Part I — Situation overview

According to a government resolution published in the Hungarian Official Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) on 31 August 2026, the Government would review the Supervisory Authority for Regulated Activities (SZTFH) and examine the related statutory regulation. According to the MTI summary reported by 24.hu, the aim is to examine by what regulatory solutions the abolition of the authority, or the transfer of its tasks to bodies directed by the Government, could be carried out. The resolution called on the Justice Minister to prepare a report, with a deadline of 30 September. The resolution thus ordered an examination, not an abolition. The SZTFH was created by the National Assembly in 2021 as an autonomous regulatory body. Under Article 23 of the Fundamental Law, this is an authority established by a cardinal law, which reports annually to the National Assembly, and whose head may also issue decrees within the limits of statutory authorisation. Its abolition therefore requires a cardinal law of the National Assembly, that is, a law whose adoption requires the votes of two thirds of the MPs present; a government resolution or government decree is not sufficient for this. According to the summaries of 24.hu and HVG, the authority today supervises areas far removed from each other: tobacco trade, the gambling market, mining, oil, natural gas and geothermal extraction, the operation of court bailiffs, the register of liquidators, and the security of information systems. It also includes the domestic coordination of the ESG framework (the system measuring companies’ environmental, social and governance performance). In its statement, the authority invoked its independence, its more than 400 staff, and the fact that EU law requires a regulator independent of the government in several areas.

A week later, on 8 September, according to HVG’s report, on behalf of the Government Dávid Vitézy, Minister for Transport and Investment, submitted to the National Assembly the bill that would strip the SZTFH of its tasks and powers relating to state concessions and would abolish the Concession Council. According to the explanatory memorandum, the SZTFH does not in fact carry out this activity, whereas other state bodies do. This is the removal of one group of powers, not the abolition of the authority; the adoption of the bill is for the National Assembly to decide, and the processed sources did not give any newer information on the state of the procedure. Meanwhile, the concession system has reopened in several sectors at once. MIAK published analyses on the waste concession on 4 September, on tobacco wholesale and the casino concessions on 17 September, and on closing the motorway concession on 19 September. These dealt with the individual contracts. And at the rearrangement of ministerial portfolios on 1 September, MIAK already once called for a public map of powers. This analysis is about the supervisory institutional system: about the body that supervises part of the concession-based and licence-bound markets, while the contracts of these same markets are now being renegotiated.

MIAK’s reading: the abolition of the SZTFH may be defensible, because supervision of markets with mutually alien logics in a single hand means a concentration of discretionary power. Abolition in itself, however, only changes the nameplate if it is not known where the powers go. Three risks are real. The first is a supervisory gap: gambling, tobacco trade and mining are among the regulated markets generating the largest rents, so a lost month here is expensive. The second is legal succession, that is, the question of who takes the place of the abolished authority in its pending licensing, inspection and sanctioning cases, and how the deadlines for legal remedies continue. The third is conflict of interest: if supervision goes to the same ministry that renegotiates the concessions on behalf of the state, then the same body will be both the contracting party and the supervisor of the contracting partner. The question is not whether there should be an SZTFH, but who will afterwards supervise these markets, on what legal basis and independently of whom — and this has to be set out publicly before the decision.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three works help decide in what order it is worth transforming a regulatory authority. Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor of law and political science at Yale University, one of the founders of the economic analysis of corruption) writes in her 1999 book Corruption and Government that if the state grants a market entitlement, the regulatory institution has to be set up credibly, before the tendering, and that dismantling one licensing step can create new opportunities for abuse at the remaining decision point. Robert Klitgaard (American economist, author of the classic handbook of anti-corruption policy) describes, in his 1988 work Controlling Corruption, the conditions for abuse as the coincidence of monopoly, discretion and the absence of accountability. It follows that the yardstick of the transformation is the change in these three factors, not the name of the organisation. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics; they received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2024) discuss the iron law of oligarchy in their 2012 book Why Nations Fail. According to this, after a change of leaders extractive institutions often continue to operate untouched, only in other hands. The detailed discussion of the literature — author by author — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first is linked to the Justice Minister’s report of 30 September; the second and third describe the mandatory content of the bill on abolition or transformation. None of them decides in advance whether the SZTFH should be abolished. All three ensure that, if it is abolished, the decision is transparent and leaves no supervisory gap.

3.1 A public inventory of powers together with the report (by 15 October 2026 at the latest)

MIAK proposes that the Government publish the Justice Minister’s report together with the itemised inventory of powers annexed to it by 15 October at the latest. For every SZTFH power, the inventory should contain six data points. The first is the legal basis: a law, a government decree or a decree of the President of the SZTFH. The second is what level of legislation the transfer requires: a cardinal law, an ordinary law or a decree. The third is the proposed receiving body. The fourth is whether an EU legal act requires an authority independent of the government in the given area; the authority itself has invoked this, so it has to be confirmed or refuted item by item, with the exact legal provision. The fifth is the number of pending cases per case type. The sixth is the headcount and the supervisory fee revenue attributable to the given task. The inventory does not choose the solution, but makes visible what the subject of the decision is. The proposal applies the I3 legislative impact assessment programme point to the abolition of an institution. The A6 checks and balances programme point provides the consideration that the National Assembly should not decide on the fate of an autonomous regulatory body without knowing the map of powers. According to Klitgaard’s formula (see 6.4.2), the inventory is at the same time a baseline measurement: power by power, it shows where there is monopoly, where there is discretion, and to whom the decision-maker is accountable.

3.2 A succession timetable and transitional rules in the abolishing law (when the bill is submitted)

MIAK proposes that the succession timetable be a mandatory annex to the bill on abolition, assigning a legal successor and an entry-into-force date to every item of the 3.1 inventory. The timetable should lay down four rules. A supervisory power should cease at the SZTFH only on the day it enters into force at the receiving body; staggered dates differing by sector are allowed, a day without supervision is not. In pending licensing, inspection and sanctioning proceedings, the legal successor should take the place of the authority, procedural acts already performed should remain in force, and the deadlines for legal remedies should neither restart nor be interrupted. In administrative lawsuits pending before the courts, the legal successor should be the defendant. The registers, including the register of liquidators and the data concerning bailiffs, should not become inaccessible for a single day. Finally, succession of decrees: if the President of the SZTFH has issued a decree in the given area, the government or ministerial decree taking its place should enter into force on the same day, and the law should provide the authorisation for this. Rose-Ackerman’s proposition (see 6.4.1) justifies the sequence here: the renegotiation of the concessions and the transformation of supervision are taking place at the same time, so the supervisory framework has to be settled before the contractual negotiations are concluded, not afterwards. The proposal also builds on the KI3 bureaucracy-reduction programme point: the client should not pay the cost of the handover between authorities.

3.3 Separating the ownership and supervisory powers, with independence guarantees (in the same law)

The third proposal lays down where supervision should not go. The same body should not be able to be, at the same time, the party that tenders, manages and renegotiates the concession on behalf of the state, and the inspector and sanctioner of the same concession holder. The bill of 8 September takes the concession tasks away from the SZTFH. According to MIAK, the correct counterpart of this is that the supervisory power should not go to the ministry that renegotiates the concessions in the given sector either. Where EU law prescribes an independent authority, the task should remain with an autonomous regulatory body. Where it does not, it may go to a body directed by the Government, but with four guarantees. The first is a fixed-term mandate and public selection of the head of the body. The second is an annual report to the competent committee of the National Assembly. The third is a public, searchable register of authority decisions and fines imposed. The fourth is a revolving-door ban, that is, the heads of supervision should not be able to work for a set period in the sector they supervised; the G6 programme point proposes three years for this. This proposal builds on the G6 programme against regulatory capture. By regulatory capture we mean the situation in which actors of the supervised sector influence the authority’s decisions in their own interest. Acemoglu and Robinson’s proposition (see 6.4.3) warns that powers merely changing hands does not eliminate this risk, it only relocates it.

The three proposals are bound together by one principle: abolishing an authority is not a single point but a process, and every step of the process has to be public. The inventory shows the subject of the decision, the timetable rules out a supervisory gap, and the separation prevents the old concentration from arising in a new place. Measured by Klitgaard’s yardstick, the transformation is worth something if monopoly and discretion decrease and accountability increases, and this can be demonstrated power by power.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public administration The inventory and the timetable make the handover of tasks plannable; the receiving bodies can prepare in advance Preparing the inventory in the two weeks after the 30 September deadline is tight; because of the staggered handover, the supervision of a sector may temporarily be split between two bodies
Regulated sectors (economy) Businesses know in advance which authority to turn to, and their pending cases are not lost If the transition drags on, licensing slows down, and during a supervisory gap the illegal market (for example online gambling) may gain ground
Legal certainty, clients The succession rules preserve procedural acts already performed and the route of legal remedy In the event of an incorrect or incomplete designation of successors, lawsuits may be launched on the grounds of lack of competence
Transparency and conflict of interest Separating the ownership and supervisory roles reduces the likelihood of regulatory capture Tasks transferred to several bodies may increase coordination costs; for supervision placed under government direction, independence depends on the guarantees being observed
Budget An itemised account of supervisory fee revenue and headcount makes the cost of the transformation measurable If the fee revenue does not appear separately at the receiving body, the cost of the transformation will not be traceable

The main dilemma lies between speed and continuity. The rapid abolition of a politically contested authority is easy to communicate; a carefully scheduled handover is slower and keeps the old body in place for months. MIAK’s proposal tilts towards continuity, because on regulated markets the cost of a supervisory gap is paid not by the authority but by consumers, honest competitors and the budget. The proposal becomes risky if the inventory and the timetable become tools of procrastination. That is why both need a calendar deadline: 15 October for the inventory, and the submission of the bill for the timetable. The other dilemma lies between independence and government responsibility. A government-directed body is more politically accountable; an autonomous regulatory body is less exposed to the political intention of the moment. MIAK does not give a general answer but one task by task: the fourth data point of the inventory, the EU independence requirement, decides which model is mandatory.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests following the performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) below. These are proposals, not government decisions:

  • Whether the Justice Minister’s report and the itemised inventory of powers are public by 15 October 2026 (yes/no).
  • In the annex to the abolishing or transforming bill, the share of powers to which a named legal successor and an entry-into-force date are assigned: the expected value is 100 per cent.
  • The number of days left without supervision per regulated sector over the entire transition period: the expected value is zero.
  • Among the pending cases handed over, the share of those in which the legal successor takes a substantive procedural step within 60 days, and the number of cases terminated or challenged in court on the grounds of lack of competence. According to the KI8 efficiency-measurement programme point, it is worth including this in the receiving bodies’ first annual report, compared against the SZTFH’s last annual inspection and fining data.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request: the Justice Minister’s report should not only be about whether the SZTFH can be abolished, but also about what the fate of each power will be. The inventory should be public by 15 October, and the abolishing bill should contain the succession timetable and the separation of the ownership and supervisory roles. The decision belongs to the National Assembly, but the Government decides with what information the proposal comes before the MPs.

Two MIAK foundational values are at stake in this topic. Transparency, because the SZTFH has so far been criticised precisely for supervising high-stakes markets behind closed doors. If its abolition is also decided behind closed doors, the problem is not solved but inherited. And accountability, because the supervisory gap and conflict of interest are exactly the kind of risk for which nobody is answerable afterwards if it is not designated in advance who is responsible for what.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band, Telex reported the content of the resolution factually, and emphasised that the only thing connecting the areas supervised by the authority is that the state regulates them. 444.hu stressed the authority’s political embeddedness: it recalled that in the previous term it was under the direction of Antal Rogán, and that the mining supervision imposed the highest possible fine on one of the Orbán family’s companies. The outlet also reported on the authority’s statement of protest. HVG covered the topic in two articles. The first focused on the authority’s closed operation and the persons of its leaders; the second published the bill of 8 September under a headline about “the abolition of the Fidesz super-authority”. According to the text of the article, however, the bill concerns the concession powers and the Concession Council, not the authority itself. The same article at one point refers to the government resolution of 31 August as a government decree. Népszava’s headline was about examining the possibility of abolition. The band thus carried the authority’s political past, not the fate of its powers.

In the public-affairs band, 24.hu, alongside the MTI summary, was the only one to publish the authority’s own position in detail: the arguments concerning its independence, its reporting obligation towards the National Assembly, the economic weight of the supervised sectors, and the requirements of EU law. The outlet’s headline spoke of the transformation of the entire system of regulatory authorities, which is a wider frame than the resolution. In the economic band, Portfolio placed the topic in a political frame: it wrote about “one of the Orbán government’s favourite authorities”, and on 8 September published an analysis of the flaws of the tobacco concession system. The full text of the articles is behind a paywall.

In the conservative band, among the processed sources, Magyar Nemzet and Mandiner published no material on the SZTFH. In Mandiner, however, an opinion piece by Gábor Fodor on the National Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office (NVVH) wrote that the real problem is not the person of its head but the creation of a new office. In his view, suspicious cases should be investigated within the existing law-enforcement and judicial institutional system (the system of investigating authorities, the prosecution service and the courts). The title quote of a 444.hu interview with the Prime Minister on 28 August itself called the NVVH a “super-authority” in which the powers of several bodies had been kneaded together. The mirror image of the two bands is instructive: the government-critical press criticises the old super-authority, the conservative band the new one, and both raise the same question of principle. How many powers can be placed in a single body, and who controls it? MIAK’s proposal provides a yardstick for this question that is independent of political affiliation.

6.2 Facts and data

The questions to be worked out and the answers currently known

Question What is known on the basis of the processed sources?
Which powers does the SZTFH exercise? Tobacco trade; gambling market; mining, oil, natural gas and geothermal extraction; court enforcement and the body of bailiffs; register of liquidators; security supervision of information systems; ESG coordination; concession matters (24.hu, HVG)
Which requires a statutory transfer, and which a transfer by decree? Not publicly known. The abolition of the body requires a cardinal law (Article 23 of the Fundamental Law)
What will happen to pending proceedings? Not publicly known; the resolution does not provide for this
Where will the tasks go? According to the resolution, to bodies directed by the Government; a breakdown by body is not known
Does EU law prescribe an independent authority? According to the authority’s statement, yes in several areas; the specific legal provisions are not known
What has changed so far? Bill submitted on 8 September on removing the concession powers and abolishing the Concession Council (HVG)

Supplementary factual data

Data Value Source
Publication of the government resolution 31 August 2026 (Hungarian Official Gazette) Telex; 24.hu (MTI)
Deadline and person responsible for the report 30 September 2026; Justice Minister 24.hu (MTI); 444.hu
Establishment of the SZTFH 2021, by the National Assembly, as an autonomous regulatory body 24.hu; SZTFH statement
Constitutional status of an autonomous regulatory body established by cardinal law; its head is appointed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Prime Minister; reports annually to the National Assembly; its head may issue decrees Article 23 of the Fundamental Law
Number of staff more than 400 SZTFH statement (24.hu)
Weight of the supervised sectors according to the authority annual revenue of several tens of thousands of billions of forints, more than 50 thousand employees, tax and contribution revenue exceeding 1,000 billion forints SZTFH statement (24.hu)
Removal of concession powers bill submitted on 8 September 2026; it would also abolish the Concession Council HVG
Hungary’s government effectiveness and control of corruption +0.42 and −0.17 respectively World Bank, governance indicators (WGI, Worldwide Governance Indicators), 2024

The first part of the table shows that there is currently no public answer to most of the questions to be worked out. This is not an omission by the Government: the report has not yet been completed. Precisely for this reason, it has to be decided now that the report should answer these questions too. The economic data published by the authority are the authority’s own claims; verifying them independently is one of the tasks of the inventory. The two World Bank indicators do not measure regulatory authorities but governance as a whole. Nevertheless, they signal that the control of corruption is a weaker point in Hungary than the government’s executive capacity, so in an institutional transformation strengthening accountability is the more critical element.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — KI3 bureaucracy reduction provides the yardstick for whether the transformation is a real reduction of burdens or merely a rearrangement of the map of powers, KI8 efficiency measurement provides the performance indicators of the receiving bodies, and the KI11 organisational behaviour audit addresses the risk that the receiving body performs the task taken over according to the old routine;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the A6 checks and balances programme point underpins the publicity of the decision on the fate of autonomous regulatory bodies, and A2 public procurement transparency underpins the publicity of concession tenders and authority decisions;
  • Economy (programme points) — the G6 programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture provides the revolving-door ban and the measurement of the capture risk of regulated markets, and the G20 impact assessment system provides the ex-post evaluation of the transformation;
  • Justice (programme points) — I3 legislative impact assessment covers the ex-ante impact assessment of the abolishing law, and I7 legislative simplification covers the review of the body of decrees linked to the SZTFH and the settlement of the succession of decrees.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In the chapters on anti-corruption reforms, Rose-Ackerman formulates two complementary propositions. The first is about sequencing. If the state grants a market entitlement and the holder has market power, the regulatory institution has to be set up credibly even before the tendering. This institution itself has to be protected against improper influence, with a transparent and open procedure. If this does not happen, the winning bidder can also influence the design of supervision. The author adds that the regulatory models of developed countries cannot be transferred unchanged to places where the risk of capture by the supervised companies is greater. New institutions have to be designed with this risk in mind, both limiting and managing discretion. The second proposition is about dismantling: the simplest anti-corruption step is to abolish a programme burdened with abuses, but removing one incentive can create a new opportunity elsewhere. If nine out of ten licences are abolished, the issuer of the tenth gains greater power.

In the case of the SZTFH, this means that abolishing the authority reduces the likelihood of abuse on the supervised markets only if the powers are not concentrated in a single new decision point. In addition, during the period of renegotiating the concessions, the supervisory framework has to be settled not afterwards but before the contractual negotiations are concluded. This is the theoretical basis of the sequencing rule of proposal 3.2 and of the separation principle of proposal 3.3.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard describes the conditions under which abuse arises in a principal–agent framework. The principal represents the public interest; the agent is the official who deals with the client. Abuse flourishes where monopoly and discretion meet the absence of accountability. This relationship is usually summarised in the formula corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability. According to the author, a rule can work in two ways: it can create a monopoly if it entrusts the allocation of a scarce entitlement to a single official, but it can also reduce discretion and make accountability easier. A more radical way of reducing discretion is to change the task of the organisation. Among his examples is that narrowing the scope of a customs authority also put an end to abuses for the products concerned.

The formula can be used as a yardstick in the SZTFH case. Abolition is real change if it can be shown, power by power, that monopoly narrows (for example a licence is issued by several mutually independent bodies or through an open procedure), discretion decreases (criteria published in advance), and accountability increases (public decisions, reporting to Parliament). If the powers go to another body with unchanged content, none of the terms of the formula moves; only the name of the organisation changes. The 3.1 inventory is therefore not only a transfer plan but also a baseline measurement.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.3 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Acemoglu and Robinson build their analysis on the distinction between extractive institutions (which extract rents for the benefit of those in power) and inclusive ones. One chapter of the book discusses a concept of the German sociologist Robert Michels, the iron law of oligarchy. According to this, new leaders often overthrow the rule of the old ones by promising radical change, and then, once in power, continue to operate the same extractive institutions, only for their own benefit. The authors show through historical examples that a political turn is not enough in itself: the structure of institutions decides whether change is lasting.

Applied to regulatory authorities, the lesson is simple. Abolishing a politically contested authority tied to the previous government can be a credible step, but if the concentrated powers go in unchanged form to a new, government-directed body, the structure remains the same and only its owner changes. The independence guarantees of proposal 3.3 — the fixed-term mandate, the parliamentary report, the public register of decisions and the revolving-door ban — serve precisely to ensure that the guarantee depends not on the good intentions of the leaders of the day but on the rules.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail (Miért buknak el a nemzetek?)

6.5 International comparison

International practice offers two lessons. The first concerns the governance of regulatory authorities. The OECD (the international cooperation organisation of developed economies), in its 2014 recommendation on the governance of regulators (The Governance of Regulators), names clarity of roles as its first principle: the regulator’s objectives and functions should be clear, and conflicting roles should not be assigned to the same body. The same recommendation also lists the prevention of undue influence, accountability and regular performance evaluation among its principles. The OECD guidelines on the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises are even more specific: the state’s ownership function has to be clearly separated from its market-regulatory function. The four guarantees of proposal 3.3 are the Hungarian application of this framework. EU law makes an independent national regulator mandatory in certain sectors; one example is the electricity market, where the EU Electricity Directive requires the regulatory authority to be independent of the government. The fourth data point of the 3.1 inventory clarifies whether there is a similar requirement in the SZTFH’s areas.

The second lesson concerns the sequence of the handover. In the United Kingdom, communications supervision was taken over in 2003 by Ofcom, through the merger of five former regulators. The receiving body had already been created by a separate act in 2002, so that it could prepare before taking over the powers, and the former regulators ceased to exist only on the day of the takeover. In gambling supervision, the British Gambling Act 2005 created the Gambling Commission in place of the former supervisory body, and it received full supervisory powers under the new act in September 2007, when the act came fully into force. The common lesson of the two examples: the receiving body is created and prepares before taking over the full powers, and the day of the handover is fixed by legislation. This is the logic of proposal 3.2.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI3 — Measurable bureaucracy reduction
  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration
  • KI11 — Organisational behaviour audit

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A2 — Public procurement transparency

Economy

  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G20 — Economic policy impact assessment system

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I7 — Legislative simplification programme

Proposed new programme point: Rule for transforming regulatory authorities: a public inventory of powers, a succession timetable and the separation of the ownership and supervisory roles whenever an authority is abolished — for the Public administration and e-government area, as an institutional complement to programme points A6 and G6.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 1 September 2026 — topic 6; 2 September 2026; 9 September 2026 — topic 6):

  • [Telex] Magyar Péter jelentést kér az igazságügyi minisztertől arról, hogyan számolhatnák fel a Szabályozott Tevékenységek Felügyeleti Hatóságát — https://telex.hu/gazdasag/2026/08/31/szabalyozott-tevekenysegek-felugyeleti-hatosaga-megszuntetes-hatarozat
  • [Portfolio] Célkeresztbe került az Orbán-kormány egyik kedvelt hatósága: az SZTFH felszámolásának lehetőségét vizsgálja a Tisza-kormány — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260831/celkeresztbe-kerult-az-orban-kormany-egyik-kedvelt-hatosaga-az-sztfh-felszamolasanak-lehetoseget-vizsgalja-a-tisza-kormany-859512 (the article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [24.hu] A kormány átalakíthatja a szabályozó hatósági rendszert — https://24.hu/fn/gazdasag/2026/09/01/sztfh-megszuntetes-kormany-atvilagitas/
  • [444.hu] Megszüntetheti a kormány a Szabályozott Tevékenységek Felügyeleti Hatóságát — https://444.hu/2026/09/01/megszuntetheti-a-kormany-a-szabalyozott-tevekenysegek-felugyeleti-hatosagat
  • [HVG] 2,5 milliárd forintot kapott a vagyonvisszaszerzési hivatal — https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20260831_vagyonvisszaszerzesi-hivatal-koltsegvetes-sztfh
  • [HVG] Benyújtották a törvényjavaslatot a fideszes szuperhatóság megszüntetéséről — https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20260908_szabalyozott-tevekenysegek-felugyeleti-hatosaga-sztfh-torvenyjavaslat-megszuntetes-vitezy-david
  • [Portfolio] Nekimegy a kormány a dohánykoncesszióknak, de mi a baj a rendszerrel? — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260908/nekimegy-a-kormany-a-dohanykoncesszioknak-de-mi-a-baj-a-rendszerrel-860288 (the article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Népszava] A Szabályozott Tevékenységek Felügyeleti Hatóságának megszüntetésének lehetőségét vizsgálja a kormány — https://nepszava.hu/ (title-level reference only)
  • [444.hu] „Ez egy szuperhatóság, összegyúrtuk az ügyészség, a rendőrség és a NAV jogosítványait" — https://444.hu/2026/08/28/ez-egy-szuperhatosag-osszegyurtuk-az-ugyeszseg-a-rendorseg-es-a-nav-jogositvanyait (the article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Mandiner] Fodor Gábor: Unger Anna személye másodlagos, az igazi probléma az NVVH létrehozása — https://mandiner.hu/belfold/2026/08/unger-anna-szemelye-masodlagos-az-igazi-problema-az-nvvh-letrehozasa

Knowledge base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail (Miért buknak el a nemzetek?)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI3, KI8, KI11)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A2, A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G6, G20)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3, I7)
  • MIAK legal foundations (background material) — the role of the Government and the National Assembly in law-making, the hierarchy of legal sources
  • MIAK topic monitor, 20 September 2026 — topic 4, score: 89/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 23 (autonomous regulatory bodies)
  • Hungarian Official Gazette (Magyar Közlöny), 31 August 2026 — government resolution on the review of the SZTFH
  • World Bank — Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2024
  • OECD: The Governance of Regulators (OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, 2014)
  • OECD: Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (on separating the state’s ownership and regulatory functions)

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