Part I — Situation overview

On 14–15 June 2026 Portfolio reported that the Tisza government’s Finance Minister, András Kármán, spoke about the wealth tax and the budget review: on the table is the introduction of a tax burdening the largest fortunes and the screening of the existing budgetary path. The introduction of a wealth tax — a tax levied annually on net private wealth above a defined threshold — is, however, risky according to HVG’s analysis: the constitutional concerns and the determination of thresholds and rates are all open questions. In parallel, on the agenda is the beneficial ownership of private-equity funds (closed-end institutional investment funds in which an often hard-to-see ownership structure lies hidden): by HVG, Tisza would go after some HUF 2,600 billion of public money, while Portfolio’s podcast speaks of a HUF 1,900 billion public-asset recovery.

The topic is at once a budgetary and a transparency question, and it is worth handling with public-law precision. A wealth tax — like every type of tax — is adopted in statute by the National Assembly; the Government submits but does not “adopt” a tax law, and a government decree cannot override the statute either (the hierarchy of legal sources: Fundamental Law > statute > government decree). Taxation, moreover, has constitutional limits: the principle of property protection and proportionality requires that the tax not be confiscatory in character. Public-asset recovery likewise requires a rule-of-law procedure — the register of beneficial owners (the real beneficiaries of the wealth) is not an end in itself, but the precondition of transparent, lawful recovery.

MIAK’s reading — and here it is worth noting that earlier blogs of ours have already dealt with the broader question of the transparency and recovery of NER wealth (see the analyses of the new system of asset declarations and the anti-corruption legislative package) — is that the focus here is a new thread that has not yet had a standalone blog: the wealth tax as a tax-policy and constitutional instrument. MIAK’s message is twofold. First: a wealth tax is legitimate if it is fair, predictable and constitutionally defensible — the threshold and constitutionality concerns flagged by HVG are not incidental, but conditions of the introduction’s success. Second: the common precondition of public-asset recovery and fair taxation is beneficial-ownership transparency — without it, it is possible neither to levy a fair tax nor to recover lost public assets lawfully.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Thomas Piketty (French economist, leading researcher of the long-run data of wealth inequality) discusses the progressive wealth tax in his work Capital in the Twenty-First Century as an instrument for managing growing wealth inequality — while also stressing the practical limits: the precondition of a working wealth tax is the transparency of wealth, the system of asset declarations. Susan Rose-Ackerman (American legal scholar and economist, leading researcher of the economics of corruption) in her work Corruption and Government describes the connection between ownership transparency and rent-seeking (unproductive gain stemming from influence): the hidden ownership structure is the breeding ground of corruption, so the revelation of the beneficial owner is the basic precondition for pushing back abuses. Daniel Kaufmann (governance researcher at the World Bank, one of the developers of the Worldwide Governance Indicators) in his work Governance Matters treats the control of corruption as a measurable governance dimension — the Hungarian indicator (−0.17 by the World Bank WGI 2024) signals how much there is to do in protecting public assets. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that the wealth tax and public-asset recovery are fair, predictable and rule-of-law-based.

3.1 A beneficial-ownership register as the precondition of every further step (started immediately)

Neither a fair wealth tax can be levied nor public assets lawfully recovered while the real ownership structure of fortunes remains hidden. MIAK therefore proposes, within the framework of the publicity of asset declarations (A3) and the public-money dashboard (A1), the building of a beneficial-ownership register of private-equity funds and the asset elements linked to them: a machine-readable, public register that leads, through front men and interposed funds too, to the real beneficiary. This is the direct application of Rose-Ackerman’s thesis: without revealing the hidden ownership chain, rent-seeking and the siphoning-off of public assets remain opaque. The fate of the HUF 2,600 billion and 1,900 billion items depends precisely on this transparency — without it both the recovery and the taxation can be evaded.

3.2 A constitutionally defensible, predictable wealth-tax model (at the stage of legislative preparation)

A wealth tax is legitimate if it is legally unassailable. MIAK proposes, within the framework of the simplification and progressive reform of the tax system (G3) and progressive capital-income taxation (G8), a model that (a) burdens only the largest fortunes with a clear, high threshold, (b) works with a moderate, non-confiscatory rate, and (c) operates with a pre-fixed, predictable set of rules. The constitutional limit of property protection (I5) is not an obstacle here, but a guarantee: the tax stands before the Constitutional Court if it is proportionate and not confiscatory. The constitutional concerns flagged by HVG must therefore be resolved not by bypassing them, but in advance, at the legislative stage — otherwise the introduced tax fails later, and the revenue target is not met either.

3.3 A transparent budget review and a data-based opening balance (at the start of the review)

A budget review is credible if its methodology is public. MIAK proposes, within the framework of the data-driven budget (G1) and the systematic review of state expenditures (G21), that the government prepare an itemised, public opening balance — of inherited obligations, pending projects and unfunded promises — and document every step of the review. In this way the wealth tax and the recovered public assets will not be an ad hoc source for plugging an opaque budget hole, but an element of a publicly justified, accountable fiscal strategy. The monitoring of wealth inequality (G7), in turn, ensures that the impact of tax policy on the wealth structure remains measurable and verifiable.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: fair burden-sharing and the protection of public assets can only be built on transparency. Beneficial-ownership transparency, a constitutionally defensible tax and a public budget review together turn the wealth tax from what it could easily be — a risky money-grab — into what it should be: a predictable, fair and rule-of-law-based instrument.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy / budget The wealth tax and the recovered public assets can bring new revenue and fairer burden-sharing A poorly calibrated threshold/rate may cause capital flight, legal disputes and uncertainty; the revenue falls short of plan
Transparency The beneficial-ownership register narrows the room for siphoning-off public assets and for rent-seeking Building the register is slow and technically difficult; if incomplete, the hidden structures keep working
Law / constitution A proportionate, predictable tax stands the constitutionality test and provides a lasting frame A confiscatory or tailor-made tax may fail on a constitutional complaint, and harms legal certainty

The main point to weigh is the balance between the revenue target and constitutional defensibility. An aggressive wealth tax promising fast, large revenue is tempting, but precisely the high rate and the low threshold increase the risk of capital flight, legal dispute and constitutional failure — in the end less may come in than from a moderate, predictable model. The narrow path: a high threshold, a moderate rate, pre-fixed rules and — above all — beneficial-ownership transparency, without which even the best-designed tax can be evaded.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

Three performance indicators (KPIs) are worth tracking over the next 12–24 months:

  • Ownership transparency: whether a public beneficial-ownership register of private-equity funds and the assets linked to them is built, and what mass of wealth becomes transparent;
  • Tax revenue vs. plan: how closely the actual revenue of the introduced wealth tax approaches the planned figure, and how many constitutionality/legal objections arise;
  • Recovered public assets: how much of the flagged items (in the order of HUF 1,900–2,600 billion) is actually returned to the state in a final, binding procedure.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message — to decision-makers and the public alike — is that the wealth tax and public-asset recovery are legitimate goals, but the manner decides success. MIAK therefore asks for three jointly valid steps: let us build the beneficial-ownership register of private-equity funds; let us shape a constitutionally defensible, predictable wealth-tax model; and let us make the methodology of the budget review transparent with a public opening balance. The wealth tax is not a “risky money-grab” if it is fair, lawful and transparent.

The topic engages, among MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and accountability: transparency because beneficial-ownership publicity is the common precondition of every further step — the fair tax and public-asset recovery; and accountability because the budget review and the revenue of the wealth tax are credible only as part of a publicly justified, accountable strategy. Fair burden-sharing and the protection of public assets are thus not a political slogan, but a measurable, rule-of-law programme.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The economic band (Portfolio) provided the factual outline of the topic: in a separate article it reported on the Finance Minister’s statement about the wealth tax and on the budget review, and in a podcast it discussed the HUF 1,900 billion public-asset recovery — that is, the band placed the fiscal and the implementation side in the foreground. The left-liberal and public-affairs band (HVG) approached from two directions: on one hand it warned of the constitutional and calibration risk (“the wealth tax is a risky way of raising money”), on the other it highlighted the beneficial ownership of private-equity funds as an instrument for tracking public money. The government-party–conservative band did not bring the wealth-tax topic into its top focus on this day — the emphasised constitutional concern, however, is precisely the point where MIAK and the critical framing meet: the tax stands if it is proportionate and predictable. (The Népszava source is a title-level reference only, pointing to the portal’s front page.)

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Public money affecting private-equity-fund owners ~HUF 2,600 billion HVG, 10 June 2026
Planned public-asset recovery ~HUF 1,900 billion Portfolio, 12 June 2026
Wealth-tax statement (Finance Minister) 14–15 June 2026 Portfolio, 14–15 June 2026
WGI — control of corruption (HU, 2024) −0.17 World Bank WGI

The billion-forint items are statements from the cited press sources; the final amount recoverable in a binding procedure may differ. The WGI value comes from the 2024 edition of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (a scale between −2.5 and +2.5).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Economy (programme points) — simplification and progressive reform of the tax system (G3), progressive capital-income taxation (G8), wealth-inequality monitoring (G7), data-driven budget (G1) and review of state expenditures (G21);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — publicity of asset declarations (A3) and public-money dashboard (A1);
  • Justice (programme points) — property protection as the constitutional limit of the wealth tax (I5).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

Piketty discusses the progressive wealth tax as the primary instrument for managing growing wealth inequality: in his formulation “a progressive global tax on wealth would be the ideal instrument with which to stop the formation of an endless inequality spiral”, and he holds that “the progressive wealth tax is a far more suitable instrument for handling the challenges of the 21st century” than the mere taxation of outlier incomes. At the same time Piketty stresses the precondition of its operation too: just as the tax returns generated by the income tax made it possible to study income inequality, so “the asset declarations appearing with the introduction of the wealth tax provide an instrument for studying the evolution of wealth inequalities” — that is, transparency is not a consequence but a condition of a working wealth tax. Translated to the Hungarian case: the wealth tax and the beneficial-ownership register are one-legged without each other — proposals 3.1 and 3.2 are therefore inseparable.

“A progressive global tax on wealth would be the ideal instrument with which to stop the formation of an endless inequality spiral.”

📖 Source: Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman, within the framework of the economics of corruption, shows how the hidden ownership structure creates room for rent-seeking and for siphoning off public assets. By her analysis, channelling wealth and public money into opaque intermediary structures (funds, interposed companies) creates precisely the murk in which gain stemming from influence can operate unpunished; the process of privatisation and asset transfer is especially vulnerable if the real beneficiary remains hidden. It follows that the first step of anti-corruption action is not the sanction, but the revelation of the ownership chain. Translated to the Hungarian private-equity-fund affair: the traceability of the HUF 2,600 billion and 1,900 billion items depends on whether one can reach the beneficial owner — without that, both the recovery and the taxation can be played around.

The hidden ownership structure is the breeding ground of rent-seeking and of siphoning off public assets; revealing the beneficial owner is the precondition for pushing back abuses.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

6.4.3 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

Kaufmann and his co-authors broke down the quality of governance into six measurable dimensions, among them the control of corruption indicator, which quantifies the extent of the private exploitation of public power. The lesson of the frame is that the protection of public assets is not a matter of mood but a measurable and internationally comparable condition — the Hungarian indicator’s 2024 value of −0.17 signals the accountability deficit to which ownership transparency and public-asset recovery respond. The success of the wealth tax and of the recovery will therefore be measured not only by the amount that comes in, but also by the medium-term improvement of the governance indicator: this is the external, impartial feedback that shows whether the programme brought structural change.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

6.5 International comparison

The international experience of the wealth tax counsels caution, and it splits apart precisely along calibration and transparency. Several European countries that introduced a high-rate, low-threshold wealth tax after the 1990s experienced capital flight and administrative difficulties, and in the end withdrew the tax too — not because the principle of the wealth tax is flawed, but because the calibration was wrong. Where, by contrast, a high threshold, a moderate rate and — above all — a working asset register stood in the background, there the tax operated predictably and inescapably. The spread of beneficial-ownership registers through EU directives, in turn, has shown that transparency is technically solvable — and that the real precondition of a working wealth tax is not the rate but visibility. The Hungarian lesson: calibration and ownership transparency matter more than the rhetorical edge of the tax.

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budget
  • G3 — Simplification and progressive reform of the tax system
  • G7 — Wealth-inequality monitoring
  • G8 — Progressive capital-income taxation
  • G21 — Systematic review of state expenditures

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations

Justice

  • I5 — Protection of property rights

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 15 June 2026 — topic 5):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government
  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G3, G8)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A3, A1)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I5)
  • MIAK press monitor, 15 June 2026 — topic 5, score: 86/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • NAV (National Tax and Customs Administration) statistics, OECD taxation database
  • EU AMLA (anti-money-laundering authority) and the EU framework on the beneficial-ownership register
  • World Bank — Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024

Generation metadata