Part I — Situation overview

COELA, the working party of the Council of the European Union dealing with enlargement, held its first meeting after the summer break on 1 September 2026, and it was here that Hungary refused to approve the screening results relating to Ukraine in the case of clusters 2 and 3. Cluster 2 covers the internal market, cluster 3 competitiveness and inclusive growth; the formal opening of clusters requires the unanimous support of all 27 member states, so the refusal of a single member state stops the process. This is the third such occasion since the change of government. The reason for the Hungarian position is unchanged: there is no advance until Kyiv fulfils its bilateral commitments on national minority rights. The background is that in June 2026 an agreement was reached on the educational, cultural, linguistic and political rights of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia, and on 15 June the first cluster, named “Fundamentals”, was opened for Ukraine and Moldova. In July the Hungarian government consented only to advancing Moldova’s cluster 3, but the majority of member states — led by Ireland, which then held the rotating presidency — opposed separating the processes of the two countries, so no decision was taken in either matter.

The other half of the week of talks took place in Budapest. On 1 September the prime minister met Manfred Weber, president of the European People’s Party; according to the head of government’s account, Weber promised help in ensuring that Hungary would not have to pay the one-million-euro-a-day asylum periodic penalty payment. The Hungarian position, however, was that the country would not change its asylum practice, and that it would ask for the penalty imposed so far to be credited when the new EU budget is negotiated. On 2 September António Costa, president of the European Council, held talks in Budapest; after the meeting the prime minister set out three conditions: Hungary can accept the next seven-year EU budget only if it meets the interests of Hungarian people and businesses; it expects a solution as soon as possible on suspending the daily penalty; and it does not support an accelerated accession procedure for any candidate country. He also confirmed the maintenance of the border closure and the relevant legislative environment.

MIAK’s reading: this week showed that the Hungarian enlargement-policy and asylum position is not government-dependent but structural. The same veto under a different cabinet — and the same periodic penalty payment that two governments have been unable or unwilling to end. With a position as lasting as this, the question is not whether it is justified, but whether it is documented. Two things are missing from the public record today: what the itemised, achievable list of conditions for the Hungarian veto is, and how much debt has accumulated so far from the penalty. Both are data, not opinion.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

The interpretive frame is given by three sources. The first is Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger (German-born American diplomat and historian of diplomacy, Secretary of State of the United States between 1973 and 1977), whose recurring proposition is that a country’s negotiating position depends on the number of options open to it — whoever narrows their own room for manoeuvre makes the negotiating partner’s calculations easier. The second is the European Union’s 2016 global strategy, which introduced the concept of principled pragmatism: a foreign policy decision has to be based at once on a realistic assessment of the strategic environment and on declared values, and this duality works only if the weighing is recorded in writing — otherwise the “principle” is capable of justifying any decision after the fact. The third is The Grand Chessboard by Zbigniew Brzezinski (Polish-born American geostrategist, National Security Advisor of the United States between 1977 and 1981), which describes Ukraine as a geopolitical pivot: the country’s status is not a regional detail but one of the determining variables of the continent’s structure of power. The three sources together point to the conclusion that the veto is a legitimate instrument, but that a veto without a written justification is strategic self-limitation. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy; European Union: EU Global Strategy — Shared Vision, Common Action (2016); Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The starting point of the position is that the unanimity requirement is part of the treaties, so the exercise of the veto is not a breach of the rules but an entitlement. The question is whether we exercise this entitlement in a form that is intelligible to the Hungarian public and to the negotiating partners as well.

3.1 A public veto-justification standard (introducible before the next COELA meeting)

If Hungary blocks an EU decision requiring unanimity, the decision-maker should publish a written justification of no more than two pages containing three elements: (1) the specific legislative or bilateral-commitment objection — which point of which agreement has not been fulfilled; (2) the measurable conditions of fulfilment, that is, precisely what has to happen for the veto to be lifted (for example the entry into force of legislation on school language training, the operating licence of a given number of institutions, the publication of a specified monitoring report); (3) the date of review. The proposal does not ask for the publicity of the diplomatic negotiation — negotiating tactics may remain secret — but for the publicity of the reasons for the position that emerges as the end result. This is the direct application of MIAK’s programme point KP3, which prescribes a compulsory written justification for Council votes; its model is Swedish practice, where the parliamentary committee on European affairs approves the Council mandate in advance, and the justification of the vote is public. In the Hungarian version MIAK proposes publication after the fact, because that binds the hands of the negotiating delegation less.

3.2 A monthly, itemised statement on the asylum periodic penalty payment (for the first time within 30 days)

A monthly, public statement should be prepared on the one-million-euro-a-day periodic penalty payment imposed following the asylum judgment, giving four figures: the amount of the accumulated claim from the delivery of the judgment to the end of the given month; how much of this has been enforced by way of set-off against EU payments; which budget lines the set-off affected; and the state of the legal steps aimed at ending the payment obligation. The order of magnitude of the claim can be seen by simple multiplication from the daily item — in the time elapsed since the 2024 judgment this is a matter of several hundred million euros — but nobody publishes the officially acknowledged sum and the method of set-off today. This is the financial side of MIAK’s programme point KP3, and at the same time the least contestable of the three proposals: preparing the statement requires no political decision, only the disclosure of data. As long as there is no statement, the assertion “the previous government left this to us” and the assertion “the present government has not solved this either” are equally unprovable.

3.3 Publication of the milestones of fulfilment of the bilateral minority protection agreement (before the next country report)

The government should break down the undertakings of the Hungarian–Ukrainian minority protection agreement concluded in June 2026 into measurable milestones, and publish their state of fulfilment every six months. The milestones should be verifiable: entry into force of legislation, institutional operating data, pupil numbers, financing items. Publication works in two directions. On the one hand it makes the Hungarian position verifiable and thereby defensible: if fulfilment is objectively measurable, the veto cannot be characterised as an instrument of domestic politics. On the other hand it draws an unambiguous path of fulfilment for Kyiv, which is also more valuable in the bilateral relationship than an expectation formulated in general terms. Kissinger’s argument (see 6.4.1) works here in reverse: a condition that is open but set out item by item preserves the Hungarian room for manoeuvre, whereas an objection left unclosed and undefined sooner or later loses its value, because the partners learn that there is nothing to fulfil in it.

The three measures are linked by a single principle: the Hungarian position is strong if it is capable of being fulfilled. A veto that has a list of conditions and a review date is a negotiating instrument. A veto that has neither becomes background noise in time — the partners price it in, get round it, or charge its price in other matters. MIAK’s KP4 doctrine of principled pragmatism targets precisely this difference: what counts is not who states the position, but whether it is substantiated.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy The Hungarian position becomes verifiable and thereby harder to characterise as an instrument of domestic politics An itemised list of conditions binds the negotiating delegation: what we have once written down is hard not to accept in the event of fulfilment
Budget The penalty debt becomes visible, and with it the political weight of ending it grows A large sum made public is in itself a surface for political attack — whether directed at the government or at the EU institutions
Bilateral relationship Kyiv receives an unambiguous path of fulfilment, mistrust breaks down into measurable questions If the milestones are met but the veto remains, the credibility of the Hungarian position suffers greater damage than before
EU negotiating position Predictable conduct brings coalition partners in other matters In the short term the room for manoeuvre narrows: a public condition cannot be quietly traded for a concession obtained in another matter

The main question to be weighed is the relationship between publicity and room for manoeuvre. The classic objection of the diplomatic literature to transparency is that partners exploit a position communicated in advance — this is why most freedom-of-information regulation contains a foreign affairs exemption. MIAK’s proposal avoids this risk at two points: negotiating tactics remain secret, only the reasons for the position already adopted become public, and publication is after the fact, not in advance. What genuinely narrows is the possibility of quiet retreat. This, however, is not a side effect but the essence of the proposal: in MIAK’s view a veto that can be given up at any time without justification is for that very reason not a credible threat. The proposal tips over to the risk side if the list of conditions is too detailed, and every small shortfall in fulfilment results in automatic blocking — this is why the review date and weighting are needed.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs — Key Performance Indicators). These are proposed indicators, not governmental undertakings.

  • Proportion of justified vetoes: for what percentage of Hungarian refusal positions cast in matters requiring unanimity a public written justification is prepared. The baseline value in today’s practice is essentially zero; MIAK proposes 100 per cent as the target for 2027.
  • Development of the penalty debt: the monthly closing sum of the accumulated periodic penalty payment and the proportion of the part enforced by set-off. If the debt grows but no legal step is in progress, that is in itself a signal.
  • Rate of fulfilment of the minority protection milestones: how many undertakings from the June agreement have been fulfilled on time. This is the indicator that the lifting of the veto can refer to.
  • Divergence of Council positions from the majority position: one of the basic indicators of the credibility audit under MIAK’s programme point KP23 — not because divergence would be bad in itself, but so that its long-term price is visible.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request in a single sentence: the government should publish the itemised list of conditions for the veto and the monthly statement on the asylum penalty debt — because without these two documents the Hungarian position is verifiable neither for the Hungarian voter nor for the negotiating partners, and what cannot be verified is sooner or later not taken seriously either. The proposal does not ask for the veto to be given up, and it takes no position on the question of Ukraine’s membership either; it asks that the Hungarian position exist in a form that can be fulfilled.

Of MIAK’s foundational values two are in play here. Transparency is what gives the essence of the proposal: a foreign policy decision is a public matter even if the negotiation is not. And data-drivenness is the yardstick: a minority protection objection may be entirely well founded, but as long as it has no measure, it cannot be decided whether it has been met — and this does the most harm precisely to that Hungarian community on whose protection we rely.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The framing of the press, spectrum by spectrum

The liberal-left band built on international news sources and explained the mechanics of the process. 444.hu published the most detailed procedural description on the basis of the Kyiv Post and Ukrainska Pravda — the content of the clusters, the unanimity requirement, the failure of the July Moldovan separate track — so its framing is technical, not evaluative. The same paper, however, in its report on the Weber talks already sharpened the focus onto the internal contradiction: the government asks for the penalty to be ended while not changing its practice. HVG handled the two strands in two separate articles, and in the eurologus piece highlighted the Kyiv Post’s interpretation, according to which Budapest attaches further concrete Ukrainian steps to the process.

The public affairs band used a shorter, explanatory register. 24.hu’s summary gave a procedural explanation intended for the lay reader — that before the opening of the clusters the process is still only at screening, and that almost every point of the process requires full agreement — which is the most useful element of the field for those who see the news for the first time. ATV confined itself to reporting the fact of the Costa meeting.

The conservative band sharpened the same sequence of events onto the question of what was given in return. According to the Magyar Nemzet headline, the head of government “keeps deeply silent” about what Weber asked in exchange for the help offered, and the paper also sketches the balance of power around the next seven-year budget — the opposition between net contributors and net beneficiaries. Mandiner took over the Kyiv Post’s report and placed the fact of the veto in focus. The substantive contribution of the conservative framing to the debate is precisely the question of what is given in return: if the leader of an EU party family promises help in settling a member state’s payment obligation, then its political price also deserves publicity — this is exactly the argument on which MIAK’s veto-justification standard is built as well, only in the opposite direction.

One source requires a note: the relevant Népszava piece is available in today’s monitor only as a title-level reference, so we refrain from analysing its framing.

6.2 Facts and data

Item Status Note
Cluster 1 (“Fundamentals”) opened on 15 June 2026 for Ukraine and Moldova this is the only formally opened cluster
Cluster 2 (internal market) approval of the screening results did not take place because of the Hungarian veto 1 September 2026, COELA meeting
Cluster 3 (competitiveness, inclusive growth) approval of the screening results did not take place because of the Hungarian veto 1 September 2026, COELA meeting
Cluster 6 (foreign and security policy, trade) the Hungarian block lifted technical preparation could start
Decision rule the opening of clusters requires the unanimous support of all 27 member states a single member state can stop the process
Bilateral agreement June 2026, educational, cultural, linguistic and political rights in Transcarpathia the basis of reference for the Hungarian veto
Asylum periodic penalty payment EUR 1 million a day on the basis of the 2024 judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union; the 2020 judgment established the infringement

Two calculations are worth carrying out, because neither appears in the press material. One: one million euros a day corresponds at the present exchange rate to roughly 400 million forints a day — this sum is not an abstract EU item but a burden on the Hungarian budget. The other: in the time elapsed since the 2024 judgment the daily item has accumulated a claim of several hundred million euros; the exact, officially acknowledged sum and the method of set-off, however, are published by no one. Point 3.2 of MIAK’s proposal targets precisely this gap — without knowing the order of magnitude it is impossible to judge how large an item the settlement of the penalty is in the EU budget negotiations.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — compulsory written justification of Council votes and half-yearly foreign policy data disclosure (programme point ID: KP3), the recording in writing of the value-based and interest-based weighing of decisions (programme point ID: KP4), issue-by-issue EU coalition-building (programme point ID: KP17) and the annual alliance credibility audit (programme point ID: KP23);
  • Social policy (background material) — the asylum procedural system, whose non-compliance with EU law is the basis of the periodic penalty payment; ending the penalty depends on a regulatory decision taken in this area, not on the foreign policy negotiation.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

Kissinger formulates the basic rule of the negotiating position in his analysis of nineteenth-century Prussian foreign policy, and the formulation still holds today:

“A country’s negotiating position depends on the options open to it. If we eliminate these, we thereby make the adversary’s calculations easier.”

The proposition can be applied to the question of the veto in two directions. On the one hand: whoever blocks in every matter and in every forum narrows their own options, because the partners learn that the Hungarian position does not depend on the content of the matter, and that it is therefore not worth making an offer on it. On the other hand — and this is the more important — whoever does not even determine the conditions of their veto makes the partner’s calculations easier: the partner knows that there is nothing to fulfil, and therefore will not. Kissinger shows the other side too in the same analysis: credibility is built slowly and lost quickly, because the weight of an unfulfilled threat declines in direct proportion to the passing of time. The Hungarian enlargement-policy position stands today at precisely this point — after the third repeated blocking, the question is whether the veto has a condition of fulfilment, or has become a permanent state.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

6.4.2 European Union: EU Global Strategy — Shared Vision, Common Action (2016)

The 2016 global strategy cuts short the debate about whether EU foreign policy should be value-based or interest-based. The document’s answer is both, and it coins a concept for this:

“We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.”

Principled pragmatism in itself gives an answer to no single concrete question — this is the weakness of the concept and at the same time its use. Its weakness, because it is broad enough for almost any decision to fit into it: if the principles never have to be set in writing against the strategic interest, the concept becomes a justification after the fact. Its use, because if the weighing has to be documented, then the clash of the principled and the interest-based consideration becomes visible, and can be called to account afterwards. This is why MIAK’s programme point KP4 takes over not the concept but the procedure belonging to the concept: a written weighing document for every foreign policy decision. In the case of the Hungarian veto this document would answer the question to which there is no answer today — how the minority protection value and the neighbourhood policy interest relate to each other when the two point in opposite directions.

📖 Source: European Union: EU Global Strategy — Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (2016)

6.4.3 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

Brzezinski describes Ukraine not as a simple neighbouring state but as a geopolitical pivot, and records his proposition in the following form:

“Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia.”

The volume appeared in 1997, almost three decades before today’s situation, and this is precisely why it is worth taking seriously: the author was not arguing in the light of the present war. The consequence of the proposition for the Hungarian debate is that the question of Ukraine’s EU integration cannot be reduced to the minority protection matter — however justified a sub-question that is, it is an order of magnitude smaller a stake than the question of which institutional order the eastern edge of the continent belongs to. This is not an argument against the Hungarian objection; it is an argument for the objection having to be formulated in a form capable of being fulfilled. If the Hungarian position is tied to measurable conditions, then the minority protection aim is attainable and the strategic question also remains decidable. If it is not, the two matters slide together, and the partners will read the Hungarian position as an answer to the strategic question — regardless of whether it was meant as one.

📖 Source: Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

6.5 International comparison

The public justification of Council positions is not a theoretical proposal: in Sweden the Riksdag’s committee on European affairs approves the Council mandate in advance, and the justification of the vote is public. The price of the system is well documented: the Swedish delegation’s room for manoeuvre is narrower, because the mandate is fixed, and it can therefore give ground less easily during negotiations. Denmark uses a similar, though less rigid, solution. Since 2018 the Dutch government has reported annually on the results of EU coalition-building, and the Finnish foreign affairs administration evaluates annually the fulfilment of multilateral commitments — these are the models for MIAK’s programme point KP23.

From the side of enlargement conditionality, the most instructive precedents are the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia and the name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia. In both cases a member state’s bilateral objection blocked the accession process, and both cases teach the same thing: blocking led to a solution when the objection took a concrete, written and achievable form (in the case of the Prespa agreement, treaty text), and dragged on for years when the objection remained general. The Hungarian situation is today in the second state, even though with the June bilateral agreement the raw material is there for it to move into the first.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Principled pragmatism doctrine
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit

Proposed new programme point: A veto-justification standard — for the Foreign policy area: in the event of blocking an EU decision requiring unanimity, a compulsory two-page justification published after the fact, with an itemised list of conditions and a review date.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 3 September 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge base references (specialist books):

  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy
  • 📖 European Union: EU Global Strategy — Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (2016)
  • 📖 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3, KP4, KP17, KP23)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 3 September 2026 — topic 2, score: 90/100

Generation metadata