Part I — Situation overview

On Tuesday, 13 October 2026, the General Affairs Council of the Council of the European Union (the Council configuration of ministers responsible for EU affairs), meeting in Luxembourg according to Telex, approved the European Commission’s proposal of 23 September. With this it lifted the conditionality measures imposed on Hungary in 2022. The conditionality procedure is based on the 2020 regulation protecting the EU budget: if rule-of-law deficiencies endanger the proper use of EU money, the Council may suspend payments. According to Portfolio, the decision required a qualified majority; according to Telex, the ministers decided unanimously. The decision makes 4.2 billion euros of cohesion funds available, and the universities that changed their governance model can return to the Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe programmes. These universities had been excluded because of their maintenance structure organised into public-interest asset management foundations (KEKVA). According to Index, Finance Minister András Kármán listed among the conditions the extension of the Integrity Authority’s powers, the dismantling of the KEKVA system, and the tightening of the rules on public procurement and asset declarations. Prime Minister Péter Magyar wrote of 1,500 billion forints.

According to HVG, in December 2022 the Council froze 55 per cent of three cohesion programmes, 6.3 billion euros. Because the previous government did not meet the conditions, Hungary lost more than 1 billion euros for good in each of 2024 and 2025. According to Portfolio, 4.2 billion remained after the amounts lost and reallocated. The decision also opens the way for payments under the revised, 10-billion-euro recovery plan. This programme is financed from the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), with 6.5 billion euros in grants and 3.5 billion euros in loans. The Commission will assess the payment requests by 20 November. According to HVG, however, some 3.5 billion euros remains frozen. These are the horizontal enabling conditions, that is, general payment preconditions tied to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: academic freedom, the protection of LGBTQ people together with the ‘child protection’ law, the right to asylum, and the poverty-reduction and Roma integration strategy. On the same day, the National Assembly amended the 2021 ‘child protection’ law with 139 votes in favour and 51 against. According to the Euractiv summary recorded in MIAK’s foreign press monitor, this may unlock some 500 million euros. According to Telex, at the same meeting the ministers heard the Hungarian government for the 11th time in the Article 7 procedure. This procedure was launched in 2018 by the European Parliament (EP) on the basis of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, because of breaches of the EU’s foundational values. No decision was taken on closing it.

MIAK wrote about the proposal to release the funds on 24 September, proposing a ranked project list and a unit-price benchmark. Analyses were published on the structure of conditionality on 17 September, on the return to Horizon on 22 September, and on the cohesion debate over the next EU budget on 30 September. The new element of the present decision is that the conditionality procedure has formally closed, and the range of open questions has become narrower and more precise. In MIAK’s reading, the Council decision closed the most easily measurable part. Three questions remain open, and all three are about accountability. There is no public timetable for the roughly 3.5 billion euros still frozen. There is no official, itemised account of the 2024–25 loss. And for closing the Article 7 procedure there is not yet a point-by-point, verifiable body of evidence.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework. Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union describes a two-stage procedure. The Council may first determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the foundational values, and before doing so it must hear the member state. Suspension of voting rights can only be reached after a second, unanimous determination by the European Council. This explains why there could be 11 hearings without a decision. Under Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the member states are bound by the Charter when they implement EU law. Spending EU funds is one such case. This is why cohesion money can be tied to the freedom of the sciences (Article 13), the right to asylum (Article 18) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 21). In Corruption and Government, Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor of law and political science at Yale University, a researcher of the political economy of corruption) warns that external funding arriving without conditions can postpone painful decisions, because it masks the underlying problems. Together the three sources say: after the release, discipline is no longer maintained by the external freeze but by domestic publicity and precise accounting. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first concerns the amount still frozen, the second the money lost for good, and the third the closure of the Article 7 procedure. MIAK maintains its earlier proposals (a ranked project list, a unit-price benchmark, a half-yearly statement of the amounts dependent on conditions) and does not repeat them here.

3.1 A scheduled, public action plan for the conditions tied to the roughly 3.5 billion euros still frozen (within 30 days, by 13 November)

Three figures for the amount still frozen are currently circulating in the press: HVG writes of some 3.5 billion, Portfolio puts the part tied to academic freedom at some 2.2 billion, and Euractiv the part tied to the child-protection condition at some 500 million. There is no official breakdown by condition. MIAK proposes that the Government publish within 30 days an action plan on the enabling conditions not yet met. These are: academic freedom, the remaining provisions of the child-protection legislation, the right to asylum, and the poverty-reduction and Roma integration strategy. For each condition, six pieces of information should be included. How much money depends on it, according to the Commission? What is the Commission’s concrete objection? What legislative amendment or measure is needed? Which ministry is responsible? By when will the Government submit the bill to the National Assembly? And when will it ask for the Commission’s assessment? On the child-protection legislation, according to Euractiv, Human Rights Watch objects to remaining restrictions. Here the plan should include an independent legal analysis of whether the amended text fully implements the April judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The statement MIAK proposed on 17 September shows how much money depends on each condition. This plan would show when and how the condition is met. Under Article 51 of the Charter (see 6.4.2), these rights bind every use of EU money, so they are not one-off obstacles but lasting rules. The proposal extends programme point A8 on cohesion accountability with the monitoring of how the conditions are met. The Roma integration condition can build on the data of the TE3 segregated-area map and catching-up programme.

3.2 An official, itemised account of the funds lost for good in 2024–2025 (by 31 December 2026, with ex-post audit by the State Audit Office)

According to HVG, more than 1 billion euros was lost each year. Portfolio writes of funds lost and reallocated. Of the 6.3 billion suspension, 4.2 billion has now been released. The difference is therefore 2.1 billion euros, and the public data do not show precisely how much of this is a final loss and how much a reallocation. MIAK proposes that the Government publish an itemised account by 31 December 2026. It should show, by programme and by year, the amount lost and the deadline whose miss caused the loss. It should also show where the reallocated part went. It should list which planned projects did not go ahead, and which were financed instead from the national budget, and at what additional cost. The account should be audited by the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), which should submit its report to the National Assembly. The ÁSZ makes findings; the question of political responsibility belongs before the National Assembly. The purpose of the account is not to blame the previous government after the fact, but to ensure that the same failure cannot recur. It should therefore also include a forward-looking part: all EU funding deadlines for the next 24 months, with the amounts at risk. The 20 November recovery assessment is its first test. The proposal follows the logic of programme points G1 (data-driven budget) and SZ14. The aim of SZ14 is that not a single forint of EU funding be lost because of a missed deadline. On 1 September MIAK asked for an itemised account of the drawdown of recovery funds. This proposal narrows the focus to the loss on the cohesion side.

3.3 A point-by-point compliance report for closing the Article 7 procedure (before the EP delegation’s visit at the end of October)

According to Magyar Nemzet and Telex, Michael McGrath, the European Commissioner responsible for the rule of law, indicated that the Commission cannot unilaterally initiate the termination of the procedure. The EP, which launched the procedure, can withdraw its initiative, and the Council can close its deliberations. According to Telex’s information, the EP’s report may go before the plenary as early as December. According to rapporteur Tineke Strik, the EP delegation’s visit to Hungary at the end of October may be the moment for consulting those concerned about how things work in practice. MIAK proposes that the Government publish a compliance report before the visit. It should compare, point by point, the concerns of the 2018 EP resolution with the steps taken. For each point it should give the legislative change, the date of entry into force, the first measurable result of implementation and, if there is one, the open question. Civil society organisations and judicial bodies should be able to comment on the report in writing, and these comments should also be public. The closure would thus rest on evidence, not on a political bargain. In June MIAK noted that the political intention is to close it. After four months and two hearings, the procedure is formally open. Article 7 of the Treaty (see 6.4.1) ties the determination and the hearing to a procedural order. A point-by-point report follows the same order in reverse. The proposal applies programme points KP23 (alliance credibility audit) and KP17 (issue-based coalition building). The institutional indicators of programme point A6 (checks and balances) can serve as the report’s metrics.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: after the release, domestic publicity must take over the discipline of the external freeze. As Rose-Ackerman (see 6.4.3) warns, unconditional funding can postpone difficult decisions. The timetable for the amount still frozen, the itemised account of the loss and the precise report in the Article 7 procedure reduce this risk. All three ask the same thing: that meeting the conditions be not an announcement but a verifiable fact.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Budget and EU funds The roughly 3.5 billion euros still frozen can be planned condition by condition; the source of the loss becomes known and preventable Publishing the precise breakdown may show that some conditions (e.g. the right to asylum) will not be met within a foreseeable time, so the budget cannot plan with these amounts
Rule of law and fundamental rights The Charter conditions become lasting legal rules, not one-off obstacles The independent legal analysis may contradict the government’s assessment and open a domestic political debate on the child-protection legislation
Foreign policy and EU relations The closure of the Article 7 procedure rests on evidence, which withstands a later attempt to reopen it If the report also honestly records open points, part of the EP may cite them to postpone the withdrawal
Higher education and research The return of Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe is accompanied by a predictable set of conditions If the roughly 2.2 billion euros tied to academic freedom remains frozen, infrastructure development at the universities that changed their governance model may slip
Public administration A single public timetable replaces scattered announcements Three documents with deadlines burden the ministries at the same time, in parallel with the 20 November assessment of the recovery requests

The most important dilemma is the price of honesty. A precise action plan and a precise compliance report also make the open questions visible. Political opponents, and members of the EP dissatisfied with the withdrawal, can use this too. In MIAK’s view, transparency is nevertheless the smaller risk. Compliance that is not recorded, only promised orally, is much easier to call into question in a later debate than compliance documented point by point. The second dilemma is the asylum condition. It is linked to the implementation of the EU’s migration rules, and is therefore politically the hardest. Here the timetable is useful even if the deadline is longer, because at least the budget will not count on revenue that will not arrive.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • Timetable for the amount still frozen. Target: by 13 November 2026 the action plan is published, with an amount, a responsible party and a deadline for each enabling condition. Baseline: roughly 3.5 billion euros of frozen funds, with no official breakdown by condition. It is also worth following for how many conditions the Government asks for the Commission’s assessment by 31 March 2027.
  • Itemised account of the loss. Target: by 31 December 2026 the account is published, and in it the 6.3 billion suspension, the 4.2 billion release and the amount lost or reallocated reconcile without remainder. It is worth following whether any further amount is lost at the end of 2026 (target: 0 euros), and whether the ÁSZ report goes before the National Assembly in the first half of 2027.
  • Assessment of the recovery requests. It is worth following whether the Commission completes its preliminary assessment of the payment requests by 20 November, and whether the amounts arrive by the end of the year.
  • The Article 7 procedure. Target: the compliance report is public before the EP delegation’s visit. It is worth following whether the EP’s report in December recommends withdrawing the 2018 initiative, and whether the 11th hearing will indeed be the last.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks the Government for three documents: an action plan on the roughly 3.5 billion euros still frozen by 13 November, an itemised account of the funds lost for good by 31 December, and a point-by-point compliance report in the Article 7 procedure before the EP delegation’s visit. It asks the National Assembly to debate the ÁSZ report on the loss. The Council decision is good news, but not the end of the process. With the closure of the conditionality procedure the external freeze has ended, and the oversight role of publicity has thereby become even more important. MIAK discusses the debate on control in the next EU budget in a separate analysis.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, accountability and transparency are at stake here. Accountability requires a precise reckoning of the money lost too, not only of the money obtained. Transparency requires that the conditions be met not in negotiating rooms but according to a public, verifiable timetable. In this way domestic publicity can take the place of external discipline.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal segment, HVG’s Eurologus column put the loss at the centre. It highlighted that the decision concerns only 4.2 billion, because more than 2 billion was lost over two years, and listed in detail the fundamental-rights conditions of the amount still frozen. Telex foregrounded the Article 7 procedure. It explained the procedural routes (the Council can close with recommendations, or the EP can withdraw) and the EP rapporteur’s timetable, and noted that the hearing took place on the same day as the National Assembly amended the ‘child protection’ law. In the economic segment, Portfolio gave the most complete numerical picture. It also described the 2023 and July releases, the structure of the recovery plan and the 20 November deadline, and separately highlighted the roughly 2.2 billion tied to academic freedom.

In the public-affairs segment, Index relayed the government’s communication: the statements of the finance minister and the prime minister, as well as Fidesz’s reaction. According to Fidesz, Brussels helped Tisza to power “by means of financial blackmail”. 24.hu framed the decision as the closure of earlier conflicts, the solution of “the biggest problem” (the article was not publicly downloadable, only its lead). In the conservative segment, Magyar Nemzet stressed already in its headline that the rule-of-law procedure is “still ongoing”. Citing Világgazdaság, it highlighted that the Article 7 procedure remains unclosed and the conditions for suspending voting rights, and discussed the released funds in the second half of the article. MIAK’s press monitor did not record a Mandiner or 444.hu article on the topic that day.

In the international press, the BBC put the amendment of the ‘child protection’ law at the focus of the news and linked the release of funds to it. It quoted a representative of the Háttér Society, according to whom most of the problems had been remedied but further steps are expected. Euractiv explicitly framed the change as a tool for unlocking funds (the article was not publicly downloadable). The common blind spot of the segments is that none of the outlets held the government to account for the precise breakdown of the amount lost for good. The figure became news; the absence of an itemised account did not.

6.2 Facts and data

Funding amounts (according to the sources indicated):

Item Amount Source
Cohesion commitments suspended in December 2022 (55% of three programmes) 6.3 billion euros HVG, Portfolio
Amount lost for good more than 1 billion euros per year in 2024 and 2025 HVG
Cohesion funds now released 4.2 billion euros (according to Péter Magyar, approx. HUF 1,500 billion) HVG, Portfolio, Index
Funds still frozen on other grounds approx. 3.5 billion euros HVG
— of which tied to academic freedom approx. 2.2 billion euros Portfolio
— of which tied to the child-protection condition approx. 500 million euros Euractiv (based on MIAK’s foreign press monitor)
Breakdown by the Commission spokesperson on 23 September 2.7 billion horizontal + 0.8 billion thematic enabling conditions 24.hu, 23 September 2026
Cohesion funds released in December 2023 (judicial reforms) approx. 10.2 billion euros Portfolio
Revised recovery plan (Council approval: 10 July 2026) 10 billion euros (6.5 billion grants + 3.5 billion loans) Portfolio
Total envelope of the May political agreement 16.4 billion euros Telex, BBC

Two interpretive notes belong to the table. First, the difference between 6.3 and 4.2 billion is 2.1 billion euros, while HVG writes of a final loss of more than 2 billion over the two years in total, and Portfolio also speaks of reallocation. The two figures can only be reconciled with an official breakdown, which is what proposal 3.2 asks for. Second, Portfolio’s 2.2 billion and Euractiv’s 500 million sub-amounts together make 2.7 billion. This matches the horizontal amount in the September spokesperson’s statement, and the remaining 0.8 billion may belong to the thematic conditions. This is MIAK’s calculation, not an official breakdown, which is why proposal 3.1 asks for the official figures by condition.

Timeline:

Date Event Source
September 2018 The EP initiates the Article 7 procedure Telex, Portfolio
December 2022 The Council suspends 6.3 billion euros and prohibits new commitments towards the KEKVA universities HVG, Portfolio
April 2026 CJEU judgment: the ‘child protection’ law violates the EU’s foundational values Telex, BBC
9 September 2026 The Government announces that the conditions have been met Portfolio
23 September 2026 The Commission proposes lifting the measures HVG, Portfolio
13 October 2026 The Council lifts the measures; 11th hearing in the Article 7 procedure; the National Assembly amends the ‘child protection’ law Telex, Portfolio, BBC
End of October 2026 EP delegation in Hungary Telex
20 November 2026 The Commission’s preliminary assessment of the recovery payment requests Portfolio
December 2026 (expected) The EP report may go before the plenary Telex (unofficial information)

The sources gave different venues for the meeting: Telex wrote of a meeting in Luxembourg, HVG mentioned Brussels. The blog uses Telex’s information; this does not affect the substance of the decision.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the timetable for the amount still frozen and the account of the loss are part of cohesion accountability (A8); the metrics for the Article 7 procedure can be taken from the institutional indicators of checks and balances (A6); tracking the released money is a task for the public-money dashboard (A1);
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the closure of the Article 7 procedure is a question of alliance credibility (KP23) and of issue-based coalition building in the EU (KP17);
  • Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points) — the territorial allocation of the 4.2 billion euros is a test of the data-based allocation of cohesion funds (TE2); the Roma integration condition can build on the data of the catching-up programme (TE3);
  • Education (programme points) — the effect of the return of Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe can be measured with the indicators of data-driven education development (O3);
  • Economy (programme points) — the itemised statement of the loss and of conditional revenues is part of the data-driven budget (G1); preventing the loss of funds through missed deadlines is the aim of programme point SZ14.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 European Union: Treaty on European Union

Article 7 of the Treaty describes two separate stages. Under paragraph (1), the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the EP, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a member state of the values referred to in Article 2. Before the determination it also has a procedural obligation:

“Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure.”

Paragraphs (2) and (3) are the second stage: the European Council may unanimously determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach, and only then may the Council, by qualified majority, suspend certain rights of the member state, including its voting rights. The procedure against Hungary has been in the hearing phase of the first stage since 2018. According to Telex, the process “has moved neither forwards nor backwards”, and no determination was made even after 11 hearings. This explains why the closure of the conditionality procedure does not automatically mean anything for the Article 7 procedure. The two procedures have different legal bases, different initiators, and different bodies decide on closing them. Proposal 3.3 therefore asks for a point-by-point report to be prepared for the EP as the initiator. The Treaty’s procedural order can thus also be applied in reverse: just as a determination requires a hearing and reasons, so does closure require verifiable reasons.

📖 Source: Treaty on European Union (consolidated version, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26 October 2012), Articles 2 and 7

6.4.2 European Union: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Under Article 51(1) of the Charter, its provisions are addressed to the member states only when they are implementing Union law. The use of EU funds is such implementation, which is why respect for the Charter is among the conditions of cohesion payments. The conditions tied to the amount still frozen can be traced back to specific articles of the Charter. Article 13 on the freedom of the arts and sciences reads:

“The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected.”

Article 18 guarantees the right to asylum in line with the Geneva Refugee Convention. Article 21 prohibits discrimination, among other grounds on the basis of ethnic origin, membership of a national minority and sexual orientation. The objection concerning the KEKVA universities is therefore linked to Article 13, the objection concerning the child-protection legislation to Article 21, and the asylum objection to Article 18. The Roma integration condition also partly follows the logic of Article 21. Two consequences follow from this. First, these conditions do not disappear with the release, because the Charter also binds every later use of the released money. Second, meeting them is a legal question, not a matter of negotiation, which is why proposal 3.1 asks for a concrete legislative step and an independent legal analysis for each condition.

📖 Source: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26 October 2012), Articles 13, 18, 21 and 51

6.4.3 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Among the anti-corruption tools of international actors, Rose-Ackerman separately discusses how international aid can be tied to reform, even when the government is not enthusiastic about change. She also writes that international organisations must be ready to stop support if a country is unable to use it effectively. On the risk of the opposite direction, unconditional external funding, she writes:

“If overseas aid lacks conditionality, it may simply postpone painful decisions by masking underlying problems that would produce a crisis in less fortunate countries.”

In other words, unconditional external funding can simply postpone painful decisions, because it masks the underlying problems that would lead to a crisis in other countries. EU cohesion money is not development aid, and the present release is not unconditional. The logic nevertheless holds. The 6.3 billion freeze meant external discipline for four years. After the release, this discipline must be maintained by domestic institutions; otherwise the inflowing money may mask the fact that some reforms were met only on paper. Proposal 3.2 therefore asks for a lesson from the loss, proposal 3.1 for a timetable from the remaining conditions, and proposal 3.3 for documented compliance from the Article 7 procedure.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 1999)

6.5 International comparison

The closest parallel is Poland. After the change of government in Poland, the Commission found in early 2024 that Poland met the Charter’s horizontal enabling condition and the judicial conditions, which made significant cohesion funds available. The Article 7 procedure against Poland had been launched by the Commission, so in spring 2024 it was the Commission that withdrew its reasoned proposal. Telex also refers to this single earlier example when it writes that the institution that launched the procedure can step back. The Hungarian procedure was initiated by the EP, so here withdrawal depends on a plenary decision of the EP. This is why the Commission’s recognition is not enough: the report under proposal 3.3 must also convince the EP.

The 2018 EP resolution listed 12 areas of concern. These included judicial independence, corruption and conflicts of interest, freedom of expression and academic freedom, equal treatment, the rights of minorities, including Roma, and the rights of migrants and asylum seekers. According to Telex, the 2021 ‘child protection’ law was not part of the original reasoning, but it has been at the centre of the debate since the CJEU’s April judgment. The current press sources did not report the item-by-item status of the 12 areas.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A8 — Cohesion policy accountability

Foreign policy

  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition building in the EU
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit (annual)

Territorial inequality and rural policy

  • TE2 — Data-based allocation of EU cohesion funds
  • TE3 — Segregated-area map and catching-up programme

Education

  • O3 — Data-driven education development

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budget

Social policy

  • SZ14 — Cohesion Pillar 2.0 — making full use of the Hungarian allocation

Proposed new programme point: EU funding-loss log: an itemised, audited account of all EU funds lost through missed deadlines, with a 24-month forward-looking list of deadlines — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 14 October 2026 — topic 1; MIAK foreign press monitor, 14 October 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Treaty on European Union (consolidated version)
  • 📖 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A6, A8)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP17, KP23)
  • MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points; programme point ID: TE2, TE3)
  • MIAK policy area: Education (programme points; programme point ID: O3)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G1)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ14)
  • MIAK press monitor, 14 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 97/100
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 14 October 2026 — topic 2, score: 92/100

Supplementary public data sources (if used):

  • Suggested data sources for follow-up: the European Commission’s Cohesion Open Data Platform, the documents issued on the meeting of the General Affairs Council of the Council of the European Union (13 October 2026), the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard), the European Parliament’s reports on the Article 7 procedure, the annual report of the Integrity Authority, the reports of the State Audit Office

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