Economy

In-depth analysis

G1 — Data-driven budget

• Mechanism: Every budget item is published in machine-readable format (Open Fiscal Data Package standard). A real-time API feeds the dashboards. Each item carries a mandatory target indicator and performance metric (outcome-based budgeting). Automatic anomaly detection flags unusual payment patterns.
• Quantified target: By 2028, 100% of the state budget is available in machine-readable format; the share of “unclassified” spending items falls below 5% (currently ~15–20%).
• International precedent: South Korea’s DBRE (Digital Budget and Reporting) system has operated since 2007 — after its introduction the detection time for budgetary anomalies fell by 40% and administrative costs dropped by 30%.
• Trade-off / risk: Full transparency alone is no guarantee of better decisions — the risk of “dashboard politics”: easily measured indicators can overshadow hard-to-quantify (but important) public goods.

G2 — SME digitalisation programme

• Mechanism: Three-tier support: (1) digital-maturity assessment (AI-based self-diagnosis), (2) targeted technology vouchers (ERP, CRM, e-commerce, automation — max. 5M HUF per enterprise, 50% own contribution), (3) a mentor network drawing in existing successful SMEs. Condition of support: digitalisation must be tied to a measurable efficiency improvement (e.g. order-processing time, share of online revenue).
• Quantified target: Within 3 years, the digital-maturity level of 50,000 SMEs rises by at least one grade (DESI SME digitalisation index Hungary: 36% → target: 50%).
• International precedent: Singapore’s SMEs Go Digital programme (2017–) reached 80,000 enterprises in 5 years; participants’ productivity rose by 18% on average.
• Trade-off / risk: Digitalisation grants are prone to “deadweight loss”: they also subsidise firms that would have invested anyway. A filtering mechanism is needed: the smallest, least-digitalised enterprises must have priority.

G3 — Tax-system simplification and progressive reform

• Mechanism: A reduction in the number of tax types (currently ~40 different taxes and contributions) with a unified, algorithm-based calculation. The progressive capital tax operates in 3 brackets: 0–5M HUF annual capital income: 15%, 5–50M HUF: 25%, above 50M HUF: 35%. Automatic returns: NAV (Hungarian Tax Authority) sends a pre-filled tax return that individuals can simply approve.
• Quantified target: Reducing time spent on tax returns from 277 hours per year (Hungarian average, PwC Paying Taxes) to below 100 hours. Expected additional revenue from progressive taxation of capital income: 200–400 billion HUF per year.
• International precedent: Estonia’s e-Tax system: the average tax return takes 5 minutes, with a 98% digital filing rate. The progressive capital taxes of the Nordic countries (Sweden: 30% flat; Denmark: progressive 27–42%) did not cause significant capital flight within the EU.
• Trade-off / risk: Unilateral introduction of a progressive capital tax may cause capital outflow if EU neighbours (Slovakia, Romania) offer lower rates. EU-level coordination is therefore not an optional add-on but a precondition of the programme.

G4 — Innovation ecosystem and active development policy

• Mechanism: Regulatory sandbox: new technology ventures receive a 2-year exemption from certain regulatory requirements in exchange for providing data to the authority. Venture-capital incentives: the state acts as co-investor at up to 1:1 ratio with private VC funds, but the private fund makes the investment decision. R&D tax incentive: a 200% super-deduction on research expenditure.
• Quantified target: Raising R&D spending from 1.6% of GDP to 2.5% by 2030 (EU average: 2.3%). 60% of startups exiting the sandbox achieve a successful market entry.
• International precedent: Israel’s Yozma programme (1993): the state invested USD 100M as co-investor in VC funds, catalysing a private VC sector worth USD 10 billion within 10 years. Finland’s TEKES / Business Finland programme distributes €500M of innovation support a year with performance-based monitoring.
• Trade-off / risk: The sandbox invites abuse: firms may exploit the looser regulation without delivering genuine innovation. Exit criteria and strict enforcement of the sandbox time limit are needed.

G5 — Competition policy and anti-monopoly

• Mechanism: Strengthening the GVH (Hungarian Competition Authority): doubling its budget, expanding analytical capacity, sector-specific market-analysis powers. AI-based market-concentration monitoring: automatic calculation of the HHI index in every sector, alerts on threshold breaches. Lowering the merger-screening threshold, introducing a “killer acquisition” filter in the tech sector.
• Quantified target: The GVH’s annual fine revenue (currently ~5–10 billion HUF) matters less than the market impact: the aim is that the top-3 players’ market share in a sector should not exceed 70% in oligopolistic sectors. Reducing the average duration of competition proceedings from 24 months to 12 months.
• International precedent: Australia’s ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission): its 2019 “digital platform inquiry” examined the market power of tech giants and secured a mandatory bargaining position for the media sector (News Media Bargaining Code).
• Trade-off / risk: Overly aggressive competition enforcement can produce a “chilling effect”: firms avoid innovative mergers and cooperation. The filter must distinguish value-creating from value-destroying concentration.

G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture

• Mechanism: An annual “Rent-Seeker Index”: AI analysis identifies privileged market positions — sector by sector it examines who regulation protects, what entry barriers exist and how large the price–cost gap is in regulated sectors. A public “Regulatory Capture Report” on the top-10 problematic sectors. A revolving-door ban: heads of regulatory authorities may not work in the sector they regulated for 3 years.
• Quantified target: A 30% reduction in the number of licensable activities within 4 years. Measurable easing of entry barriers in the affected sectors (a 20% increase in the number of new market entrants).
• International precedent: Denmark’s “deregulation commission” (Virksomhedsforum) has operated since 2012: in 4 years it eliminated 7 billion DKK of administrative burden. The OECD PMR (Product Market Regulation) index ranks Denmark among the least-regulated countries.
• Trade-off / risk: Dismantling regulation is not always positive: some barriers serve consumer-protection goals (e.g. food-safety licences). The programme must distinguish rent-generating from public-good-serving regulation.

G7 — Wealth-inequality monitoring

• Mechanism: Integrating the data of NAV (Hungarian Tax Authority), KSH (Hungarian Central Statistical Office) and MNB (Hungarian Central Bank) into a single inequality dashboard. Quarterly updates: income and wealth distribution (deciles, top 1%), regional breakdown (county, district), sectoral breakdown. The annual Inequality Report is mandatorily submitted to parliament, with a debate day.
• Quantified target: By 2027, availability of wealth-decile data (the top 1% wealth share is currently not publicly available data in Hungary). Goal: closing the data gap, reducing the Gini coefficient from 0.299 to below 0.28 by 2032 through targeted policies.
• International precedent: France’s Observatoire des inégalités: an annually published, detailed inequality report that made the public-policy debate fact-based. Adaptation of the methodology of the World Inequality Database (Piketty et al.).
• Trade-off / risk: Collecting wealth data raises data-protection questions — the balance between GDPR and statistical anonymisation must be struck. Inequality monitoring does not in itself reduce inequality: the data must be accompanied by action.

G8 — Progressive capital-income taxation

• Mechanism: Three tax brackets: annual capital income 0–5M HUF: 15% (current level, protecting small savers), 5–50M HUF: 25%, above 50M HUF: 35%. The TBSZ (Long-Term Investment Account) benefit is retained for annual returns below 5M HUF. Rental income: long-term residential rental is taxed at a preferential rate (10%), short-term (Airbnb-type) is taxed in the standard bracket.
• Quantified target: Additional annual revenue: 200–400 billion HUF (from raising the tax burden on the top 5% of capital-income holders). The effective tax-rate gap between labour and capital income falls from 15 percentage points to below 5 percentage points.
• International precedent: Denmark’s progressive capital tax (27% below DKK 61,000, 42% above): after its introduction there was no measurable capital outflow, and capital-market activity did not fall. Norway’s wealth tax (1.1%) also works within the EEA.
• Trade-off / risk: A progressive capital tax increases the attractiveness of capital-optimisation strategies (holding companies, offshore structures). Required: maximum use of the CRS (Common Reporting Standard) automatic information exchange and strengthening of the “beneficial ownership” register.

G9 — Strategic industrial policy

• Mechanism: Data-driven sector identification: based on the comparative-advantage index (RCA), export complexity, growth potential and job-creation capacity. Conditional support: 3–5-year cycles with annual performance review (exports, employment, R&D output). If the indicators are not met → support is reduced or ends. Sectors: green technology, AI/software, biotech, precision agriculture, EV-battery manufacturing.
• Quantified target: The export share of strategically supported sectors rises from 15% to 25% by 2032. The emigration rate of highly qualified labour in these sectors falls by 20%.
• International precedent: South Korea’s Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive (1973–79): contested, but it established the global competitiveness of the automotive, semiconductor and shipbuilding industries. Modern version: Taiwan’s TSMC support — the state financed semiconductor research for 25 years before TSMC became self-sustaining.
• Trade-off / risk: The greatest risk of industrial policy is political capture: support is distributed by lobbying power rather than by performance. The MIAK manages this through a conditional, audited system, but political pressure is present in every system.

G10 — State development bank

• Mechanism: Hungarian Development Bank (MFB 2.0): politically independent governance (50% of the board are independent experts on 5-year mandates), market-based lending (not free loans) but with longer maturities (10–25 years) and a lower required return than commercial banks. Focus: green-transition infrastructure, R&D investment, housing construction.
• Quantified target: Annual loan disbursement: 500 billion HUF (~0.7% of GDP), of which at least 40% green investment. The non-performing loan (NPL) ratio stays below 5% (currently ~8% at the MFB).
• International precedent: Germany’s KfW: annual balance sheet ~€550 billion, AAA rating, one of the main financiers of the German Energiewende. Brazil’s BNDES: mixed record — effective in infrastructure development but political influence led to over-financing of “national champions”.
• Trade-off / risk: Development banks are prone to “quasi-fiscal activity”: the government uses them to bypass budget constraints. Required: a transparent balance sheet, independent audit and parliamentary oversight.

G11 — Disruptive-innovation protection

• Mechanism: Annual Regulatory-Barrier Audit: AI text analysis across all sectoral legislation — identifies entry barriers (licences, certifications, capital requirements) and compares them with the consumer-protection rationale. If the barrier is not demonstrably for consumer protection → “sunset clause” (automatic expiry within 3 years unless reaffirmed). Annual publication of a “Disruptive Innovation Barometer”.
• Quantified target: A 30% reduction in the number of licensable activities within 4 years (currently ~400 activity types). A 50% reduction in market-entry time caused by regulatory barriers.
• International precedent: The United Kingdom’s “Red Tape Challenge” (2011–2014): 3,000 regulations were reviewed, of which 3,095 were abolished or simplified. Australia’s “Regulatory Guillotine” (2006): 9,500 obsolete regulations abolished in 12 months.
• Trade-off / risk: The “sunset clause” imposes an administrative burden on law-making (every rule must be reviewed regularly). Moreover, the protection of disruptive ventures sometimes comes at the expense of incumbents’ employees (e.g. Uber vs. taxi drivers).

G12 — Venture-capital mobilisation

• Mechanism: (1) A state co-investor VC fund (Hungarian Venture Fund): annual allocation of at least 30 billion HUF, co-investing with private VC funds at a 1:1 ratio — the investment decision is made by the private sector. (2) Angel-investor tax relief: 30% of individuals’ startup investments is deductible from personal income tax (max. 10M HUF/year). (3) Under the EU Capital Markets Union, harmonised regulation of cross-border VC investment — integrating the Hungarian VC market into the European ecosystem. According to the EC 2025 Euro Area Report, EU VC investment is 0.15% of GDP versus 0.45% in the US — bridging this gap is a strategic necessity.
• Quantified target: Hungarian VC investment rises from 0.1% to 0.25% of GDP by 2030; 50+ startups receive VC financing each year (currently ~20); the angel-investor tax relief is used by 1,000+ individuals per year.
• International precedent: Israel’s Yozma programme (see G4) is a successful VC-sector-inducing model. The EC IP304 report proposes a European Savings and Investments Union to convert savings into productive investment. France’s Bpifrance: a state investment bank with annual VC allocations of €2 billion+, a key player in the growth of the French startup ecosystem.
• Trade-off / risk: The “crowding out” effect of state co-investment: if the state fund is too large, private investors withdraw because the state takes the good opportunities. Required: the state fund must remain a minority co-investor (max. 49%) and not interfere in investment decisions. 📖 Source: EC: 2025 Euro Area Report (IP304); OECD: EU Economic Survey 2025

G13 — Capital Markets Union implementation

• Mechanism: (1) Expanding capital-market financing for SMEs: developing the SME segment of the BÉT (Budapest Stock Exchange), simplified listing rules for companies with revenues below 5 billion HUF. (2) Retail investment incentives: introducing a tax-advantaged European Savings Account, where the return is tax-free after a 5-year holding period. (3) Developing the corporate bond market: building on the lessons of the MNB (Hungarian Central Bank) Growth Bond Programme but on a market basis. According to the EC IP304, ~50% of EU SMEs rely primarily on bank financing — reducing this is key to competitiveness.
• Quantified target: The share of capital-market financing in total SME financing rises from 10% to 20% by 2030; the number of SME securities traded on the BÉT doubles; the share of retail investment on the domestic equity market rises from 15% to 25%.
• International precedent: The EC Capital Markets Union initiative (2015–) aims to integrate Europe’s fragmented capital markets. Sweden: the share of retail equity investment is at the highest level in Europe (60%+ of adults), thanks to the tax-advantaged ISK (Investeringssparkonto) account.
• Trade-off / risk: Listing SMEs is risky for smaller firms (transparency requirements, volatility) — a balance must be struck between investor protection and easy access. Encouraging retail investment without financial-literacy development is risky. 📖 Source: EC: 2025 Euro Area Report (IP304); OECD: EU Economic Survey 2025

G14 — Single-market deepening — services

• Mechanism: (1) Active Hungarian support for EU-level harmonisation of the licensing requirements for professional services (legal, accounting, consulting, engineering). (2) Reducing the administrative burden of cross-border service provision: a unified digital registration system for service exports within the EU. (3) Targeted dismantling of internal-market barriers in the transport, retail and telecommunications sectors, where the OECD documents the highest barriers. Both the OECD EU 2025 Survey and EC IP304 emphasise: deepening the single market for services is the largest reserve of EU competitiveness.
• Quantified target: A 20% increase in Hungarian service exports by 2030; a 50% reduction in the administrative lead time of cross-border service provision; an improvement of at least 0.05 points in the OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI).
• International precedent: The EU Services Directive (2006/123/EC) is not fully implemented in 70% of member states — the remaining barriers cost the EU 2–3% of GDP (EC estimate). Estonia: its digital state infrastructure enabled simple registration of cross-border services — service exports as a share of GDP are twice the EU average.
• Trade-off / risk: Services liberalisation can threaten the competitiveness of domestic providers, especially smaller, locally operating businesses. Required: transitional support for catch-up, but not lasting protectionism. 📖 Source: OECD: EU Economic Survey 2025; EC: 2025 Euro Area Report (IP304)

G15 — Countercyclical fiscal stabiliser

• Mechanism: A rule-based countercyclical budgetary mechanism: automatic budgetary rules tied to the output-gap indicator. In recession, automatic demand-boosting expenditure increases (infrastructure, public works, SME support); in expansion, budgetary reserve building. The mechanism contains stabilisers that activate without parliamentary approval (e.g. investment surplus up to 1% of GDP). Keynes showed that insufficient effective demand leads to persistent unemployment and that it is the state’s task to supplement the level of investment.
• Quantified target: The fiscal stabiliser activates automatically when the output gap exceeds 1%; the cyclical component is up to 1% of GDP; in a recessionary period the general-government deficit may be temporarily raised by up to 2 percentage points.
• Trade-off / risk: Countercyclical expenditure increases can be embedded in the political cycle: the government may use “recessionary expenditure increases” to justify otherwise unjustified spending. Required: an independent fiscal council as a check, with an automatic trigger (not a discretionary decision). 📖 Source: Keynes: The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (chapters 10, 24)

G16 — Algorithmic application of Smith’s tax principles

• Mechanism: An annual review of the tax system based on Adam Smith’s four tax maxims: (1) proportionality — everyone contributes according to their ability, (2) certainty — the amount of tax should be clear, not arbitrary, (3) convenience — the manner and timing of payment should be the least burdensome, (4) efficiency — the cost of tax collection should be minimal relative to the revenue. An AI-based “Smith audit”: each tax type is evaluated against these four criteria, and the worst performers are identified and reformed.
• Quantified target: The annual Smith-audit result is publicly published; within 4 years, reform of the 5 worst-performing tax types; the tax-collection cost/revenue ratio falls below 2%.
• Trade-off / risk: The “Smith audit” is a technocratic tool — it does not replace political compromise. Some tax types are politically protected (e.g. sector-specific special taxes) that are clearly bad under the Smithian maxims but stem from political bargains. 📖 Source: Adam Smith: The Wealth of Nations (Book V, Chapter II)

G17 — Mandatory savings scheme (CPF model)

• Mechanism: Adaptation of Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF): a mandatory individual savings account for every employee, with employer and employee contributions (initially 5+5%, with gradual increase). The savings can be used for: home purchase, healthcare expenditure and retirement. Lee Kuan Yew: “If the soldier’s family has no home of its own, he soon concludes that he is defending the property of the rich.”
• Quantified target: Within 5 years, 80% of employee households hold an active CPF account; the household savings rate rises by 5 percentage points; the homeownership rate rises from 92% to 95%.
• Trade-off / risk: Mandatory saving reduces disposable income, which is procyclical in a recession. The Singaporean system imposes a high employer burden — in Hungary, the competitiveness of labour costs may be harmed. Gradual introduction is needed. 📖 Source: Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First (Chapter 7)

G18 — Tripartite wage-coordination council

• Mechanism: A Singapore-style National Wages Council: a tripartite (government-employer-trade union) wage-coordination mechanism with annual wage recommendations based on economic growth, productivity and competitiveness. Not binding wage setting but a data-driven recommendation. In Singapore, ~5% annual real-wage growth was achieved for 25 years alongside industrial peace.
• Quantified target: The wage council publishes wage recommendations once a year; the gap between real-wage growth and productivity growth falls below 2 percentage points; the number of labour disputes falls by 20%.
• Trade-off / risk: Trade-union organisation is low in Hungary (~8%) — the legitimacy of the tripartite model is questionable. The effectiveness of “non-binding recommendations” depends on the parties’ voluntary participation. 📖 Source: Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First (Chapter 6)

G19 — Radical transparency in economic decision-making

• Mechanism: Application of Dalio’s “radical transparency” and “believability-weighted decision-making”: public reasoning behind every economic-policy decision, a record of decision-makers’ previous forecasting accuracy (track record), and a mandatory stress test — the counter-arguments of every significant economic proposal must be presented publicly. Annual publication of an “Economic-Policy Decision Log”.
• Quantified target: The annual Decision Log contains the ex-post evaluation of 50+ economic-policy decisions; the track-record system covers key decision-makers within 3 years; every measure above 100 billion HUF is accompanied by a public stress test.
• Trade-off / risk: Publishing a track record is politically sensitive: decision-makers may avoid bold decisions if their errors become public. The system should serve learning, not punishment. 📖 Source: Ray Dalio: Principles (Radical Transparency, Believability-Weighted Decision Making)

G20 — Economic-policy impact-assessment system (Drucker audit)

• Mechanism: Mandatory ex-post impact assessment based on Drucker’s “effective decision-making” principle: (1) before the decision, the expected outcome and boundary conditions must be recorded, (2) after 12–18 months a mandatory feedback review — comparing outcomes with expectations, (3) if the measure did not produce the expected result, an automatic review is launched.
• Quantified target: Every economic-policy measure above 50 billion HUF undergoes a mandatory Drucker audit within 18 months; modification or phase-out for 30% of audited measures; audit results are 100% public.
• Trade-off / risk: Ex-post impact assessment generates bureaucracy. Admitting “failure” is politically difficult — the audit must not become an attack surface for the government but remain a learning tool. 📖 Source: Peter Drucker: The Effective Executive (Chapters 6–7)

G21 — Systematic review of public spending

• Mechanism: Drucker’s “organised abandonment” principle: every budget item undergoes a mandatory zero-based review every 3 years — not “by how much shall we raise it?” but “if we weren’t doing it today, would we start?”. Items that fail the test are phased out, with resources redeployed to higher-impact programmes.
• Quantified target: Within 3 years, 100% of budget items have undergone a first review; the share of phased-out programmes is 10–15%; 100% of freed-up resources are channelled into an identified higher-priority programme.
• Trade-off / risk: The “zero-based” method is resource-intensive — reviewing every item requires considerable administrative capacity. Political lobbying mobilises to defend existing programmes. Required: the review must be handled by an independent body. 📖 Source: Peter Drucker: The Effective Executive (Chapter 5); Adam Smith: The Wealth of Nations (4th tax maxim)

G22 — Financial-stability monitoring and shadow-banking regulation

• Mechanism: (1) Macroprudential Supervisory Dashboard: real-time monitoring by the MNB (Hungarian Central Bank) and the Financial Stability Council of the systemic risk of the shadow-banking system (investment funds, insurers, leasing companies, fintech lenders). (2) Extension of leverage limits and liquidity buffers to non-bank financial intermediaries. (3) Quarterly public publication of a “Systemic Risk Report”. Krugman has shown: the return of “depression economics” is due to regulation failing to keep pace with the growth of the shadow-banking system. Blanchard identified two amplification mechanisms: liquidity panic and the capital-ratio restoration imperative — both are strengthened by opacity and interconnectedness.
• Quantified target: By 2028, 100% of the shadow-banking system is under macroprudential supervision; a quarterly Systemic Risk Report; leverage limits for non-bank financial intermediaries defined.
• Trade-off / risk: Overly strict regulation hampers financial innovation. Blanchard warns: “regulation is always imperfect and always lags financial innovation” — the goal is not to reduce risk to zero but to conduct meaningful monitoring of systemic risk. 📖 Source: Krugman: The Return of Depression Economics; Blanchard: The Crisis — Basic Mechanisms, and Appropriate Policies (IMF WP/09/80)

G23 — Sovereign-debt sustainability framework

• Mechanism: Reinhart and Rogoff proved on a database of 66 countries going back eight centuries: the “this time is different” illusion appears before every crisis and is then refuted. Rising capital mobility regularly produces banking crises. Hungarian adaptation: (1) Annual “Debt Sustainability Report” — trends in public debt, private debt and external indebtedness, in international comparison. (2) Early Warning System: monitoring of capital inflow waves, the credit/GDP gap and real-estate price dynamics. (3) Automatic fiscal brake: if the government debt/GDP ratio exceeds a threshold (e.g. 60%), an automatic consolidation mechanism activates.
• Quantified target: Annual Debt Sustainability Report from 2027; the EWS operates on a 6–12-month forecast horizon; the government debt/GDP ratio stays below 70%.
• Trade-off / risk: The automatic fiscal brake is procyclical in a recession — this is offset by G15 (countercyclical stabiliser). 📖 Source: Reinhart & Rogoff: This Time Is Different (NBER Working Paper)

G24 — Institutional-quality index — a growth precondition

• Mechanism: Acemoglu’s growth theory has shown: TFP (total factor productivity) and technology adoption are the engines of long-term growth, but these require an inclusive institutional framework — property-rights protection, contract enforcement, handling the “holdup problem”. An annual “Institutional Quality Index”: 20+ indicators on property-rights protection, contract enforcement, ease of starting a business, technology-adoption capacity and institutional inclusiveness. The index is public and comparable with the V4 partners.
• Quantified target: The index is publicly published by 2028; the share of “problematic” indicators falls year on year; reaching the top-30 of the Doing Business / B-READY ranking by 2032.
• Trade-off / risk: The index is politically sensitive — weak results can be interpreted as criticism of the government. The solution: it is handled by an independent institution (MTA KRTK or similar). 📖 Source: Acemoglu: Introduction to Modern Economic Growth (Chapters 4, 24–25)

G25 — Energy-price shock preparedness plan

• Mechanism: The OECD’s 2026 Interim Report documented: the Middle East conflict’s energy-market shock slowed global growth to 2.9%, while reigniting inflation. Hungarian preparedness plan: (1) Expansion of strategic energy reserves (crude oil, natural gas) to a 90-day import equivalent. (2) Automatic compensation mechanism: if the energy-price index exceeds the 12-month average by 30%, the bottom 40% income quintile automatically receives energy support. (3) Energy-diversification plan: reducing gas dependence (a single supplier’s share capped at 50%).
• Quantified target: 90-day strategic energy reserve by 2029; the energy-price compensation activates within 48 hours; gas dependence on a single supplier falls from 80% to below 50%.
• Trade-off / risk: Maintaining strategic reserves is costly (~50–100 billion HUF per year). Automatic compensation can generate inflationary pressure — the mechanism must be applied in a targeted, not universal, manner. 📖 Source: OECD: Economic Outlook, Interim Report — Testing Resilience (March 2026)

G26 — Behavioural-economics public-policy design

• Mechanism: The World Bank’s WDR 2015 documented: poverty imposes a cognitive burden — material scarcity “consumes cognitive resources”, impairs decision-making, and thereby deepens disadvantage further. At the same time, smart defaults, commitment savings accounts and simplified information provision measurably improve public-policy outcomes. Hungarian programme: (1) A mandatory “behavioural impact assessment” for every new economic-policy measure: does it take account of cognitive biases and decision framing? (2) Economic-policy extension of the KI5 (Nudge Unit): behavioural optimisation of tax-payment notices, savings defaults and SME-support forms.
• Quantified target: From 2028, a behavioural impact assessment for every economic-policy measure above 50 billion HUF; 5+ RCT-based interventions in economic policy per year; an ROI greater than 5:1 for targeted interventions.
• Trade-off / risk: Behavioural interventions focus on “easy wins” — they do not solve structural problems (unemployment, inequality). 📖 Source: World Bank: World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society, and Behavior (Chapters 4, 6)

G27 — Reform of global economic governance — Hungarian position

• Mechanism: Stiglitz documented: the IMF and World Bank do not even meet the standards of democratic accountability expected of the public institutions of modern democracies — leadership is chosen “behind closed doors” and freedom of information does not apply. Hungarian position: (1) Democratising the decision-making of the IMF and World Bank: greater voting weight for developing countries. (2) Rejection of ideology-driven “shock therapy” — support for gradual, context-sensitive reforms. (3) Raising the transparency standards of international institutions: public decision logs, impact assessments.
• Quantified target: Hungarian support for IMF/World Bank reform at every relevant EU forum; the Hungarian delegation actively supports quota review; annual publication of a “Global Governance Assessment”.
• Trade-off / risk: Hungary’s small voting weight limits its influence — EU-level coordination is the effective channel. 📖 Source: Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents