Part I — Situation overview

On 8 July 2026 the reshaping of state-asset and company management entered a new phase: economic-development minister Kapitány István recalled the director-general of HEPA (Hungarian Export Development Agency), Bihari Katalin, and the director-general of HIPA (National Investment Agency), Joó István — the latter also being the government commissioner for investment promotion. On the same day the minister appointed a new director-general at the head of the state EXIM Bank and the MEHIB belonging to it, in the person of Kiss Zalán, who earlier worked at MBH Bank belonging to the interests of Mészáros Lőrinc, and who steps into the place of Berta Adrienn, recalled on Monday, 7 July 2026; the minister set as his task the closing of the audit and handover-takeover process, as well as ensuring lawful, transparent operation. Portfolio placed this in the Tisza government’s broader series of leadership changes (the replacement of the MVM leaders had happened one day earlier).

The news in itself would be a routine post-change-of-government personnel change — what makes it a turn is what stayed unchanged in the meantime. 24.hu, following Mfor, showed that the NER-linked LATEREX Zrt. (whose indirect majority owner is the Gerencsér family) keeps winning public tenders even after the 12 April 2026 election: it concluded a two-year framework contract with Óbuda University (4 May, some 1 billion forints, selected from among ten bidders), contracted for the construction of the Danubian Reformed Church District’s school in Biatorbágy (6 May, 3.88 and 1.22 billion forints in stages), and joined the Kőszeg swimming-pool investment as a subcontractor. In parallel with this the agriculture ministry — signalling in a Tuesday video — reached into the investment of the National Stud Farm’s Nonius Hotel in Mezőhegyes, whose cost rose for a 16-room luxury hotel from 1.2 billion to 3.5 billion forints, and for which, according to the ministry, the usability analysis was missing; the project would be redirected to an educational-model-farm purpose.

By MIAK’s reading, the two pieces of news together show the real problem: the gap between the personnel change and the system. If the leaders change at the head of a state company network, but a government-linked construction company keeps winning tenders unhindered even after the change of government, then the outflow of public money depends not on the persons but on the rules. The stake is therefore not who sits in the director-general’s chair, but whether the public-procurement loopholes that sustain monopoly and discretion are closed — because without this the dismantling of NER wealth changes only owner, not logic.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame in which the relationship of personnel change and system can be interpreted. According to the formula of Robert Klitgaard’s work Controlling Corruption (1988) — corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability (C = M + D − A) — corruption flourishes where the actor is in a monopoly position, has wide discretion, and its accountability is weak; the change of leaders can affect only accountability of these three factors, not monopoly and discretion, so in itself it is not enough. Susan Rose-Ackerman’s work Corruption and Government names public procurement as one of the main channels of high-level political corruption: in a manipulated tender the insider company wins instead of the most efficient, and the state receives too little even when the most efficient bidder wins — the difference means higher taxes or less public spending. And the study Governance Matters (1999) by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón makes it measurable — with six aggregate governance indicators, among them the control of corruption — whether a purge is a real institutional quality improvement, or only a personnel rotation. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures which would make the dismantling of NER wealth, beyond the personnel change, a systemic, rule-of-law reform.

3.1 Rule-based, court-reviewable asset settlement (continuously)

The most important principle is that the reshaping of asset and company management should happen not by hand-steering, but according to a rule fixed in advance and reviewable by a court. On the basis of the A3 publicity of asset declarations and the A6 checks and balances programme points, MIAK proposes that every change of leaders and asset decision be underpinned by a documented, individually tailored justification, and that everyone concerned be able to seek legal remedy. In Klitgaard’s C = M + D − A frame (see 6.4.1) the danger of the hand-steered personnel change is precisely that it does not reduce discretion but relocates it: the new leader inherits the same wide discretion. The aim is therefore not the swapping of the actors, but the narrowing of discretion with rules and the strengthening of accountability — so that the asset settlement is not reversible or open to revenge at the next change of government.

3.2 Closing the public-procurement loopholes (within 30–90 days)

The LATEREX case is the litmus paper of the systemic fault: if a government-linked company keeps winning even after the change of government, then the problem is not the actor, but the rule. On the basis of the A2 public-procurement transparency programme point, MIAK proposes that those elements of the public-procurement law through which the recurring winners slip — the artificially narrowed bidder circle, the single-bid procedures, the unjustified technical conditions enabling overpricing — be closed by a targeted amendment, and that AI-based anomaly detection (automatic flagging of suspicious patterns, overpricing, recurring winners) run on every larger tender. According to Rose-Ackerman’s analysis (see 6.4.2), the price of the manipulated tender ultimately burdens the taxpayer; the closing of the loopholes is therefore not a formal but a direct public-money-protection question. And the Mezőhegyes investment, swollen from 1.2 to 3.5 billion, justifies making the usability analysis mandatory for every large project.

3.3 Independent accountability capacity and official rotation (medium term, 2026–2028)

The third condition is that accountability should not depend on the goodwill of the government of the day, but be institutionalised. On the basis of the A10 Independent Anti-Corruption Office (on the model of the Singaporean CPIB, which can investigate against any public official) and the KI7 official-selection and rotation system programme points, MIAK proposes that in areas of corruption risk (procurement, permitting) there be mandatory position rotation every five years and an integrity check before appointment, and that a politically independent office be able to investigate in the case of unjustified wealth increase. This is the guarantee that would turn the present, hand-steered purge into lasting, side-independent accountability — so that it does not matter who is in government, but that the rule applies to everyone equally.

These three proposals are bound together by a single principle: the corrupt rent system lives not in persons, but in the structure of the absence of monopoly, discretion and accountability. Until we dismantle this structure, the personnel change only rewrites the roster of the beneficiaries.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy Restoring competition in public procurement brings cheaper, better public investments Tightening the tender rules may temporarily slow ongoing projects
Transparency The rule-based asset settlement and the open tender data reduce rent-seeking The hand-steered purge may raise the suspicion of new clientele-building
Public administration Rotation and independent accountability lastingly reduce the corruption risk Institution-building is slow; the old actors may build a victim narrative

The main question to weigh is the relationship of speed and legality. The fast, spectacular change of leaders gives immediate satisfaction, but if it is not coupled with rule reform, then the outflow of public money continues, only with different beneficiaries; the slower but rule-based reshaping, by contrast, brings a lasting, irreversible result. The proposal works if the personnel change is accompanied by reform narrowing monopoly and discretion; it tips onto the risk side if the purge stays an end in itself, and the new leadership uses the same discretionary power it wanted to abolish.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following suggested performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) worth tracking on a 6–24-month horizon:

  • Share of recurring winners: whether public tenders are still won by the same narrow circle of companies — its fall is the main sign of the loophole-closing’s success.
  • Competition in tenders: the share of single-bid procedures and the average number of bidders — the aim is more bidders, lower price.
  • The legal outcome of the asset settlement: how many decisions were successfully challenged — a high proportion is a sign of hand-steering, not of lawfulness.
  • The publicity of the procurement data: whether the data of every state tender is available in machine-readable, real-time form.

These are suggestions, not government decisions — MIAK considers worth tracking what shows on a factual basis whether a real system reform took place, or only the names changed.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message is simple: the dismantling of NER wealth is a legitimate aim, but the personnel change in itself is not enough. MIAK asks the decision-maker that the asset settlement be rule-based and court-reviewable, that the public-procurement loopholes be closed, and that all tender data be public — because the corrupt rent system is dismantled only by the narrowing of monopoly and discretion, not by the swapping of the beneficiaries.

The topic moves two MIAK foundational values. Accountability is concerned because the asset settlement is legitimate only if it happens in a documented procedure open to legal remedy — the hand-steered purge weakens precisely the accountability it is meant to strengthen. And transparency, because the publicity of the procurement data is the only lasting protection against rent-seeking: what is visible and comparable is harder to squander.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal and public-affairs band (444.hu, HVG, 24.hu, ATV) stressed the weight of the news on the continuity of the system: 444.hu highlighted the EXIM chief arriving from the Mészáros interests and the suspicion of the Mezőhegyes public-money siphoning, 24.hu and ATV LATEREX’s post-change-of-government tender wins as proof of the “survival of NER”, and HVG the HEPA/HIPA change of leaders factually. The economic band (Portfolio) served it objectively, in the frame of “immediate change in the economic-development elite”, placed in the Tisza government’s broader series of personnel changes. The pro-government-conservative band (Magyar Nemzet) ran rather the series of removals as an “another sacking” story, without the continuity narrative. In the name of ideology-freeness it should be recorded: the gap between the personnel change and the system is not a side-dependent observation — restoring competition in public procurement is a public interest from both left and right, because the overpriced tender goes from everyone’s taxes.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Recalled HEPA chief Bihari Katalin HVG / Portfolio, 8 July 2026
Recalled HIPA chief Joó István (investment-promotion government commissioner) HVG / Portfolio, 8 July 2026
New EXIM/MEHIB chief Kiss Zalán (earlier MBH Bank) 444.hu, 8 July 2026
LATEREX — Óbuda University framework contract ~1 billion HUF (from among 10 bidders), 4 May 24.hu / Mfor, 8 July 2026
LATEREX — Biatorbágy Reformed school 3.88 + 1.22 billion HUF, 6 May 24.hu / Mfor, 8 July 2026
Cost of the Mezőhegyes Nonius Hotel 1.2 → 3.5 billion HUF (16 rooms) 444.hu, 7 July 2026

The direction of the set of figures is unambiguous: the change of leaders is fast and wide-ranging, but the main channel of the outflow of public money — public procurement — is untouched; the LATEREX wins and the Mezőhegyes cost swelling show that it is the rules, not the persons, that sustain the system.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — public-procurement transparency (A2), the publicity of asset declarations (A3), checks and balances (A6) and the Independent Anti-Corruption Office (A10) are the gravitational centre of the topic;
  • Economy (background material) — action against rent-seeking and regulatory capture is a condition of restoring the competitive market;
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — official rotation (KI7) and Drucker-principle efficiency measurement (KI8) are elements of institutional resilience.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard condenses corruption into a single, since-canonical formula: “CORRUPTION = MONOPOLY + DISCRETION − ACCOUNTABILITY”, that is, illicit gain-seeking proliferates where the actor is in a monopoly position, has wide discretion, and its accountability is weak. He emphasises separately that a mere change of owner is no cure: if the monopoly position and the discretionary power remain, the consumer keeps paying too high a price — “the key ideas… might not be capitalism versus state socialism… but rather competition and accountability”. In the Hungarian case this means that the change of leaders carried out at the head of HEPA, HIPA or EXIM can improve only the A (accountability) factor; while the monopoly and discretion that enable the LATEREX-type tender winning remain, the corruption risk does not fall either — competitive public procurement and open accountability are the real antidote.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman analyses public procurement and the award of concessions as the main channel of high-level political corruption: governments confer significant financial advantages on private companies through these contracts, and “corrupt incentives may mean that the most efficient bidder loses out to a corrupt insider. Even if the most efficient firm does win, corruption in the tendering process assures that the government receives too little” — and the difference means higher taxes or less public spending. She describes kleptocracy as “corruption organised at the top of the government”, which directs the rents to the insiders. The Hungarian LATEREX case is, in this frame, a textbook example: the unhindered tender winning after the change of government suggests that the problem is not the actor, but the procedural structure that favours the insider — which is why MIAK proposes the targeted closing of the loopholes and the guaranteeing of the competitive procedure.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Kaufmann–Kraay–Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

The authors set up six aggregate governance indicators — among them the “control of corruption” indicator — and empirically show the strong, causal relationship between better governance and better development outcomes. The study’s main contribution is that it makes the quality of governance measurable and comparable across countries — so that a purge can be judged at the level of the indicators, not of the rhetoric. In the case of the Hungarian asset settlement, this frame gives MIAK’s standard: the personnel change is successful if the control-of-corruption indicator actually improves (the Hungarian value is, according to the World Bank’s 2024 data, slightly negative, −0.17), and not if only the roster of leaders changes. The aim is measurable institutional quality improvement, not the symbolic turn.

📖 Source: Kaufmann–Kraay–Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

6.5 International comparison

The best-known operative example of the narrowing of monopoly and discretion is Singapore: the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), subordinate directly to the head of government but politically independent, can investigate against any public official, and in the case of unjustified wealth increase the burden of proof reverses — this is the model of MIAK’s A10 programme point. On the procurement side European practice has moved towards the open data standard (Open Contracting Data Standard) and real-time publicity, because the experience is that recurring winners and overpricing fall fastest where all tender data is comparably, machine-readably available. The Hungarian lesson: the personnel change in itself has nowhere brought lasting improvement — the measurable change came from rule reform and independent accountability.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Office (CPIB model)

Public administration and e-government

  • KI7 — Official-selection and rotation system
  • KI8 — Drucker-principle efficiency measurement

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 9 July 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Kaufmann–Kraay–Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

Note: in the blog’s visible text the local file path of the books does not appear — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A2, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI7)
  • MIAK press monitor, 9 July 2026 — topic 3, score: 87/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Database of the Public Procurement Authority; EU OLAF reports; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI); World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (control of corruption: −0.17, 2024)

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