Part I — Situation overview

On 18 September 2026 Politico Europe published two opposing opinion pieces on the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF — the EU’s seven-year budgetary framework). According to the joint piece by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten, Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo and Austrian Chancellor Christian Stocker, the increase of some 60 per cent in nominal terms proposed by the Commission is “not realistic”. They therefore ask for a balanced cut of “several hundred billion euros” compared with the proposal, and would steer spending towards security, competitiveness and action against irregular migration. An important clarification: they are not demanding a reduction compared with the current framework. Carlos Cuerpo, Spain’s Deputy Prime Minister and Economy Minister, would raise the framework to 2 per cent of gross national income (GNI — the basis of member states’ contributions). He would also reschedule the repayment of the common borrowing of the post-coronavirus recovery programme (NextGenerationEU), which would free up as much as 11 billion euros a year. On both sides this is a negotiating position, not a decision. The MFF regulation fixing the headline figures is adopted unanimously by the Council, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament (EP), under Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Hungarian Government’s vote is therefore needed for it.

Alongside the budget debate, a structural debate is also under way. The Commission would merge the agricultural, cohesion and other major spending areas into a single national plan per country. According to Euractiv, the negotiations in the EP’s agriculture committee broke down on the morning of Thursday, 17 September. The Socialists, the right-wing groups and the Left rejected the idea that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) should remain entirely within the single plan. The proposal would ring-fence 300 billion euros for farmers’ income support. Rural development, however, would compete for funding from the common fund, together with cohesion objectives. A decision is expected in the negotiating document of the Irish Council Presidency in October, and an agreement in December at the earliest. MIAK’s analysis of 27 August dealt with quantifying the shrinking of the envelope and with own resources, and its analysis of 17 September with the structure of the rule-of-law condition.

MIAK’s reading: Hungary is a net beneficiary, so the size of the envelope matters, but the Hungarian balance of the next cycle will be decided at least as much by the internal rules of the single plan. If agricultural and convergence money compete in one fund, then alongside hectare-based income support, rural development and the catching-up of the most disadvantaged areas will fight for the same remainder. The districts with the least capacity to apply for funding are losers in this competition from the outset. The question is therefore not whether the CAP will be merged, but whether the single plan will contain a protected, mandatorily ring-fenced share for those who have the least chance in the competition.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide a framework for the internal structure of the national plan. According to the EU Economic Survey 2025 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), CAP direct payments largely function as a general entitlement and are capitalised into land prices and rents. The support should therefore be steered from the richest farms towards the poorest. The survey also indicates that country plans built on the model of the recovery facility may speed up implementation, but may lose sight of local development strategies. The OECD’s earlier survey, the EU Economic Survey 2021, finds that rural areas are eligible for both rural development and cohesion support at the same time, but the two are poorly coordinated. It also records that some 80 per cent of direct payments go to 20 per cent of farmers. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC — the EU’s consultative body of civil society), in its opinion written for the 2021–2027 cycle, itself asked for the rural development fund to be reintegrated into the common cohesion rulebook, in order to strengthen synergies. It follows that the merger makes professional sense if the merged framework protects the weakest. The detailed treatment of the literature — by author, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. All three target the internal structure of the single national plan, not the overall size of the framework, and all three relate to the time window before the Irish Presidency’s October negotiating document.

3.1 A mandatory territorial minimum quota in the single national plan (EU negotiating position by October, domestic enshrinement with the first draft of the national plan)

MIAK proposes that in the Council negotiations the Government should support not the restoration of a separate CAP plan, but a territorial minimum quota to be built into the rules of the single plan. Every national plan should be required to ring-fence a minimum share for the least developed regions. Rural development and cohesion spending should count towards this share together, so that the two areas would not compete with each other but serve a common district strategy. At home, the Government should lay down in the first draft of the national plan that the share reaching the most disadvantaged (LHH) districts — in line with the objective of MIAK’s programme point TE2 — should reach 25 per cent by 2030. According to MIAK’s estimate, it is 12–15 per cent today. Any deviation should have to be publicly justified under the “comply or explain” principle (comply or explain). Compliance should be shown by the project data sheets under A8, broken down by district, and the annual report should be debated by Parliament’s European Affairs Committee. According to the OECD’s 2021 finding (see 6.4.2), the two funding sources are poorly coordinated in rural areas today. The single plan can solve this, but only if the competition is not decided by the capacity to apply for funding.

3.2 A mandatory upper limit on CAP income support and priority for small farmers (negotiating position by October, domestic implementing rule by the end of 2027)

The proposed ring-fenced income support of 300 billion euros is the most protected part of the single plan. This is therefore where it will be decided most of all who the money goes to. MIAK proposes that in the negotiations the Government should support a per-farm upper limit (capping) and degressivity, meaning that support should gradually decrease above a certain amount. These should not be a member-state option but a mandatory EU rule. The amount freed up above the upper limit should stay within the national envelope, and should be mandatorily used to strengthen the complementary support for the first hectares of smaller farms, as well as the territorial share under 3.1. In domestic implementation, the Government should publish the beneficiary concentration of income support in bands by farm size. The data should be searchable and downloadable on the MG2 agricultural data platform, and the administrative burden on small farms should be reduced by the digitalisation programme of MG4. According to the OECD’s 2025 survey (see 6.4.1), a significant part of the payments is capitalised into the price and rent of land. The upper limit is therefore directed not against farmers, but against land rent.

3.3 Rescheduling the Covid loan repayment as an issue-based coalition point (position before the October document, publication of a cost calculation by 31 October 2026)

Cuerpo’s proposal would not change the maturity of the common loan (2058), it would only spread the principal repayments more evenly. According to Politico, this is supported by the Commission, Italy, France, Portugal and Poland, while the net contributors reject it. MIAK proposes that, following the logic of issue-based coalition-building in KP17, the Government should join the southern and Polish camp on this single question. The support should be conditional. First: the Government should publish how much additional interest the rescheduling means up to 2058, and how much of this falls on the Hungarian contribution. Second: the room for manoeuvre freed up should primarily mitigate the cuts to the cohesion and rural development share, not finance new priorities. Third: this coalition should not be linked to the question of the rule-of-law condition. Rescheduling is a technical financial decision, while conditionality is an institutional question, and linking the two would damage Hungarian credibility in both matters. According to the EESC’s argument (see 6.4.3), the point of the merged framework is synergy. The repayment room for manoeuvre is needed precisely so that the merger does not turn into a silent cutting of the weaker chapters.

The three proposals are bound together by a single principle: a common fund is only better than separate funds if the competition is limited by rules. Both OECD surveys show that unrestricted competition favours actors that are already strong, whether a large farm or a region with a large capacity to apply for funding.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Territorial convergence The mandatory minimum quota provides a predictable source of funding for the most disadvantaged districts, and enforces a coordinated rural development–cohesion strategy If the quota is not accompanied by capacity-building, the funds remain uncommitted and flow back or are lost
Agriculture The upper limit and priority for small farmers mitigate the concentration of support and reduce the part capitalised into land prices Large holdings can circumvent the upper limit by formally splitting up the farm; exemptions for employment can hollow out the rule
Budget Rescheduling the Covid loan repayment opens up EU room for manoeuvre of as much as 11 billion euros a year, which may mitigate the cuts to cohesion and rural development A longer repayment typically means more interest, and shifts the burden onto the budgets after 2035
Foreign policy An issue-based coalition with the southern and Polish camp gives the Hungarian position a concrete, quantified point In the eyes of the net contributors the Hungarian position may appear to be part of the “spend more” camp, which could weaken Hungary’s bargaining position on other questions

The main question for deliberation lies between protection and efficiency. The minimum quota protects the weakest regions, but if the capacity to apply for funding there does not grow, the quota is met only on paper, or is filled with poor projects. Programme point TE2 also signals this: directing funds somewhere does not automatically mean they are used. That is why proposal 3.1 only works together with district-level project preparation capacity. The upper limit becomes risky if the rule is merely formal: the legal splitting of the farm must be countered by aggregated calculation for linked enterprises. In the case of the Covid loan, the risk is shifting the burden between generations. MIAK therefore proposes not unconditional support, but support tied to a published cost calculation.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes four performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) from which it will be visible in 6, 12 and 24 months whether the proposals have been put into effect:

  • A territorial minimum in the EU rule: it is worth following whether the agreement on the single national plans contains a mandatory minimum share ring-fenced for the least developed regions (yes/no, on the basis of the text of the December agreement).
  • Share of LHH districts: the suggested target is that the combined share of rural development and cohesion funds reaching the most disadvantaged districts should reach 25 per cent by 2030, and that this should be published annually, broken down by district.
  • Concentration of income support: it is worth following how the share of CAP income support going to the largest 20 per cent of beneficiaries changes, and whether a mandatory per-farm upper limit applies from 2028.
  • Covid loan cost calculation: it is suggested that by 31 October 2026 the Government publish the impact of the rescheduling on the Hungarian contribution and the additional interest; the indicator is the fact and date of publication.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the Government is that in the negotiations on the 2028–2034 EU budget it should stand up not only for the size of the envelope but also for the internal rules of the single national plan. It should ask for a mandatory territorial minimum quota, towards which rural development and convergence count together. It should support a mandatory upper limit on CAP income support and priority for small farms. And in rescheduling the Covid loan repayment it should take on an issue-based coalition with the southern and Polish camp, with a published cost calculation. The piece by the five net contributors and the Spanish proposal are for now only positions, so there is still time until the October document to formulate the Hungarian structural demands.

Two MIAK foundational values are at stake. Universal representation, because in a common fund it is the regions and farmers without the capacity to apply for funding and to assert their interests who lose. The mandatory quota and the upper limit enshrine their interest in a rule, not in a bargain. Data-drivenness, because all three proposals are tied to a verifiable figure: the district share, the beneficiary concentration and the published cost of repayment.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

Politico Europe framed the debate as a duel between two camps: the headline of the news article is about Germany and Spain going head-to-head, and by placing the two opinion pieces side by side it highlights that an agreement is still far off. The paper added that, according to officials who asked for anonymity, a more moderate cut is the most likely outcome, and that rescheduling the repayment could be a last-minute solution in the December deal. The net contributors’ piece chose the frame of “spend better, not more”, and named the rule of law as a precondition for all EU funding. The Spanish piece, by contrast, put at its centre the defence of the welfare state and of integration, as well as the populist pressure ahead of next year’s elections.

Euractiv focused on the structural debate: it quoted an MEP describing the breakdown of the agriculture committee negotiations as the “first wheel to fall off” the reform, and indicated that a separate CAP plan could contradict the EP’s interim report of April. Two further pieces by the paper — on the dispute over green safeguards and on divisions over cohesion policy — are behind a paywall, and only their headline and subheading are readable. In the Hungarian press, MIAK’s domestic press monitor of 18 September did not rank the topic among the most important topics. The day before, Portfolio’s section dealing with EU funds covered the other side of common EU borrowing: the plan to include EU bonds in government bond indices. Common to the whole spectrum is that the internal structure of the national plan — who competes with whom in the common fund — appears only in the specialist press.

6.2 Facts and data

Datum Value Source
The Commission’s proposal for the 2028–2034 framework nearly 2,000 billion euros; an increase of some 60 per cent in nominal terms Politico Europe, 18 September 2026
The demand of the five net contributors a cut of “several hundred billion euros” compared with the Commission proposal; they are not demanding a reduction compared with the current framework Merz, Frederiksen, Jetten, Stocker, Orpo, Politico Europe, 18 September 2026
The five countries’ share in financing the EU budget nearly 40 per cent Politico Europe, 18 September 2026
The Spanish proposal a ceiling for the framework of 2 per cent of GNI Carlos Cuerpo, Politico Europe, 18 September 2026
The Commission proposal without repayments some 1.15 per cent of GNI Carlos Cuerpo, Politico Europe, 18 September 2026
Repayment of the recovery loan some 300 billion euros between 2028 and 2058; under the current plan 25 billion euros a year in the next cycle Politico Europe, 18 September 2026
Impact of the rescheduling as much as 11 billion euros a year; according to Cuerpo’s calculation nearly 70 billion euros over the seven years Carlos Cuerpo, Politico Europe, 18 September 2026
The burden of the Covid loan on the next framework nearly 170 billion euros the five leaders’ piece, Politico Europe, 18 September 2026
The amount ring-fenced for farmers’ income support 300 billion euros Euractiv, 17 September 2026
EP groups rejecting the single national plan in the agriculture committee Socialists and Democrats, Patriots for Europe, European Conservatives and Reformists, the Left, Europe of Sovereign Nations Euractiv, 17 September 2026
EP groups supporting the single national plan European People’s Party, Renew Europe, the Greens Euractiv, 17 September 2026
The CAP framework in 2021–2027 387 billion euros, of which 291 billion is the guarantee fund (direct payments and market measures) OECD: EU Economic Survey 2025
Concentration of direct payments in the EU some 80 per cent of them go to 20 per cent of farmers OECD: EU Economic Survey 2021 (World Bank data, 2017)
Share of cohesion funds reaching LHH districts 12–15 per cent (MIAK estimate); MIAK’s target is 25 per cent by 2030 MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy

Two data points need a separate note. The 12–15 per cent for LHH districts is a MIAK estimate, not an official statistic: this is precisely why proposal 3.1 asks the Government to publish official data broken down by district. As for the repayment data, the annual figure of 11 billion and the seven-year figure of 70 billion are Cuerpo’s own calculation, not Commission data. According to Politico, the Commission supports the rescheduling, but the article does not report a Commission cost calculation.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Agriculture (programme points) — the upper limit on CAP income support and the transparency of beneficiary concentration: MG2 (agricultural data platform) is the tool for publishing the concentration data, and MG4 (digitalisation of small farmers) reduces the administrative burden on small farms;
  • Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points) — TE2 (data-based allocation of EU cohesion funds) provides the 25 per cent LHH target and the “comply or explain” principle, and TE1 (micro-regional development index) the measurement basis for district-level targeting;
  • Social policy (programme points) — the independent Cohesion Watch body of SZ14 (Cohesion Pillar 2.0) could give its opinion on the territorial share of the national plan;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — KP17 (issue-based coalition-building in the EU) is the framework for the coalition with the southern and Polish camp built on rescheduling the Covid loan;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the project data sheets of A8 (cohesion policy accountability) make the fulfilment of the territorial quota verifiable;
  • Economy — the rescheduling of repayments also affects the domestic budget through Hungary’s GNI-based contribution.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 OECD: EU Economic Survey 2025

The OECD’s 2025 survey of the EU speaks directly to the present debate on two points. The first is the targeting of CAP direct payments. According to the survey, the effect of the payments on the level and stability of farm income is limited, because a significant part of them is capitalised into the price and rent of land, and so ends up with other actors. From this the survey derives a clear direction:

“Similarly to the cohesion spending, to reduce inequality both between and within countries, the CAP support needs to be re-directed from the richest to the poorest EU countries and from the richest to the poorest farm households within a country.”

The second is the Commission’s new budgetary structure built on country plans. According to the OECD, it follows the model of the recovery facility, which linked reforms and investments in a single plan, but did not bring the expected administrative simplification, and involved regional and local governments only to a small extent. Cohesion policy has so far been built on multi-level governance. As the survey warns, “while policy execution may be accelerated, the approach may fail to identify the best local development strategies”. Translated to the Hungarian single plan: central planning may be faster, but the local strategy is lost if there is no mandatory territorial share. That is why MIAK asks for the district-level minimum in proposal 3.1, and for the upper limit on income support in 3.2.

📖 Source: OECD: OECD Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025

6.4.2 OECD: EU Economic Survey 2021

The OECD’s 2021 survey compares the two major instruments of territorial balancing, cohesion policy and the CAP. It finds that three quarters of cohesion funds go to regions with a GDP per capita below 75 per cent of the EU average, while the allocation of the CAP is largely based on historical entitlements and is much less redistributive. Since support is mostly hectare-based, some 80 per cent of direct payments go to 20 per cent of farmers. Its finding on rural areas speaks directly to the present structural debate:

“Rural regions are often eligible for sizeable support from both rural development policy and cohesion policy, but their interventions are poorly coordinated.”

The survey’s recommendation is an integrated strategy financed jointly from the two sources. MIAK’s proposal 3.1 carries this logic into the single national plan: rural development and cohesion spending should count towards a common district minimum, so that the merger improves coordination rather than sharpening competition between the two.

📖 Source: OECD: OECD Economic Surveys: European Union 2021

6.4.3 European Economic and Social Committee: Cohesion policy as a fundamental pillar

The EESC’s economic section collected its opinions on the 2021–2027 multiannual framework in a single publication. In it, the body criticised both the then planned reduction of the cohesion and agricultural frameworks, and proposed stricter harmonisation of the common provisions. From the point of view of the present debate, the most important point is that the body itself asked for the rural development fund to be reintegrated into the common rulebook:

“[The EESC] believes that the Commission should further reinforce synergies by finding a way to reintegrate the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development into the rulebook.”

This argument speaks in favour of the present single national plan, and shows that the idea of merging is not merely a savings intention, but a long-standing professional demand. MIAK therefore proposes not reversing the merger, but ensuring that synergy is not achieved at the expense of the weaker chapters. The repayment room for manoeuvre under 3.3 reduces precisely this risk.

📖 Source: European Economic and Social Committee (ECO Section): Cohesion policy as a fundamental pillar for bringing the EU closer to its citizens and for reducing disparities among EU regions and inequalities among people (QE-04-20-656-EN-N)

6.5 International comparison

For territorial targeting, Polish cohesion practice is the closest model: according to MIAK’s programme point TE2, there the decision-making power over regional operational programmes belongs to the voivodeships, and territorial allocation is adjusted to the development level of the regions. In the Hungarian single plan the counterpart of this could be the district minimum quota and project preparation at county and district level. The OECD’s 2025 survey also points out that gradualism is an established tool in the CAP. At the time of the 2004 enlargement, direct payments to the new member states were phased in over ten years, starting from 25 per cent of the final level, and the same pattern was followed on the accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. A mandatory upper limit can therefore also be introduced with transitional rules, helping large holdings to adjust.

For giving priority to small farms, the 2021–2027 rules already contain a minimum requirement: according to the OECD’s 2021 survey, member states must steer part of the payments towards smaller farms. Capping and degressivity, however, remained a member-state option. MIAK’s proposal 3.2 would make this option mandatory in the next cycle. According to Politico, the Commission, Italy, France, Portugal and Poland are already open to rescheduling the repayment. This is the rare situation in which Hungary’s interest on a concrete, quantified technical question coincides with that of a broad group of member states.

Agriculture

  • MG2 — Agricultural data platform
  • MG4 — Digitalisation of small farmers

Territorial inequality and rural policy

  • TE1 — Micro-regional development index
  • TE2 — Data-based allocation of EU cohesion funds

Social policy

  • SZ14 — Cohesion Pillar 2.0 — making maximum use of the Hungarian allocation

Foreign policy

  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A8 — Cohesion policy accountability

Proposed new programme point: A mandatory territorial minimum quota in the single national plan and a per-farm upper limit on CAP income support — for the Agriculture policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 18 September 2026 — topic 1):

Supplementary Hungarian press source:

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 OECD: OECD Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025
  • 📖 OECD: OECD Economic Surveys: European Union 2021
  • 📖 European Economic and Social Committee: Cohesion policy as a fundamental pillar for bringing the EU closer to its citizens

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Agriculture (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Agriculture (programme points; programme point ID: MG2, MG4)
  • MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points; programme point ID: TE1, TE2)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ14)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP17)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A8)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 18 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 89/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 312 — the procedure for adopting the multiannual financial framework
  • European Commission — CAP expenditure database (the database of CAP expenditure)
  • European Commission — Cohesion Open Data Platform

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