Part I — Situation overview

On the evening of 13 July 2026 the National Assembly adopted the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law with 139 votes in favour and 6 against. Under the amendment, the mandate of the sitting President of the Republic, Tamás Sulyok, ceases on the day following entry into force, and his successor is elected by the National Assembly within 30 days; the mandates of four constitutional judges over the age of 70 — among them Péter Polt — cease; and at the next parliamentary election no one may stand who has already been a member of parliament for at least 12 years. The package also enshrines at the level of the Fundamental Law the creation of the new accountability institution, the National Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office (NVVH). The Fidesz and KDNP parliamentary groups boycotted the sitting, Mi Hazánk voted no, and Gergely Gulyás resigned the leadership of the Fidesz parliamentary group in protest. Speaker Ágnes Forsthoffer signed the adopted text the same day; promulgation, however, requires the head of state’s signature, and Tamás Sulyok has five days to decide.

The amendment has its antecedents: Tisza had already signalled during the campaign its intention to replace the holders of high public office, and the bill has been accompanied by constitutional debate since its submission — MIAK analysed the question of procedural guarantees both at the time of submission and on the day before the vote. What is new is that the decision has been made, and with it the centre of gravity of the debate has shifted from the normative text to the conduct of the transition. In Tamás Sulyok’s view, the proposal “violates in numerous elements the principles of the rule of law, democracy and the separation of powers”; according to the statement of the Sándor Palace, the Venice Commission — the advisory body of the Council of Europe made up of constitutional lawyers — will consider the head of state’s 22-page submission not under an urgent procedure but only in October. Former prime minister Viktor Orbán put it thus: if the president is “deprived of his office by force, then Hungary has the right to resist”. According to prime minister Péter Magyar, by contrast, on 12 April the voters gave a mandate precisely to dismantle the system entrenched by two-thirds laws, and the drafting of the new constitution comes next.

MIAK’s reading: accountability and rule-of-law guarantees are not alternatives to each other, and the yardstick is not who exercises the two-thirds majority, but whether the intervention builds structural guarantees or merely swaps people. The statutory termination of the mandates of the sitting head of state and constitutional judges creates a precedent even if the declared aim is the dismantling of the earlier concentration of power — the procedural pattern now taking shape will be the one that any future two-thirds majority can invoke.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Montesquieu (the 18th-century French thinker on the theory of the state, who elaborated the doctrine of the separation of powers), in his work The Spirit of the Laws, argues that liberty is lost where the legislative, the executive and the judicial power are united in the same body — the yardstick, then, is not intent but the actual separation of the branches of power. According to Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics; they received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2024), the success of nations is given by inclusive institutions: those that distribute power broadly and make it difficult for whoever holds power to usurp the institutional system — the quality of the constitutional transition can be measured on this yardstick. And Spin Dictators by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman (an economist and a political scientist, researchers of modern autocracies) describes the pattern in which a leader converts his popularity into the reshaping of institutions: he entrenches his power with constitutional amendments and by packing the courts, while the appearance of democracy is preserved — this pattern is the reference point from which the new majority must visibly depart if the transition is not to repeat the system it seeks to dismantle. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures for conducting the constitutional transition in accordance with the rule of law.

3.1 Commitment-level incorporation of the Venice Commission’s opinion (within 60 days of the October opinion)

MIAK proposes that the government undertake publicly, already now, to give an itemised, reasoned response to every recommendation of the Venice Commission’s October opinion, and to lift the elements that can be incorporated into the preparation of the new constitution. After the vote Péter Magyar himself indicated that if there are proposals, they will be built into the constitution-making process — this undertaking is worth something if it takes an accountable form: a public compliance table (recommendation → accepted/rejected → reasoning), with a parliamentary committee hearing. The programme point on strengthening checks and balances (A6) records exactly this principle: institutional independence is not a matter of declaration but of verifiable practice. In the Acemoglu–Robinson frame (see 6.4.2) this is the point where the critical juncture can turn into inclusive institution-building.

3.2 A depoliticised procedure for the head-of-state succession (within 30 days)

If the amendment enters into force, the National Assembly elects a new President of the Republic within 30 days. MIAK proposes that the nomination take place with a public hearing, with the substantive participation of the opposition parliamentary groups and with the candidate’s public-law independence undertakings recorded in writing — the legitimacy of the new head of state is given not by the speed of the election but by the quality of the procedure. The same applies to the succession of constitutional judges: in filling the seats falling vacant in September, the yardstick is the depoliticised nomination procedure under the programme point on protecting judicial independence (I4), otherwise the refilling of the “decapitated” body would repeat the institution-hollowing pattern described by Guriev–Treisman (see 6.4.3).

3.3 An annual constitutional “stress test” for the whole duration of the transition (12-month cycle, first report by July 2027)

MIAK proposes the immediate launch of the constitutional stress test (I10): an annual, independent, public review should measure whether the system of checks and balances would prevent a hypothetical concentration of power — now in the new public-law cast of roles. The review covers the actual exercise of the Constitutional Court’s restored powers, the new head of state’s activity in vetoes and in initiating constitutional review, and the procedural quality of two-thirds legislation (consultation time, impact assessment). The spin-dictatorship prevention index (A9) provides its data-driven basis.

The common principle of the three proposals: a two-thirds mandate is not self-justifying — the separation of powers in Montesquieu’s sense (see 6.4.1) requires precisely that the majority build guarantees limiting its own power, because only such a guarantee protects it too, when one day it finds itself in the minority.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public law Dismantling of the two-thirds structure of the NER era, rebuilding of the Constitutional Court’s powers The statutory termination of sitting mandates is a precedent: any future two-thirds majority can use it for personnel changes
Political stability Resolution of the constitutional stalemate (government vs. head of state), a predictable succession timetable In the event of a removal procedure or a protracted signature dispute, the constitutional-crisis narrative strengthens at home and abroad
International standing Transparent handling of the Venice Commission procedure can strengthen rule-of-law credibility and the fulfilment of EU funding conditions If the recommendations of the October opinion remain unanswered, the reading of “speed before guarantees” becomes fixed

The main matter for consideration is time: the government’s argument is that the constitutional dead end can only be exited through constitution-making, and the voters’ mandate is for this; the counter-argument is that what is today a tool of dismantling a system can tomorrow be a tool of building one. The risk tips over if the steps of the transition — succession, the nomination of constitutional judges, the new constitution — follow the tempo of the present amendment without its guarantees. The condition of balance is that the preparation of the new constitution already proceed with the announced broad involvement and with the incorporation of international constitutional-law opinions.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK’s proposed key performance indicators (KPIs) for the quality of the transition:

  • Venice Commission compliance: the share of itemised, reasoned responses given to the recommendations of the October opinion within 60 days — proposed target: 100% response rate, with a public compliance table;
  • Quality of the succession procedure: whether public hearings of the new head-of-state and constitutional-judge candidates take place, and the participation rate of the opposition parliamentary groups in the nomination procedure;
  • Constitutional Court activity: the actual exercise of the restored powers — the number of substantive constitutional-review decisions by the newly composed body within 12 months;
  • Constitutional stress test: publication of the first independent report by July 2027.

5.2 Summary

The National Assembly’s decision closed the debate over whether there will be a constitutional rearrangement — but not over what kind it will be. MIAK asks the government to treat the October opinion of the Venice Commission not as a formality to be ticked off but as the quality assurance of the new constitution, and in the succession decisions to prove that the aim is structural guarantee, not a change of personnel. And it asks the public to watch, over the next 12 months, not the drama of the day of the vote but the verifiable steps of the transition. Of MIAK’s foundational values, accountability and non-ideological policy prevail here: holding procedural guarantees to account is credible only if it does not depend on which camp happens to exercise the two-thirds majority — the yardstick stays the same when the mandate changes hands.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal band analysed the fact of the decision and the paths open to the head of state: Telex followed the vote, Ágnes Forsthoffer’s signature and the four scenarios facing Sulyok in three articles; 444.hu worked with the framing “no way around it: it has been written into the Fundamental Law” and with a separate news item on the October timing of the Venice Commission; and HVG’s international press review highlighted the “a constitutional crisis may come” reading from the world press. The public-affairs and economic band was more matter-of-fact: 24.hu listed the itemised content of the amendment (head of state, constitutional judges, the 12-year limit on members of parliament), Portfolio recorded the announcements of the prime-ministerial press conference — including the possibility of further amendments and the restoration of the Constitutional Court’s powers — and ATV followed the immediate reactions after the vote.

The conservative, pro-government side carried the narrative of injury to the rule of law: Magyar Nemzet put Viktor Orbán’s resistance statement on its front page (“today they settle scores with Tamás Sulyok, tomorrow they can do it to anyone”), while Mandiner quoted law professors’ criticism of Tisza’s constitution-making. Népszava carried the fact of the vote on its front page (title-level reference only). The difference in framing is an instructive mirror image: the same papers that after 2010 described two-thirds constitution-making as the natural exercise of a mandate, or as the demolition of the rule of law, now argue with the roles reversed — which in itself argues for MIAK’s camp-independent procedural yardstick.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The National Assembly adopted the amendment with 139 votes in favour and 6 against, with no abstentions, on 13 July 2026 (Telex, Portfolio reports); the two-thirds threshold in the 199-member National Assembly is 134 seats.
  • At the election of 12 April 2026 Tisza won 141 seats (70.85%), Fidesz–KDNP 52 and Mi Hazánk 6 (National Election Office — NVI, finalisation of 19 April 2026).
  • The main elements of the amendment: the mandate of the sitting President of the Republic ceases on the day following entry into force, with a successor elected within 30 days; the mandates of constitutional judges over 70 cease; a 12-year limit on members of parliament standing again; the NVVH enshrined at the level of the Fundamental Law (Telex, 24.hu, Portfolio).
  • Under the rules of the Fundamental Law in force, promulgation of the law requires the head of state’s signature; since 2013 the Constitutional Court may review an amendment to the Fundamental Law exclusively on procedural grounds, not on substance (Telex analysis; Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article S)).
  • The Venice Commission will consider Tamás Sulyok’s 22-page submission not under an urgent procedure but at its October plenary session (444.hu, based on the statement of the Sándor Palace).
  • According to the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI — Worldwide Governance Indicators), in 2024 Hungary stood at +0.35 in the rule-of-law dimension (World Bank WGI 2024) — the effect of the transition will also be measurable on this time series.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Justice (programme points) — the reshaping of the composition and powers of the Constitutional Court, guarantees of judicial and constitutional-court independence (I4, I10);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — data-driven monitoring of the actual functioning of checks and balances, prevention of the concentration of power (A6, A9);
  • Foreign policy (background) — the connection between the Venice Commission procedure, the EU rule-of-law assessment and the funding conditionality framework.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu defines political liberty as the tranquillity of security, which is possible only under a government where no one need fear another. According to his famous thesis, where the legislative and the executive power are united in the same body there is no liberty — and “there is no liberty either if the judicial power is not separated from the legislative and the executive”. Translated to the Hungarian situation: the 17th amendment touches the apex institutions of all three branches at once — the head of state, the Constitutional Court and the composition rules of the legislature — and so the Montesquieu test asks not about the intent of the individual elements but about the resulting structure: after the amendment, do the three branches of power mutually constrain one another, or does a single political will rearrange all three? The restored constitutional-court powers are a positive element by this test; the termination of sitting mandates, by contrast, is exactly the type of intervention that is compatible with the separation of powers only with strong guarantees made unrepeatable.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.2 Daron Acemoglu — James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Acemoglu and Robinson’s central thesis is that inclusive political institutions — those that distribute power broadly and constrain the arbitrary exercise of power — make it difficult to usurp power and to erect extractive institutions, while the vicious circle of extractive institutions sustains itself: whoever captures the institutions uses them to entrench their own position. The authors stress that a combination of extractive and inclusive elements is an unstable construction — the system tips either one way or the other. Translated to the Hungarian transition: in the book’s conceptual frame, the change of government in 2026 is a critical juncture that can open in two directions. If the new majority dismantles the inherited tools of power concentration and makes them unrepeatable, the vicious circle can be broken; if it keeps operating the same tools in new hands — even with the best of intentions — the structure remains, only its beneficiary changes. The 17th amendment must therefore be judged not from the perspective of the present two-thirds majority but of the next one: what accountability makes possible today — what makes it possible tomorrow?

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu — James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.4.3 Sergei Guriev — Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

Guriev and Treisman describe the operating rulebook of modern autocracies: the spin dictator governs not with open violence but by maintaining the appearance of democracy — he uses his popularity to have constitutional amendments adopted with reference to spectacular election victories, to fill the courts and the regulatory bodies with loyal appointees, and thus to hollow out from within the institutions that formally survive. Using Putin’s example, the authors show how the centralisation of power turns from steps that at first seem reasonable into the dismantling of checks and balances. This pattern carries a double lesson for the Hungarian transition. On the one hand, this is the frame that describes the system the new government received a mandate to dismantle. On the other hand — and this is the more uncomfortable reading — the formal elements of the pattern (a constitutional amendment invoking an overwhelming mandate, the reshaping of the courts’ composition) also appear in the toolkit of the dismantling. What makes the difference is not rhetoric but verifiable guarantees: a public nomination procedure, independent review, the incorporation of international constitutional-law opinions — precisely MIAK’s proposals.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev — Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.5 International comparison

A constitutional amendment affecting the mandates of sitting holders of high public office is an extraordinary instrument in Europe, and international practice offers models on the side of guarantees. In Poland, after the change of government in 2023, one of the most contested questions of rule-of-law restoration became precisely how judicial positions filled irregularly by the previous majority can be handled without violating legal continuity — the lesson of the Polish debate is that the tension between “quick clean-up” and “precedent discipline” cannot be resolved by unilateral steps, only with the involvement of international bodies. The practice of the Venice Commission consistently examines whether transitional provisions (the shortening of sitting office-holders’ mandates) are necessary and proportionate to the declared aim — according to the body’s earlier opinions, such an intervention can be justified exceptionally, but only if it does not become a repeatable tool of government. The October opinion is therefore not a formality: it will be the first independent, itemised yardstick on the Hungarian transition.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A9 — Spin-dictatorship prevention index

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Proposed new programme point: International audit protocol for constitutional transition — for the Justice area: a mandatory, deadline-bound, public regime for responding to the opinions of the Venice Commission and other international constitutional-law bodies for every amendment at the level of the Fundamental Law.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 14 July 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu — James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev — Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A9)
  • MIAK press monitor, 14 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 95/100
  • MIAK proposal-processing topic monitor, 12 July 2026 — the accepted proposal on the Venice Commission’s expected opinion merged into this blog post

Additional public data sources (if used):

  • NVI — final result of the 2026 parliamentary election (19 April 2026)
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — rule of law
  • Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force on 17 April 2026) — Article S), Articles 9–13

Generation metadata