Part I — Situation overview

On 6 October 2026 in Strasbourg, the European Commission adopted its package of pre-enlargement policy reviews, entitled Preparing for a wider Union. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called enlargement a “geopolitical imperative”. According to the Commission’s press release, future accession treaties would receive stronger safeguards. The period of applicability of the economic, internal-market and justice-and-home-affairs safeguard clauses would be significantly longer, that is, the period in which temporary protective measures can be taken in the event of market disruption or serious failings. A new, institutional safeguard would apply to serious breaches of the values set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and of the principle of sincere cooperation, in the most serious cases with suspension of voting rights in the Council. According to Telex, Index and EUobserver, this would be applicable in the fifteen years after accession, and according to Telex by qualified majority instead of unanimity. The material published by the Commission does not set out these two details, only that all safeguards are temporary, targeted, reversible and subject to regular review. The package would also put the opening of negotiating clusters to a qualified majority, while final admission would remain unanimous. In the case of Ukraine, targeted rules would restrict support for and market access of sensitive agricultural products. The Commission would also examine, with the European Parliament and the Council, more effective handling of procedures under Article 7, including possible deadlines. The package will be discussed by the European Council on 15–16 October.

On the same day it emerged that the three-member fact-finding delegation of the European Parliament (EP) cautiously supports releasing the €4.2 billion of cohesion funds frozen for Hungary. Daniel Freund (Greens) would have considered a phased release appropriate, while according to Jean-Marc Germain (Socialists) “the same corruption risks” persist, and the implementation of the new laws is still fragile (EUobserver, Népszava). The EP has no decision-making power. The Commission’s proposal of 23 September is decided by the Council of the European Union, that is, the governments of the member states, by qualified majority. MIAK wrote on 24 September about the project ranking of the released envelope, on 29 September about the reform of unanimity, and yesterday about limiting the veto of new members. The new element is the data analysis of Telex’s economics section: between 2010 and 2024, HUF 17 trillion of cohesion and regional development funds were paid out, yet income gaps between districts did not narrow.

MIAK’s reading: the two news items are about the same thing. The Union is now writing down what yardstick it expects of future members, and it applies the same yardstick to the Hungarian release. Hungary can be credible in this debate if it does two things. It does not ask for an exception in its own case, and it does not prescribe for others what it would not accept for itself. And releasing the money is not the end point, but the start of the test. The experience of 2010–2024 shows that quantity alone does not bring convergence.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework. Under Article 7 TEU, a serious and persistent breach of the values set out in Article 2 is determined unanimously by the European Council, that is, the body of heads of state or government. Only then may the Council suspend a member state’s rights by qualified majority. Article 354 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) excludes the state concerned from the vote, but the veto of the other member states remains. This is the gap through which the Polish and Hungarian governments previously protected each other. The Union’s 2016 global foreign and security policy strategy, the EU Global Strategy, makes strict and fair conditionality the condition of a credible enlargement policy. Fairness here means that the rule applies equally to everyone. The OECD, the organisation for economic cooperation of advanced economies, warns in its 2021 EU country report that although Central and Eastern Europe has caught up, within most countries the gap between large cities and rural areas has grown. Project selection must therefore be tied to regional development objectives, not to the order of arrival. The detailed discussion of the literature — source by source, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first concerns the days before the European Council of 15–16 October, the second the weeks before the Council decision on the €4.2 billion, the third the entire period of use of the released envelope. All three fall within the competence of the Government. Where statutory regulation is needed, the National Assembly decides.

3.1 A symmetrical rule-of-law position: the same yardstick for new and old members (in writing by 13 October, before the European Council)

MIAK proposes that the Government set down its position on the Commission’s institutional safeguard in writing by 13 October, and present it to the National Assembly’s committee on European Union affairs. Point 3.2 of yesterday’s analysis asked that the rule for new members be closed in time and the same for every entrant. This proposal goes one step further: the rule should be symmetrical not only among the new members, but also between new and old members. The position should consist of three elements. First: Hungary should support the institutional safeguard if four conditions are met. The decision-making rule is expressly set out in the treaty, it is subject to the consent of the EP, the triggers are based on the findings of the Commission’s annual rule of law report, and the state concerned can turn to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Press reports on the decision-making rule do not match, so the Government should clarify this point in the negotiations. Second: Hungary should support the Commission’s proposal on deadlines for procedures under Article 7, and should declare this for its own procedure, ongoing since 2018, as well. It should not seek its closure through a political bargain, but on the basis of public milestones and Council hearings with deadlines. Third: Hungary should signal that at the next treaty change it is open to easing the unanimity step of Article 7, for example to the four-fifths majority already known today. This would apply to every member state, Hungary included. The test is simple: Hungary should ask of new members only a rule that it would accept for itself today. This follows from the structure of Article 7 (see 6.4.1) and from the principle of fair conditionality (see 6.4.2). It is an application of the KP19 institutional reform position and KP3 transparent foreign policy to the protection of the Union’s foundational values.

3.2 An implementation evidence package and voluntary follow-up for the release (the package by 20 October, follow-up reports after six and twelve months)

The EP delegation’s objection was not about the laws, but about implementation. According to Népszava, the MEPs held talks with civil society organisations, business actors and the Integrity Authority, but did not meet the Government’s leaders. MIAK proposes that the Government publish a short implementation evidence package by 20 October, before the Council decision. It should not list the legislation adopted, since a register of that was already proposed in point 3.3 of the 24 September analysis. It should show operational data. Four indicators are proposed. The number of the Integrity Authority’s investigations and recommendations, and the percentage of recommendations implemented. The share of single-bid public procurement in EU co-financed procedures. The start date and staffing of the asset recovery office, because according to Deutsche Welle the office has been set up but is not yet operating. Finally, the number of conflict-of-interest checks carried out at the foundations of the model-changing universities. Instead of a phased release, Hungary should voluntarily undertake follow-up: after six and twelve months it should report on the same indicators to the Commission, the Council and the competent EP committees. The Government should also invite the EP’s further monitoring delegation planned for the end of October, and this time members of the Government should also be available to it. The Government cannot interfere in the proceedings of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Hungarian prosecution service, so their data can enter the package only from the authorities’ own communications. This is an application of the A8 cohesion accountability and A1 public-money dashboard programme points, and in persuading the member states, a tool of KP17 issue-based coalition-building.

3.3 A district-level impact target and independent impact evaluation for the released envelope (targets set within 90 days of the Council decision, first evaluation by 30 June 2028)

The analysis by Telex’s economics section revealed two gaps. One is that there is no meaningful relationship between the funds paid out and district-level income growth. The other is that for many projects it is not known where the money was spent, because a state company appears as beneficiary, and the data do not show the place of final use. MIAK proposed on 8 August an ex-ante territorial allocation formula for the funds. This proposal addresses the outcome side, in three steps. First: for every project of the €4.2 billion envelope, the place of final use must be shown at district level, and for network investments (rail, road) with the list of districts concerned. Second: within 90 days of the Council decision, the Government should set down, programme by programme, which district-level outcome indicators it expects to improve. These could be the dimensions of the TE1 micro-regional development index, for example employment and taxable income per capita. If the share reaching the most disadvantaged districts falls short of the target of the TE2 programme point, the decision-maker should justify the deviation in writing. Budapest transport projects may still be justified, but the deviation should be visible. Third: by 30 June 2028 an independent research institute should carry out a control-group impact evaluation, that is, compare the supported districts with districts of similar characteristics that were not supported, according to the method described in the TE3 programme point. It should publish the data. The results should also feed into the negotiation of the national and regional partnership plan of the 2028–2034 EU budget. According to the OECD’s thesis (see 6.4.3), within-country gaps grow if selection is not aligned with development objectives.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: the same yardstick outwards and inwards. What Hungary expects of new members (a verifiable rule, with deadlines, that also stands up in court), it should accept for its own Article 7 procedure too. What the Union demands at the release (functioning institutions, not just laws), the Government should show with data. What the Hungarian taxpayer rightly expects from the money (a tangible improvement in lagging regions) must be measured, not assumed.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy The symmetrical position strengthens Hungarian credibility and is also fair towards the candidates A rule extended to old members provokes resistance from several member states; the Hungarian proposal may become isolated
Rule of law An Article 7 procedure with deadlines; the chance of mutual protection decreases Tying its own procedure to deadlines also makes the conditions of closure public, which may spark domestic political debate
EU funds The implementation data respond directly to the EP’s objection; a Council majority is easier to obtain If an indicator shows a poor picture, it can be used as an argument against the release
Territorial inequality The place of final use and the district-level targets make visible where the money goes Under the pressure of the 2029 spending deadline, the impact targets may become a formality
Public administration The control-group evaluation lays the groundwork for 2028–2034 planning The evaluation is data- and expertise-intensive, and its results arrive only years later

The most important question to weigh is timing. Publishing implementation data before the Council decision is risky, because an unfavourable indicator gives an argument to opponents of the release. MIAK nevertheless proposes it. A qualified majority is needed in the Council, and the member states also read the EP delegation’s report. Silence therefore does not protect against criticism; it only removes the opportunity to respond. An honest version of the evidence package, one that also names the gaps, is a stronger argument than a list of laws fulfilled.

In the symmetry proposal, the risk is overcommitment. Easing the unanimity step of Article 7 requires a treaty change, which every member state must ratify. This is not realistic in the short term. MIAK therefore proposes a two-step position: support now for the deadlines, which the Commission is examining within the existing treaty framework, and the treaty change only at the next comprehensive reform. KP4 principled pragmatism asks for exactly this: a position that is value-based but also weighs feasibility.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • A written Hungarian position on the institutional safeguard. Target: publication by 13 October, presentation to the National Assembly’s committee on European Union affairs before the European Council, with a commitment to deadlines for its own Article 7 procedure.
  • Implementation evidence package. Target: publication by 20 October with the four indicators, follow-up reports in April and October 2027. It is worth following whether the share of single-bid public procurement decreases over twelve months compared with the baseline.
  • The start of operations of the asset recovery office. Target: a public start date and staffing by the end of 2026.
  • Place of final use for the projects of the released envelope. Target: recorded at district level and public for 100 per cent of projects by 31 March 2027.
  • Independent impact evaluation. Target: a control-group evaluation published by 30 June 2028, together with the raw data.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the Government. Before the European Council of 15–16 October, it should set down that Hungary supports the rule-of-law safeguard proposed for new members, but asks for the same yardstick for old members too, including for its own pending procedure. Before the Council decision on the €4.2 billion release, it should respond to the doubts of the EP delegation not with a list of laws, but with operational data and voluntary follow-up. And for the released money, within 90 days of the Council decision, it should set down what improvement it expects in which district, and entrust independent researchers with measuring whether this has happened.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, accountability and data-drivenness are at stake here. Accountability, because a rule is legitimate only if it also binds whoever makes it. A member state that sets a stricter yardstick for others than for itself weakens its own rule. Data-drivenness, because after fifteen years and HUF 17 trillion of experience it is no longer enough to point out that the money has arrived. What must be shown is what it changed where it was intended to go.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band, Telex presented the enlargement package from the perspective of the Hungarian experience: already according to its headline, the Commission, learning from the Hungarian example, proposes a simplified rule-of-law procedure. The article described in detail how the unanimity of Article 7 can be circumvented if two governments protect each other. It also reported that the Ukrainian agriculture minister would accept only temporary restrictions, not permanent ones. At one point the article wrote of a unanimous decision by EU affairs ministers, whereas under the treaty this step is taken by the European Council, that is, the heads of state or government. The data analysis of Telex’s economics section asked about the impact of the money. Among the reasons for the lack of impact, the authors mentioned politically based allocation and conspicuously pointless projects, and concluded that the newly available funds must be used differently. Népszava (Tamás Rónay) described the situation as two parallel decision-making processes: the Council decides on the cohesion release, and the Commission on the final payment request of the recovery fund. The paper named asylum and LGBTQI rights as the most serious open issues. Another Telex article covered the EP’s report on tax avoidance, which provides background to the debate on the EU budget’s own resources.

In the public-affairs band, Index, building on an interview given to the Guardian by Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, chose a personalised frame: according to the sentence quoted in the headline, the Union does not want “more Viktor Orbáns”. The article wrote about a fifteen-year “probation period” during which a new member could lose its voting rights or its EU funds. Another Index article reported on the banner protest of the Fidesz–KDNP group in Strasbourg. In it, Patriots for Europe MEPs drew attention to the endangerment of Hungarian democracy, and Kinga Gál accused the EU institutions of double standards.

In the business press, Portfolio, building on a presentation by a funding consultant, highlighted that the EU money tap is not closing, but in the cycle starting in 2028 the funds will arrive in a different form. The article stated that the Commission had already “released” the €4.2 billion. In reality the Commission only proposed it; the decision belongs to the Council. The paper put the amount still frozen at €2.2 billion, whereas according to the Commission information quoted by Népszava, €2.7 billion remains frozen because of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and a further €0.8 billion because of other conditions. Another Portfolio article published a debate among economists on why Hungary fell behind. According to István Hamecz, “we fell behind like the tip”, while Balázs Szabó stressed the competition-distorting effect of support programmes. The third Portfolio article covered the leaked EU levy on large companies, which requires a unanimous decision of all 27 member states.

In the conservative band, Magyar Nemzet gave the floor to Kinga Gál, vice-president of Fidesz and vice-president of the Patriots for Europe party family. According to her, the EU institutions are silent about the authoritarian system being built in Hungary. The paper did not discuss the enlargement package and the release in this frame. Common across the whole spectrum is that the enlargement safeguard was interpreted from the perspective of the past, that is, the experience of the Orbán era. None of the papers wrote about what position the current Hungarian Government should take on it.

In the international press, EUobserver presented the proposal, in the commissioner’s words, as an “insurance policy”, and highlighted that the Commission denies the charge of a two-tier Union. Another EUobserver article quoted MEPs criticising the pace of the release. Deutsche Welle framed the package as a search for balance between simplifying enlargement, encouraging the candidates and the concerns of old members. A DW article of 30 September wrote about the restraint so far of the Hungarian reckoning. EUobserver’s podcast highlighted the financial obstacle, because none of the countries joining in the near future would be a net contributor. Four Rapporteur analyses (on rules limiting the veto, on Ukrainian agricultural restrictions, on the gradual defence integration of candidates and on “insuring” enlargement) are included at headline level. Balkan Insight’s weekly democracy digest discussed the proceedings against two former ministers.

6.2 Facts and data

Main elements of the enlargement package (6 October 2026):

Element Content Source
Sectoral safeguard clauses The period of applicability of the economic, internal-market and justice-and-home-affairs safeguard clauses would be significantly extended European Commission, IP/26/2075
Institutional safeguard In case of serious breach of the values of Article 2 TEU and of sincere cooperation, in the most serious cases suspension of voting rights in the Council; temporary, targeted, reversible, regularly reviewed European Commission, IP/26/2075 and QANDA/26/2076
Duration 15 years after accession Telex, Index, EUobserver (not set out in the Commission material)
Decision-making rule Qualified majority; a blocking minority requires at least four member states representing at least 35% of the EU population Telex (not set out in the Commission material)
Scope Only member states that joined at most 15 years earlier; of the current ones, at most Croatia until mid-2028 Telex
Cluster opening Qualified majority for opening clusters and for interim decisions; final admission unanimous European Commission, QANDA/26/2076
Article 7 More effective handling of procedures under Article 7, with possible deadlines, examined jointly with the EP and the Council European Commission, IP/26/2075
Ukraine Targeted rules significantly restricting support for and market access of sensitive agricultural products European Commission, IP/26/2075
Voluntary commitment A new member may commit for a limited period not to block later enlargement because of a bilateral dispute European Commission, IP/26/2075; EUobserver
Roadmaps Indicative roadmaps for Montenegro, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine in the 2026 enlargement package, at the end of October European Commission; Telex

The release of funds and the impact of EU funds:

Data Value Source
Cohesion envelope proposed for release €4.2 billion of the €16.4 billion available to Hungary EUobserver, 6 October 2026
Deadline for the Council decision One month from the Commission proposal of 23 September Népszava, EUobserver
Cohesion funds still frozen approx. €2.7 billion (Charter of Fundamental Rights) + approx. €0.8 billion (other thematic conditions) Népszava, based on the Commission’s September information
Envelope of the recovery plan approx. €10 billion in grants and concessional loans; final payment request submitted by 30 September Népszava
Joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office Commission confirmation on 10 July, in force from August Népszava
Cohesion and regional payments 2010–2024 HUF 17 trillion, 2.5% of the period’s GDP Telex (economics section), 7 October 2026
The same relative to the taxable income of households and companies approx. 6% Telex (economics section)
Correlation: EU support and annual growth of taxable income (real terms) −0.15 Telex (economics section)
Correlation: EU support and annual growth of company revenue 0.28 Telex (economics section)
District level: support per capita and change in company revenue 0.04 (not significant) Telex (economics section)
District level: support per capita and change in taxable income 0.33 (very weak relationship) Telex (economics section)
Support per capita of neighbouring districts in the eastern and southern regions up to a four- to five-fold difference Telex (economics section)

Two interpretive notes belong to the tables. First, the 15-year duration and the qualified-majority decision-making rule were reported only by the press, citing EU sources. The Commission’s press release and Q&A material do not set these out, so MIAK treats them as press reports. Second, Telex’s correlation calculations measure co-movement, not causal effect, as the authors themselves stress. This is precisely why point 3.3 proposes a control-group evaluation, which can also estimate the causal effect.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the Hungarian position on the institutional safeguard and on Article 7 deadlines (programme point ID: KP19); public justification of the voting position (programme point ID: KP3); securing a Council majority (programme point ID: KP17); a value-based but feasible position (programme point ID: KP4);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — implementation indicators and follow-up for the released envelope (programme point ID: A8, A1); measuring the actual functioning of independent institutions (programme point ID: A6);
  • Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points) — district-level impact targets and the share reaching the most disadvantaged districts (programme point ID: TE1, TE2); control-group impact evaluation (programme point ID: TE3);
  • Economy (background material) — the productivity effect of EU transfers, the competition-distorting risk of support, and the partnership plans of the 2028–2034 budget;
  • Legal foundations (background material) — the Commission proposes, the Council decides, the EP delegation has no decision-making power; the accession treaty must be ratified by every member state, and thus by the National Assembly too; the Government cannot interfere in criminal proceedings.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Article 7 TEU and Article 354 TFEU: suspension of membership rights

Article 7 separates two distinct steps. Under paragraph (1), the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members and with the consent of the EP, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the values referred to in Article 2. This is the step launched against Hungary in 2018. Paragraph (2) concerns the more serious determination, and here the rule is different. According to the official text, the European Council, after inviting the member state in question to submit its observations, “may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2”, acting by unanimity. Only then may the Council, by qualified majority, suspend rights, including voting rights. Under Article 354 TFEU, the member state concerned does not take part in the vote, and abstention does not prevent the decision. However, a vote against by any other member state does prevent it. Applied to the Hungarian case: unanimity protects not the state concerned, but the government allied with it. The Commission’s current proposal would close this gap for new members by qualified majority, but leave it open for old ones. Point 3.1 therefore asks that Hungary accept at least the change concerning deadlines for old members, itself included.

📖 Source: Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26 October 2012), Article 7 TEU, Article 354 TFEU

6.4.2 European Union: EU Global Strategy

The Union’s 2016 global foreign and security policy strategy, Shared Vision, Common Action, treats enlargement policy as one of the main instruments of resilience in the neighbouring region. The document’s central sentence:

“A credible enlargement policy grounded on strict and fair conditionality is an irreplaceable tool to enhance resilience within the countries concerned.”

In other words: a credible enlargement policy built on strict and fair conditionality is an irreplaceable tool for strengthening the resilience of the countries concerned. Elsewhere, the strategy calls a credible enlargement policy a strategic investment in Europe’s security and prosperity. The two adjectives together are the point. Enlargement without strictness erodes the trust of current members, and strictness without fairness erodes the trust of the candidates. One test of fairness is that the condition does not apply only to entrants. If the Union expects of new members a rule-of-law discipline that old members do not accept for themselves, the charge of two-tier membership will not remain an empty phrase. The symmetry test of point 3.1 translates this fairness condition into a Hungarian negotiating position.

📖 Source: European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)

6.4.3 OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union 2021

The OECD’s 2021 EU survey deals with regional convergence in a separate chapter. According to the chapter, convergence over the past two decades has been uneven: Central and Eastern Europe has moved closer to the average, while Southern Europe has often fallen behind. The study adds:

“Furthermore, within most countries, gaps between large cities and rural areas have widened.”

In other words: within most countries, moreover, the gap between large cities and rural areas has grown. In its recommendations on the EU budget, the OECD also writes that effective regional development requires careful project selection. Instead of the first-come, first-served principle sometimes applied, applications should be compared according to how far they contribute to regional development objectives. The report also warns of weak competition in cohesion procurement and frequent single-bid procedures. Telex’s district-level data show the Hungarian version of this thesis: alongside national convergence, income gaps between districts did not narrow even over fifteen years. The district-level impact target of point 3.3 and the single-bid indicator of point 3.2 make these two OECD warnings measurable.

📖 Source: OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union 2021

6.5 International comparison

Post-accession monitoring has an EU precedent. Telex recalls that Bulgaria and Romania could join in 2007 only under anti-corruption monitoring, and that this procedure was ended in 2023. This Cooperation and Verification Mechanism shows that a post-accession set of conditions can work. However, it also shows that such an instrument can persist for as long as a decade and a half if it has no exit condition fixed in advance. The history of Article 7 shows the other side. The procedure against Poland was launched in 2017, the one against Hungary in 2018, and according to Telex the Hungarian procedure has since moved neither forwards nor backwards. Because of mutual protection, the mechanism remained inoperable for old members for years. The Commission’s proposal would apply the first lesson to new members, but responds to the second only by examining deadlines.

For measuring territorial impact, MIAK’s programme points record two foreign models. In the United Kingdom, the multidimensional deprivation index (Index of Multiple Deprivation) is the main instrument for allocating local and central development funds. According to the lesson of the TE1 programme point, the index improved targeting, but territorial inequality as a whole did not decrease. The index is therefore a necessary but not sufficient condition, which is why an impact evaluation is needed alongside it. In Poland, according to the description of the TE2 programme point, the allocation of cohesion funds is aligned with the development level of the voivodeships, and decision-making powers over regional programmes lie with the voivodeships. The Hungarian proposal 3.3 is more modest: it does not decentralise decision-making powers, but makes district-level outcomes visible and measurable.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Principled pragmatism doctrine
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP19 — International institutional reform position

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability

Territorial inequality and rural policy

  • TE1 — Micro-regional development index
  • TE2 — Data-based allocation of EU cohesion funds
  • TE3 — Segregated-area map and catch-up programme

Proposed new programme point: A symmetrical EU rule-of-law position — Hungary supports for new members only a rule-of-law rule that it also accepts for its own Article 7 procedure, with deadlines, judicial review and closure conditions fixed in advance — for the Foreign policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 7 October 2026 — topic 2):

International press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 7 October 2026 — topics 3 and 4):

Official documents and legal sources:

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
  • 📖 European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)
  • 📖 OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union 2021

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3, KP4, KP17, KP19)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A6, A8)
  • MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points and background material; programme point ID: TE1, TE2, TE3)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (background material)
  • MIAK legal foundations: typical conceptual errors concerning branches of power and institutional competences (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 7 October 2026 — topic 2, score: 85/100
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 7 October 2026 — topic 3 (94/100) and topic 4 (89/100)

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