Part I — Situation overview

The entry into force of the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law, promulgated on 18 July, opened a new front in the accountability dispute. László Gajdos, the Tisza government’s minister for a living environment, wrote on Sunday on his social media page: “Péter Polt’s protection has ended,” the former Prosecutor General — currently president of the Constitutional Court (CC) — “like every other citizen must give account of his deeds before the soon-to-be-established National Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office,” because “there are no more untouchable people.” The amendment, by restoring the upper age limit of 70, indeed affects Polt: his and three fellow judges’ constitutional-judge mandate ends, under the rule, within months. Polt replied on Monday in a statement published on the CC’s website: the minister “named not a single concrete case, legal violation, conduct or piece of evidence,” his declaration is “a political pre-empting of the outcome of a procedure that has not even begun”; immunity is not impunity but a procedural guarantee that does not exclude criminal-law accountability; and on criminal-law liability “not a ministerial Facebook post, but an independent court proceeding on the basis of the law decides” — “the presumption of innocence is a fundamental right due to everyone, not a political favour.”

In parallel with the dispute, the incumbent Prosecutor General also came into the crosshairs. The defence lawyers in the so-called Ukrainian cash-carriers case, Lóránt Horváth and Adrienn Laczó, in a submission built on five arguments, initiated at Ágnes Forsthoffer — who as Speaker of the House currently also exercises the powers of the President of the Republic — that she propose to the National Assembly the removal from office of Prosecutor General Gábor Bálint Nagy. Among the objections are the procedural concerns experienced in their case, the taking over of the prosecution in the defamation cases of governing-party politicians, and what they consider an unauthorised, publicly funded foreign personal protection. HVG additionally wrote that under the Prosecutor General elected for nine years in June 2025, the advancement of certain prosecutors linked to governing-party politicians’ families accelerated conspicuously at the Prosecutor General’s Office.

MIAK’s reading: the stakes of the dispute are not the person of Péter Polt, but whether accountability proceeds in the language of institutions or in the language of political communication. The “no more untouchable people” principle is in itself the correct requirement of equality before the law — but it remains so only if all its elements take shape in a lawful procedure: concrete suspicion, an authority with competence, the right to a defence, and without declarations pre-empting the pronouncement of guilt. The credibility of accountability is decided not by whom it targets, but by how it is conducted.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. The Fundamental Law of Hungary fixes the legal status of both institutional actors in the dispute: Article 24 the Constitutional Court, Article 29 the prosecution service as the exerciser of public prosecution — the detailed immunity and mandate rules are given by cardinal acts, that is, the question of “protection” is an itemised legal, not a political qualification question. Joseph Raz (Oxford legal philosopher, one of the leading figures of legal positivism) in his work The Authority of Law derives the principles of the rule of law — pre-promulgated, clear, stable rules, the binding of individual decisions to general rules — from the single thought that law must be capable of guiding people’s conduct, and separately warns: the most typical form of appearance of arbitrary exercise of power is the individual, person-targeted legal act. Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor at Yale University, pioneer of the economics of corruption) in her work Corruption and Government, analysing the accountability dilemmas of post-transition countries, concludes that the role of spectacular criminal cases is the creation of credibility, but against corruption it is not the weeding out of “bad apples” but structural reform that has effect. And the memoir of Lee Kuan Yew (founding prime minister of Singapore) gives the institutional model of exception-free accountability: the yardstick is not the declaration, but the independent investigative office that strikes at every actor with the same rule. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures to give rule-of-law authentication to the accountability process.

3.1 A government communication protocol on pending and possible proceedings (within 30 days)

MIAK proposes that the government adopt and publish a self-limiting communication protocol: members of the government should not make statements pre-empting the criminal-law liability of a concrete person, and their knowledge pointing to a legal violation — as Polt’s statement also points out — they are obliged to present to the authority with competence, not to announce on social media. This is not a brake on accountability but a condition of its success: in the Razian frame (see 6.4.2) the announced but not procedure-formed allegation of guilt is precisely the individual act that reclassifies law into a political weapon — and as a side effect also makes the later, genuinely well-founded indictment attackable.

3.2 The public fixing of the asset-recovery office’s procedural guarantees (in the establishing act)

The National Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office (NVVH — the new organ, given a Fundamental Law basis by the 17th amendment, tasked with recovering unlawfully acquired assets) — its credibility is decided by the detailed rules now being drafted. MIAK proposes that the establishing act fix publicly and itemised: under what standard of proof an investigation may be launched, how the burden of proof is distributed, what judicial review is due to the person affected, and where the boundary lies between the office’s asset-focused examination and the competence of the investigating authorities as well as the prosecution service exercising public prosecution. The Singaporean model of the A10 programme point (see 6.4.4) shows that exception-free accountability works if the institution is operationally independent and its rules are fixed in advance — by the Rose-Ackermanian lesson (see 6.4.3) without this the spectacular cases do not improve the system but merely change the actor.

3.3 Prosecution-service personnel transparency and the reasoned adjudication of the removal-from-office initiative (within 60 days)

The adjudication of the removal-from-office initiative against the Prosecutor General is now with the Speaker of the House exercising the head-of-state power: MIAK proposes that the decision — whether forwarding the initiative or rejecting it — be made with a public reasoning citing legal provisions, because the existence of the statutory conditions (culpable failure of duty, unworthiness) is a legal question that cannot be decided by silence. In addition, MIAK proposes for the prosecution-service organisation the analogy of the I1 judicial-transparency programme point: the public, professional reasoning of managerial appointments and advancements at an unusual pace — for the accelerated career paths documented by HVG feed precisely the appearance against which the prosecution service can defend itself only with transparency, regardless of which political era appointed its leaders.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: accountability is not weakened but strengthened by procedural guarantees. Equality before the law is two-directional — it also means that the actors of the former power are not untouchable, and it also means that they too can be held to account only in a lawful procedure.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Rule of law channelling accountability into a procedural bed; a precedent-value guarantee system at the NVVH if guilt-pre-empting communication becomes entrenched, even legitimate accountability gets a “political retribution” framing
Institutional system the transparency of prosecution-service personnel decisions; the clarified yardstick of the removal procedure the simultaneity of the CC transition and the prosecution-service dispute may bring a temporary weakening of institutional trust
Society a tangible demonstration of equality before the law in lawful cases if the promised holding to account does not become a lawful procedure, the disappointment delegitimises in both directions

The main deliberative question is the relationship between time and credibility. Fast, spectacular announcements satisfy accountability expectations in the short term, but any advance verdict without evidence produces later procedural vulnerability — even a well-founded case may fall on the ground that the accused can invoke political prejudice. Conversely: the slower but lawful path may seem “lukewarm” in the short term, but in the long term it is the only one that can bring a result that also holds up before a court. The tipping point will be the NVVH: if it is established with procedural guarantees and professional leadership, it can be an institution of accountability; if as the executor of political declarations, then at the next change of government the same dispute repeats itself, with the roles reversed.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Procedure ratio: of the allegations of legal violation publicly formulated by government actors, how many become an official procedure (criminal complaint, investigation) within 6 months — goal: 100% or the withdrawal of the allegation;
  • NVVH guarantees: whether the establishing act contains the standard of proof, judicial review and the delimitation of competence — yes/no, still before the office is established;
  • Removal-from-office initiative: whether a public, reasoned decision was made on the submission within 60 days — yes/no;
  • Prosecution-service transparency: the introduction of a practice of public reasoning of managerial appointments and advancements — for what percentage of the affected decisions a published reasoning is accessible.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the decision-maker is concrete: every step of accountability — from ministerial communication through the establishment of the NVVH to the adjudication of the initiative against the Prosecutor General — should proceed according to pre-fixed, public procedural rules, and on guilt only an independent court should pronounce judgment. This is not the protection of the former power, but of the new system’s: every guarantee saved today makes the results of accountability attackable tomorrow. The proposal attaches to two MIAK foundational values: to accountability — because equality before the law is realised only in functioning, exception-free procedures, not in declarations —, and to freedom from ideology — because the yardstick proposed here remains exactly the same even if one day it is the officials of the present government who must give account; these two together separate institutional accountability from political retribution.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal band documented both sides of the dispute: Telex carried in a separate article Gajdos’s post (“Péter Polt’s protection has ended”) and Polt’s response statement, 444.hu raised the main argument of Polt’s response into its headline (“named not a single concrete legal violation”), and HVG raised the strongest quotation into its headline (“The presumption of innocence is not a political favour”), and in a hvg360 analysis added the thread of the accelerated prosecution-service advancements, and was the first to report on the removal-from-office initiative against the Prosecutor General.

The public-affairs-economic band remained fact-reporting: 24.hu presented the Gajdos–Polt exchange with quotations, without qualification, Portfolio, on the basis of the Tisza communication, carried the immunity announcement in a short news item. ATV reinforced the government side’s framing with its choice of headline (“There are no more untouchable people”).

The pro-government-conservative band applied a retribution framing: according to Magyar Nemzet, Gajdos “would have Polt taken away by the new ÁVH” — with the historical parallel linking accountability to the autocratic past —, and treated the minister’s statement together with the ministry’s operational problems. The two edges of the spectrum thus form mirror images: on one side the “end of untouchability,” on the other the “new ÁVH” — the itemised legal situation recedes into the background in both framings, which is precisely why this analysis focuses on it.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The 17th amendment restored the constitutional judges’ upper age limit of 70; because of this four judges — among them Péter Polt, president of the CC — see their mandate end within months, and Csaba Hende’s because of the indirect effect of the 12-year MP mandate limit (Telex, 444.hu, Index calculation); according to Béla Pokol, speaking to Magyar Nemzet, the date of the personnel changes has shifted to 1 September.
  • The key claims of Péter Polt’s statement: as Prosecutor General he was entitled to the same immunity as members of the National Assembly, so his election as constitutional judge created no new protection; the CC already ruled in 2004 that the Prosecutor General bears no political responsibility to the National Assembly for a decision taken in an individual case and cannot be instructed to make such a decision — this, however, does not exclude criminal-law liability (Telex, Magyar Nemzet).
  • The removal from office of the Prosecutor General can, under the relevant rules, be initiated if he fails for a culpable reason to fulfil the duties arising from his mandate, has committed a crime established in a final judgment, or has become unworthy of his office (HVG summary of the submission).
  • Gábor Bálint Nagy was elected Prosecutor General for nine years on 11 June 2025 by the then governing-party majority of the National Assembly; after taking office he removed Secretary General Ervin Belovics, entrusted the secretary-general’s duties to Richárd Kontrát, and Vajk Kövér became deputy head of the personnel department (HVG360).
  • On the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI 2024) Hungary: control of corruption −0.17, rule of law +0.35 — control of corruption is the only Hungarian indicator in negative territory, this gives the numerical background to the stakes of the accountability programme (World Bank WGI).

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Justice (programme points) — the independence of judges and constitutional judges, and the transparency of the judicial system: I4 protection of judicial independence, I1 judicial transparency (by analogy for prosecution-service personnel decisions);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the institutional frame of depoliticised accountability: A10 independent corruption-investigation office, A6 strengthening of checks and balances.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Fundamental Law of Hungary

The itemised legal frame of the dispute consists of three elements. Under Article 24 the Constitutional Court is “the supreme organ for the protection of the Fundamental Law” — the legal status of its members, thus the termination of their mandate, is regulated by cardinal act and by the Fundamental Law itself; the 17th amendment, by restoring the age-limit rule, changed at this level. Article 29 defines the prosecution service as an independent constitutional organ: the Prosecutor General and the prosecution service “as a contributor to the administration of justice” exercise public prosecution — that is, it is not part of the judicial branch and not a subordinate of the government either; the Prosecutor General reports to the National Assembly. Applied to the present dispute: the content of “protection” and its termination is a question of interpretation of these itemised rules, which neither a ministerial post nor an affected party’s statement can decide — ultimately the decisions of the organs with competence to apply these rules give the answer to it.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (Articles 24 and 29)

6.4.2 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

Raz derives the principles of the rule of law from a single basic thought: law must be capable of guiding the conduct of its addressees — therefore the rule must be pre-promulgated, clear and stable, and therefore individual legal acts must be born within the frame of public, general rules. He separately analyses that arbitrary exercise of power — power exercised out of revenge, favour or for personal advantage — takes shape most typically precisely in individual, person-targeted acts, and that a government subject to the rule of law is limited precisely in adjusting the law retroactively, suddenly or secretly to its own goals. Applied to the Polt dispute: the retrospective, person-fitted interpretation of the immunity and mandate rules — in whichever direction — would be a violation of the Razian yardstick; accountability is lawful if it is the general application of a general rule, not an act tailored to an individual goal.

📖 Source: Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law (Chapter 11: The Rule of Law and its Virtue)

6.4.3 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman, analysing the experience of transition and new democracies, concludes that corruption is a structural-incentive phenomenon, and therefore the criminal-law path in itself is not sufficient: the tracking down and punishment of “bad apples” does not solve the underlying problem. Proceedings against spectacular, high-ranking officials have, in her view, a real function — the creation of the state’s credibility and the winning of public support —, but this function is fulfilled only if the proceedings are lawful, and if behind them actual structural reform takes place: the narrowing of discretionary powers, the building of transparency and accountability institutions. Applied to the Hungarian accountability wave: the Polt case and its companions serve the fight against corruption if, alongside the evidence-based proceedings, institutional reform — asset transparency, independent investigative capacity, appointment guarantees — is also realised; without this even the most spectacular case is merely a change of actor.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.4 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

Singapore’s founder built the working model of anti-corruption policy on the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB): the bureau is operationally independent, can investigate any public official and politician, and with unjustified enrichment the burden of proof is reversed. By Lee’s lesson, “it is easy to start with high moral standards, but hard to live up to them, unless the leaders are strong enough to deal with every rule-breaker, without exception.” Exception-freeness, however, is for him an institutional, not a rhetorical, category: it is not the political leader who designates who must “give account,” but the pre-fixed rule and the independent bureau — striking even at his own party’s ministers. Applied to the Hungarian NVVH and the A10 programme point: the “no more untouchable people” principle will be true precisely to the extent that the new institutions apply the same yardstick to the actors of every incumbent government too.

📖 Source: Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First (Chapter 12)

6.5 International comparison

The international experience of post-authoritarian accountability is two-directional. The positive model is given, besides the Singaporean CPIB, by the 2013–2018 period of the Romanian anti-corruption prosecution (DNA): cases against high-ranking politicians that hold up before a court — yet the shadow side of the Romanian example is also instructive, because the disputes around the procedural guarantees (cooperation with the secret services, the practice of pre-trial detentions) later damaged the institution’s credibility too. The negative model is abusive “accountability”: where the prosecution, as the tool of the incumbent power, targets political opponents in ostensibly common-law cases, there criminal law is the continuation of political competition by other means — the Polish post-2015 restructuring of the prosecution (the merger of the justice-minister and Prosecutor-General posts) was a recurring subject of the European Union’s rule-of-law proceedings, and a counter-example for the Hungarian regulation: the independence of public prosecution depends not on the goodwill of the incumbent government but on organisational guarantees.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I1 — Judicial transparency

Proposed new programme point: Accountability communication code — self-limiting rules binding on members of the government for the public commenting of pending and possible proceedings — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 20 July 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary
  • 📖 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A10, A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I1)
  • MIAK legal-foundations background material (prosecutorial and constitutional-judge legal status, immunity rules)
  • MIAK press monitor, 20 July 2026 — topic 3, score: 82/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Magyar Közlöny issue of 18 July 2026 (the text of the 17th amendment)
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 (control of corruption, rule of law)

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