Part I — Situation overview

On 14 June 2026, 444.hu and Telex reported that, by an internal report of NAV (the National Tax and Customs Administration), the Office of the Prosecutor General may have acted unlawfully in the case of the Ukrainian cash convoys — referred to in the press as the “gold convoy”. The executive summary of the document obtained by 444.hu lists, in 24 points, the findings of the inspection, which concern omissions, deficiencies and concrete breaches of law; at one point it records that the designation of the investigating authority “took place in an unlawful manner”. The position the prosecution service sent to the paper is to the contrary, while NAV confirmed that such an examination — indeed, more than one — was actually ordered. In the background — by HVG’s account — the investigating chief prosecutor (the paper names Pál Furcht) resigned days earlier, and ATV reported that the question of responsibility also arose at a higher level.

The case is a test of the integrity of the justice system, and precisely for that reason it demands conceptual precision. The prosecution service is an autonomous constitutional body (Fundamental Law, Article 29), the exerciser of public prosecution and the guardian of legality — in the strict public-law sense it is not part of the judiciary, since that is the branch of the courts (Article 25). MIAK therefore uses the umbrella term “the justice system (the courts and the prosecution service)”. In a concrete case the Prosecutor General accepts instructions from no one, and reports not to the minister of justice but to the National Assembly — this independence is the constitutional essence of the prosecuting authority. Precisely for that reason the irregularity that has now arisen can be remedied not by political instruction, but by institutional means — parliamentary reporting, internal and external control.

MIAK’s reading: the disclosed irregularity is serious, and must be examined — but the disclosure is only credible if the procedure itself is also flawless. The restoration of the rule of law cannot be a pretext for political pressure in the reverse direction; if the new majority tries to steer the prosecuting authority for its own ends, then it repeats exactly the error it complains of. The key to credible accountability is not the winding-up of independence, but making it accountable.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Susan Rose-Ackerman (American lawyer-economist, a leading researcher of the economics of corruption), in her work Corruption and Government, regards independent judicial and prosecutorial institutions as one of the cornerstones of the anti-corruption system: the prosecuting authority fulfils its role if it is protected from political influence yet transparently accountable. Robert Klitgaard (American economist, one of the founders of corruption research), in his book Controlling Corruption, provides the mechanism: corruption flourishes where a monopoly position and discretionary power meet the absence of accountability — and the prosecution service is precisely such an actor, endowed with great discretion, for which the absence of control is the greatest risk. Daniel Kaufmann (governance researcher at the World Bank, one of the developers of the Worldwide Governance Indicators), in his work Governance Matters, treats the rule of law and the control of corruption as a measurable governance dimension — the Hungarian indicators (by the World Bank’s WGI 2024, the control of corruption is −0.17) signal where the work lies. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that the examination of the disclosed irregularity strengthens, rather than weakens, the rule of law.

3.1 An impartial procedure and independent external control in the examination (launched immediately)

The irregularity disclosed in NAV’s internal report must be examined in a procedure whose impartiality cannot be disputed. Within the framework of strengthening checks and balances (A6), MIAK proposes that independent external control be brought into the examination — the inspection toolkit of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), and, where necessary, cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) — and that the result of the findings be public. An important public-law limit: the ÁSZ is a body of inspection, not of binding decision — it makes findings and gives a report to the National Assembly; the actual holding to account is within the competence either of the National Assembly (political responsibility) or of the prosecution service and the courts (criminal responsibility). The aim is that the examination should look not like a political reckoning, but like a regular, verifiable procedure — otherwise its result loses its credibility.

3.2 Strengthening the prosecution service’s accountability without giving up independence (within the legislative cycle)

The solution is not the dismantling of the prosecuting authority’s independence, but making it accountable. MIAK proposes strengthening the whistleblower system (A5) within the prosecution service (a protected channel for reporting breaches of law), as well as a more transparent, numerical reporting order of prosecutorial activity towards the National Assembly — without anyone being able to instruct the Prosecutor General in a concrete case. In the language of Klitgaard’s formula, this means making D (discretionary power) transparent and strengthening A (accountability): not the removal of the power, but the verifiability of its use. And the merit-based, transparent appointment guarantees of the official-selection and rotation system (KI7) ensure that leadership positions are filled on the basis of competence, not political loyalty.

3.3 Independent corruption-investigation capacity and public-money transparency (within the institution-building cycle)

Recurring irregularities require a system-level response. MIAK proposes for consideration the Singaporean (CPIB) model of an independent corruption-investigation office (A10): a body protected alike from the executive power and from day-to-day politics, which investigates high-level cases of suspected corruption impartially and reports publicly on its activity. This is complemented by the public-money dashboard (A1): public, machine-readable tracking of public-money movements reduces the opacity in which such cases can arise at all. Rose-Ackerman’s thesis becomes practice here: independent but accountable institutions are not obstacles to political will, but the load-bearing pillars of the rule of law.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: the restoration of the rule of law is credible only if it is also rule-of-law in its instruments. An impartial procedure, accountable independence and independent investigative capacity together ensure that the disclosure strengthens trust — rather than dealing it a further blow.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law / justice An impartial, verifiable examination restores trust in the prosecuting authority and sets a precedent for institutional integrity If the examination looks like a political reckoning, trust erodes further, and the prosecuting authority’s independence is damaged
Anti-corruption policy Independent control and public-money transparency reduce the room for manoeuvre of abuses Too rapid an institutional restructuring without guarantees may create new, unpredictable actors, without adequate checks
Public administration / institutions The merit-based appointment order and the reporting obligation lastingly strengthen institutional quality Personnel changes alone — without structural guarantees — only reverse the direction of loyalty, not solve the problem

The main point to weigh is the balance of speed and guarantees. The public expects rapid, visible accountability, and the political pressure encourages this; but a procedure that is too rapid and without adequate legal guarantee would repeat exactly the criticised pattern — turning the prosecuting authority into an instrument. The narrow path: launching the examination without delay, but in a strictly regular procedure that is impartial and under independent control, every step of which can be verified afterwards.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

Three performance indicators (KPIs) are worth tracking over the next 12–24 months:

  • Procedural impartiality: whether the examination takes place with the involvement of independent external control (ÁSZ, where necessary EPPO), in a documented and public procedural order;
  • Institutional guarantees: whether new instruments of prosecutorial accountability that do not damage independence come into being (a protected reporting channel, a numerical parliamentary report);
  • Rule-of-law indicator: whether the corruption-control and rule-of-law indicators (WGI) concerning Hungary improve over the medium term, which is the external, comparable feedback on the structural change.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message — to decision-makers and the public alike: the disclosed irregularity must be examined, but the manner of the examination is itself a test of the rule of law. MIAK therefore asks for three steps, valid together: a procedure under impartial, independent control; the strengthening of the prosecution service’s accountability without giving up independence; and independent investigative capacity and public-money transparency that narrow the room for manoeuvre of abuses.

Among MIAK’s foundational values, the topic engages accountability and transparency: accountability because the prosecuting authority’s independence is only legitimate if it is paired with the verifiability of its activity — the two are not opposites but conditions of each other; and transparency because the opacity in which such cases arise can be dispelled only by public accounting and independent control. The rule of law is strong when it observes its own rules even against itself.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal public-affairs band (444.hu, Telex, HVG, ATV) carried the topic: 444.hu disclosed the content of NAV’s internal report (the 24-point executive summary), Telex, referring to it, reported on the possible breach of law by the Office of the Prosecutor General, HVG tied the investigating chief prosecutor’s resignation to the case, and ATV highlighted the emergence of responsibility at a higher level. The economic band (Portfolio) summarised the case in a fact-stating frame, under the title “serious breaches of law disclosed”. The government-party–conservative band did not bring the topic into the top focus on this day — which is itself telling: criticism of an earlier prosecutorial practice touches the earlier government circle uncomfortably. In MIAK’s reading, the one-sidedness of the source spectrum warns precisely that the examination must be conspicuously impartial — otherwise it is easy to draw it into a political frame. (The Népszava source is only a title-level reference, pointing to the portal’s front page.)

6.2 Facts and data

Datum Value Source
Findings of NAV’s internal report 24 points (omissions, deficiencies, breaches of law) 444.hu, 14 June 2026
Designation of the investigating authority “took place in an unlawful manner” (by the report) 444.hu, 14 June 2026
Investigating chief prosecutor resigned HVG, 11/14 June 2026
WGI — control of corruption (HU, 2024) −0.17 World Bank WGI
WGI — rule of law (HU, 2024) +0.35 World Bank WGI

The WGI values come from the 2024 edition of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (the indicator is scaled between −2.5 and +2.5); the negative value of corruption control signals the weakness of institutional accountability, to which proposals 3.1–3.3 respond.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (background material) — the balance of judicial and prosecutorial independence and accountability, the autonomous constitutional legal status of the prosecution service;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — checks and balances (A6), the whistleblower system (A5), an independent corruption-investigation office (A10) and the public-money dashboard (A1);
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — merit-based official selection and rotation (KI7).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In designing anti-corruption reform, Rose-Ackerman places the institutional conditions in the foreground, and treats separately the role of independent judicial and prosecutorial institutions: the prosecuting authority and the court fulfil their control function if they are protected from political influence but publicly accountable. In her work she shows how organised crime and corruption intertwine when illegal actors seek to operate safely “by bribing the police, politicians and judges” — and precisely for that reason the integrity of the prosecuting authority is a key element of the system. Translated to the Hungarian gold-convoy case: the solution is not political control over the prosecuting authority, but transparent, verifiable independence — by Rose-Ackerman, this is exactly what structurally pushes back corruption.

“Independent Judicial and Prosecutorial Institutions” — independent judicial and prosecutorial institutions as a precondition of accountable governance.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard condenses the conditions of corruption’s emergence into a single, still-cited thesis. By his formulation, “corruption flourishes under the following conditions: monopoly and discretionary power, together with the absence of accountability.” From this he derives that countering corruption does not necessarily mean removing the power, but making discretion more regulated and strengthening accountability — as he writes, the rules “can create or reduce ‘rents’; can delimit or increase actual discretionary power; can help or hinder accountability.” The prosecution service, which by its nature has great discretion, is exactly the actor for which the absence of control poses the greatest risk — and therefore not its independence, but its unaccountability is the problem.

“Consider the conditions under which corruption flourishes: monopoly plus discretion, and an absence of accountability.”

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.3 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

Kaufmann and his co-authors broke the quality of governance down into six measurable dimensions — among them the indicators of the rule of law and the control of corruption — and thereby made governmental integrity comparable and trackable over time. The lesson of the framework is that institutional weakness is not a matter of mood, but a measurable and internationally comparable condition. In this framework, the Hungarian gold-convoy case is not a singular scandal, but a symptom of a measurable accountability deficit: the improvement or deterioration of the WGI indicators will be the external, impartial feedback that shows whether the examination and the institutional reform brought real change, or only the actors were swapped.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

6.5 International comparison

The experience of restoring prosecutorial integrity shows sharp regional differences, and divides precisely along the balance of independence and accountability. Where the reform drew the prosecuting authority under political control — even under the slogan of a “clean-up” — there independence was damaged, and after the next change of power the same instrument turned back. Where, by contrast, reform kept independence but built a transparent reporting and internal control system — for example in the model of the Singaporean Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), which is protected alike from the executive power and from day-to-day politics — there the authority and effectiveness of the prosecuting authority grew at the same time. The lesson of the Hungarian case: the credible response is not the “takeover” of the prosecuting authority, but the building of institutional guarantees that also bind the next government.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A5 — Whistleblower system
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Corruption-Investigation Office (CPIB model)

Public administration and e-government

  • KI7 — Official-selection and rotation system

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 15 June 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI7)
  • MIAK press monitor, 15 June 2026 — topic 2, score: 88/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • World Bank — Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024
  • ÁSZ — annual inspection reports; prosecutorial annual reports to the National Assembly
  • GRECO (the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption body) — country recommendations

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