Part I — Situation overview

In the gold-convoy case — the scandal surrounding the interception of a Ukrainian cash-transport convoy on 5 March 2026 — two developments became public on 15 July 2026. First, 444.hu obtained and reported the record of the suspect interrogation of police lieutenant-general János Hajdu, former director-general of the Counter-Terrorism Centre (TEK): according to it, two days before the raid Hajdu was called in for consultation by Örs Farkas, the state secretary of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office led by Antal Rogán who supervises the civilian national-security services. The next day a briefing was held in the presence of the highest-ranking intelligence chiefs — while the designating decision of the Prosecutor General’s Office was issued only on the day of the arrest. According to the testimony, on the day before the operation the then interior minister Sándor Pintér also approved the raid. Second, according to information obtained by HVG, the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) withdrew the mandates of two of its leaders involved at the highest level in the operation — the deputy director-general for criminal affairs and the head of the Central Investigation Department; the news was confirmed by both the Finance Ministry and NAV.

The background: NAV has essentially closed the money-laundering investigation for lack of a criminal offence, while on 29 June the Budapest Investigative Prosecutor’s Office named Hajdu a suspect on seven counts of unlawful detention committed with the tormenting of the victim. Two earlier MIAK analyses covered the prosecutorial strand of the case; the present development opens a new layer: for the first time, a procedural document has become public that points to the political-governmental preparation of the operation. It must be stressed: a suspect’s testimony is a one-sided account, not a proven fact, and it contradicts the NAV witness statements on several points — establishing the truth is the task of the courts. In MIAK’s reading, the policy question stands regardless: Hungarian law today does not guarantee that the ordering and approval chain of an armed law-enforcement operation can be credibly reconstructed afterwards.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the theoretical frame. The core thesis of The Spirit of the Laws by Montesquieu (legal philosopher of the French Enlightenment) is that every person vested with power is inclined to abuse it, and therefore, from the very nature of things, institutions must be arranged so that power checks power — the political direction of armed bodies is exactly such a field, one requiring institutional constraints. The case studies of Robert Klitgaard (former professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, a classic of corruption research) on the Hong Kong ICAC and Singapore CPIB anti-corruption agencies show that the credible investigation of cases close to power requires an institution separated from day-to-day politics, with broad powers but itself accountable. Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor at Yale University, a leading researcher of the economics of corruption) analyses the hierarchical patterns of corruption within law-enforcement organisations: where the chain of command is informal, responsibility crumbles away. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures to establish operational accountability.

3.1 Mandatory written form and logging in the decision chain of law-enforcement operations (within 12 months)

A law should prescribe that the ordering, approval and inter-agency handover of tasks in priority law-enforcement operations (armed apprehension, coordinated multi-agency action) may take place exclusively in writing, with tamper-proof logging — including approaches coming from government actors. The lesson of the gold-convoy case is that the key elements of the decision chain today exist in oral discussions and telephone calls, about whose content contradictory testimonies are given afterwards. In the Montesquieuan frame (see 6.4.1) the written form is itself the institutional constraint: it makes the exercise of power documentable, and thus accountable. The accountability framework under programme point KB6 is its natural vehicle.

3.2 A code of contact between the political cabinet and operational law enforcement (within 18 months)

A public code should be drawn up on the channels through which, and the documentation duties under which, the government’s political staff (the prime minister’s cabinet, state secretaries) may communicate with operational law-enforcement and intelligence chiefs. The law in force settles the powers of direction (Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, the TEK statute), but there is no rule for “consultations” outside the formal chain of command — the meetings described in the testimony fall exactly into this grey zone. British practice is exemplary: the principle of the operational independence of the police states that the minister may set strategic direction but may not give operational instructions in a concrete case. This can be transposed into Hungarian law as part of the internal oversight reform under KB7.

3.3 Independent investigative capacity for cases with government involvement (by 2028)

The investigation of law-enforcement cases with government involvement should be entrusted to the Independent Corruption Investigation Office under MIAK programme point A10, on the model of Singapore’s CPIB (see 6.4.2): the office is operationally independent, may investigate any official or politician, while strong legality and parliamentary control stands above its operation. The structural weakness of the present situation is that the bodies involved in the case (NAV, TEK, the prosecution service, the intelligence services) investigate one another, while the personnel consequences are drawn by a ministry subordinate to the government of the day — this produces a trust deficit even if every step is lawful. For the dismissals, a minimum of public reasoning can be expected: the Finance Ministry’s statement that “no reasons need to be given” maintains exactly the transparency gap that accountability seeks to close.

The common principle of the three proposals: procedural cleanliness is not severity against suspects but protection for everyone — a reconstructable decision chain vindicates the official who acted lawfully and makes abuse visible.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Rule of law Operational decisions can be reconstructed afterwards; the space for informal political influence shrinks The documentation duty may become formalistic (“everything in order on paper”)
Functioning of law enforcement The official is protected: the written instruction covers them too; the order of responsibility clears up With over-regulation, operations requiring immediate intervention may slow down
Public trust Dismissals and investigations proceed in reasoned, transparent procedures — accountability cannot look like a settling of scores If the investigations are selective, the credibility of the institutional reform is lost

The main question of judgement is the balance between speed and documentation: a counter-terrorism operation by its nature unfolds within hours, so the written form does not mean prior bureaucracy but simultaneous, automatic logging (timestamps, audio recording, a deadline for subsequent minuting). The other risk is political: the new government’s accountability programme keeps its credibility only if the standards now introduced apply to its own operation as well — the dismissal of the NAV leaders without reasons is a bad precedent in this respect, regardless of whether it was professionally well founded.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following key performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Within 12 months: submission of the legislative amendment on the written form of operations; ordering documentation verifiable afterwards for 100% of priority operations.
  • Within 18 months: public publication of the code of contact between the political cabinet and law enforcement; public, substantive reasoning for 100% of withdrawals of law-enforcement leadership mandates.
  • Within 24 months: progress of the court phase of the gold-convoy case (indictment or termination, with public reasoning); a legislative timetable for setting up the independent investigative office.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks the government and the National Assembly to leave the individual questions of responsibility in the gold-convoy case to the courts, but not to let the systemic lesson be lost: legislation settling the written form of law-enforcement operations and the political-operational boundary should come before the National Assembly this year. The proposal connects to two MIAK foundational values: to accountability — because every exercise of armed public power must be verifiable afterwards, regardless of which government it happens under —, and to transparency — because drawing leadership consequences without reasons keeps alive the very institutional culture whose dismantling accountability promises.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal band chose the frame of political direction: 444.hu — in possession of the interrogation record — opens the story with the Örs Farkas phone call and confronts Hajdu’s claims in detail with the NAV witness statements; on the dismissal thread, HVG highlights that the review “cut down” two leaders who, despite the pressure, were willing to question the Ukrainians only as witnesses — that is, the paper treats the new government’s move in a critical frame as well.

The public-affairs band builds on procedural fact-reporting: 24.hu quotes the content of the testimony at length, highlighting the chronology of the intelligence consultations; ATV’s news programme carries the Sándor Pintér thread (“the raid may have been authorised personally by Sándor Pintér”) and the “there is evidence” statement of the lawyer representing the Ukrainians, keeping the question of political criminal responsibility open.

The pro-government-conservative band is minimalist: Magyar Nemzet reports the dismissal of the NAV leaders in a short news item, without the political aspects of the testimony; Mandiner did not rank the topic among its highlighted news that day. The framing asymmetry is itself telling: the political thread of the testimony is a lead story on one half of the spectrum and does not appear even at the level of a mention on the other.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
The suspicion against János Hajdu 7 counts of unlawful detention committed with the tormenting of the victim 444.hu, 15 July 2026
Day the suspicion was communicated 29 June 2026 444.hu, 15 July 2026
Interception of the Ukrainian convoy 5 March 2026 444.hu, 15 July 2026
First government consultation according to the testimony 3 March 2026 (two days before the raid) 444.hu, 24.hu, 15 July 2026
Dismissed NAV leaders deputy director-general for criminal affairs and the head of the Central Investigation Department HVG, 15 July 2026
Status of the money-laundering investigation essentially closed for lack of a criminal offence HVG, 15 July 2026
Hungary’s governance indicator — rule of law (2024) +0.35 World Bank WGI 2024

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — independent investigative office (A10), whistleblower protection (A5);
  • Public security and law enforcement (programme points) — police accountability and code of ethics (KB6), anti-corruption internal oversight reform (KB7);
  • Justice (programme points) — judicial and procedural transparency (I1);
  • Public administration and e-government (background) — the reasoning culture of the withdrawal of leadership mandates.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu sees the condition of political liberty in moderate government, but immediately adds that moderate government does not protect by itself:

“Constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go, till he meets with limits. […] To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power.”

A law-enforcement operation is the sharpest form of public power: the application of armed coercion against concrete people. In the gold-convoy case the question is therefore not whether the actors proceeded with good or bad intent, but whether the institutional constraints existed — written ordering, a documented approval chain, subsequent independent control — that, according to Montesquieu, structurally impede abuse. The picture emerging from the testimony (oral briefings, phone calls disputable afterwards) documents precisely the absence of these constraints.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (A törvények szelleméről)

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Through the case studies of Hong Kong’s ICAC and Singapore’s CPIB, Klitgaard shows how abuse close to power can be credibly investigated: both agencies stand outside the day-to-day police and political hierarchy, with broad investigative powers — the CPIB has proceeded in the cases of high-ranking officials and ministers as well, and precisely this founded public trust. At the same time the author also records the model’s shadow side: the “frightening” powers of such bodies carry an abuse risk of their own, so strong legality control must stand above their operation. Translated to the Hungarian situation: in the gold-convoy case the bodies involved investigate one another, while the personnel decisions are made by government discretion — the Klitgaardian lesson is that the investigation of cases with government involvement can be credibly performed, in the long run, only by a separate, independent institution.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.3 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Analysing the organisational dynamics of law-enforcement corruption, Rose-Ackerman shows that in police organisations abuse typically spreads through the hierarchy — informal practices are institutionalised by superiors’ tacit acquiescence or active participation, while responsibility crumbles away along the whole chain. The author’s conclusion is that the antidote to hierarchical abuse is the documentation of decision points and external, apolitical oversight — internal investigation is weak in itself because the investigator is part of the same hierarchy. In the gold-convoy case, contradictory testimonies were given about the handcuffing, the place of detention and the order of the interrogations — exactly the situation in which, according to the author, the absence of a written ordering chain makes it undecidable afterwards who was responsible for what.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.5 International comparison

In British law the operational independence of the police is a constitutional convention: the home secretary may set strategic priorities but may not intervene in a concrete operation — the boundary is recorded in writing by the Policing Protocol Order (2011). Complaints against the police have been investigated since 2004 by an independent body (today the IOPC), not by the police itself. In Singapore the CPIB is subordinate to the prime minister but independent in its investigative decisions; if the prime minister were to block an investigation, it can still be conducted with the president’s approval — a safeguard designed expressly for cases close to power. In Germany the ordering of federal police operations proceeds along a formalised, documented service route, while parliamentary control is exercised by the internal committees of the Bundestag, with a separate body for the intelligence services. The common pattern: the political level gives direction, the operational level executes, and every contact between the two leaves a trace.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office
  • A5 — Whistleblowing system

Public security and law enforcement

  • KB6 — Police code of ethics and accountability
  • KB7 — Anti-corruption internal oversight reform

Justice

  • I1 — Judicial transparency

Proposed new programme point: Mandatory written form and logging of the decision chain of law-enforcement operations — for the Public security and law enforcement area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 16 July 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (A törvények szelleméről)
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A10, A5)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and law enforcement (programme points; programme point ID: KB6, KB7)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I1)
  • MIAK press monitor, 16 July 2026 — topic 3, score: 82/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police (rules of direction)
  • Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure (the suspect’s testimony and the publicity of the investigation)
  • United Kingdom: Policing Protocol Order (2011); IOPC annual reports
  • GRECO country reports; World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024

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