Part I — Situation overview

On Thursday, 17 September 2026, Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced on Facebook that the Government had decided to submit a bill on wealth investigations of politicians, and would put the proposal before Parliament “without delay”. According to the detailed accounts of HVG and Portfolio, the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) — the tax authority directed by the Finance Minister — would examine whether the wealth and lifestyle of those concerned are in line with their taxed income and their asset declarations. The group concerned: every Member of Parliament, prime minister, minister, state secretary, government commissioner and prime ministerial commissioner whose mandate ended in the past five years, as well as current and future office-holders. NAV would check those in office two years after the start of their first mandate, and those leaving within 30 days. Wealth accumulation could be examined as far back as twenty years, extending to the wealth of relatives and to assets transferred to others. The procedure starts with a risk analysis; in the event of a discrepancy an itemised tax audit follows, and where a criminal offence is suspected, NAV’s investigative authority, the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office (NVVH), the prosecution service or the police is notified. NAV would publish the number of investigations monthly, and, in the case of a tax shortfall of at least five million forints established by a final decision, also the name and position of the person concerned and the amount of the shortfall.

The tool is not new. According to Portfolio’s summary, the tax authority already used wealth investigations in the 2000s, on a mass scale from 2007, and in its classic form until the end of 2015; from 1 January 2016 estimate-based investigations were essentially tied to ongoing criminal proceedings. The government first announced the plan on 23 July. MIAK wrote about the reform of the asset declaration system on 9 June (a machine-readable database, automatic cross-checking, an alert threshold and sanctions). The current decision goes further: it would examine not the declaration but the wealth itself, with the tax authority’s full toolkit.

MIAK’s reading: the direction is right, and it could be a substantive implementation of MIAK programme point A3. The strength of the tool, however, is also its danger. By its construction, the first round will overwhelmingly affect office-holders of the previous government, while members of the current government would come up only in two years. The twenty-year look-back tests the limits of constitutional legal certainty, and the publication of names tests the limits of privacy. A tool that investigates politicians’ wealth has to be written so that it remains acceptable even when one day it is in the hands of another government. Credibility depends not on the intention but on the structure of the rule.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three classic works provide a framework for the three structural questions of the government decision. Robert Klitgaard (American economist, author of the structural model of corruption) analyses in his book Controlling Corruption (1988) the Hong Kong rule of 1971, which shifted the burden of proof onto officials whose wealth exceeded their income. In his view this is a strong deterrent, but it has obvious drawbacks, which is why the successful Hong Kong anti-corruption commission built civilian oversight and the separation of prosecution alongside it. Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor at Yale Law School, a leading scholar of the political economy of corruption) warns in Corruption and Government (1999) that an independent anti-corruption agency is useful only as long as it embodies a long-term, credible commitment and cannot be turned against political opponents. According to The Authority of Law (1979) by Joseph Raz (Israeli-born Oxford legal philosopher), the rule of law can be violated in two ways on the side of expectations: by retroactive law-making and by failing to enforce existing law. This distinction separates permissible verification from a prohibited retroactive obligation. The detailed treatment of the literature — by author, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures for the parliamentary debate of the bill. The first ensures equal application, the second constitutional durability, and the third the protection of privacy — all three can be fulfilled by amending the submitted text.

3.1 One yardstick for everyone: the same automatism, a public selection methodology, external oversight (in the text of the law, before the first investigation)

The announced system also covers those in office, but staggered in time: those now taking office for the first time will be investigated in two years, whereas former office-holders immediately. MIAK proposes that Parliament lay down in the law that the same risk analysis, with the same twenty-year look-back, be run on members of the current Government, state secretaries and MPs in the first twelve months as on former office-holders. This also makes it possible to record the starting asset position against which later accumulation can be measured. The second element is the transparency of selection. Before the law enters into force, NAV should publish the criteria of the risk analysis and the rule for the order of investigations (for example by the date on which the mandate ended), and the exact thresholds should be audited by an independent expert body. The third element is oversight: the competent committee of Parliament should hold a public hearing every six months on the distribution of the investigations. According to Klitgaard’s analysis of Hong Kong (see 6.4.1), what gave the anti-corruption commission its credibility was precisely that it involved the government’s critics in oversight too. In the longer term, investigative powers could move to an office operationally independent of the government, as envisaged by programme point A10; the checks-and-balances logic of A6 justifies this.

3.2 The limit of retroactive effect and preliminary constitutional review (before the final vote)

The twenty-year look-back is not in itself retroactive law-making if the investigation checks whether the person concerned paid the tax they were obliged to pay under the laws in force at the time. It becomes retroactive if the law imposes a new obligation or sanction for a past period, or if it revives a tax claim that has already become time-barred. Section 2(2) of Act CXXX of 2010 on lawmaking expressly prohibits this, and in its Decision 11/1992 (III. 5.) the Constitutional Court already held at the time of the change of regime that a limitation period that has already expired cannot be revived after the fact. MIAK therefore proposes three provisions. Asset data from earlier years should serve only as starting wealth and as evidence. Tax should be assessable only for periods that are not yet time-barred, under the substantive rules of the time (as a main rule, the right to assess tax lapses after five years). And the criminal-law strand should run according to its own limitation rules. In addition, the Government, as the proposer, should initiate preliminary review of norms under Article 6(2) of the Fundamental Law before the final vote, and Parliament should send the law to the Constitutional Court so that it examines it before promulgation. This carries particular weight: Article 37(4) of the Fundamental Law restricts ex-post review of laws on central taxes to a narrow set of fundamental rights, but not review before promulgation. If the rules can be classified as laws on central taxes, this may be the only full constitutional test. According to Raz’s distinction (see 6.4.3), making up for failed law enforcement strengthens the rule of law, whereas a retroactive obligation weakens it. The proposal follows the logic of the I3 impact assessment and the I10 constitutionality test.

3.3 Publication of names only after a final decision, with full protection of relatives (from entry into force)

The announcement ties publication of names to a tax shortfall of at least five million forints established by a final decision — this is right, and MIAK asks that the text of the law lay this down exactly so. “Final” should mean that judicial review has been concluded or its deadline has passed without result, not merely that the tax authority’s decision has become enforceable. Relatives are not public figures: because of the privacy protection under Article VI of the Fundamental Law, their names, their data and the fact of the investigation should not be able to appear on any publication list, even if a tax shortfall emerges in the politician’s case. The monthly statistics should not allow individual identification. If there are fewer than five cases in a category (for example among former prime ministers), they must be reported in aggregated form. Anyone whose investigation closed without a discrepancy should, at their request, receive an official certificate, which they may make public themselves. The data of the investigation fall within tax secrecy (taxpayer data handled by the tax authority and protected by law); the explanatory memorandum of the law should separately lay down the sanction for leaks. Rose-Ackerman’s warning (see 6.4.2) is most concrete here: the investigation must not become a tool of public shaming. Aggregate data can be published in anonymised form, similarly to the wealth inequality monitoring of G7.

The three proposals are bound together by a single principle: the wealth investigation serves accountability if its rules hold up equally with members of the current government, with a future government and before the Constitutional Court. Klitgaard, Rose-Ackerman and Raz say the same thing from three sides: the legitimacy of a strong tool comes from its limits.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Rule of law and constitutionality Preliminary review of norms clarifies the limits of the look-back before the investigations begin; the risk of later annulment decreases The Constitutional Court procedure delays entry into force by weeks; the narrower limitation scope means less assessable tax
Political credibility The same automatism and a public order refute the “revenge” narrative, and make the Prime Minister’s promise verifiable If the investigation of those in office remains a formality, the measure reinforces the image of selective accountability
Public administration and the tax authority According to the Prime Minister, several dozen specially trained auditors are needed; the risk analysis focuses investigations on genuinely divergent cases NAV and the NVVH recruit from the same narrow pool of specialists; according to the police union concern quoted by Magyar Nemzet, drawing away investigative capacity may slow down other cases
Privacy Publication of names tied to a final decision and the exclusion of relatives from the list make the interference proportionate With small case numbers, the monthly statistics may make those concerned identifiable if there is no aggregation rule
Budget The uncovered tax shortfall and recovered assets bring revenue, and the preventive effect reduces future tax evasion The revenue is uncertain and drawn out over time; only amounts established by a final decision can be built into budget planning

The main question for deliberation lies between speed and durability. Submission “without delay” is politically understandable, and Klitgaard’s Hong Kong case also shows the risk of delay: after the 1971 rule was adopted, many of the officials concerned left the territory together with their wealth. The time between the announcement and entry into force also offers an opportunity to move assets; the proposal partly addresses this by including assets transferred to others. On the other side, however, a law that the Constitutional Court partly annuls after the first final tax assessments would void not only the cases concerned but the credibility of the whole tool. The proposal becomes risky if the twenty years of the look-back become a tax assessment period, or if the first year’s investigations affect only former office-holders. Both are measurable, and therefore trackable.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes four performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) from which it will be visible in 12 and 24 months whether the investigation system meets the yardstick of equal application and rule-of-law durability:

  • The share of those in office in the first year’s investigations: it is worth following what proportion of the risk analyses carried out in the twelve months after entry into force concern members of the current Government, its state secretaries and sitting MPs; the suggested target is for the initial analysis to be run on every one of them.
  • Constitutional durability: whether preliminary review of norms took place (yes/no), and how many provisions the Constitutional Court annuls ex post — the suggested target is zero.
  • NAV decisions standing up in court: what percentage of the decisions taken in itemised tax audits the courts uphold unchanged; this is the best external yardstick of the professional quality of the risk analysis and the investigations.
  • Privacy incidents: the number of name or data leaks concerning relatives, or occurring before a final decision — the suggested target is zero, with a public report on every case.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the Government and Parliament is that the guarantees of credibility be written into the text of the wealth investigation law already now. The same risk analysis should be run on those in office in the first year as on former office-holders, and the selection criteria should be public. The twenty-year look-back should serve only as evidence, not as a tax assessment period. The Government should request the preliminary review of the Constitutional Court. And names should be public only after a final decision, with relatives fully excluded. According to the Prime Minister, “this is not about revenge” — this can be proven by the structure of the law, not by the accompanying statement.

Two MIAK foundational values are at stake in this decision. Accountability, because the explainability of wealth accumulated in office is the basis of public trust, and its decades-long absence made corruption risk systemic. Ideology-free governance, because an accountability tool is legitimate if it works with the same automatism regardless of party affiliation — the yardstick is not whom it affects first, but whether its author would submit to the same.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the liberal-left band 444.hu was the most outspoken: its summary stated that the first round “naturally mainly affects Fidesz politicians”, but it did not mention the publication of names tied to a final decision, only the five-million threshold. HVG presented the full group concerned, and highlighted the Prime Minister’s sentence according to which the investigation “of course” also extends to current and future office-holders; the paper’s news podcast summarised the news with the verb “introduce”. Telex put in its headline the Prime Minister’s statement from the ATV interview, phrased as a guarantee (“this is not about revenge”), and presented NAV as the guarantor of fairness. An opinion piece in Népszava discussed accountability in a broader frame, from the angle of asset recovery and the restoration of public goods.

In the general-interest band ATV, through its own interview, brought to the fore the automatism, the need for auditors and the open question of the scope of family members — here the Prime Minister indicated that the exact scope will be determined by tax-law regulation. 24.hu wrote about the same interview, but in its headline it highlighted the arrival of EU funds. In the economic band Portfolio gave the fullest picture: it presented the publication of names tied to a tax shortfall established by a final decision, the 2007–2015 precedent and the 2016 tightening, and recorded that the Prime Minister mentioned both governing-party and opposition politicians.

In the conservative band Magyar Nemzet did not discuss the decision directly; on the asset recovery thread it put the emphasis on police capacity, quoting a union spokesperson saying that the NVVH may draw away the most experienced investigators. Several papers (HVG, Portfolio and 24.hu) put it that the government is “introducing” the investigation. From a public-law point of view this is inaccurate: the Government decided to submit the bill, and the legal basis is created by Parliament. Also common to the whole spectrum is that none of the papers analysed substantively the constitutional question of retroactive effect or the staggered investigation of those in office.

6.2 Facts and data

Datum Value Source
The announcement Thursday, 17 September 2026 (the Government decided to submit the bill) 444.hu, HVG, Portfolio, 17 September 2026
Group concerned Member of Parliament, prime minister, minister, state secretary, government commissioner, prime ministerial commissioner — whose mandate ended in the past five years, as well as current and future office-holders HVG, Portfolio, 17 September 2026
Start of checks for those in office two years after the start of the first mandate 444.hu, HVG, Portfolio
Check on leaving office within 30 days 444.hu, HVG
Look-back wealth accumulation as far back as twenty years HVG, Portfolio, Telex
Extension wealth of relatives, assets transferred to others or to a company 444.hu, Portfolio
Procedural chain risk analysis → itemised tax audit → notification of NAV’s investigative authority, the NVVH, the prosecution service or the police 444.hu, HVG, Portfolio
Publicity monthly statistics; name, position and amount in the case of a tax shortfall of at least five million forints established by a final decision Portfolio, HVG
Precedent mass application from 2007, classic form until the end of 2015; tied to criminal proceedings from 1 January 2016 Portfolio, 17 September 2026
First announcement 23 July 2026 Portfolio
Staffing need several dozen specially trained NAV auditors ATV, 17 September 2026
Composition of Parliament Tisza 141, Fidesz–KDNP 52, Mi Hazánk 6 seats (out of 199) National Election Office, 19 April 2026

Two data points need a separate note. One: “five years” and “twenty years” mean two different things. The five years determine who counts as a former office-holder (those whose mandate ended within that period), while the twenty years determine how far back the examination of wealth accumulation may reach. The constitutional question of retroactive effect concerns primarily the latter. The other: according to the Prime Minister, some of the announced details — for example the exact definition of the circle of relatives — will be decided in the tax-law rules of the bill, so MIAK’s proposals can be finalised against the submitted text.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the investigation system is the substantive verification side of A3 (transparency of asset declarations); the long-term institutional owner is designated by A10 (independent anti-corruption investigation office), and external oversight is justified by A6 (checks and balances);
  • Justice (programme points) — the question of retroactive effect and preliminary review of norms falls within I3 (regulatory impact assessment) and I10 (constitutionality test), while I4 (protection of judicial independence) expressly aims to restore Constitutional Court review of tax laws;
  • Economy (programme points) — the data-protection yardstick of G7 (wealth inequality monitoring) provides a model for anonymising the monthly investigation statistics;
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — retaining auditor and investigator capacity is a question for KI6 (competitive public-service pay system).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard’s book discusses the question of the burden of proof among information strategies, and shows both the strength and the price of the tool:

“Shifting the burden of proof to the agent to show she is not guilty, can be a powerful deterrent to corruption. (Of course, such a step has obvious drawbacks.)”

In the same place he contrasts two models. In Thailand an official who had become unusually wealthy had to prove the lawful origin of the wealth, whereas in Mexico only checks on officials whose wealth markedly exceeded their income were prescribed, without reversing the burden of proof. The Hong Kong rule of 1971 chose the former path: anyone with wealth or a standard of living greater than their income had to prove their innocence, and unexplained enrichment (in English terminology unexplained enrichment, or unexplained wealth) became a criminal offence. According to the book, after the rule many officials left the territory together with their wealth. According to Klitgaard’s analysis, the credibility of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), set up in 1974, came not from its powers but from its counterweights. Civilian advisory committees were created, in which critics of the government also had seats. And the decision on prosecution was taken not by the commission but by the attorney general, so that zeal would not cloud objectivity. The announced Hungarian construction is closer to the Mexican model: a tax audit, without a general reversal of the burden of proof. From a rule-of-law point of view this is an advantage. The Hong Kong lesson — independent oversight and the separation of investigation from decision — nevertheless applies here too, which is why MIAK proposes the public methodology and half-yearly parliamentary hearing under 3.1.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman acknowledges the Hong Kong and Singapore success stories, but points to the weak point in both. The Singapore investigating body has been directly subordinate to the Prime Minister’s Office since 1970 and does not appear to be under external control; the Hong Kong commission, because of its direct subordination to the colonial governor, faced the accusation that it could also be used against political opponents. Her conclusion:

“A tough, independent anticorruption agency can be a potent tool so long as it represents a credible long-term commitment and can avoid being misused for political ends.”

The book also records a little-known detail: when dismantling corruption networks within the police, the Hong Kong commission ran into protest and ultimately granted an amnesty for acts committed before 1 January 1977. This retreat did harm, but the commission was able to restore its authority through its emphasis on public education. Translated to the Hungarian decision: NAV is directed by the Finance Minister, so in the current construction the owner of the investigations is a body directed by the government. This does not make the tool illegitimate, but it places the burden of credibility on the rule. If the yardstick of selection is public and those in office come up in the same way, the tool can become a long-term institution; if not, then, according to Rose-Ackerman’s warning, it becomes a weapon at the next change of government. That is why MIAK asks for the same automatism under 3.1 and the restrained publicity under 3.3.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

Raz derives the principles of the rule of law from the predictability of law: the law must be prospective, public and clear, because a retroactive rule cannot guide. He distinguishes two forms of violating the rule of law, uncertainty and frustrated expectations, and writes of the latter:

“It leads to frustrated expectations when the appearance of stability and certainty which encourages people to rely and plan on the basis of the existing law is shattered by retroactive law-making or by preventing proper law enforcement, etc.”

The second half of the sentence is the key to the debate on the wealth investigation. According to Raz, it is not only retroactive law-making that damages the rule of law but also preventing the enforcement of existing law. If a politician concealed income that was taxable under the tax laws in force at the time, uncovering it after the fact is not retroactive law-making but making up for law enforcement that previously failed — this strengthens the rule of law. If, however, the law imposes a new obligation for a past period, or revives an expired limitation period, it breaks precisely the expectation on which, according to Raz, the rule of law is built. Proposal 3.2 draws this dividing line in the text of the law: twenty-year-old data may be evidence, but not a tax assessment period.

📖 Source: Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

6.5 International comparison

There are three established international models of wealth investigations. The Hong Kong and Singapore models reverse the burden of proof through criminal law, in the hands of a strong, specialised anti-corruption body; their effectiveness is proven, but in both cases the main criticism was the body’s subordination to the executive. In the United Kingdom, since 2018 the court order requiring the origin of wealth to be explained (Unexplained Wealth Order, under the Criminal Finances Act) has been a civil-law instrument: at the request of the authority, a court may oblige the person concerned to explain the origin of their wealth, meaning that the gateway to intervention is guarded by a judge. The third path is that of the independent integrity agency: Romania’s National Integrity Agency (ANI) has since 2007 initiated proceedings against more than a thousand public figures on the basis of discrepancies in asset declarations, with administrative findings that can be challenged in court.

The announced Hungarian construction is identical to none of the models: a tax authority procedure that does not generally reverse the burden of proof, but in which the investigation is carried out by a body under government direction. From a rule-of-law point of view this is gentler than the Hong Kong path, but from an independence point of view weaker than the Romanian one. International experience allows two conclusions: the judicial gateway (the English solution) and independent oversight (the Hong Kong advisory committees, the Romanian agency) do not slow the tool down but make it durable. And Hong Kong’s partial amnesty of 1977 shows that an overly broad look-back can force a political retreat. It is better to draw its limits precisely right from the start.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A3 — Transparency of asset declarations
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)

Justice

  • I3 — Regulatory impact assessment
  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutionality “stress test”

Economy

  • G7 — Wealth inequality monitoring

Public administration and e-government

  • KI6 — Competitive public-service pay system

Proposed new programme point: A rule-of-law minimum standard for wealth investigations of politicians (the same automatism, a public selection methodology, exclusion of retroactive effect, publication of names tied to a final decision) — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 18 September 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A3, A6, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3, I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G7)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 18 September 2026 — topic 2, score: 92/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Fundamental Law of Hungary — Article B)(1) (rule of law), Article VI (protection of privacy and personal data), Article XV(1) (equality before the law), Article 6(2) and (4) (preliminary review of norms), Article 37(4) (limitation on Constitutional Court review of tax laws)
  • Act CXXX of 2010 on lawmaking — Section 2(2) (prohibition of retroactive obligations)
  • Constitutional Court Decision 11/1992 (III. 5.) AB (prohibition of reviving a limitation period after the fact)
  • Act CL of 2017 on the Rules of Taxation (limitation of the right to assess tax)
  • National Election Office — final result of the parliamentary election of 12 April 2026 (19 April 2026)

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