Part I — Situation overview

The criminal case around the National Cultural Fund (NKA — the central grant institution of state support for culture) expanded with two new developments on 23 and 24 July 2026. On the one hand, the investigating judge of the Kecskemét District Court extended, until 25 October 2026, the detention of four of the six suspects arrested in June, and placed two other suspects — in line with the prosecution’s motion — under criminal supervision instead of detention. For all of them the suspicion is misappropriation causing particularly significant financial disadvantage (financial damage of qualified magnitude caused by the management of entrusted third-party assets). Among those remaining behind bars is Balázs Bús, former deputy president of the NKA and former mayor of Óbuda. On the same day, police also brought in the former chief of staff of former culture and innovation minister Balázs Hankó, on whom the court in the first round ordered one month of detention. The core of the case is a temporary board budget of some 17 billion forints, from which, according to the suspicion, organisations linked to the governing party and campaign events were also supported; by the end of June the beneficiaries had already repaid around 2.38 billion forints.

The antecedent of the story is familiar: on 22 July 2026, in a separate analysis, MIAK examined why discretionary culture financing without open competition systematically breeds scandal, and why the open-tender system is the structural answer. The current two developments, however, open a new axis. The 24.hu and HVG revealed that Balázs Hankó’s ministry decided on billions of forints of non-repayable support not only in the days before the elections, but also in the weeks after Fidesz’s electoral defeat on 12 April — for instance, more than one billion forints went to an organisation linked to Sándor Lezsák. The decisions are especially sensitive because among his first measures after taking his oath on 9 May 2026, Prime Minister Péter Magyar instructed the outgoing caretaker ministers to undertake commitments only with prior prime-ministerial approval; the responsible ministry has now launched an immediate investigation into the lawfulness of the decisions and payments. Meanwhile Fidesz speaks of “political prisoners” and demands the immediate release of the detainees and the closure of what it calls a show trial.

MIAK’s reading is dual, and this is precisely the point. On one side stands the institutional risk of the power transition: a cabinet that has suffered defeat and is losing its mandate may, even in its last days, allocate non-repayable funds virtually without accountability — this is a textbook example of why the period of the power transition needs to be regulated. On the other side, the rule-of-law yardstick cuts both ways: the suspicion of misappropriation is not proven guilt, everyone concerned is entitled to the presumption of innocence, and the lawfulness and proportionality of detention are decided solely by an independent court — not the government, nor even the prosecution service. The character of the problem is thus not a party question, but an institutional one: the checks that would make the handover of power transparent and reversible are missing, while the rule-of-law channel of holding to account must also be protected.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly frame that shows why fund allocation after an electoral defeat is no accident. According to the work Spin Dictators by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman (an economist and a political scientist, researchers of modern authoritarianism), today’s autocracies use, instead of open violence, public money and pseudo-institutions to maintain power and to serve the loyal circle — the allocation of resources is thus not a neutral administrative act but the fuel of the power system, which becomes most vulnerable precisely at the handover of power. In their work Why Nations Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics; they received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2024) describe this as the logic of extractive institutions: the narrow elite turns the community’s resources to its own survival, and even on departure tries to extract what it can. Lee Kuan Yew’s (the founding prime minister of Singapore) memoir gives the institutional side of the solution: an anti-corruption office independent of the political cycle and entitled to investigate every official and every minister. And Kautilya (an ancient Indian statecraft theorist, author of the Arthashastra) already wrote, in antiquity, a typology of treasury officials’ embezzlement — the suspicion of misappropriation thus follows an ancient pattern. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotation — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that handle the structural risk of the power transition — not by speeding up personal accountability, but with institutional checks, while preserving the rule-of-law guarantees.

3.1 Power-transition funding limit (from the next transition period, at statutory level)

MIAK proposes that a statutory limit apply to the power-transition (in international usage caretaker) period between the election and the new government taking office: the caretaker cabinet losing its mandate should not, above a value threshold fixed in advance, be able to make an irreversible, non-repayable fund-allocation decision. In unpostponable, ongoing matters (wage payment, contractual obligation, crisis situation) the decision should remain possible, but with mandatory prior publication, and subject to subsequent parliamentary as well as state-audit (the State Audit Office, ÁSZ, which monitors public finances) review. The current case shows precisely this gap: the billions awarded in the weeks after Fidesz’s electoral defeat — including the more than one billion of the organisation linked to Sándor Lezsák — under such a limit either would not have been born at all, or would become immediately publicly visible. Programme point A1, the public-money dashboard, adds the technical instrument, while the limit itself requires a new, standalone rule. In the Guriev–Treisman frame (see 6.4.1) this is the institutional closing-off of the vulnerability of the power transition.

3.2 A real-time, public public-money dashboard for subsidy decisions (with full coverage from 2027)

MIAK proposes that every state subsidy decision — both tender-based and individual — go into a public database at the moment of the decision, in machine-readable, searchable form: beneficiary, amount, legal title, decision-maker, justification and the status of the accounting. The system should signal, with automatic anomaly alerts, unusual timing (for example fund allocation around elections), conflicted beneficiaries and amount thresholds deviating from the rules. It is telling that in the current case journalists mined the post-election payments from the state-aid database reported to the European Commission, after the fact — with a domestic, real-time dashboard this publicity would have been prior and automatic. This is the backbone of the A1 public-money dashboard, complemented by the logic of the anomaly detector of the A2 public-procurement transparency. In Acemoglu and Robinson’s frame (see 6.4.2) this is the essence of the inclusive institution: the path of the resource is controlled by the broad public, not the narrow elite.

3.3 A politically independent corruption investigation with full preservation of the rule-of-law guarantees (established by 2028)

MIAK proposes that corruption-suspect cases be handled by an office independent of the government and entitled to investigate every official and every minister alike — the A10 Independent Corruption Investigation Office on the model of Singapore (CPIB). This has a key role precisely in the current situation: when one side speaks of “political prisoners” and of a show trial, the strongest counter-argument is an institution whose impartiality rests structurally — not on the day-to-day political goodwill. In parallel, MIAK emphasises the rule-of-law yardstick of coercive measures: detention and its extension are decided by a court, the presumption of innocence is due to the suspects as well, and I4 judicial independence and the I5 procedural guarantees ensure the proportionality of the procedure. The political framing — from both directions — is replaced by judicial control and independent investigation. According to Lee Kuan Yew’s experience (see 6.4.3), the source of credibility is precisely that the office is independent even of those in power.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: power is not private property, and its handover is not a private matter. The power-transition funding limit prevents, the real-time dashboard makes visible, and the independent investigation holds to account credibly, within a rule-of-law channel. Together they ensure that neither can the departing cabinet distribute irreversibly, nor can accountability slip into political score-settling.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public money and economy the funds distributable during the power transition become traceable and limited; fewer irreversible, unaccounted payments too strict a value threshold may paralyse genuinely unpostponable, ongoing matters in the transition period
Rule of law coercive measures under judicial control, and independent investigation neutralises even the charge of political influence the “political prisoner” framing may lend credence even to a rule-of-law procedure if communication adopts one side’s narrative
Public administration and democracy the handover of power becomes predictable, the mandate of the outgoing cabinet becomes clear the new rule may temporarily give rise to disputes of legal interpretation (what counts as “unpostponable”)

The main deliberative question is the balance between the operability of the transition period and the prevention of abuse. The caretaker government has legitimate tasks — the state cannot come to a standstill between the election and the inauguration —, so MIAK proposes not the freezing of decision-making, but the limitation of irreversible, large-sum fund allocation, with a clear, pre-fixed value threshold and mandatory publicity. The other tipping point is the tone of accountability: the current procedure is credible if it stays within a rule-of-law channel throughout, respecting the presumption of innocence, not treating suspicion as a verdict — and precisely for this reason it cannot be allowed that either the exposing or the relativising political framing take over the role of the judicial and the independent investigative forum.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs, that is, metrics from which it is visible whether the measure is successful):

  • Existence of a power-transition limit: whether there is a statutory rule that, in the caretaker period, ties fund allocation to a value threshold and makes it public — yes/no, and with what threshold;
  • Public coverage: the share of state subsidy decisions that appear at the moment of the decision in a public, searchable database — target for 2027: 100%;
  • Share of transition-period payments: the amount and share of non-repayable subsidies awarded in the period between the election and the inauguration of the new government, published annually;
  • Capacity of independent investigation: the establishment of the politically independent corruption investigation office and the number of its annual substantive investigations — per the aim of programme point A10.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the decision-maker is concrete: the ongoing investigation should not end with the closure of the individual cases, but should lead to a lasting, statutory rule — a power-transition funding limit, a real-time public-money dashboard and a politically independent corruption investigation. The proposal is attached to two MIAK foundational values. To transparency, because the real-time publicity of the path of public money is the only structural protection against the “last-day” handout at the handover of power — what is foreseeable is harder to distribute unaccountably. And to accountability, because holding to account is credible only if it is carried out by a politically independent institution and judicial control: thus it can become neither impunity nor political score-settling. Together these two distinguish a system-level reform from a one-off, personalised holding to account — and safeguard the power transition from remaining the weakest point of democracy.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The public-affairs and left-liberal band gave the most detailed treatment, but along two separate threads. The 24.hu and HVG placed the post-election fund allocation at the centre (the more than one billion of the organisation linked to Sándor Lezsák, the world meeting of Hun- and Turkic-conscious peoples, the premiere of János Orbán Dénes’s grand operetta), and highlighted that the responsible ministry launched an immediate investigation. Telex and 444.hu focused on the criminal-law developments: the bringing-in of the chief of staff and the extension of the detentions. Portfolio published the precise anatomy of the court decision (four extensions until 25 October, two criminal supervisions, the 17-billion-forint budget). Népszava highlighted the fact of the public-money handout at the headline level.

The pro-government-conservative framing appeared on this day not as a standalone analysis but through the Fidesz statement (quoted by 444.hu): according to it a “show trial” is under way, the detainees are “political prisoners”, and the seizure of the servers is “data theft”. The monitored conservative outlets (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) did not bring a downloadable, article-level standalone treatment of the topic on this day. MIAK adopts neither frame: neither the exposing nor the relativising reading. It places the emphasis on the structural cause (the lack of regulation of the power transition) and on the rule-of-law yardstick (judicial control, presumption of innocence, independent investigation).

6.2 Facts and data

  • Court decision (23 July 2026): the investigating judge of the Kecskemét District Court extended the detention of four suspects until 25 October 2026, and placed two suspects under criminal supervision until 23 November 2026; the suspicion is misappropriation causing particularly significant financial disadvantage (Portfolio, 24.hu).
  • Among the six persons arrested in June: Balázs Bús (former deputy president of the NKA, former mayor of Óbuda), Attila Ughy (former Fidesz MP, former president of the 17-billion-forint temporary board), Anikó Krucsainé Herter (suspended director-general of the National Cultural Support Manager) and further officeholders (Portfolio, 444.hu).
  • New bringing-in (23 July 2026): on the former chief of staff of former minister Balázs Hankó the court in the first round ordered one month of detention (444.hu, following Telex).
  • The case’s budget total: a temporary board budget of some 17 billion forints; by the end of June some 2.38 billion forints repaid (24.hu, Portfolio).
  • Post-election fund allocation (24 July 2026): Balázs Hankó’s ministry decided on billions of forints of non-repayable support both in the days before the elections and in the weeks after Fidesz’s defeat; more than one billion forints went to an organisation linked to Sándor Lezsák; the responsible ministry launched an immediate investigation into the lawfulness (24.hu, HVG).
  • Power-transition context: after taking his oath on 9 May 2026, Prime Minister Péter Magyar instructed the outgoing caretaker ministers to undertake commitments only with prior prime-ministerial approval (24.hu).
  • Legal status: for everyone concerned the suspicion is the starting point of the official investigation, not established guilt — the presumption of innocence is due to every suspect.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the power transition and the publicity of public money: A1 public-money dashboard, A2 public-procurement transparency, A10 independent corruption investigation office;
  • Justice (programme points) — judicial control over coercive measures and the procedural guarantees: I4 judicial independence, I5 procedural and property-rights guarantees;
  • Culture (background material) — culture financing as the affected resource circle; the details of the structural reform (open tender) are treated by MIAK’s analysis of 22 July 2026.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

According to Guriev and Treisman, the authoritarian systems of the 21st century have shifted from open violence to manipulation and pseudo-institutions: one of the main instruments of maintaining power is the targeted distribution of public money to the loyal circle, while preserving the appearance of competence and of democratic form. Resource allocation in this frame is not a neutral administrative function but the fuel of the power system — precisely for this reason the power transition, when this machinery loses its mandate, is the system’s most vulnerable point. The non-repayable subsidies awarded in the days after the electoral defeat fit into this pattern: the departing circle tries, until the last moment of the mandate, to channel resources to the actors linked to it. MIAK’s power-transition funding-limit proposal closes off precisely this vulnerable moment institutionally.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.4.2 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Acemoglu and Robinson trace the success or failure of nations back to the character of institutions. Inclusive institutions share power broadly, protect property and hold to account publicly; extractive institutions concentrate power and economic benefit in the hands of a narrow elite and create a self-perpetuating “vicious circle”. Channelling public money to a narrow circle, bypassing publicity and competition, is exactly the working of the extractive logic — the elite turns the community’s resource to its own survival. MIAK’s proposals — real-time publicity and independent investigation — shift precisely the character of the institution towards the inclusive direction: the path of the resource is controlled by the broad public, not the closed circle of insiders.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.4.3 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

Lee Kuan Yew’s memoir gives the practical model of anti-corruption institution-building. In Singapore the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) operated alongside the prime minister’s office, but its competence extended to every official and every minister — the key to credibility was precisely that the investigation did not depend even on those in power. In small cases the government narrowed the scope of discretion with clear, published rules, while for the big fish the independent office concentrated, with a gradually tightening statutory background. Translated to the Hungarian case: the strongest structural answer to the charge of “political prisoner” is a corruption-investigation institution whose impartiality rests not on day-to-day political goodwill but on its institutional independence — this is the target of MIAK’s programme point A10.

📖 Source: Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

6.4.4 Kautilya: Arthashastra

Treasury abuse is not a novel problem. Kautilya, the ancient Indian statecraft theorist, gives a methodical typology of treasury officials’ embezzlement in his administrative manual the Arthashastra, and sees sharply the limits of detection too:

“It is possible to mark the movements of birds flying high up in the sky; but it is not possible to ascertain the movement of government servants with a hidden purpose.”

Kautilya’s conclusion is that, since abuse with a hidden purpose can never be perfectly filtered out, strict, predictable deterrence and continuous monitoring are needed. In today’s Hungarian case, the suspicion of misappropriation causing particularly significant financial disadvantage is the modern legal formulation of this same ancient pattern — and MIAK’s answer is precisely predictable institutional control: real-time publicity and independent investigation, not an ad hoc, politically motivated strike.

📖 Source: Kautilya: Arthashastra

6.5 International comparison

The regulation of the power transition is an established practice in several democracies. In the United Kingdom, the “purdah” (pre-election period) conventions for the period between the election campaign and the formation of the government limit what the incumbent government may announce and what irreversible commitment it may undertake. In Australia and Canada the “caretaker conventions” similarly prohibit the caretaker government from making far-reaching decisions binding on its successor — precisely against a risk similar to the current Hungarian situation. On the institutional independence of corruption investigation, Singapore (CPIB) and Hong Kong (ICAC) are the classic model: both operate directly alongside the summit of executive power, but independently of it, investigating every actor. These examples show that MIAK’s proposal is not Hungarian over-regulation, but the baseline of the power-transition and anti-corruption practice of the developed democracies.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A5 — Whistleblowing system
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I5 — Property-rights protection and procedural guarantees

Culture

  • KU5 — Cultural participation index and open culture financing

Proposed new programme point: Power-transition funding limit (caretaker-government rule) — tying irreversible, large-sum fund allocation to a value threshold in the period between the election and the inauguration of the new government, with mandatory publicity and subsequent oversight — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 24 July 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First
  • 📖 Kautilya: Arthashastra

Note: the local file path of the books does NOT appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A2, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I5)
  • MIAK policy area: Culture (background material; programme point ID: KU5)
  • MIAK press monitor, 24 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 87/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and national reports; the State Audit Office (ÁSZ) NKA reports; the domestic state-aid database reported to the European Commission; international models: Singaporean CPIB, Hong Kong ICAC, British “purdah” convention, Australian and Canadian “caretaker conventions”

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