Part I — Situation overview

On 29 September 2026 six net contributor member states came out in a letter against the 2028–2034 EU budget. A net contributor is a country that pays more into the common purse than it gets back from it. According to Politico Europe, the leaders of Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Finland wrote to Irish Taoiseach Micheál Martin. They demanded that the Commission’s proposal of nearly 2,000 billion euros be reduced by several hundred billion euros. The regulation on the multiannual financial framework (MFF — the Union’s seven-year budgetary framework) is adopted by the Council unanimously, with the consent of the European Parliament. The letter is therefore essentially a conditional veto. Citing four diplomats, the paper writes that next week’s negotiating document of the rotating Irish presidency (negotiating box, the compromise framework with figures) may bring a cut exceeding 100 billion euros, mainly from agricultural and regional funds. The 17-member “Friends of Cohesion” group, to which, according to the Hungarian press, Hungary also belongs, is working on a joint declaration. On the same day the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education proposed to raise the Erasmus+ budget from 40 billion to 47 billion euros, and to tie the funds to the rule of law and transparency. According to EUobserver, this is a clear reference to the earlier exclusion of the Hungarian universities that changed their operating model.

The debate is not new. On 27 August, in connection with the net contributors’ meeting in Berlin, MIAK proposed a public, quantified Hungarian negotiating mandate. On 17 September it wrote about a measurable structure for the rule-of-law condition, and on 24 September about the use of the 4.2 billion euros of unblocked cohesion funds. According to MIAK’s analysis of 3 September, on 2 September the Prime Minister told European Council President António Costa that Hungary can only accept a budget that serves the interests of the Hungarian people and businesses. That, however, is a condition, not an offer.

Meanwhile an argument has appeared that could reframe the debate. EUobserver cites a recent study by PBL, a Dutch government research institute. According to it, the Dutch provinces get back roughly 99 cents of additional growth for every euro paid into the EU. MIAK’s reading: in the days before the negotiating document, the Hungarian position is strong if it not only defends the size of the budget but also makes a measurable offer to the net contributors. It should commit to public measurement of results, show the contributors’ benefit in figures, and treat the rule-of-law condition as evidence of its own return.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide the framework of interpretation. According to the Economic Surveys: European Union 2021 report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the evidence on the growth effect of cohesion policy is only moderately encouraging. Above a certain level of funds per capita, improving the quality of government is a far more powerful development lever than further investment. Moreover, project selection often happens on a first-come, first-served basis rather than by comparing results. The OECD’s 2025 survey of the Union and the euro area records that the net contributor balance does not measure the cross-country spillover effects of EU spending or the broader benefits of membership. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC — the Union’s advisory body representing employers’, workers’ and civil society organisations) in the debate on the 2021–2027 framework both criticised the cohesion and agricultural cuts and supported tying EU funds to the rule of law. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first gives substance to the Hungarian contribution to the Friends of Cohesion joint declaration, the second gives a quantified answer to the net contributors’ argument, and the third turns the Erasmus+ rule-of-law condition to the advantage of the Hungarian position.

3.1 A performance commitment in the Friends of Cohesion declaration (before the European Council meeting of 15 October)

MIAK proposes that the Government not merely sign the Friends of Cohesion joint declaration, but propose that it include a performance commitment. Under it, the members of the group would commit to publishing three data points annually, in a uniform format, in the post-2028 cycle. The first is the absorption rate. The second is the achievement of the common result indicators of Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 on the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. The third is the share of EU co-financed public procurements concluded with a single bid. Hungary should offer to be the first to publish the baseline values, even before the negotiations are closed. In the negotiating document the Government should ask for a floor on national cohesion envelopes similar to the current cycle, and link it to the indicators committed to. Today, under the Common Provisions Regulation, a country’s 2021–2027 envelope may not be less than 76 per cent of that of the previous cycle. The step is an application of the issue-based coalition building of KP17. Hungary shares an interest with the cohesion camp in defending the budget, and with the net contributors in measuring effectiveness. The public allocation database with result indicators of TE2 provides the domestic basis. According to the OECD’s 2021 finding (see 6.4.1), above a certain level the quality of government is worth more than additional money. A credible quality commitment is therefore the best argument for keeping the budget.

3.2 A Hungarian return calculation modelled on the PBL study (preliminary result by 30 November 2026, full study by 31 March 2027)

The Dutch study showed, from the net contributor’s side, that a significant part of the contribution returns as growth. The Hungarian calculation could show the other side. MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Finance commission an independent research institute or university team to produce a calculation with a public methodology, answering three questions. First: how much additional growth did one euro of EU funds bring to the Hungarian regions between 2014 and 2024, broken down by county. Second: what share of the value of EU co-financed Hungarian investments went to companies of the net contributor countries supplying machinery, technology and services. Third: how would all this change within the cut ranges of the negotiating document. The preliminary result should be ready by 30 November, so that it can be used in the year-end phase of the negotiations. The model and the data should be public, together with the uncertainty range of the estimate. The step is an application of the data-driven budgeting principle of G1 to EU transfers. The OECD’s 2025 survey (see 6.4.2) itself indicates that the net balance does not measure spillover effects. The Hungarian calculation would fill this gap on one side of the debate, alongside the scenario-range allocation calculation proposed by MIAK on 27 August.

3.3 Public support for the Erasmus+ rule-of-law condition (until the Council’s position on the Erasmus+ regulation is formed)

The Council decides on the Erasmus+ regulation by qualified majority, so Hungary could not block it alone here anyway. The only question is what role it takes on. MIAK proposes that the Government support, both in the Council working party and publicly, the proposal of the parliamentary committee that would tie the funds to the rule of law and transparency. It should ask for two additions. The yardstick for meeting the condition should be fixed in advance and verifiable, as MIAK’s analysis of 17 September proposed. And programmes for adult learners and disadvantaged participants should also receive a share of the increased budget, as the committee’s 20 per cent quota prescribes. The latter is linked to the lifelong learning programme point O4. At home, the Government should publish the number of outgoing students in 2026–2027 at the 21 previously excluded universities, compared with the academic years before the exclusion. There are two reasons for the support. The return of the Hungarian universities is itself the proof that the condition can be met. And the EESC’s position (see 6.4.3) shows that the rule-of-law condition and the defence of the cohesion budget are not opposites. The same body stood for both.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: the Hungarian position is credible if it accepts the same yardstick that the net contributors demand. In the Friends of Cohesion group, the defence of the budget; towards the net contributors, measurable results; in the Erasmus+ debate, acceptance of the rule of law. Together the three make the Hungarian yes valuable, and the veto unnecessary.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy and negotiating position The performance commitment gives Hungary a bridging role between the cohesion camp and the net contributors; instead of threatening a veto, it arrives with an offer The other members of the cohesion camp want no part of the measurement obligation, and the proposal becomes isolated within the group
Economy and budget Besides defending the budget, the return calculation also helps domestic planning: it becomes visible which funds bring real growth If the calculation shows an unfavourable effect in some regions or programmes, the net contributors may use it as an argument for cuts
Territorial inequality The result indicators and the county breakdown make visible where the funds go, and this favours the most disadvantaged districts Absorption pressure and strict measurement may put areas with weak application capacity at a disadvantage
Agriculture Credibility gained in defending the cohesion budget also helps in the negotiations on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) The negotiating document may cut the agricultural envelope more heavily; the proposal gives no direct answer to this
Education Raising the Erasmus+ budget and supporting the condition can make the return of the Hungarian universities lasting If the yardstick of the condition remains vague, a later government failure will again hit the students

The main question to weigh is whether the measurement commitment hands a weapon to the net contributors. MIAK’s answer: measurement is already taking place, just not in the hands of the member states. The OECD, the European Court of Auditors and the Commission all evaluate cohesion policy, and the net contributors refer to these evaluations. Whoever arrives with their own data and their own commitment also shapes the subject of the debate. The proposal becomes risky if the Government treats the commitment merely as a communication gesture and fails to publish the baseline values. The other risk is time. According to Politico, the negotiating document will appear next week, and according to Világgazdaság the European Council meeting begins on 15 October. The return calculation must therefore start with a preliminary, range-based estimate, not a finished study.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes four key performance indicators (KPIs), from which it will be visible after 6, 12 and 24 months whether the proposals have taken effect:

  • Performance commitment in the joint declaration: it is worth following whether the Friends of Cohesion declaration contains a measurable results commitment before the European Council meeting of 15 October, and whether Hungary publishes its own baseline values alongside it (absorption rate, common result indicators, share of single-bid procurements).
  • Return calculation: the suggested target is that the preliminary, range-based estimate be published by 30 November 2026, and the full study with a public methodology and a county breakdown by 31 March 2027.
  • Share of single-bid public procurements: the suggested target is that among EU co-financed contracts this share fall by at least one third by 2030 compared with the 2027 baseline value.
  • Erasmus mobility at the returning universities: it is worth following the number of outgoing students at the 21 previously excluded universities in the 2026–2027 and 2027–2028 academic years, compared with the academic years before the exclusion.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks the Government, before next week’s negotiating document and the summit of 15 October, not only to set conditions but also to make an offer. In the Friends of Cohesion group it should propose common performance indicators published annually, and commit to Hungary being the first to publish its own data. It should commission a public return calculation on how much growth EU money brings at home, and how much benefit it brings to the contributors. And it should openly support the Erasmus+ rule-of-law condition, because the return of the Hungarian universities proves precisely that the condition can be met.

Two MIAK foundational values are in play. Data-drivenness, because the budget debate has so far revolved around two numbers, the contribution and the amount received. Neither side measured what becomes of the money. The return calculation and the common indicators push the debate towards results. Accountability, because the performance commitment and support for the rule-of-law condition mean that Hungary makes its own use of funds answerable too, not only that of the net contributors.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the international band, Politico Europe wrote from the angle of the balance of power in the negotiations. Citing diplomats, it quantified the expected cut, quoted the letter’s key sentence on the financing capacity of “those who bear the main financial burden”, and dealt separately with the European Parliament’s delay. Parliament promises a position by November, but according to a Green negotiator, at the current pace it will not be ready even by the end of next year. EUobserver’s analysis, by contrast, disputed the net contributors’ argument. Based on the PBL study, it wrote that the frugal countries are also harming their own regions; this article was only partly publicly readable. Two further articles in the paper presented the internal structure of the budget. One was about the Erasmus+ increase and the rule-of-law condition, the other about how the planned AgoraEU fund would bring support for culture, media, equality and civil society into a single envelope. Two articles of Rapporteur (formerly Euractiv) could be checked only at headline level. The title of one (“Groundhog days”) refers to the repetitiveness of the budget debate, while the other indicates that capitals would not fund ocean protection from the fisheries budget. Visegrad Insight discussed the deadline for the Czech and Polish 2027 budgets; the greater part of the paper’s analysis is behind a paywall. None of the sources in the international band examined what the members of the cohesion camp could offer the net contributors.

In the domestic band, economic and public-affairs outlets carried the topic. Portfolio framed the letter as a “quasi-veto”, and highlighted that the six countries provide roughly 40 per cent of EU revenue. Világgazdaság, following Politico, outlined the letter’s reasoning: the net contributors are in a minority but bear about three quarters of the financing burden. The paper’s headline mentions Ursula von der Leyen as the addressee of the letter, whereas according to Politico it was addressed to the Irish Taoiseach. Index wrote about it as an ultimatum, and emphasised the risk of the 2027 French, Italian, Spanish and Polish elections. The sources also differ on the size of the group: Portfolio writes of a 16-member Friends of Cohesion, Index and Politico of a 17-member one. The left-liberal band (Telex, 444.hu, Népszava, HVG), based on the articles reviewed by MIAK, has not carried the letter to date; its attention on EU funds focused on the unblocking of 23 September. In the conservative band, Magyar Nemzet likewise did not deal with the letter among the articles reviewed by MIAK, and Mandiner, by its own account, has ceased providing content. None of the domestic sources asked what the Government will bring to the Friends of Cohesion declaration.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
The Commission’s MFF proposal for 2028–2034 nearly 2,000 billion euros Politico Europe, 29 September 2026
Countries signing the letter Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Finland Politico Europe, 29 September 2026
Reduction requested in the letter “several hundred billion” euros Politico Europe; Portfolio, 29 September 2026
Cut expected in the negotiating document exceeding 100 billion euros (according to four diplomats) Politico Europe, 29 September 2026
The six countries’ share of financing roughly 40% of EU revenue; according to the letter, the net contributors bear about three quarters of the burden Portfolio; Világgazdaság, 29 September 2026
Size of the Friends of Cohesion group 17 member states (Politico, Index); 16 member states (Portfolio) Articles of 29 September 2026
Start of the European Council meeting 15 October 2026 (two days) Világgazdaság, 29 September 2026
Target date for the European Parliament’s position November 2026; negotiations with the member states from January 2027 Politico Europe, 29 September 2026
Value of agricultural support governed by the CAP more than 300 billion euros Politico Europe, 29 September 2026
Erasmus+ budget in the parliamentary committee’s proposal 47 billion instead of 40 billion euros; 24 in favour, 1 abstention EUobserver, 29 September 2026
Erasmus+ quota and internal split 20% for disadvantaged participants; education and training 74%, youth and volunteering 15%, sport 4% EUobserver, 29 September 2026
Main result of the PBL study Dutch provinces: roughly 99 cents of additional growth for every euro contributed; 10 EU funds, 2013–2024 EUobserver, September 2026 (Olga Ivanova, PBL; published in the Dutch economics journal ESB)
The previously excluded Hungarian universities 21 universities, with a valid Erasmus mobility application for the 2026–2027 academic year Statement by Judit Lannert, Mandiner (archive), 4 September 2026
Proposal to lift the budgetary protection measures 23 September 2026; the Council decides by qualified majority European Commission; MIAK, 24 September 2026
Cohesion floor in the current cycle the national envelope may not be less than 76% of that of the previous cycle; ceiling of 2.3% of GDP OECD, 2025 (based on the Common Provisions Regulation)

Two data points require a separate note. One is the PBL study: MIAK knows it only from EUobserver’s partly readable analysis and has not seen the text of the study. The 99-cent figure is therefore the paper’s summary, not MIAK’s own verification. The other is the state of the Erasmus case. The Council has to decide on the Commission’s proposal of 23 September, and by the time this article was finalised MIAK had seen no source indicating that this had happened. The statement on the valid applications of the 21 universities is earlier, from 4 September.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the centre of gravity of the topic: KP17 (issue-based coalition building in the EU) provides the dual coalition logic, i.e. the common cause is the budget with the cohesion camp and the measurement of effectiveness with the net contributors;
  • Economy (programme points) — G1 (data-driven budgeting) is the principle behind the return calculation and the publicity of the common indicators, while G21 (systematic review of public expenditure) provides the practice that identifies poorly performing programmes before the next cycle;
  • Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points) — the public database with result indicators of TE2 (data-based allocation of EU cohesion funds) is the domestic basis of proposal 3.1; according to the background material, the share of funds reaching the most disadvantaged districts still falls short of need today;
  • Education (programme points) — O4 (lifelong learning) is affected because the parliamentary committee would also strengthen programmes for adult learners and the quota for the disadvantaged;
  • Agriculture (background material) — the CAP is one of the largest items of the budget; according to the background material, the bulk of Hungarian CAP support is direct payments, so an agricultural cut directly affects farm incomes.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union 2021

The OECD’s 2021 EU survey examines the effectiveness of cohesion policy in a separate chapter. Its starting point is cautious: most econometric studies find a positive but small growth effect, and some analyses find an insignificant or negative one. According to the report, one reason for the differences is the institutional quality of the beneficiary regions. The central proposition:

“Indeed, above a certain threshold of cohesion funds received per capita, improving the quality of government is a far more powerful lever for development than additional public investment.”

In other words: above a certain level of cohesion funds per capita, improving the quality of government is a much stronger development tool than further public investment. The survey also finds that projects are often selected on a first-come, first-served basis, and that managing authorities often put rapid absorption ahead of good allocation. Moreover, in cohesion co-financed public procurement it is common for only a single bid to be received. Hungary is among the fund-intensive member states, so the proposition applies to it particularly strongly. Proposal 3.1 therefore places not the size of the budget but the quality commitment at the centre of the argument, and treats the share of single-bid procurements as an indicator to be measured.

📖 Source: OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union 2021

6.4.2 OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025

The OECD’s 2025 survey records the limitation of the net contributor calculation. According to the report, the distribution of net contributions has over the years followed differences in population and income, and this measure does not capture cross-country spillover effects or the broader benefits of membership. The note attached to the figure goes further:

“Expenditure that appears to go only to a Member State may benefit several or all of them given strong spillovers of EU expenditure, or provide a European public good.”

In other words: spending that appears to go to only one member state may, owing to the strong spillover effects of EU spending, benefit several or even all member states, or create a European public good. The survey also describes that in the current cycle the Common Provisions Regulation caps a country’s cohesion envelope at 2.3 per cent of GDP from above and at 76 per cent of the previous cycle from below. The Dutch PBL study quantified this spillover from the contributor’s side. Under proposal 3.2 Hungary should do the same from the beneficiary’s side, while 3.1 would link the logic of the floor to result indicators.

📖 Source: OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025

6.4.3 EESC: Cohesion policy as a fundamental pillar

The EESC publication collects the body’s opinions on cohesion for 2021–2027. In the previous MFF debate the body acknowledged the new programmes with high European added value, but questioned whether the increase should come from cutting cohesion policy by 10 per cent and the CAP by 15 per cent. It would have raised the size of the budget to 1.3 per cent of gross national income. In the same opinion it also supported the rule-of-law condition:

“[The EESC] supports the proposal to make the receipt of EU funds by the Member States conditional upon respect for the principle of the rule of law, and thinks that this conditionality could be extended to the other principles linked to the Rule of Law contained in the EU Treaties.”

In other words: the EESC supported making the member states’ EU funds conditional on respect for the rule of law, and would extend the condition to the other rule-of-law principles contained in the Treaties. In another opinion the body also notes that the performance of macro-regional strategies in reducing territorial disparities has remained modest, partly because of complex governance and insufficient involvement of civil society actors. Today’s debate is therefore a repetition: the same pressure for cuts, the same conditionality. The lesson is the basis of proposal 3.3. Whoever defends the cohesion budget can also accept the rule-of-law condition — indeed, can argue more credibly by accepting it.

📖 Source: European Economic and Social Committee: Cohesion policy as a fundamental pillar for bringing the EU closer to its citizens and for reducing disparities among EU regions and inequalities among people

6.5 International comparison

According to EUobserver, the Dutch PBL study tracked the effect of ten EU funds in the Dutch provinces between 2013 and 2024, from Horizon research grants to agricultural and regional money. In most provinces the growth effect of EU investment exceeded the province’s share of contributions. This became an argument in the net contributor country’s internal debate too, and it offers a model for the cohesion camp: the debate can be settled with numbers. EUobserver also recalls that in 2013 the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands achieved the first cut in the EU budget, and that then, too, the agricultural and cohesion envelopes lost the most. According to the TE2 programme point, the Polish example shows that a high absorption rate and decisions delegated to the regional level can together build credibility. The OECD’s 2021 proposition applies here too: in international comparison, what distinguishes successful beneficiaries is not the amount of money received but the quality of its use.

Foreign policy

  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition building in the EU

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budgeting
  • G21 — Systematic review of public expenditure

Territorial inequality and rural policy

  • TE2 — Data-based allocation of EU cohesion funds

Education

  • O4 — Lifelong learning

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A8 — Accountability in cohesion policy

Proposed new programme point: EU return and spillover calculation for budget negotiations — for the Economy area (a calculation with a public methodology and a county breakdown of how much growth one euro of EU funds brings, and how much of it flows back to the net contributor countries; updated before every MFF negotiating phase).

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 30 September 2026 — topic 1):

Supplementary Hungarian press sources:

Knowledge base references (books):

  • 📖 OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union 2021
  • 📖 OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025
  • 📖 European Economic and Social Committee: Cohesion policy as a fundamental pillar for bringing the EU closer to its citizens and for reducing disparities among EU regions and inequalities among people

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP17)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G1, G21)
  • MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points and background material; programme point ID: TE2)
  • MIAK policy area: Education (programme points; programme point ID: O4)
  • MIAK policy area: Agriculture (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A8)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 30 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 89/100

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