Part I — Situation overview

Post-change-of-government accountability entered a new, formalized phase on 9 July 2026: at the government spokespersons’ briefing Köböl Anita and Magyar Éva announced that the government had filed criminal complaints against persons unknown in five corruption-suspect cases — on suspicion of misappropriation, abuse of office and budget fraud — as part of a programme the pro-government press refers to only as “Operation Purgatory”. The five cases: the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH) paid out 31.2 billion forints between December 2021 and June 2026 for data-deletion codes linked to the veglegestorles.hu system — according to the suspicion not for the deletions performed but for the codes themselves, part of which were never even used; seven civil organisations linked to Király Nóra, a former Fidesz candidate in Csepel, received a total of 1.52 billion forints of state grants between 2021 and 2026, while the screening uncovered economic entanglements and the suspicion of the repeated accounting of the same programmes; in the contracts concluded with Observer Média­figyelő between 2020 and 2026, totalling 30.9 billion forints, the fee grew from 2–2.4 billion a year to 5.8 billion without a proportionate expansion of the service; the Budapest dialogue centre of the Hungarian exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople swelled from the 2023 grant of 5.3 billion to 34.2 billion, while the investment is still not completed; finally, in the case of the black-clad persons who acted against counter-demonstrators at campaign events, the Prime Minister’s Office found a Fidesz organisational connection and filed a supplement to a criminal complaint.

In parallel with the wave of complaints the defence ministry also acted: defence minister Ruszin-Szendi Romulusz set up a working group to screen the contracts connected with the Military-Equipment Development Programme and the ministry’s operation; the review may extend to all valid and already performed contracts concluded between 2022 and 2026, and the ministry’s parliamentary state secretary will prepare a report on it by 31 December. The antecedents are known: in recent weeks the government has already filed complaints in the case of the Borsod hospital, the National Cultural Fund’s 400-million one-person list and the motorway concessions — but the current package is the first to file several complaints in a single announcement, framed as an “operation”.

MIAK’s reading is twofold. That the suspicious public-money-use cases go before the investigating authorities not as communication panels but as formal complaints is the correct direction of rule-of-law accountability — with the complaint the decision leaves the government’s hands and goes where it belongs: to the investigating authority, the prosecution and ultimately the court. At the same time the risk is real: if accountability is organised as a government campaign, to the rhythm of communication, then “Purgatory” creates the appearance of a reckoning, and weakens the credibility of every later, well-founded case too. The stake is therefore not the outcome of the five cases, but whether accountability becomes a government-independent institution.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame in which the wave of complaints can be interpreted. The central warning of Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor at Yale University, leading researcher of the political economy of corruption) in her work Corruption and Government is that anti-corruption campaigns have historically often failed because those in power used them to weaken their opponents — structural reform, not the criminal-law campaign, is the first line of defence, and criminal law is effective when it targets the systems causing the greatest social harm, not the spectacular cases. According to the formula of Robert Klitgaard (former professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, a classic of anti-corruption policy) in his book Controlling Corruption — corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability — the cases listed here (one-person decisions, unchecked contract amendments) are textbook discretion problems, so the lasting solution is the narrowing of discretionary powers and the institutionalisation of control. And the memoir of Lee Kuan Yew (founding prime minister of Singapore) shows, with the experience of the Singaporean anti-corruption bureau (CPIB), how determination becomes an institution operating for decades: through enforcement without exception, not sparing even the cases of one’s own political camp. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures which would turn the wave of complaints from a campaign into an institution.

3.1 Accountability transparency protocol (within 30 days)

The first step is making the process transparent: the government should publish a public, uniform data sheet on every complaint filed — the subject of the case, the suspected crime, the public-money sum concerned, the date of the complaint and the publicly traceable state of the procedure (complaint → investigation → indictment or termination). This is the direct application of the A1 public-money dashboard programme point to accountability. A mandatory element of the protocol is public-law-precise communication: the government is a complainant, not a judge — the investigation is decided by the authority, the charge by the prosecution, guilt by the court, and government communication may not pre-empt criminal-law responsibility. According to Rose-Ackerman’s analysis (see 6.4.1) it is precisely this distinction that separates credible accountability from a witch-hunt-suspect campaign.

3.2 Setting up an Independent Corruption Investigation Office (bill within 90 days)

The second, systemic step: accountability should not depend on the resolve of the government of the day. On the basis of the A10 programme point, MIAK proposes an Independent Corruption Investigation Office to be set up on the model of the Singaporean CPIB, which can investigate against any public official and politician — including the members of the present government — and whose independence is protected by law, its own budget and strict guarantees of the head’s removal. According to Lee Kuan Yew’s experience (see 6.4.3) one single thing gives an anti-corruption institution its credit: enforcement without exception. In the transition until the office is set up, the fate of the complaints now filed — in the spirit of the I1 judicial transparency programme point — should be publicly traceable, signalling that the government commits not to the result but to the transparency of the procedure.

3.3 Extending the contract-review methodology to every ministry (by 31 December 2026)

The defence ministry’s contract screening is a correct template, but limited to a single ministry it remains incidental. MIAK proposes that the government extend the defence working group’s methodology — full contract stock, valid and performed contracts, deadline report — in unified form to every ministry and to the state companies with an annual contract stock above 100 billion forints, and publish the results in a public summary according to the logic of the HV2 defence-spending transparency programme point. In Klitgaard’s frame (see 6.4.2) this is the tool of narrowing discretion: if every contracting party knows that the contract can be screened afterwards, the risk of overpricing and fictitious performance falls at the moment of contracting. The reviews should not stop at the previous government’s cases: the methodology should run on the present government’s contracts too — this is the guarantee that a review, and not a reckoning, is taking place.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: the value of accountability is given not by the number of complaints but by its institutional quality. The structure of the absence of monopoly, discretion and accountability spans governments — the answer must span them too.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law Steering the suspicious cases onto an official track; a precedent that squandering public money has a legal consequence “appearance of a reckoning” if communication pre-empts guilt; overloading of the prosecution and the courts
Public finances Deterrent force: contractors know they can be screened afterwards; potential wealth recovery recovering the reported sums may take years; the wait may turn into disappointment
Political culture The taking root of the accountability norm: governing does not come with impunity if accountability stays one-sided, after the next change of government it repeats in reverse

The main question to weigh is the relationship of pace and institutionalisation. The fast, spectacular phase of complaints is politically rewarding, but criminal proceedings last for years — if the government collects the communication benefit in advance, the later terminated investigations (as in the gold-convoy case, where the National Tax and Customs Administration has now suspended the procedure for lack of a crime) may begin to erode the credit of the whole programme. Institutionalised, government-independent accountability is slower, but sustainable across government cycles — and only this rules out that “Purgatory” repeats itself with reversed signs.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes four performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) for tracking:

  • Procedural conversion: the share of investigations and indictments started from the government complaints after 12 and 24 months respectively — the direct measure of the quality of the investigation;
  • Institutional milestone: the legislative setting-up of the Independent Corruption Investigation Office by mid-2027, the start of its operation by 2028;
  • Side-independence: among the screenings and complaints, the share of cases concerning the operation of the present government — an early indicator of one-sided accountability if this share is lastingly zero;
  • Contract transparency: the closing and public summary of the ministry-level contract reviews at every ministry by the end of 2027.

5.2 Summary

The government’s complaint package is a step in the right direction, but in itself a fragile one: the suspicious cases have got onto an official track, yet accountability is for now a government campaign, not an institution. MIAK asks the government to make the fate of every complaint publicly traceable within thirty days, to submit the bill on the independent corruption-investigation office within ninety days, and to extend the contract review to every ministry — including its own — by the end of the year. The proposal connects to two of MIAK’s foundational values: to accountability, because the impunity of public-money use was the breeding ground of systemic corruption; and to ideology-freeness, because the standard of accountability is credible only if it applies, independently of side, to the government of the day too.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal band ran the topic factually, focusing on the details of the cases: HVG processed the government-briefing announcements and the details of the NMHH case in separate articles, 444.hu placed the complaints in the series of the Orbán era’s suspicious public procurements, Telex put the grant entanglements of the seven civil organisations linked to Király Nóra in the headline. The public-affairs band summarized the whole announcement package: 24.hu published the full list of the complaints under the title “Rogán money, black hoods and suspicious tens of billions”, and reported separately on the defence contract review; ATV framed the five complaints as the launch of “Operation Purgatory”.

The pro-government-conservative band did not conceal but reframed the topic: Mandiner, under the title “Purgatory is flooding: the government files dozens of complaints”, presented the spokespersons’ announcements in detail — and the facts accurately — while the paper’s opinion column classified the programme as “a reckoning cinema masking the real performance”. This framing is not negligible from the point of view of MIAK’s analysis: it thematizes precisely the risk — the campaign-like nature of accountability — that must be ruled out with rule-of-law guarantees. Népszava ran the NMHH complaint announced by Gajdos László on its front page (title-level reference only).

6.2 Facts and data

Case Sum concerned Suspected crime
NMHH data-deletion codes (2021–2026) HUF 31.2 bn payment allegedly made for unused codes
Grants of seven civil organisations (2021–2026) HUF 1.52 bn misappropriation, abuse of office, budget fraud
Observer media-monitoring contracts (2020–2026) HUF 30.9 bn suspicion of overpricing (fee rise from HUF 2–2.4 bn/year → 5.8 bn)
Dialogue centre of the Orthodox exarchate HUF 5.3 bn → 34.2 bn budget fraud, failure of control, false private document
Case of the black-clad troublemakers — supplement to a complaint for a disorderly-conduct procedure

International benchmark: in 2024 Hungary stood at −0.17 on the control-of-corruption dimension of the World Bank’s governance indicators (Worldwide Governance Indicators) — the indicator ranks the country among the regional laggards, and it measures exactly what the current accountability programme could improve in a lasting, institutional way, if it becomes a system instead of a campaign.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the institutionalisation of the wave of complaints: public-money dashboard (A1), public-procurement transparency (A2), independent corruption investigation (A10);
  • Justice (programme points) — the public traceability of the procedures (I1); the prosecution is an independent constitutional actor, the fate of the complaints is not a government competence;
  • Defence (programme points) — the ministry-level contract review is the direct application of the transparency of defence spending (HV2).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman distinguishes three pillars of anti-corruption policy: structural reform (reshaping or abolishing the programmes that produce the opportunities for corruption), criminal law and public-procurement reform — in this order. She has two warnings about the criminal-law tool that are directly relevant to the current Hungarian situation. On the one hand, the aim of the law is not to enforce total moral purity but to deter the corrupt systems causing the greatest social harm — the rigid rules of the absolutist approach may, contrary to the intention, increase the incentives for corruption. On the other hand, anti-corruption campaigns have historically often run aground because those in power used them to undermine their opponents, and the complaint mechanisms became collecting channels for private revenge. Applied to the Hungarian wave of complaints: the structural common denominator of the five cases (one-person decision, unchecked contract amendment, missing performance certification) signals the need for system reform — the criminal procedure treats the symptom, the rule reform the disease.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

According to Klitgaard’s formula corruption flourishes where monopoly and wide discretionary power meet the absence of accountability. The book’s most famous case study is the 1974 setting-up of the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC): the direct trigger was the scandalous flight abroad of a “big fish” — the corruption-suspected police chief Godber — and the answer was not another campaign but a permanent institution operating with strong powers, direct subordination to the governor and an internal ethics code. Klitgaard emphasises: legal authorisation in itself was never enough before — the anti-corruption bodies themselves ran out or became corrupt until independence, staff quality and consistent enforcement were coupled to it. The Hungarian parallel is obvious: the current complaints are the “big fish” phase; according to the Hong Kong lesson the lasting result is decided by whether an institution corresponding to the post-Godber-case ICAC is built behind them.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.3 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

Singapore’s founding prime minister fixes in his memoir two basic principles of the operation of the anti-corruption bureau (CPIB). The first is the pairing of targeting and simplification: the bureau concentrated on the high-level, “big” cases, while at the lower levels it eliminated the very opportunity for corruption by simplifying the procedures and abolishing the discretionary powers — with clear, published rules and the abolition of permit requirements. The second is enforcement without exception: Lee let the procedure be carried out even against his own political allies — his minister, his fellow trade-union leader — and put it that it is easy to start with a high moral standard, but it can be maintained only if the leaders act against every rule-breaker, without exception. The credibility test of the Hungarian accountability programme will be the same: what will count is whether the review methodology runs on the government’s own cases too.

📖 Source: Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First — The Singapore Story 1965–2000

6.5 International comparison

The international experience of transitional and post-autocratic accountability is twofold. The common feature of the successful models — Hong Kong ICAC (1974), Singapore CPIB — is that they quickly turned the scandal-triggered campaign into a permanent, government-independent institution that could also proceed against the power of the day. The failed templates — several Latin American and East European “anti-corruption waves” — ran aground where accountability proceeded to the rhythm of government communication, selectively against opponents: the procedures lasted until the first change of government, then repeated with reversed signs. Hungary’s accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) — on which the government has already decided — is a complementary external guarantee in this frame: in cases concerning EU funds the prosecutorial decision is already taken out of the domestic political space.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)

Justice

  • I1 — Judicial transparency

Defence

  • HV2 — Transparency of defence spending

Proposed new programme point: Accountability transparency protocol — a uniform, public tracking order for government complaints and screenings — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 10 July 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First — The Singapore Story 1965–2000

Note: in the blog’s visible text the local file path of the books does not appear — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A2, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I1)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV2)
  • MIAK press monitor, 10 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 95/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (control of corruption, 2024: −0.17); EU Rule of Law Report (Hungary chapter); Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index; Electronic Public Procurement System (EKR)

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