Part I — Situation overview

In the Wednesday Official Gazette of 27 May 2026 — the official journal of legislation and parliamentary resolutions — the parliamentary resolutions on setting up the five parliamentary inquiry committees initiated by the Tisza faction appeared. The committees were voted on at the Tuesday plenary sitting by the Tisza-majority National Assembly: the Inquiry Committee to Uncover the Systemic Crisis of Child Protection, to Uncover Those Responsible for the Clemency Scandal, to Uncover Spontaneous Privatisation and the Loss of Public Assets, to Uncover Abuses Connected with the Operation of the MNB (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the central bank), and to Uncover Enforcement Abuses. Each body consists of six members: Tisza may nominate three, and Fidesz, the KDNP and Mi Hazánk one each.

The inquiry committee is the classic instrument of parliamentary oversight: a body of the National Assembly itself, set up to uncover the use of public power and public money — not an investigating authority and not a court, but a political-oversight body whose findings do not replace the prosecution of the independent prosecution service or the judgement of a court. Precisely for this reason the exact delimitation of competence is a key question. According to Tisza’s proposal, the work of the committees would be made more effective by imposing a million-forint fine on anyone who, through their own fault, fails to appear before the body a second time, and on the third absence police-compelled appearance would follow.

This efficiency-enhancing intent brought the main tension to the surface. The Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ — a rights-protection NGO) has already flagged: the quasi-coercive powers and the strict sanctions may cross the boundary of rule-of-law guarantees. Prime Minister Péter Magyar, responding to this, told TASZ to study Western European practice. In MIAK’s reading the stake is real: accountability is a legitimate and necessary aim, but the instrument of accountability must itself meet the requirement of due process — otherwise the restoration of the rule of law violates the basic principles of the rule of law.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive framework. Susan Rose-Ackerman (one of the leading American lawyer-economist authors of corruption research) devotes, in her work Corruption and Government, separate chapters to the checks and balances of the legislative process, to “accountable implementation” and to “openness and accountability” — the essence of her thesis is that accountability strengthens the quality of governance when it is institutionalised, predictable and transparent, not an ad hoc political instrument. Montesquieu (French legal philosopher of the Enlightenment), in his work The Spirit of the Laws, with the separation of powers at once grounds the legitimacy of legislative oversight — the legislature has the right to call the executive to account — and marks out its limit: oversight cannot tip over into the usurpation of the judicial and prosecutorial function. The two authors together give the inquiry committee its principled place: strong oversight, but confined within the framework of due process. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that the inquiry committees are instruments that can be taken seriously, yet remain rule-of-law instruments.

3.1 Anchoring the procedural guarantees in law (simultaneously with adopting the efficiency package)

MIAK proposes that the inquiry-committee law, simultaneously with the efficiency-enhancing elements (duty to appear, fine), anchor the guarantees of due process: the prohibition of self-incrimination (no one may be obliged to incriminate themselves), the right of those heard to legal representation and to a substantive defence, and the clear delimitation of the committee’s findings from a final court judgement (presumption of innocence). The committee’s task is to uncover the systemic flaw, not to pronounce individual criminal responsibility — the latter is the competence of the independent prosecution service and the court. This balance is described by Rose-Ackerman’s “accountable implementation” frame (see 6.4.1).

3.2 A proportionate, graduated sanction system instead of liberty-restricting coercion

MIAK takes seriously the disproportionality concern raised also by TASZ: enforcing the duty to appear is legitimate, but the sanction must be graduated and proportionate. The fine should be banded, adjusted to the income of the obliged person, and compelled appearance should be an instrument applicable only as a last resort, under judicial control — not a routine threat. The aim is that the committee be taken seriously, not criminal-law overreach. This fits the logic of A6 (strengthening checks and balances): a check is a check precisely because it too operates within limits.

3.3 Adapting the Western European model and the structured use of the findings

MIAK agrees with Péter Magyar’s suggestion that the German Untersuchungsausschuss (the Bundestag’s inquiry-committee system) and the British Select Committee model are a good reference — these operate with strong investigative powers but precisely circumscribed procedural guarantees. MIAK proposes that the committees’ final reports not remain political documents: from the uncovered systemic flaws concrete, traceable legislative and institutional proposals should be born (e.g. from the public-assets investigation the strengthening of public-procurement transparency A2, from the MNB investigation the settlement of central-bank accountability). Connected to this is the principle of I9 (popular-sovereignty audit): the findings should receive structured, public feedback.

The shared principle of the three proposals is that the credibility of accountability is given not by the harshness of the sanction but by the cleanliness of the procedure — this is reinforced by both sources of the scholarly frame.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public administration The uncovering of the use of public power and public money, the identification of systemic flaws If the committee behaves as an investigating authority, it oversteps its competence
Rule of law The strengthening of parliamentary oversight, institutionalised accountability The disproportionality of liberty-restricting coercion may bring a fundamental-rights concern and judicial annulment
Society The strengthening of the “everyone is accountable” principle, the restoration of public trust The appearance of stigmatisation and political revenge, if the presumption of innocence is violated

The main judgement question is the balance of efficiency and guarantees. A toothless committee, from which one can stay away unpunished, does not fulfil its function; an overpowered committee, however, sacrifices due process. The proposal tips to the risk side if the sanction rises to the level of criminal-law coercion without judicial control; and it works if strong investigative powers are accompanied by precise procedural guarantees.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

On the basis of the following performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) it will be possible to judge in 6–18 months whether accountability within rule-of-law frameworks has succeeded:

  • whether the inquiry-committee law anchored the guarantees of due process (prohibition of self-incrimination, legal representation);
  • whether the sanction system became proportionate and graduated (liberty-restricting coercion only as a last-resort instrument under judicial control);
  • how many concrete, traceable legislative/institutional proposals the committees’ final reports produced;
  • whether the procedures withstood any judicial or constitutional review without a violation of fundamental rights.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message: we support parliamentary oversight and accountability, but we ask the decision-maker that the strong powers of the inquiry committees be accompanied by precise procedural guarantees and a proportionate sanction system, on the model of proven Western European practice. This request stems from two MIAK foundational values: from accountability, because real responsibility for mistakes can be established credibly only if the procedure is fair; and from openness, because the committees’ findings serve the public interest when they are public, documented and lead to concrete reform. Without these two values, the instrument of accountability may breed the suspicion of political revenge, and may lose precisely its credibility.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The liberal and public-affairs lane (Telex, HVG, 24.hu) focused on the institutional and procedural details: Telex on the appearance of the resolutions in the Official Gazette and the composition of the committees (six members, a 3–1–1–1 ratio), HVG on the efficiency-enhancing proposal (fine, compelled appearance) and TASZ’s concerns, and 24.hu on Péter Magyar’s reply to TASZ (the study of Western European practice). The economic lane (Portfolio) discussed the launch of the committees factually, embedded in the entire Wednesday legislative package. The conservative framing criticised the coercive elements of the efficiency package (compelled appearance). The common point of the spectrum is the facts (five committees, formal set-up); the difference is the emphasis: the strengthening of institutional oversight, or the fear for the rule-of-law guarantees.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The parliamentary resolutions on setting up the five inquiry committees appeared in the Official Gazette of 27 May 2026; the bodies were voted on at the Tuesday plenary sitting (Telex, 27 May 2026).
  • The committees: to Uncover the Systemic Crisis of Child Protection; to Uncover Those Responsible for the Clemency Scandal; to Uncover Spontaneous Privatisation and the Loss of Public Assets; to Uncover Abuses Connected with the Operation of the MNB; to Uncover Enforcement Abuses (Telex, 27 May 2026).
  • Composition: six members per body — Tisza 3, Fidesz 1, KDNP 1, Mi Hazánk 1 (Telex, 27 May 2026).
  • The efficiency-enhancing proposal: a million-forint fine on a second culpable absence, police-compelled appearance on the third (Telex, HVG, 27 May 2026).
  • TASZ considers the sanctions disproportionate; Péter Magyar recommended studying Western European practice (24.hu, HVG, 27 May 2026).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A6 (strengthening checks and balances), A2 (public-procurement transparency), A3 (publicity of asset declarations): the inquiry committee as an institutional check and the use of the findings;
  • Justice (programme points) — I9 (popular-sovereignty audit): the structured, public feedback of the findings;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the relationship of parliamentary oversight and the accountability of the executive power.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman ties the quality of governance to the existence of institutionalised accountability: the chapters “checks and balances in the legislative process”, “accountable implementation” and “openness and accountability” show that holding power to account strengthens public trust when it is predictable, transparent and procedurally disciplined — not an ad hoc political instrument. In the case of inquiry committees this is a direct argument that strong investigative powers be accompanied by precise procedural guarantees: the credibility of accountability is given by the cleanliness of the process, not the harshness of the sanction.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

6.4.2 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu, with the separation of powers, at once grounds the legitimacy of legislative oversight and marks out its boundary: the legislature has the right to call the executive to account, but this oversight cannot tip over into the usurpation of the judicial and prosecutorial function. The inquiry committee is the practical imprint of this thesis: a body of the National Assembly that uncovers and reports, but does not pass judgement. The Hungarian committees remain within Montesquieu’s frame if they sharply delimit their findings from the competence of the independent prosecution service and the court.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.5 International comparison

The German Untersuchungsausschuss (the Bundestag’s inquiry-committee system) and the British House of Commons Select Committee model are the most frequently cited references: both have strong investigative powers (witness hearing, document requests) but operate within precisely circumscribed procedural guarantees, and delimit their findings from the establishment of criminal responsibility. These practices are operative realisations of Rose-Ackerman’s and Montesquieu’s thesis: strong but regulated oversight produces a more stable institution than a coercion-based model without guarantees. The Venice Commission’s recommendations also emphasise the balance of the parliamentary right of investigation and individual legal protection.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations

Justice

  • I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 28 May 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government
  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Note: the visible text of the blog does not show the sources’ local file path — only the author and title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A2, A3)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I9)
  • MIAK press monitor, 28 May 2026 — topic 2, score: 90/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Bundestag Untersuchungsausschuss rules (German parliamentary inquiry-committee system)
  • British House of Commons Select Committee system
  • Council of Europe — Venice Commission recommendations on the parliamentary right of investigation

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