Part I — Situation overview

In July 2026 a wave of accountability set off along several strands around Hungarian culture financing. The most spectacular case is that of the writer Orbán János Dénes: according to the press, in roughly the year preceding the elections 422 million forints of public money was paid to him for the multi-year usage rights of nine operetta librettos, in part for the very works for which he had already received a fee from the Budapest Operetta Theatre. The payer was the Carpathian Basin Talent Development Nonprofit Ltd. (KMTG — a state-founded organisation operating from public money), which the author himself heads — that is, he obtained funds for his own works from an organisation he directs himself. Culture minister Zoltán Tarr filed a criminal complaint in the case, signalling that from here on it is the authorities’ task to uncover the details; the author offered to buy back the rights, to which the minister replied: “there are no backroom deals”.

The individual case fits into a wider screening. To unravel the grant scandal linked to the previous cultural leadership — the temporary panel funds of the National Cultural Fund (NKA — the main tender institution for state support of culture) used as a “personal envelope” by an outgoing minister — the minister appointed a new NKA vice-president and sent a notice to 806 applicants to account for the support they had used within 15 days. In the affair that erupted in April there have since been arrests, and several grantees chose instead to repay the money: in a single week a further 220 million forints flowed back. On another strand, the Debrecen chapter of a civic movement raised the suspicion of campaign financing: according to them several local associations linked to governing-party actors obtained NKA funds that they could in fact turn to political promotion — individual requests instead of a public tender call, often with terse justification.

MIAK’s reading: these seemingly separate cases — the one-person self-payment, the “personal envelope” and the suspicion of disguised campaign financing — are bound together by a common structure. Each arose where a single decision-maker allocated valuable, scarce public funds without public competition and without ex-post accountability. For MIAK the lesson is not the stigmatisation of individual actors — the presumption of innocence applies to everyone affected, and a complaint is not yet guilt — but the recognition of the systemic fault: discretionary culture financing is itself the source of the risk.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame that shows why this series of scandals is no accident. Robert Klitgaard (American economist, pioneer of the economic analysis of corruption), in his work Controlling Corruption, condenses the structure of corruption into a single formula: C = M + D − A, that is, corruption flourishes where a monopoly position (M) and individual, discretion-based decision-making power (D — discretion) meet a lack of accountability (A). The culture-financing cases exhaust all three conditions: monopolised fund allocation, individual decision without a public call, and ex-post or missing accountability. Susan Rose-Ackerman (American legal economist, leading researcher of the political economy of corruption), in her work Corruption and Government, adds to this: where a decision-maker allocates a scarce, valuable resource without clear, published rules, rent necessarily arises (rent — the gain above market justification that can be skimmed off from the decision-maker’s position), which feeds a client system based on patronage and loyalty; the solution is to entrust allocation to independent, impartial bodies. The detailed literature treatment — by author — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that eliminate the root of the scandal — discretionary handouts — rather than merely treating its symptoms.

3.1 An open, searchable culture-financing database for all grants (with full coverage from 2027)

MIAK proposes that every state cultural grant — tender-based and individual decision alike — be placed in a public, machine-readable database: beneficiary, amount, legal title, the body or person making the decision, the assessment justification and the accounting status. In the Klitgaardian C = M + D − A frame (see 6.4.1) this directly strengthens the accountability (A) factor: the Orbán János Dénes-type self-payment or the Debrecen individual requests would have become visible in such a database at once, before the scandal broke out. This is the backbone of the KU5 open culture-financing programme point, served by the technical solution of the A1 public-money dashboard. Publicity is not an ex-post punishment but prevention: what is foreseeable is harder to allocate indefensibly.

3.2 Reducing the discretionary share and open, professional assessment (from the next NKA cycle)

A common feature of the cases now uncovered is that the money was decided not by a public tender but by an individual decision — from a “personal envelope”, on an individual request. MIAK proposes that, according to the numerical goal of the KU5 programme point, the discretionary (individual, competition-free) financing share fall below 30 percent, and the remaining funds be allocated by open tender on the basis of pre-published, objective criteria and a decision by an assessment committee free of conflicts of interest. For the larger creative-industry funds the international-jury model of the KU3 programme point offers a template. In Rose-Ackerman’s frame (see 6.4.2) this is the “insulation” of the decision-maker from the demands of political backers: if the decision is tied to rules and open competition, the room for patronage logic narrows. An important counterweight is that the tender system should not become disproportionate administration weighing on genuine civil actors — for small-sum grants a simplified but still public procedure is proposed.

3.3 A strict separation of cultural support and campaign financing (in the autumn transparency package)

The Debrecen suspicion — that cultural funds may have flowed into disguised political promotion — signals the blurring of the boundary between culture financing and campaign financing. MIAK proposes that, following the logic of the A12 campaign-financing transparency programme point, the beneficiary circle of cultural grants and the involvement of local political actors be publicly cross-checkable: if an elected politician or candidate sits in the leadership of a supported organisation, this must be indicated on the grant form, and cultural funds awarded during a campaign period should be subject to stricter accounting and publicity rules. This is not the suspicion of cultural associations but the institutional drawing of the boundary — so that public culture cannot become a campaign tool, and genuine cultural actors are not lumped together with disguised political financing.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: accountability is lasting if it stems not from a one-off campaign but from a permanent rule. The current screening — the criminal complaint, the appointment of the NKA vice-president, the 15-day accounting deadline — is a correct and necessary step, but by the Klitgaard formula it in itself treats only the symptom of one case; system-level protection is built from narrowing discretion and making publicity permanent.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Culture support is decided by professional quality, not political proximity; rural, broadly participatory culture gets more funds over-bureaucratising the tender system may deter small actors; a shortfall of funds may arise during the transition
Society the public traceability of public money increases; trust in cultural institutions is restored generalising the scandals to the whole cultural sector may raise an unfair “collective suspicion”
Public administration the open database and professional assessment institutionalise accountability; fewer individual decisions reducing the discretionary share may clash with the political demand for “fast, flexible support”

The main deliberative question is the balance of open competition and flexibility. Individual, fast decisions have a legitimate place — for example in the case of an unexpected international opportunity or a crisis situation — which is why MIAK proposes not the total abolition of discretion but its strict delimitation and the reduction of its share: every individual decision with a public justification and ex-post accounting. The other tipping point is the tone of accountability: the ongoing screening is credible if it remains within a rule-of-law channel — respecting the presumption of innocence, not treating a complaint as a judgment — and does not slide into a political reckoning. The recognition of the systemic fault matters precisely because it shows that the problem is not one or another “bad actor” but the structure that made the bad decision possible and profitable.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Public coverage: the share of state cultural grants that appear in a public, searchable database with beneficiary, amount and justification — goal for 2027: 100%;
  • Discretionary share: the share of individual cultural decisions made without an open tender, relative to all grants — goal: below 30%;
  • Accounting discipline: the share of grants accounted for on time and completely — published publicly each year;
  • Campaign separation: separate registration and publication of cultural grants awarded during a campaign period that are linked to political actors — yes/no.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the decision-maker is concrete: the ongoing screening should not end with the closing of the individual cases but should lead to a lasting rule — an open, searchable culture-financing database, a reduction of the discretionary share, and a strict separation of campaign financing. The proposal attaches to two MIAK foundational values: to transparency — because the public traceability of public money is the only structural protection against the “personal envelope” logic —, and to accountability — because by the Klitgaard formula it is precisely its lack that makes monopolised discretion corrupt. These two together distinguish system-level reform from one-off, personalised accountability — and protect the whole of culture from falling under collective suspicion because of a few cases.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The economic and public-affairs band gave the most detailed treatment: Portfolio unpacked the financial anatomy of the Orbán János Dénes case (422 million forints, the self-payment structure of KMTG, the disproportionality of the librettos’ market value), 444.hu and 24.hu detailed the appointment of the NKA vice-president, the 15-day accounting notice sent to 806 applicants and the Debrecen campaign-financing suspicion, and 24.hu in a separate article covered the nearly 600-million grant awarded by individual ministerial decisions to a company part-owned by Merkely’s son, which the responsible ministry later deemed “professionally unjustified”.

HVG and ATV carried the side of the ministerial communication (“there are no backroom deals”, “we have become a country with consequences”). The governing-party-conservative band handled the topic more cautiously: Mandiner reported the fact of the complaint but put the wider screening — which touches the decisions of the previous cultural leadership — less in focus, and the possibility of political motivation appeared in its framing. MIAK adopts neither frame: neither the exposing nor the relativising reading — it places the emphasis on the structural cause (discretionary handouts) and on rule-of-law accountability (presumption of innocence, open rules).

6.2 Facts and data

  • Orbán János Dénes case: according to the press about 422 million forints for the usage rights of nine operetta librettos, through the KMTG headed by the author; a criminal complaint was filed (Portfolio, Mandiner, ATV, HVG).
  • NKA screening: a 15-day accounting deadline for 806 applicants; in a week a further roughly 220 million forints repaid; a new NKA vice-president to unravel the earlier “personal envelope” cases (444.hu, 24.hu).
  • Merkely strand: the Ministry of Science and Technology later deemed “professionally unjustified” the nearly 600-million grant awarded over three years by individual ministerial decisions to a company part-owned by the rector’s son; the failure to declare a conflict of interest was raised (Portfolio/Telex).
  • Debrecen strand: according to a civic movement 15 local organisations linked to governing-party actors obtained NKA funds without a public call, with terse justification; the suspicion of prohibited campaign financing and budget fraud arose, with a complaint held out (24.hu).
  • Frame figure: Hungarian cultural public expenditure is about 1 percent of GDP, slightly below the EU average — according to MIAK the main problem is not the volume but the structure of allocation (MIAK Culture background material).
  • Legal status: in every case above the complaint or the suspicion is the starting point of the official investigation, not established guilt — the presumption of innocence applies to everyone affected.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Culture (programme points) — the structural reform of financing: KU5 open culture-financing and cultural participation index, KU3 tender-based, international-jury support of the creative industry;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the publicity of public money and campaign separation: A1 public-money dashboard, A12 campaign-financing transparency;
  • Justice (background material) — the distinction between complaint, investigation and judgment and the consistent enforcement of the presumption of innocence in public accountability.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard condenses the structure of corruption into the now widely quoted formula C = M + D − A: abuse becomes probable where a monopoly position (a single actor controls the scarce resource) and discretion (individual, discretion-based decision not tied to rules) meet a lack of accountability. By his argument, defence against corruption is not primarily the filtering out of “bad people” but the transformation of the structure: narrowing discretion with clear rules and objective criteria, introducing competition, and strengthening external accountability — public data, independent oversight. Translated to the culture-financing cases: the one-person allocation of funds, the individual requests without a public call, and the missing ex-post oversight realised precisely all three risk elements of the formula at once. MIAK’s proposals — an open database, a reduced discretionary share, professional assessment — directly target reducing D and increasing A.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman points out that where an official allocates a scarce, valuable resource by one-person discretion without clear, published rules, rent necessarily arises, which the decision-maker and the beneficiaries skim off — the allocation rewards not performance but the existing insiders and political loyalty. A system built on patronage undermines the fair operation of public services and steers the funds away from the genuine community goal towards the client circle. The solution, according to Rose-Ackerman, is institutional: allocation must be entrusted to independent, impartial bodies that the rules insulate from the demands of political backers. Applied to the Hungarian cases, this provides the theoretical frame for the Debrecen (suspicion of disguised campaign financing) and the self-payment cases — discretion breeds rent, rent breeds patronage — and at the same time the direction of MIAK’s solution: open competition and rule-bound assessment free of conflicts of interest.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

6.5 International comparison

The European benchmarks of open culture financing are well documented. The British Arts Council England and several Scandinavian models follow the “arm’s length” principle: the political decision-maker sets the frameworks, but the concrete grants are decided by an independent, professional body on the basis of pre-published criteria — precisely the structure that Rose-Ackerman describes as an “impartial body”. On the publicity of public money the Slovak mandatory contract register (every state contract online, in searchable form) and the Brazilian Portal da Transparência offer a template: the publicity of the beneficiary, the amount and the legal title prevents, rather than punishing after the fact, the abuse. These examples show that MIAK’s proposal is not a Hungarian peculiarity or over-regulation but the baseline of developed cultural-policy practice — narrowing discretion and making publicity permanent protect both public money and the professional autonomy of culture at once.

Culture

  • KU5 — Cultural participation index and open culture-financing
  • KU3 — Support of the creative industry

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A12 — Campaign-financing transparency

Proposed new programme point: A culture-financing conflict-of-interest and campaign-separation rule — the mandatory indication of the political involvement of supported organisations and stricter publicity of cultural grants during a campaign period — for the Culture area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 19 July 2026 — topic 8):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Note: the local file path of the books does NOT appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Culture (programme points and background material; programme point ID: KU5, KU3)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A12)
  • MIAK press monitor, 19 July 2026 — topic 8, score: 74/100

Additional public data sources:

  • NKA tender database; State Audit Office (ÁSZ) cultural-support reports; international templates: Arts Council England (arm’s length), Slovak contract register, Brazilian Portal da Transparência

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