Part I — Situation overview

Two interconnected economic-policy steps became public on 9 July 2026. The government tabled before Parliament bill T/273 — signed by deputy prime minister Ruff Bálint, presented by finance minister Kármán András — which reshapes the special tax on crude-oil-product producers: the tax on the surplus profit Mol earns on the difference between the purchase price of Russian Ural (REBCO) and Brent-type crude oil becomes banded. Under the current rule a 95% tax must be paid on the per-barrel price gap reduced by 5 dollars; under the new system the tax liability already applies at a 2-dollar gap, at a 50% rate in the band between 2 and 5 dollars, still at 95% on the part above 5 dollars, and the tax’s scope is also extended to 2027. The Ministry of Finance expects 6.25 billion forints of revenue this year and around 15 billion next year — the actual sum depending on oil prices and the margin. In parallel, according to Portfolio’s analysis, the government has, in line with its campaign promise, begun to phase out the system of public-interest asset-management foundations performing public tasks (KEKVAs), which particularly affects Mol: a little more than 30% of the company’s shares are currently owned by such foundations, and the fate of this share package can also reshape the company’s dividend policy and governance structure.

The two steps together are a reordering of the relationship between the state and big business. The origin of the windfall tax is known: Russian oil was sold at a significant discount because of the sanctions, the gap produced surplus profit at Mol, which the previous government withdrew with a special tax and spent on financing the utility-cost cut. The new government now does not abolish but tightens and bands the levy — while at the government briefing the spokesperson denied that a decision had been made about the reshaping of Mol’s management. And the KEKVA phase-out is the dismantling of the quasi-privatized asset structure of the NER era, about which our earlier analyses wrote from the side of rule-of-law guarantees — the current development is the tax and ownership-policy side.

MIAK’s reading: the direction of both steps is defensible, but in both cases the real stake is rule-basedness. A special tax does not become a perpetual, bargaining-based levy if it is tied to conditions and a phase-out path fixed in law; a wealth recovery does not become new clientele-building if it happens with a public inventory and accountable asset-management rules. The question is not whether the state is strong against big business — but whether it is predictable.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame in which windfall taxation and the dismantling of the asset-management system can be interpreted. The thesis of Thomas Piketty (French economist, the leading researcher of long-run data on wealth inequality) in his work Capital in the Twenty-First Century is that the progressive taxation of capital income is a legitimate means of counterbalancing wealth concentration — but it works only coupled with a high level of financial transparency, otherwise the tax can be evaded and becomes arbitrary. Joseph Stiglitz’s (Nobel-laureate American economist, former chief economist of the World Bank) book Globalization and Its Discontents draws from the failures of the post-socialist privatizations the lesson that the movement of state assets — whether out or back — without appropriate legal-institutional frameworks distorts into an opportunity for insiders’ wealth acquisition. And Elinor Ostrom’s (Nobel-laureate American political economist) work Governing the Commons provides the design principles of the governance of common wealth: clear boundaries, the publicity of the rules and of the monitoring, built-in conflict resolution — that is, the institutional ABC of managing the recovered wealth. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures which would fit the two steps into a predictable, rule-based frame.

3.1 Phase-out path and review clause in the windfall tax (in the parliamentary debate on T/273)

The banded structure is more refined and more rule-based than the current single-rate levy — MIAK considers this a step forward. The missing element of the proposal is the phase-out path: MIAK proposes that the law fix a sunset date (a point set in advance in the legislation at which the measure automatically ceases, unless the legislator extends it) and an annual public review, which ties the survival of the tax to the actual existence of the Russian–world-market price gap. The principle of the G3 programme point — predictable, rule-based taxation instead of ad hoc special taxes — demands precisely this: the special tax is a crisis instrument, not a permanent revenue source. In Piketty’s frame (see 6.4.1) the legitimacy of the windfall levy comes from transparency: the tax base (the price gap) rests on public, verifiable data — this accounting chain is worth reinforcing with a statement audited by the Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority and published quarterly.

3.2 Public KEKVA asset inventory and management rulebook (within 90 days)

The greatest risk of the KEKVA phase-out is not the intention but the execution: the new management regime of the recovered wealth — share packages, real estate, cash — decides whether community control or new discretionary wealth concentration comes about. MIAK proposes that within ninety days the government publish an itemized, public asset inventory (asset, book and estimated market value, previous and new manager), and adopt an asset-management rulebook which, as part of the A1 public-money dashboard, makes the fate of the asset items continuously traceable. Stiglitz’s analysis (see 6.4.2) is the warning: the movement of wealth without institutional frameworks — regardless of direction — is distorted to the benefit of insiders. For the Mol share package this means concretely: the identity of the owner’s-rights holder, the principles of exercising the voting rights and the conditions of a possible sale must be fixed in advance, publicly — before the market starts guessing.

3.3 Rent audit for the energy sector (by 30 June 2027)

The third element is drawing the systemic lesson: the windfall is not Mol’s virtue or sin, but the product of a regulatory-market situation (sanction discount, refining position) — that is, rent. On the basis of the G6 programme against rent-seeking, MIAK proposes that the government commission a public rent audit for the energy sector: which regulatory elements (price regulation, network access, stockpiling obligations) produce how much rent for whom, and which of these serves a public purpose and which merely protects a market position. According to Ostrom’s design principles (see 6.4.3) the lasting solution is not the ad hoc levy but the redesign of the institutional rules: the audit is the basis for having, at the next price shock, not an improvised special tax but a known, rule-based mechanism operating in advance. The results should come before Parliament together with the data of the G7 inequality monitoring.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: in the relationship of the state and big business it is not force but the rule that is the lasting advantage. The predictable special tax brings more revenue at a lower investment cost than the levy renegotiated every year; and the wealth recovered with a public inventory is worth more than the wealth quietly reshuffled.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Budget HUF 6.25 bn (2026), ~HUF 15 bn (2027) extra revenue; partial cover for the utility-cost support oil-price fluctuation makes the revenue uncertain; the “embedding” of the revenue makes the phase-out politically harder
Capital market, investment the banded structure is a more refined signal to the market; settling the KEKVA shares clarifies Mol’s ownership structure frequent tax change builds in a country-risk premium; uncertainty around the fate of the share package causes price fluctuation
Governance steering the quasi-privatized wealth back under community control without an inventory and rulebook the wealth may end up in new, equally opaque management

The main question to weigh is the two-directional nature of credibility. If the government keeps extending the special tax without a phase-out path, the “crisis tax” perpetuates the old disease of the Hungarian tax system — ad hoc, bargaining-based special taxation — the price of which every investor ultimately pays in a risk premium. If, on the other hand, the recovery of the KEKVA wealth happens without an inventory and rulebook, the operation repeats exactly the discretionary asset-management logic it is meant to dismantle — only with new actors.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes four performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) for tracking:

  • Rule-basedness: whether the promulgated law contains a sunset date and an annual review obligation;
  • Revenue plan vs. actual: the actual revenue of the special tax compared with the planned 6.25 and ~15 billion forints (in half-yearly breakdown, publicly);
  • Inventory milestone: the publication of the KEKVA asset inventory within 90 days, with a public data sheet for 100% of the asset items;
  • Predictability signal: the public fixing of the management principles of the Mol share package and the development of the share-price volatility relative to the announcements.

5.2 Summary

The banded windfall tax and the KEKVA phase-out together are a reordering of the relationship between the state and big business — the direction is defensible in both cases, but permanence depends on the rules. MIAK asks Parliament to supplement the law, in the debate on T/273, with a sunset date and a review clause; and it asks the government to publish, within ninety days, the itemized inventory and management rulebook of the recovered wealth, and by next summer to commission a public rent audit for the energy sector. The proposal connects to two of MIAK’s foundational values: to transparency, because the legitimacy of the wealth recovery is given solely by the public inventory; and to data-drivenness, because the survival of the special tax should be decided not by political bargaining but by a measurable condition — the actual existence of the price gap.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal band focused on the fact of the tightening: Telex ran the news under the title “The state would squeeze Mol”, embedded in the sanction-geopolitical context (the NIS affair, Putin–Trump references) (the article was not publicly downloadable, title-level reference). The economic band went deepest: Portfolio quantified the capital-market side of the KEKVA dismantling — analysing the ownership reshuffle concerning more than 30% of Mol’s shares and its dividend impact — that is, it treated the topic in a shareholder-value, not a political, frame. The pro-government-conservative band chose a surprise framing: Mandiner reported under the title “Well, well: the Tisza government tightens Mol’s windfall tax”, with precise technical details (bands, rates, entry into force) — the implicit message of the title being that the new government carries on, indeed tightens, the Fidesz era’s instrument (the special tax). HVG’s earlier, late-June podcast content (“Can the Purgatory operation catch up with the Mol chief?”) thematized the possible intersection of the company management and the accountability programme — which the spokesperson’s denial at the government briefing (no decision on a Mol leadership reshaping) leaves for now an open question.

6.2 Facts and data

Item Current rule New rule under T/273
Tax base Ural–Brent price gap reduced by 5 USD per barrel price gap above 2 USD
Rate 95% band between 2–5 USD: 50%; above 5 USD: 95%
Temporal scope 2025–2026 extended to 2027
Entry into force — promulgation + 31st day; first for the August 2026 liability
Expected revenue — 2026: HUF 6.25 bn; 2027: ~HUF 15 bn (Ministry of Finance estimate)

The KEKVA involvement: a little more than 30% of Mol’s shares are held by asset-management foundations (Portfolio); the phase-out of the system thus reshapes the ownership structure at one of the largest-capitalization companies of the Budapest Stock Exchange.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Economy (programme points) — making special-tax policy rule-based (G3), the systemic mapping of rents (G6) and the tracking of inequality effects (G7);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the public inventory and continuous traceability of the recovered KEKVA wealth on the public-money dashboard (A1).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

Piketty’s central thesis is that when the return on capital lastingly exceeds economic growth, wealth concentration becomes a self-reinforcing process, and to counterbalance this the progressive taxation of capital income is the legitimate public-policy instrument. The work sets two conditions directly relevant to the Hungarian windfall-tax debate. On the one hand, the legitimacy of the tax comes from financial transparency: the tax base must rest on public, verifiable data — in the Hungarian construction the Ural–Brent price gap is in principle exactly such a base, calculable from market prices, which is an unusually clean solution among special taxes. On the other hand, Piketty emphasises that unilateral, uncoordinated and unpredictable capital taxation produces an effect contrary to the intention: it reduces not the rent but the investment. Applied to the banded Mol tax: the progressivity of the levy (larger price gap — higher rate) is in line with the theory; the missing element is predictability, that is, the fixed phase-out path.

📖 Source: Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

6.4.2 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

Stiglitz draws one of the book’s most-cited lessons from the failure of the post-socialist transformations — above all the Russian privatization: the movement of state assets without appropriate legal and market institutions results not in efficiency but in wealth diversion. According to his description, in a badly executed privatization the insiders profited from acquiring the wealth below market price, and the new owners were interested in stripping the assets, not developing them — a process the profession of the time bitterly punned on as the merger of bribery and privatization. For the Hungarian KEKVA phase-out the lesson holds in the reverse direction: the recovery of wealth is just as institution-sensitive an operation as its siphoning-out was. If the new management regime of the recovered share packages and real estate is not public and not accountable, the operation — regardless of its intention — may become the next insider circle’s opportunity for wealth acquisition.

📖 Source: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

6.4.3 Elinor Ostrom: Governing the Commons

Examining the centuries-long successfully operating self-governance systems of common resources (pastures, irrigation systems, fisheries), Ostrom identified the design principles that distinguish lastingly sustainable common-wealth management from the failed: clearly drawn boundaries; rules fitted to local conditions; the participation of those concerned in rule-making; working, accountable monitoring; graduated sanctions; and cheap, fast conflict-resolution forums. The book’s main message is that the fate of common wealth is decided not on the “state or private” dichotomy but on the institutional details. Applied to the recovered KEKVA wealth: the question is not whether the wealth is in a form called state or foundation, but whether the institutions regulating its management — inventory, public rulebook, independent monitoring, reporting order — exist. Without these, the swapping of the ownership label in itself guarantees nothing.

📖 Source: Elinor Ostrom: Governing the Commons — The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

6.5 International comparison

The EU itself provided a framework for taxing the surplus profit of the energy sector in the crisis period: the extraordinary 2022 Council regulation introduced, under the name “solidarity contribution”, the withdrawal of the fossil sector’s windfall profit, coordinated at EU level and expressly of a transitional nature — the key element being precisely the time scope fixed in advance. The United Kingdom’s Energy Profits Levy shows the other direction: the levy originally intended as transitional was extended and raised several times, to which the North Sea oil industry reacted with investment postponement — the cost of unpredictability is well documented. On the asset-management side the Norwegian sovereign oil fund (Government Pension Fund Global) is the positive model: a management rulebook fixed in law, full portfolio transparency and a parliamentary reporting order — that is, exactly the institutional package MIAK proposes for the recovered KEKVA wealth.

Economy

  • G3 — Simplification and progressive reform of the tax system
  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G7 — Wealth-inequality monitoring

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard

Proposed new programme point: Special-tax phase-out framework rule — every crisis-situation special tax with a mandatory sunset date and public review order — for the Economy area.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 10 July 2026 — topic 6):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century
  • 📖 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents
  • 📖 Elinor Ostrom: Governing the Commons — The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Note: in the blog’s visible text the local file path of the books does not appear — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G3, G6)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1)
  • MIAK press monitor, 10 July 2026 — topic 6, score: 82/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Documents of the National Assembly (T/273); Mol stock-exchange reports (Budapest Stock Exchange); NAV special-tax statistics; EU Council Regulation 2022/1854 (solidarity contribution); annual reports of the Norwegian sovereign oil fund (NBIM)

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