Part I — Situation overview

Tamás Sulyok announced on Saturday evening, 18 July 2026, that he would sign the 17th amendment of the Fundamental Law — the text that the National Assembly adopted on 13 July, and that with a single sentence also terminates his own mandate as President of the Republic. The amendment appeared in the Hungarian Gazette that same day, entered into force on 19 July, so from 0:00 on Monday 20 July Hungary has no elected head of state. Under the provision of the Fundamental Law the tasks and powers of the President of the Republic are exercised by Speaker Ágnes Forsthoffer, who for this period is deputised in the Speaker’s duties by a deputy speaker designated by the National Assembly — according to the agenda of Monday’s extraordinary sitting, presumably Anikó Hallerné Nagy. The National Assembly must elect a new President of the Republic within 30 days; according to constitutional lawyer Péter Stánicz the nomination and election process may close quickly, so the new head of state may take office by mid-August.

The nomination of candidates began at once. Sixteen figures of science, culture and sport — among them lawyer György Antall, museum director general László Baán and Olympic champion Tímea Nagy — proposed Judit Polgár, the most successful female chess player of all time, as President of the Republic in an open letter; Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced on Sunday evening that on Monday he would meet her in person and ask her to stand. In parallel he announced a public consultation: “let the parties, the actors of public life, civil-society figures and private individuals make proposals.” The Circle of Lawyers (Ügyvédkör) recommended former justice minister Péter Bárándy. On the other side, Balázs Orbán, political director of the previous prime minister, argued that the election of Judit Polgár “will be constitutionally flawed”, so her decisions will be invalid; former constitutional judge Béla Pokol pointed out that, because of the personnel changes postponed to 1 September, the Constitutional Court (AB) may decide on the challenged Fundamental Law amendments in almost its original composition; and according to Fidesz’s statement the question of the person is irrelevant, because “eyewash and puppet-play” is under way.

MIAK’s reading: for the first time since the regime change a constitutional amendment terminates the mandate of a sitting head of state, and the election of a successor takes place under a 30-day deadline, amid a sharply divided constitutional dispute. In this situation the real stake is not the person of the candidate but the quality of the procedure: whether the nomination outside party politics and the announced public consultation become a verifiable, documented procedure — or remain a one-off political gesture accompanied by unanswered constitutional objections.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. The Fundamental Law of Hungary — the constitutional charter in force — gives an itemised procedure in Articles 10–13: the head of state is elected by the National Assembly by secret ballot, the nomination requires the written recommendation of one fifth of the members, a two-thirds majority is needed in the first round, and in case of premature termination the election must be held within 30 days. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (18th-century Genevan philosopher, a classic of the theory of popular sovereignty) warns in The Social Contract that the general will by its nature concerns general rules — when the popular assembly decides about a specific person, it no longer acts as sovereign but as an office-holder, and such a decision must therefore be authenticated by the quality of the general rules. Alexis de Tocqueville (19th-century French jurist-thinker, the first systematic analyst of American democracy) gives in Democracy in America the twofold lesson of the institution of an elected head of state: the election of a head of state is always a heightened period, but it does not become a crisis where presidential power is limited and the procedure is solid — that is, the risk of the present Hungarian situation is carried not by the personnel question but by the procedural uncertainty. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures to authenticate the head-of-state election procedure.

3.1 A public candidate hearing before the vote (within the 30-day deadline)

MIAK proposes that the competent committee of the National Assembly hear every validly recommended presidential candidate at a public, live-broadcast hearing before the vote. The Fundamental Law neither prohibits nor prescribes this — which is precisely why a precedent can be created here. The subject of the hearing is not a party-political debate but questions concerning the exercise of the office: how the candidate interprets the head of state’s power to return laws and the constitutional veto, by what standard they would sign appointments, how they would relate to the initiatives of the government majority and the opposition. This step directly follows the logic of the I10 constitutional stress test: the institution’s operability must be tested in advance, publicly, not debated afterwards. By the Tocquevillean lesson (see 6.4.3) the election remains “excitement and not collapse” if every step of the procedure is predictable.

3.2 A point-by-point, written answer to the constitutional objections (by the day of the vote)

The Balázs Orbán invalidity argument and the question raised by Béla Pokol concerning the transitional provisions circulate as political points of debate, while both are itemised constitutional claims that require an itemised constitutional answer. MIAK proposes that the government majority — relying on the legislative-preparatory capacity of the Ministry of Justice — answer these by the day of the vote in a public working paper citing the relevant legal provisions: on exactly which provision of the Fundamental Law the election of the new head of state is valid, what is the scope of the transitional provisions, and before which forum and in which procedure the decision may be challenged. If the objections are unfounded, this will emerge; if any of them is partly founded, it can be corrected in time. An unanswered objection would accompany every act of the future head of state — a state contrary to the spirit of the A6 checks-and-balances programme point.

3.3 Formalising the public consultation (within 10 days of the first sitting day)

The announced public consultation — “let us decide together, not in cigar rooms” — is more than a communications gesture if it has fixed rules. MIAK proposes that the consultation be given a structured form on the model of the I9 popular-sovereignty audit programme point: a public platform to which the candidate proposals and the arguments arrive; the publication of the number and a substantive summary of the proposals received; and the documentation of what the parliamentary groups took over and did not take over at the final nomination. In Rousseau’s frame (see 6.4.2) that is precisely the point: the decision about a specific person gains constitutional legitimacy from being made according to general, pre-fixed rules.

The common principle of the three proposals: the fact of the two-thirds majority in itself decides the outcome of the vote, but it does not replace the authentication of the procedure. A majority that elects a head of state with a public hearing, itemised legal answers and a documented consultation not only elects but also strengthens the institution.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Constitutional law A head-of-state office filled within 30 days, a precedent-setting nomination procedure the unanswered invalidity arguments make the new head of state’s acts durably disputed
Political culture a candidate outside party politics + public consultation: strengthening the neutrality of the head of state if the consultation remains unformalised, an “eyewash” framing settles in one half of public opinion
Institutional system the renewal of the Constitutional Court’s composition is put on a predictable path by the age-limit rule in the transition up to 1 September the Constitutional Court may become an actor in adjudicating the amendments — a fresh legitimacy dispute

The main deliberative question is time: the 30-day deadline is a constitutional obligation, so speed in itself is not haste. It becomes haste if the deadline becomes the justification for dropping the procedural elements — hearing, written answers, documented consultation. The other tipping point is the handling of the dispute around the person of the candidate: if the answer to the “not a lawyer” counter-argument remains a reference to authority, the dispute coarsens; if it is the presentation of the office’s actual powers — the head of state’s decisions are prepared by a legal apparatus, the standard is integrity and independence —, the dispute can be made factual.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Election within 30 days: the new head of state taking office within the Fundamental Law deadline, in the procedure under Article 11 of the Fundamental Law — yes/no;
  • Public candidate hearing: how many candidates received a valid recommendation, and how many of them took part in a public committee hearing — target: 100%;
  • Constitutional answer document: the itemised, public answer to the invalidity objections raised and those concerning the transitional provisions, by the day of the vote — yes/no;
  • 12-month follow-up: the number and outcome of constitutional proceedings launched against the new head of state’s acts — the ex-post test of procedural quality.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the decision-maker is concrete: within the 30-day deadline the National Assembly should elect the new President of the Republic with a public hearing, a written answer to the constitutional objections and a documented public consultation. What now seems procedural extra work is the cheapest guarantee of the constitutional peace of the coming decade: every later head-of-state election will align with this precedent. The proposal is attached to two MIAK foundational values: to transparency — because every step of the nomination and the election becomes publicly traceable —, and to accountability — because the government majority takes responsibility for the decision not only with its votes but also with its arguments; without these two the legal force of the two-thirds would be paired with political fragility.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal band put the process’s timetable and the candidate dispute on its front page: Telex treated both the open letter of the 16 public figures for Judit Polgár and Balázs Orbán’s invalidity argument as news, 444.hu focused on the fact of the nomination and on constitutional judge Csaba Hende’s departure, and HVG highlighted candidate pluralism (Circle of Lawyers: Péter Bárándy) and Gábor Török’s analysis, according to which the Polgár nomination is the first announcement that also divides the Tisza camp — HVG also noted that Péter Magyar erroneously mentioned Árpád Göncz as a non-lawyer president.

The public-affairs-economic band remained procedure-focused: 24.hu presented the agenda of Monday’s extraordinary sitting (the designation of the deputy speaker deputising for the speaker) and Fidesz’s reaction, Portfolio, under the title “Queen’s Gambit” (Vezércsel), reported on the nomination in a fact-conveying register, and ATV brought the announcement of the public consultation and the constitutional lawyer’s forecast of a mid-August taking of office.

The pro-government-conservative band chose a delegitimising framing: Magyar Nemzet brought Béla Pokol’s “loophole” reasoning (“this may be Fidesz’s hope”), Mandiner framed the fact of the Forsthoffer exercise of powers with Viktor Orbán’s statement “the last barrier has fallen… autocracy is now reality”, and Fidesz’s official statement — according to 24.hu’s report — deemed the personnel question irrelevant and spoke of “Tisza autocracy”. Népszava’s front page quoted Bertalan Havasi’s statement (headline-level reference only).

6.2 Facts and data

  • Under Article 11 of the Fundamental Law: the validity of a nomination requires the written recommendation of at least one fifth of the members (40 members in the 199-member National Assembly); each member may recommend one candidate; the first ballot requires the votes of two thirds of the members (134 members); the elected president takes office on the eighth day following the announcement of the result of the election.
  • The Tisza faction has 141 mandates (finalised by the National Election Office — NVI — on 19 April 2026) — the first-round two-thirds is available from its own strength.
  • The National Assembly adopted the 17th amendment on 13 July 2026 by 139 votes in favour and 6 against; the promulgation took place on 18 July, the entry into force on 19 July, and Tamás Sulyok’s mandate ended on 20 July.
  • Five judges are leaving the 15-member Constitutional Court: four (Péter Polt, Mária Haszonicsné Ádám, Miklós Juhász, Zoltán Lomniczi) because of the restored age limit of 70, and Csaba Hende because, owing to the 12-year cap on parliamentary mandates, he can no longer be elected a member of the National Assembly, which under the law on the Constitutional Court results in the termination of the membership (Index calculation, 444.hu summary).
  • There is domestic precedent for an acting period: in 2012, after the resignation of Pál Schmitt, László Kövér, and in 2024, after the departure of Katalin Novák, likewise the speaker exercised the presidential powers until the successor took office (24.hu summary).

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Justice (programme points) — the procedural guarantees of the head-of-state election and the Constitutional Court transition: I10 constitutional stress test, I9 popular-sovereignty audit, I4 judicial independence;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the public, documented procedure for filling constitutional offices: A6 strengthening of checks and balances, A9 democratic-resilience index;
  • Public administration and e-government (background) — the continuity of the appointment and signing order during the acting period, the platform side of the public consultation.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 The Fundamental Law of Hungary

The constitutional regulation in force covers both elements of the present situation. Article 11 fixes the procedure: “The election of the President of the Republic is preceded by a nomination. The validity of a nomination requires the written recommendation of at least one fifth of the Members of the National Assembly”, and on the first ballot the one who “obtained the votes of two thirds of the Members of the National Assembly” may be elected. Under Article 12 the office is incompatible with every other state, social, economic and political office — this is the constitutional background to the arguments for a candidate outside party politics. From the standpoint of the present dispute the essence is: the full, documented observance of the procedural rules is the only instrument by which the “constitutionally flawed” counter-arguments can be itemisedly refuted or substantiated.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (Articles 10–13)

6.4.2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract

Rousseau distinguishes between the general will of the sovereign people — which can concern only general rules — and specific personnel decisions. When the Athenian popular assembly appointed or removed leaders, he writes, “it no longer acted as sovereign, but as an office-holder” — that is, the personnel decision is an act of execution, framed by the general rules. Translated to the present Hungarian situation: the two-thirds of the National Assembly could sovereignly create the rules for electing the head of state, but when it elects a specific person, it too acts as a rule-following office-holder — the legitimacy of the decision is given not by the size of the majority but by the observance of the pre-fixed procedure. This principle is also the theoretical basis of MIAK’s I9 programme point: the public consultation is not a replacement of the representative decision but its structured preparation.

📖 Source: Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract (Book II, Chapter 4)

6.4.3 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Tocqueville gave the still most precise risk analysis of the institution of an elected head of state. By his observation “the period immediately preceding the election of a president and the election itself must always be regarded as a national crisis”, whose dangerousness is proportionate to the country’s internal tensions — in America, however, the election is “a cause of excitement but not of collapse”, because presidential power is limited and the procedure is solid. The danger for Tocqueville is thus not the fact of the election but the product of the stake and the procedural uncertainty. In the Hungarian situation this is a twofold lesson: the relatively limited powers of the office of head of state in themselves moderate the risk, but the constitutional dispute around the promulgation — invalidity arguments, transitional provisions — is precisely the kind of procedural uncertainty that can reclassify the election into a crisis if it remains unanswered.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America (Volume I, “The Election of the President” chapter)

6.5 International comparison

The international press frames the transition as a test of Hungarian democratic consolidation: according to Politico Europe Tamás Sulyok “bowed out under pressure” from the office after his legal options narrowed; Balkan Insight pointed out that the removal was carried out with a one-sentence constitutional amendment, and according to Amnesty International’s Hungarian organisation the method is “lawful but not elegant” — the legitimacy of the goal does not make the manner of the procedure a side issue. EUobserver placed the process in the broader current of the government’s institutional restructuring. As a comparative example, the Austrian presidential election of 2016 offers itself: the constitutional court had the second round repeated because of procedural errors, and the re-vote — precisely because of the itemised remedying of the errors — ultimately strengthened the legitimacy of the process. The lesson for the Hungarian 30 days: the swift, institutional handling of procedural objections does not weaken but strengthens the final result.

Justice

  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”
  • I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit — legislation with citizen feedback
  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening of checks and balances
  • A9 — Spin-dictatorship-prevention index

Proposed new programme point: Procedural minimum for filling constitutional offices — a public candidate hearing and a written constitutional answer document for every office filled by a two-thirds election — for the Justice area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 20 July 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary
  • 📖 Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I10, I9, I4)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A9)
  • MIAK legal-foundations background material (head-of-state powers, election procedure)
  • MIAK press monitor, 20 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 95/100 (merged in: MIAK press monitor, 19 July 2026 — topic 1; MIAK foreign press monitor, 19 July 2026 — topic 1)

Additional public data sources:

  • Hungarian Gazette of 18 July 2026 (promulgation of the 17th amendment)
  • Agenda of the National Assembly (parlament.hu), extraordinary sitting of 20 July 2026

Generation metadata