is new in two respects. The first is legal and geographical: within a week, attacks on shipping moved from a distance of 130 kilometres to within 30 kilometres of the Bulgarian coast, and then, in the case of one tanker, into Romanian territorial waters. The second is institutional: the coastal allies are no longer merely protesting but have made a concrete NATO proposal on which Hungary will also have to vote.

MIAK’s reading: the interest of landlocked Hungary lies not in standing aside but in the security of its coastal allies. Hungarian Danube cargo reaches the world market through Romanian ports, and on the western Black Sea route the London insurance market has so far treated precisely Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish territorial waters as safer. Hungary’s room for manoeuvre therefore lies in tying its vote to conditions and commitments, not in waiting.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework. In the work of Thucydides (Athenian historian of the 5th century BC, chronicler of the Peloponnesian War), the Corinthians, at the assembly of the Spartan alliance, warn the states lying far from the sea that if they do not support the coastal allies, the route of their own exports and imports will be damaged. In the end the danger reaches the interior as well. This is a 2,400-year-old description of Hungary’s Danube exposure. Under Article 46 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the Government decides on the deployment of the Hungarian Defence Forces based on a NATO decision, and reports on it to the National Assembly without delay. A Hungarian contribution to the joint command therefore has a ready-made constitutional procedure; the question is how substantive the report is. In his memoir Years of Renewal, Henry Kissinger (US Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, one of the negotiators of the Helsinki Final Act) describes how at the Helsinki negotiations the Western allies got the opposing side to accept military confidence-building measures, such as the advance notification of military exercises. Meanwhile, the allies divided the work issue by issue: one of them always led, and the others supported. Taken together, the three sources say that the interest of a landlocked ally is to support its coastal allies, that the legal route for this is known, and that verifiable rules agreed with the opposing parties are the proven tools for limiting attacks. The detailed treatment of the literature — source by source, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first concerns the Hungarian vote on the NATO proposal, the second the protection of civilian shipping, and the third the data on the Danube route, which is the most important for the Hungarian economy. MIAK maintains the monthly Danube exposure report and the written position for the summit proposed on 7 October, and does not repeat them here.

3.1 Conditional, written Hungarian support for the joint NATO Black Sea command, with an offered contribution (within 30 days, by 14 November)

In NATO, decisions are taken by consensus in the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s highest political decision-making body, so Hungary also has to take a position on the Romanian proposal. MIAK proposes that the Government, on the joint submission of the Ministry of Defence (minister: Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (minister: Anita Orbán), set down in writing within 30 days that Hungary supports the creation of the joint command. Three conditions are worth attaching to this support. First: the command’s mandate should be precisely defined, namely the maritime situational picture, mine clearance, and the protection of civilian shipping and undersea infrastructure. It should build on the joint mine countermeasures group of the Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish navies, operating since 2024, rather than create a parallel organisation. Second: the command’s operation should respect the international legal regime of the Straits, and it should therefore not start without Türkiye’s participation. The Romanian proposal itself envisages this, since until 2028 the command would operate on Turkish soil. Third: there should be a cost-sharing arrangement fixed in advance and an annual evaluation. Alongside its support, Hungary should offer a concrete contribution: staff officers for the command and the sharing of domestic counter-drone experience. If the contribution qualifies as a deployment of the Hungarian Defence Forces based on a NATO decision, then under Article 46 of the Fundamental Law (see 6.4.2) the Government decides on it and reports to the National Assembly without delay. MIAK asks that this report not be a formality: it should include the task, the headcount, the cost, the duration and the conditions of withdrawal, and it should be debated by the National Assembly’s committee dealing with defence matters. The proposal applies the HV12 geostrategic defence planning and the HV8 deterrence programme points. The report serves the KP22 exit planning protocol, and the vote the KP23 alliance credibility audit. According to Thucydides’s argument (see 6.4.1), the interest of a landlocked ally lies in supporting its coastal allies.

3.2 Joining the Bulgarian, Romanian and Turkish moratorium initiative, extended to both belligerents (at the European Council meeting of 15–16 October, at the latest at the next Foreign Affairs Council meeting)

According to Rapporteur, Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye continue to urge a ban on attacks against civilian ships. According to the BBC, Türkiye has called on both warring parties to stop attacks in the Black Sea, while Moscow has so far rejected calls for a maritime ceasefire. MIAK proposes that Hungary publicly join the initiative, and that the Prime Minister support, at the current European Council meeting, a reference to it in the conclusions as well. If this does not happen at the summit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should table such a proposal at the next Foreign Affairs Council meeting. The Hungarian position should contain three elements. First: the ban should apply to all civilian ships and port facilities, regardless of flag and attacker. According to an analysis by the maritime security firm Ambrey, quoted by Telex, both Russian and Ukrainian drones have already attacked merchant ships. Second: it should expressly cover traffic heading to Danube ports and the Sulina branch entrance, that is, the navigable mouth of the Danube. Third: compliance should be monitored with verifiable data, for example a joint, public register of incidents against ships. In September MIAK proposed an EU minimum standard for attribution, whose standard of proof can be applied here too. The initiative is led by the coastal states, and Hungary takes on the supporting role. This is the Helsinki division of labour described by Kissinger (see 6.4.3): one ally leads, the others reinforce it with their weight. The proposal applies the KP17 issue-based coalition building, the KP20 security building based on the lessons of Helsinki, and the KP15 preventive diplomacy programme points.

3.3 Initiating expert consultations in the Budapest-based Danube Commission on Lower Danube shipping data (within 60 days, by 14 December)

The Danube Commission is the international organisation for Danube navigation, with its seat in Budapest. One of the bottlenecks of Hungarian Danube exports is the Sulina branch, the navigable mouth of the Danube. Citing data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence, Telex writes that in August at least 67 ships waited more than two days near Sulina. According to EUobserver, waiting times for ships arriving on the Danube route have grown to more than two weeks because of low water levels, congested terminals and drone attacks. MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Transport and Investment (minister: Dávid Vitézy), together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initiate expert consultations in the Commission within 60 days. Their aim would be a monthly published data series on Lower Danube and Sulina branch shipping: waiting times, navigation restrictions, security incidents affecting shipping and notices issued to skippers. The Commission’s competence is the regime of navigation, not military security, so the proposal deliberately stays with shipping data. The data series would serve Hungarian freight forwarders, the domestic exposure report proposed on 7 October, and the monitoring of the moratorium under 3.2 at the same time. Besides the EU states along the Danube, the members of the Commission also include Ukraine and Russia. Joint data publication thus follows the logic of the confidence-building measures described by Kissinger (see 6.4.3): the opposing parties, too, see the same facts. The proposal serves the KP10 regional resilience building and the KP8 economic diplomacy programme points, and on the agricultural export side the data needs of the MG2 agricultural data platform.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: the security and trade of landlocked Hungary depend on the security of its coastal allies, so the Hungarian vote must be given content and commitment. According to Thucydides (see 6.4.1), an inland state that does not support the coastal ones ends up endangering its own trade. The Fundamental Law (see 6.4.2) provides the transparent route for the contribution. And Kissinger’s Helsinki experience (see 6.4.3) shows that limiting attacks requires verifiable, data-based rules, not just declarations.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Defence and the alliance system The Hungarian vote is predictable, the contribution is concrete, alliance credibility grows The staff officer and expert contribution ties up scarce personnel; formulating the conditions too strictly may look like a veto
Foreign policy Standing up for the moratorium builds an issue-based coalition with Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye If Moscow rejects the ban, the initiative remains symbolic; a ban extended to both parties may also be seen in Kyiv as false equivalence
Transport and logistics Sulina branch waiting times and security incidents become visible monthly, freight forwarders can plan The Russian member of the Danube Commission may block agreement; part of the data is commercially sensitive
Economy and energy If Romanian territorial waters remain secure, the insurance premium for ships heading to Romanian ports may stay moderate; protecting Romanian offshore gas production also strengthens regional gas supply Because of the current incident, the insurance market may also classify Romanian territorial waters among high-risk areas, regardless of Hungarian steps
Agriculture The sea route for grain and feed exports becomes more predictable A deterioration of the sea route may increase overland Ukrainian grain transit, which could again cause tension on the domestic market
Budget The cost of the contribution is known in advance and is before the National Assembly The Hungarian contribution to a jointly NATO-funded command is an item not so far planned in the defence budget

The most important dilemma is the symmetry of 3.2. The moratorium would apply to both warring parties, even though the Bulgarian defence minister and the President of the European Commission see Russia behind the current attacks. The Bulgarian government, for its part, said that the logic of the attacks favours Russia, although it did not officially name the perpetrator. MIAK nevertheless proposes the symmetrical wording, for two reasons. First, this way Türkiye also supports it, and Moscow cannot reject it by calling it one-sided. Second, the protection of civilian shipping is a matter of principle, not of camp. This does not mean blurring responsibility: identifying the perpetrator depends on the evidence and must follow the attribution standard proposed in September. The proposal tips towards the risk side if either party uses the moratorium to justify its own attacks by the other party’s violations.

The second dilemma is the conditions of 3.1. In NATO, a member state’s conditions can easily look like blocking. MIAK therefore treats them not as preconditions for support but as elements proposed for the command’s founding document. Hungary says yes, and represents these considerations in the negotiations.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • A written Hungarian position on the joint command. Target: by 14 November 2026, a public summary of the support, the three conditions and the offered contribution. It is worth following whether the Government’s report to the National Assembly includes the task, the headcount, the cost and the conditions of withdrawal.
  • Joining the moratorium. Target: Hungary publicly joins at the European Council meeting of 15–16 October or at the latest at the next Foreign Affairs Council meeting. It is worth following how many EU member states back the initiative, and whether the summit conclusions mention it.
  • The number of attacks on civilian ships. Baseline: according to Rapporteur, four ships were attacked off the Bulgarian coast in one week. It is worth following the number of incidents in the western Black Sea monthly. This is not a measure of the Hungarian government’s performance but an indicator of the outcome of regional efforts.
  • Danube shipping data. Target: a Hungarian initiative in the Danube Commission by 14 December 2026, and a monthly data series on Sulina branch waiting times by the first quarter of 2027. Baseline: in August at least 67 ships waited more than two days near Sulina (Lloyd’s List Intelligence, according to Telex).
  • The insurance classification of Romanian and Bulgarian territorial waters. It is worth following whether the London insurance market’s war-risk classification continues to treat Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish territorial waters as an exception.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the Government consists of three steps. By 14 November, a conditional yes, set down in writing, to the joint NATO Black Sea command, with a concrete Hungarian contribution and a substantive report to the National Assembly. Already at the current EU summit, public accession to the ban on attacks against civilian ships, extending to both warring parties and to Danube traffic. By 14 December, an initiative in the Budapest-based Danube Commission on the monthly publication of Lower Danube shipping data. The cause of the fire on the Yara J is still being investigated by the Romanian authorities, so the proposals rest not on a presumed attacker but on Hungarian interests and the weight of the Hungarian vote.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, accountability and data-drivenness are at stake here. Accountability, because the government decision on a NATO contribution can only be scrutinised if the National Assembly also sees the cost and the conditions of withdrawal. Data-drivenness, because compliance with the moratorium and the state of the Danube route can only be judged from regularly published, shared data, not from news about individual incidents.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the international press, Al Jazeera published a factual, Reuters-based report. It placed the case of the Romanian tanker in the series of hybrid attacks in the Black Sea, and recalled that some interpret the incursions of Russian drones as a test of the response capacity of NATO and the EU. Rapporteur took an institutional angle: in two articles it presented the details of the Romanian command proposal and the Bulgarian foreign minister’s visit to Berlin. According to the latter, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul urged further sanctions. EUobserver provided an economic frame, and highlighted in its headline that grain shipments have no alternative EU route. Balkan Insight focused on Bulgarian domestic politics: in its view, Prime Minister Radev, who had earlier, as president, also been cautious towards Moscow, said for the first time that the logic of the attacks favours Russia. The BBC put the emphasis on the legal threshold: it wrote that had the attack happened a few nautical miles further west, in Bulgarian territorial waters, Article 5 of the NATO treaty could have come up. The paper also presented the contradictory claims of the two belligerents.

In the domestic press, MIAK’s press monitor did not make the Black Sea developments a separate highlighted topic on 14 and 15 October. Of the domestic articles processed, Telex (Transtelex) gave the fullest picture. It also presented the shipping routes, the reaction of the insurance market, the joint Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish mine countermeasures group and the protection of the Romanian offshore gas field. According to MIAK’s press monitor, the other papers of the left-liberal segment, and the mainstream, economic and conservative segments, did not carry the topic among their leading topics on these two days. The Hungarian dimension of the joint NATO command proposal — namely that because of the consensus-based decision Budapest also has to take a position — did not appear in any segment.

6.2 Facts and data

The events (according to the sources):

Date Event Source
2024 Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye set up their joint Black Sea mine countermeasures group Telex
July 2026 The three countries extend the group’s mandate to the protection of undersea critical infrastructure Telex
August 2026 Ukraine can export by sea only 20 per cent of the grain exported in the same period of the previous year EUobserver
September 2026 The war risk committee of the London insurance market classifies almost the entire Black Sea as a high-risk area, with the exception of Romanian, Bulgarian, Turkish and Georgian territorial waters Telex
Early October 2026 A Turkish-owned grain carrier catches fire and sinks outside Romanian territorial waters; two dead, 11 rescued Al Jazeera; Telex
6 October 2026 Two ships are hit by drone attacks in the Bulgarian economic zone, about 130 kilometres from the coast; the 10-member crew of the sunken Alfa Watan are presumed dead BBC; Telex
7 October 2026 Bulgarian, Romanian and Turkish warships begin a new joint operational period Telex
13 October 2026 Two more ships are hit by drone attacks near the Bulgarian coast; the HS Dignity sinks, the Chelsea 3 is damaged; Bulgaria summons the Russian ambassador BBC; Balkan Insight; Telex; EUobserver
14 October 2026 The Yara J tanker catches fire in Romanian territorial waters; drones violate Romanian airspace; Romania proposes a joint NATO command; the Bulgarian foreign minister urges the moratorium in Berlin Al Jazeera; Rapporteur
15–16 October 2026 European Council meeting, with the Black Sea situation on the agenda MIAK international press monitor
From 2028 Romania is ready to host the joint command; until then the command would operate on Turkish soil with Romanian and Bulgarian officers Rapporteur

Elements of the Romanian proposal (Rapporteur): a joint NATO military command for the Black Sea; the location and the leadership would rotate among the coastal allies; Miruță proposed a joint letter to NATO to the Bulgarian defence minister. According to Miruță, the repeated Russian attacks test the response capacity of individual states and of the Alliance.

Economic and logistics data: according to the European Commission’s summary of 12 October, since May 2022 nearly 60 per cent of Ukrainian grain and oilseed exports have gone through Black Sea ports, and the remaining 40 per cent by road, rail and the Danube (Telex). Before the full-scale invasion, traffic through Ukraine’s Black Sea ports handled exports worth more than 40 billion dollars a year (EUobserver). In August at least 67 ships waited more than two days near Sulina (Lloyd’s List Intelligence, according to Telex). In August, near the Romanian offshore gas field (Neptun Deep), two Russian-made drones were destroyed, and a naval drone was sunk by Romanian F-16s (Telex).

Discrepancies between the sources. For the 13 October attack, according to the BBC six of the sunken ship’s crew were rescued and ten are missing, while according to Telex, Balkan Insight and Rapporteur five survived and eleven are missing. The BBC gives the distance of the attack site as 17 and 18 nautical miles (approx. 31–33 kilometres), Telex as 28 and around 32 kilometres, and EUobserver as 30 kilometres. Balkan Insight describes the Chelsea 3’s destination, Giurgiulești, as “Romanian”; according to Telex the port is in Moldova and was recently bought by Romania; the blog follows Telex. According to Telex’s headline, the third cargo ship sank within eight days, while according to Rapporteur four ships were attacked off the Bulgarian coast in one week; the two figures do not contradict each other, because one counts sinkings and the other attacks. MIAK’s international press monitor recorded the moratorium as a Bulgarian initiative, while according to the Rapporteur article it is urged jointly by Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye; the blog follows the text of the article. For the grain carrier that sank outside Romanian waters in early October, MIAK’s 7 October analysis, based on 24.hu, reported one fatality and one missing person, whereas Al Jazeera and Telex now write of two fatalities.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Defence (programme points) — the Hungarian contribution to the joint command in the context of the Carpathian Basin and the eastern flank (programme point ID: HV12); strengthening the deterrence capability of the coastal allies (programme point ID: HV8); domestic counter-drone experience as a contribution that can be offered (programme point ID: HV3);
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the consensus-based NATO vote as a yardstick of alliance credibility (programme point ID: KP23); the moratorium coalition with Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye (programme point ID: KP17); confidence-building rules with the opposing parties (programme point ID: KP20, KP15); the withdrawal conditions of the contribution (programme point ID: KP22); Danube data sharing as regional resilience and economic diplomacy (programme point ID: KP10, KP8);
  • Transport and infrastructure (programme points) — data on Sulina branch waiting times and Danube navigation notices; the order of the overland detour is given by the railway priority matrix (programme point ID: KO4);
  • Economy (programme points) — the risk to Romanian offshore gas production and regional energy supply (programme point ID: G25);
  • Agriculture (programme points) — the data needs of the sea route for grain and feed exports (programme point ID: MG2).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War

In the first book of Thucydides’s work, the Corinthians ask the assembly of the Sparta-led alliance for the alliance to act against Athens. In their speech they turn separately to those members that lie far from the sea and the main routes of communication, and who may therefore feel that the dispute is not their business:

“The states more inland and out of the highway of communication should understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers, the result will be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the reception in exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had nothing to do with them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the powers on the coast will one day be followed by the extension of the danger to the interior, and must recognize that their own interests are deeply involved in this discussion.”

In other words: the states lying further inland, off the main routes of communication, must know that if they do not support the coastal powers, they endanger the export of their own produce and the imports arriving from the sea. They should not regard the dispute as one that has nothing to do with them, because the sacrifice of the coastal powers will one day be followed by the spread of the danger into the interior. The Corinthians’ alliance situation was of course different from today’s NATO, and the speech urged war, not defence cooperation. The valid core of the idea, however, is commercial geography: the goods of an inland state reach the sea through the ports of its coastal allies. Hungary’s situation today is exactly this. Danube cargo moves towards Constanța and Sulina, and the two ships attacked on 13 October were also heading for Danube ports. Proposal 3.1 therefore treats the Hungarian vote not as a favour but as a matter of self-interest, and proposal 3.2 asks for Danube traffic to be expressly covered by the ban.

📖 Source: Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War (translated by Richard Crawley, 1874), Book I, the second speech of the Corinthians

6.4.2 Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 46

The Fundamental Law’s article entitled “Decision on participation in military operations” distinguishes two decision-making routes. Under paragraph (2), as a general rule the National Assembly decides on the deployment of the Hungarian Defence Forces abroad by a two-thirds majority of the Members present. Paragraphs (3) and (4) cover cases based on alliance decisions:

“(3) The Government shall decide on the deployment of the Hungarian Defence Forces and foreign armed forces referred to in paragraph (2) which is based on a decision of the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and on their other troop movements. (4) The Government shall, while simultaneously informing the President of the Republic, report without delay to the National Assembly on its decision made on the basis of paragraph (3) […].”

Two conclusions follow for the joint command. First: if the command is created by NATO and Hungary provides a military contribution to it, the decision is in the hands of the Government; it can be taken quickly and does not require a two-thirds parliamentary vote. Second: the price of speed is the reporting obligation. The Fundamental Law does not prescribe what the report must contain, so proposal 3.1 fills this gap. The task, the headcount, the cost, the duration and the conditions of withdrawal together allow the National Assembly to scrutinise the government decision meaningfully after the fact as well. Whether a specific contribution — for example the assignment of certain staff officers to a NATO command — qualifies as a deployment under Article 46 is a matter for the detailed rules. Regardless of this, MIAK’s proposal asks for a report on the entire Hungarian contribution.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force, as of 17 April 2026), Article 46

6.4.3 Henry Kissinger: Years of Renewal

In the third volume of his memoirs, Kissinger describes in detail the negotiations of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Helsinki process. The Western allies also secured the inclusion of military confidence-building measures in the Final Act. These were simple procedural rules, for example that the parties give advance notice of military exercises and troop movements above a certain size if they take place close to the borders of other participants. According to Kissinger’s account, there was hard bargaining over the length of the notification period: the West wanted a longer deadline, the Soviet Union a much shorter one, and in the end a compromise was reached. The essence of the rule was that the opposing parties, too, should see the same facts known in advance, thereby reducing the chance of escalation arising from misunderstanding. Another of Kissinger’s observations concerns the allies’ division of labour. At the end of the negotiations, the Western allies consulted regularly, and on each issue one of them always led the negotiation while the others supported it. France carried the human rights issues, Britain military confidence-building, and the United States the questions of borders. Applied to the Black Sea situation, this means two things. The ban on attacks against ships is led by the coastal states, with Hungary taking on a supporting role (3.2). And the joint publication of Danube shipping data is a confidence-building tool in which the opposing parties, too, see the same facts (3.3). The volume is listed in the knowledge base as a source to be replaced, so the blog uses it in paraphrase, without verbatim quotation.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Years of Renewal (Simon & Schuster, 1999), the chapter on the Helsinki conference

6.5 International comparison

The Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish mine countermeasures group. According to Telex, the three countries set up their joint Black Sea mine countermeasures group in 2024, extended its mandate in July this year to the protection of undersea critical infrastructure, and on 7 October their warships began a new joint operational period. The example shows that the coastal states have already built a working, small-scale cooperation. The joint NATO command (3.1) can build on this and add the Alliance’s framework, instead of creating a parallel organisation.

The Baltic Sea precedent. In early 2025, following damage to undersea cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea, NATO launched enhanced maritime surveillance there. The Baltic example shows that the Alliance is capable of organising a coordinated presence to protect the civilian infrastructure of a maritime region. The Black Sea situation, however, is complicated by the fact that the passage of warships of non-littoral states through the Straits is restricted by an international convention, so the role of the coastal allies, including Türkiye, is decisive here.

Bulgaria and Germany. According to Rapporteur, during the Bulgarian foreign minister’s visit to Berlin, Wadephul called Bulgaria an important partner in the European Sky Shield Initiative, the joint European air defence procurement programme. The Bulgarian minister indicated that counter-drone capability cannot be built overnight. This experience argues for the Hungarian contribution under 3.1: in counter-drone defence, exchanging experience can help faster than procuring new equipment.

Defence

  • HV3 — Defence innovation programme
  • HV8 — Deterrence on the principle of ‘victory without fighting’
  • HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

Foreign policy

  • KP8 — Economic diplomacy integration
  • KP10 — Regional resilience building
  • KP15 — Institutionalising preventive diplomacy
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition building in the EU
  • KP20 — Lessons of the Helsinki process — multilateral security building
  • KP22 — Exit strategy planning protocol
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit (annual)

Transport and infrastructure

  • KO4 — Railway development with data-based prioritisation

Economy

  • G25 — Energy-price shock preparedness plan

Agriculture

  • MG2 — Agricultural data platform

Proposed new programme point: A substantive report to the National Assembly on every military contribution based on a NATO or EU decision: task, headcount, cost, duration and withdrawal conditions — for the Defence area.

Proposed new programme point: Danube shipping-security data sharing in the Danube Commission: a monthly, public data series on Lower Danube and Sulina branch waiting times, restrictions and security incidents — for the Transport and infrastructure area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK international press monitor, 15 October 2026 — topic 2):

Supplementary domestic press source (MIAK press monitor, 14 October 2026):

Knowledge-base references (literature and legal sources):

  • 📖 Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War (translated by Richard Crawley)
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary — Article 46
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: Years of Renewal (1999)

MIAK internal materials:

Supplementary public data sources (suggested for follow-up):

  • the Romanian Ministry of Defence’s releases on the Yara J investigation
  • NATO’s releases on the Black Sea command proposal
  • the Danube Commission’s shipping statistics and notices to skippers
  • the area classifications of the London insurance market’s war risk committee (Joint War Committee)
  • the European Commission’s summaries of Ukrainian agricultural exports

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