Part I — Situation overview

On Tuesday, 15 September 2026, Parliament elected five new members of the Constitutional Court: Nóra Chronowski, constitutional lawyer and doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA); Miklós Ligeti, criminal lawyer and legal director of Transparency International Hungary; András György Kovács, administrative lawyer and presiding judge of a panel at the Curia; Árpád Gábor Orosz, former head of the Civil Division of the Curia; and Zsolt Szomora, criminal lawyer and university professor at the University of Szeged. In the secret ballot 143 MPs took their ballot papers, and all five candidates were elected uniformly with 137 yes and 6 no votes, with no abstentions. In the 199-member Parliament the two-thirds threshold is 133 seats, so the support exceeded it by four votes. Fidesz–KDNP walked out of the chamber before the vote and in a statement called the decision illegitimate. Mi Hazánk put forward five candidates of its own; they did not win a mandate. The new members took their oath after the vote.

The background is the seventeenth amendment to the Fundamental Law adopted in the summer, which restored the upper age limit of 70 for constitutional judges. As a result, on 1 September the mandate of Péter Polt as President of the Constitutional Court ended, as did the mandates of Mária Haszonicsné Ádám, Miklós Juhász and Zoltán Lomnici; the fifth seat had to be filled because Ágnes Czine’s twelve-year mandate expires in November. Parliament had to elect new members in their place within sixty days. The same amendment shortened the length of the mandate from twelve years to nine, and the president of the body is once again elected by the constitutional judges themselves. MIAK’s analysis of 12 September 2026 asked before the vote whether the yardstick of selection would be institutionalised; the present piece examines what the result shows.

MIAK’s reading: the election is legally valid, the two-thirds was there, and the procedure followed the rules in force. Two things, however, were not resolved. One is that the political side left out had no procedural instrument at all — the walkout did not prevent the decision, it only weakened its legitimacy, which in the long run harms precisely the institution, not the majority. The other is that the yardstick of selection is still not fixed: the professional records of the current five candidates are strong, but this depended on the quality of the nominator’s political decision, not on an institutional filter. A constitutional judge’s mandate runs for nine years, and the office-holder cannot be recalled or given instructions — which is why the quality of selection should not rest on the momentary discretion of the nominator.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide the frame in which the present election can be interpreted. The French legal thinker Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Laws (1748), formulates not only the classic argument for the separation of powers but also the less well-known thesis that regrouping judicial power is not in itself a cure: if the condition of the political community has become corrupt, it makes no difference which body receives the competence. The French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America (1835–1840), describes in his chapter on the limits of majority rule exactly what is the subject of debate today: if a political force becomes preponderant, every public-authority position comes under its control, and the minority needs an institutional counterweight. The volume Rendszerváltás Magyarországon — alkotmányreform (Regime change in Hungary — constitutional reform), edited by Mihály Bihari, documents the original intention of Hungarian constitutional adjudication: at the 1989 negotiations the establishment of the Constitutional Court was among the cardinal questions, and in its first stage the body was likewise to have started with the election of five judges. The detailed treatment of the literature — by author, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first supplies a quality filter for nomination, the second settles the procedural consequence of staying out, and the third makes the process as a whole assessable after the event.

3.1 A two-stage, public suitability filter before nomination (by the next constitutional-judge vacancy)

MIAK proposes that, before a constitutional-judge nomination, an independent professional college should compile the list of candidates found suitable. The members of the college are nominated by the self-governing body of the judiciary, the law faculties, the bar association and the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights; the college assesses according to a scored set of criteria announced in advance — professional record, publication and adjudication performance, conflict-of-interest examination — and publishes its assessment candidate by candidate, with reasons. The parliamentary two-thirds then chooses freely, but only from this list. This does not restrict the political decision: the nominator can still decide whom it considers suitable among those on the list, but the risk of unsuitability is removed from the system. The proposal follows the logic of the I4 judicial-independence programme point, which considers both the exclusive role of professional bodies in appointment decisions and the presence of external members necessary. According to Montesquieu’s thesis (see 6.4.1), transferring the competence does not in itself improve the situation — which is precisely why MIAK proposes not taking it away, but a filter.

3.2 The procedural order for filling a vacancy and the consequence of staying out (amendment of the House Rules by the end of the current session)

The public-law lesson of the present election is that the walkout of the largest opposition group had no procedural effect whatsoever: it affected neither the quorum nor the result. In the short term this favours the majority, but in the long term it encourages every future majority not to seek agreement. MIAK therefore proposes that the House Rules stipulate that, in a constitutional-judge nomination, every parliamentary group — in the nominating committee procedure — be obliged to take a written position on the candidates who have made the list, and that this position be published before the vote. For a group that takes no position, this fact must be recorded; in this way a walkout does not erase the documented trace of the decision. In addition, MIAK proposes that an upper deadline for filling a vacancy also be fixed (maintaining the current sixty-day rule), so that a future majority cannot postpone the decision to wait for a political bargaining position. Tocqueville’s argument (see 6.4.2) warns that the minority needs an institutional instrument — not merely one at the level of a gesture; a documented position is such an instrument, because it is not a veto, but it leaves a trace.

3.3 Bringing the selection procedure into the constitutional stress test (first assessment in the first half of 2027)

MIAK proposes that the annual constitutional stress test under the I10 programme point also extend to public-law selection procedures, and assess every such procedure with a single question: could the same procedure be repeated under a two-thirds majority of the opposite political composition without damaging the institution? The examination does not rate the persons elected but the procedure; the result is public, with reasons. This should be linked to the institutional independence index under the A6 checks-and-balances programme point, which measures, among other things, the share of the body’s decisions against the government and the turnaround time of decision-making. The nine-year mandate of the five members now elected runs until 2035 — the point of measurement is precisely that the balance should not have to be drawn only afterwards, after the next political turn.

The three proposals are bound together by the same principle: the question is not whether the five judges now elected are suitable, but whether the rule by which they got in remains defensible when another majority applies the same rule.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Justice system A public suitability list reduces the chance that political loyalty is enough even without professional suitability; the nine-year mandate brings more frequent renewal A shorter mandate means more frequent elections, which gives the majority of the day more occasions to shape the composition of the body
Public law and legitimacy Documented group positions leave a trace at future elections too, and give the walkout a political cost as well The professional college may itself become the subject of political dispute: if its composition is contested, the credibility of the list is impaired
Public administration and publicity The stress test of the procedure makes it measurable whether the rule of selection holds even after a change of government The “repeatability test” can easily become a political weapon if it is not carried out by an independent body and according to a fixed methodology

The main question for deliberation lies between political responsibility and a professional filter. Filling a constitutional-judge office is ultimately a political decision, and MIAK does not dispute this: it is the responsibility of the elected parliament whom it entrusts. The professional filter does not take this decision away; it only narrows the room for manoeuvre to those rated suitable. The proposal tips into risk if the composition of the college itself becomes political spoils — which is why the right of nomination must be shared among several mutually independent professional actors, and the assessment made public with reasons candidate by candidate. The nine-year mandate is in itself neither good nor bad: more frequent renewal reduces the rigidity of the body, but also increases the frequency of political influence — which is why, without the filter under 3.1, the shortening is more of a risk than an improvement.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes four performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) from which it will be visible in 12 and 24 months whether the proposals have been put into effect:

  • A public suitability list at the next nomination: the suggested target is that at the next constitutional-judge vacancy the nomination already take place on the basis of a scored suitability list published in advance, with reasons for each candidate.
  • The documentation of group positions: it is worth following whether, in future constitutional-judge votes, the position of every parliamentary group — including a refusal to participate — is publicly recorded.
  • The number and turnaround time of the Constitutional Court’s substantive decisions: the suggested target is 120 substantive rulings a year under the I4 programme point and a turnaround time below 90 days under A6.
  • The share of decisions against government proposals: it is worth following how this share develops after the renewal of the body’s composition — this is one of the hardest-to-manipulate, after-the-event signals of independence.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to Parliament: the election now concluded should not become a precedent for leaving the rule of selection unsettled. The election was lawful, but the rule that made it possible will work in the same way when another majority makes use of it. MIAK therefore does not ask for the decision to be changed, but that by the next vacancy there be a public suitability filter, and that the positions of the parliamentary groups be documented. And of the public and the press it asks that they keep the question of what is lawful separate from what is desirable: an elected constitutional judge’s mandate runs for nine years, and the judge cannot be recalled or given instructions by anyone — the framing that the body has been “placed under supervision” is wrong in public-law terms, regardless of which side uses it.

Two MIAK foundational values are at stake. Accountability, because filling a nine-year, irrevocable mandate is a decision whose reasons must be verifiable after the event as well — today the nomination leaves no documented trace of why precisely those five names made the list. Being non-ideological, because MIAK applied the same yardstick after 2010 as well, and will apply the same yardstick after the next change of government: the question is never who nominates, but whether the procedure can be repeated under an opposing political majority without damaging the institution.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the general-interest band 24.hu chose a factual, procedure-centred frame: it listed the names and professional positions of those elected, reported the exact vote ratios and the fact of the walkout, and set out in detail why filling the five seats had become necessary — from the restoration of the age limit to the shortening of the mandate. The article added no assessment.

In the liberal-left band 444.hu framed the same event from the perspective of the nominating political force, and highlighted an earlier statement by the best-known candidate, who at the committee hearing spoke of a “captured Constitutional Court”. In its piece on the committee hearing HVG put the candidates’ own formulations at the centre, and raised to the headline the sentence that the candidate comes with a career path not typical for a constitutional judge. A piece in the paper’s analysis section emphasised the gradual nature of the process; this material was not publicly downloadable for MIAK, so it is referenced only at the level of the headline.

In the conservative band Magyar Nemzet dealt with the topic in two articles, and in both it put the legitimacy objection at the centre of the frame: it published the statement of the former governing party’s group, according to which, after the removal of the body’s earlier members by personally targeted and retroactive legislation, the present election is illegitimate. The other article, relying on an external analysis, sketched the picture of a “body placed under supervision”. This latter framing has an element that is well-founded in public-law terms and one that is wrong: the question of how the legitimacy of a body elected after a mandate shortened by constitutional amendment differs from that of its predecessor is well-founded — this is a genuine constitutional-law debate. The picture of “supervision”, however, is wrong: an elected constitutional judge cannot be given instructions or recalled. MIAK would draw the same distinction if the argument came from the opposite political direction.

6.2 Facts and data

Datum Value Source
Date of the vote 15 September 2026 24.hu, 444.hu, Magyar Nemzet, 15 September 2026
MPs who took ballot papers 143 24.hu, 15 September 2026
Vote ratio (identical for all five candidates) 137 yes, 6 no, 0 abstentions 24.hu, 444.hu, 15 September 2026
Two-thirds threshold in the 199-member Parliament 133 seats Act CCIII of 2011 (calculation)
Those elected Nóra Chronowski, Miklós Ligeti, András György Kovács, Árpád Gábor Orosz, Zsolt Szomora 24.hu, 444.hu, 15 September 2026
Committee hearing of the candidates 14 September 2026 HVG, 14 September 2026
Announcement of the nominations 10 September 2026 24.hu, 15 September 2026
Length of the constitutional-judge mandate reduced from 12 years to 9 24.hu, 15 September 2026 (following the seventeenth amendment to the Fundamental Law)
Method of electing the president elected by the members of the body 24.hu, 15 September 2026
Members who lost their mandate because of the age limit 4 (1 September 2026) 24.hu, Magyar Nemzet, 15 September 2026
Deadline for filling the vacancies 60 days 24.hu, 15 September 2026
Substantive rulings of the Constitutional Court (MIAK target value) currently around 80/year, suggested target above 120 MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points)

One clarification is needed. The press carried in parallel the “previous government” and the “current government” interpretations of whether the termination of the mandates was an automatic legal consequence or the result of targeted legislation. The fact on which all sources agree: the mandates terminated following the seventeenth amendment to the Fundamental Law, because of the restoration of the age limit of 70. Whether this amendment qualifies as personally targeted is a question of constitutional-law assessment, not a statement of fact — MIAK therefore reports neither reading as fact.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Justice (programme points) — the question of selection and independence: I4 (protection of judicial independence) provides the model for the professional-body filter and the target value for the number of substantive rulings, I10 (constitutional stress test) the repeatability examination, and I1 (judicial transparency) the traceability of decisions and turnaround time;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the institutional independence index of A6 (strengthening checks and balances) was designed precisely for the objective measurement of the Constitutional Court’s functioning; A11 (civil-society partnership programme) provides a model on the nominating side of the professional college;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the procedural order of public-law appointments and the practice of open competitive selection.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

The most frequently quoted thesis of Montesquieu’s work is the separation of powers: if the legislative and executive powers are united in the same hands, there is no liberty, and the same holds if judicial power is not separated from the other two. For the present debate, however, a less well-known observation of his offers a more direct point of reference. Using the example of the Roman republic, he describes what happens when judicial competence is transferred from one body to another:

“While Rome preserved her principles entire, the judicial power might without any abuse be lodged in the hands of senators; but as soon as this city became corrupt, to whatsoever body that power was transferred […] matters still went wrong.”

The thesis warns that a rearrangement of persons or organisation is in itself neither a cure nor a catastrophe: the outcome is decided by whether the institution’s operating principles remain intact. Translated to the Hungarian situation: the question is not whether the five new members are better or worse than those who left, but whether the principle of selection has remained the same as before — and the answer is that it has: the discretion of the two-thirds of the day. That is why MIAK proposes not transferring the competence, but building in a professional filter ahead of nomination.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.2 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

In his chapter on the limits of majority rule Tocqueville describes the situation in which a political force can fill every public-authority position and no institutional instrument remains for the minority:

“In the United States, as soon as a party is become preponderant, all public authority passes under its control; its private supporters occupy all the places, and have all the force of the administration at their disposal.”

Tocqueville’s solution is not to deprive the majority of the right to decide — this he expressly rejects — but to maintain counterweights: freedom of association, an independent judicial power and local self-government. For the present Hungarian situation this yields two lessons. One is that a walkout is not a counterweight: protest is a political gesture that evaporates without procedural consequence. The other is that the counterweight must be institutional, and must be built in advance, in calm times, not at the moment of a contested decision. MIAK’s proposal 3.2 — the documented positions of the parliamentary groups — for precisely this reason gives no right of veto but leaves a trace: in this way the minority’s position becomes part of the public-law memory even if it does not influence the result of the vote.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

6.4.3 Mihály Bihari (ed.): Rendszerváltás Magyarországon — alkotmányreform

The volume processes the documents of the constitution-making process of the regime change, and records that Hungarian constitutional adjudication was not the work of a governing majority but the result of a negotiated agreement. On the agenda of the negotiating parties the draft act on the Constitutional Court was among the cardinal questions, and on the course of its establishment the volume contains the following:

“They must urge the establishment of the Constitutional Court. They propose first electing five judges, and make the creation of the institution the task of the new parliament.”

Two lessons follow from this. One is the coincidence: in 1989 too the election of five judges was the first step — now the same number of seats was filled, but not by agreement, unilaterally. The other is more important: the basic assumption of the procedure documented by the volume was that the composition of the Constitutional Court is decided not by the momentary balance of power but by agreement among the political actors. The original intention therefore presupposed a consensual institution. The present election does not violate this tradition legally — under the rule, two-thirds is enough — but practice has moved away from the original assumption. MIAK’s proposal is not the legal enforcement of consensus (that would carry the risk of an inability to decide), but the professional filter and the documented position, which make even the absence of agreement visible.

📖 Source: Mihály Bihari (ed.): Rendszerváltás Magyarországon — alkotmányreform

6.5 International comparison

Several European models offer patterns for the selection of constitutional judges. In Germany half of the members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the Bundestag and half by the Bundesrat, in both cases by a two-thirds majority — in practice this compels agreement between the two large political blocs, because neither has a two-thirds majority in both chambers on its own. In Italy a third of the fifteen members is elected by parliament, a third by the President of the Republic and a third by the supreme courts — here the shared right of nomination ensures a diversity of institutional sources. In Spain the lack of agreement between the judicial council and parliament led to seats remaining unfilled for years; this negative experience is the reason for maintaining the deadline in MIAK’s proposal 3.2. Poland’s path after 2015 is the negative example in the other direction: bringing judicial selection under political control led to EU procedures and the suspension of funds — the lesson is not that election by parliament is bad, but that with parliamentary election without a filter the credibility of the body depends on the self-restraint of the majority of the day. The positive model is Portugal, where alongside judicial self-government the perceived level of judicial independence is the highest in EU comparison; at the same time the Italian experience also warns that full self-government can lead to internal factionalism — which is why MIAK proposes the presence of external members in the professional college.

Justice

  • I1 — Judicial transparency
  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A11 — Civil-society partnership programme

Proposed new programme point: A repeatability test for public-law selection procedures — for the Justice policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 16 September 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America
  • 📖 Mihály Bihari (ed.): Rendszerváltás Magyarországon — alkotmányreform

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I1, I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A11)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (background material)
  • MIAK legal foundations — the competence and appointment order of constitutional institutions
  • MIAK press monitor, 16 September 2026 — topic 2, score: 90/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force) — Article 24, competences of the Constitutional Court
  • Venice Commission — opinions on the election of constitutional judges
  • European Commission — annual Rule of Law Report, Hungary country chapter
  • V-Dem Institute — judicial independence indicators
  • European Commission — EU Justice Scoreboard, perceived judicial independence

Generation metadata