Part I — Situation overview

Following the Tuesday cabinet meeting of 26 May 2026, several government decisions appeared in that evening’s issue of the Magyar Közlöny (the Hungarian Official Gazette). The decision drawing the greatest attention orders a full and priority review of private-equity funds, and prescribes the creation of transparency over actual ownership relations. The decision, signed by Prime Minister Péter Magyar, tasks Finance Minister András Kármán with preparing the related legislation, with a deadline of 15 June 2026. On the same day further decisions were taken: on the priority review of the operation of the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development, and on the screening of the permitting process of certain industrial investments authorised in 2021. The wider frame of the package is Péter Magyar’s earlier announcement on the review of concessions and the screening of hidden assets.

The topic is timely because, ever since the change of government, it has been an open question how the new cabinet will deliver on its promise to recover state assets that ended up close to the NER. Over the past decade and a half, private-equity funds became a favoured instrument of business circles close to the government: the structure made multi-billion investments possible while the names of the real beneficiaries largely remained hidden. According to press estimates the Hungarian state channelled more than HUF 2,600 billion into the hands of friendly business circles through various government-aligned private-equity funds — this question has now become a formal government decision in the Gazette, going beyond a mere announcement. (Our 26 May 2026 accountability analysis covered the concessions and the Asset Recovery Office; what is new in today’s entry is the concrete, signed government decision targeting private-equity funds and actual-ownership transparency.)

In MIAK’s reading the stake is not whether there should be accountability — but whether the screening takes place in a rule-of-law procedure, with a predictable, public set of criteria and in an institutionalised manner, rather than as a series of ad hoc, politically motivated acts. A poorly grounded investigation that collapses in court not only frustrates asset recovery but also undermines the entire credibility of accountability.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly framework in which asset screening can be interpreted. Susan Rose-Ackerman (American legal scholar–economist, one of the founders of corruption research) argues in her work Corruption and Government that asset recovery and screening are credible only if openness and accountability surround the procedure — a “clean-up” conducted in secret itself raises the suspicion of abuse of power. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics; awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2024) describe in their book Why Nations Fail the system that makes a few rich at the expense of many with the concept of extractive institutions — the screening of NER-era assets is precisely the dismantling of this structure. And the study Governance Matters by Daniel Kaufmann and co-authors shows that the control of corruption is a measurable governance dimension that causally improves development outcomes — that is, accountability is not an end in itself but a precondition of growth. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that accountability is realised in a rule-of-law frame, irreversibly and holding up in court.

3.1 A uniform, public procedure for reviewing private-equity funds and concessions (by the legislative deadline)

The priority review will be credible if the same public, pre-fixed set of criteria applies to every affected fund and concession: on what basis an investigation is opened, what evidence the authority must obtain, and what remedy is available to the party concerned. MIAK proposes that the 15 June 2026 legislative deadline given to Finance Minister András Kármán be used so that the government prepares not individual lists but a general, statutory-level procedural code. This addresses the risk that G6 (the programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture — that is, eliminating the extra profit gained from state protection instead of market competition) also warns about: concessions and private-equity funds were precisely the instruments of regulatory capture. In the Klitgaard-style corruption-theory frame (see 6.4) a uniform procedure curbs discretionary arbitrariness (the D factor of the corruption formula).

3.2 An independent asset-screening body, under judicial control (the CPIB model, in the first 100 days of the incoming government)

The review should be carried out not by day-to-day politics but by a professional, depoliticised office, whose head is selected in a politically neutral, public procedure, and whose every decision can be challenged in court. This is what MIAK’s A10 programme point describes: an Independent Corruption Investigation Office modelled on Singapore’s CPIB (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau — an independent corruption-investigation office). The Asset Recovery Office featured in the 26 May 2026 announcement will fulfil its role if it is created with such guarantees. According to Rose-Ackerman’s thesis (see 6.4.1) the legitimacy of asset recovery depends on the openness and accountability of the procedure — an independent body operating under judicial control provides exactly this.

3.3 A mandatory, public register of actual owners (as part of the private-equity-fund reform)

Private-equity funds became an instrument of public-money leakage because the identity of the real beneficiaries (the actual owners) could remain hidden. MIAK therefore proposes that the review legislation create a mandatory, publicly searchable beneficial ownership register for every private-equity fund and state contractual partner. This fits the A3 (publicity of asset declarations) and A1 (public-money dashboard) programme points: data publicity is itself a deterrent. In the Acemoglu–Robinson frame (see 6.4.2) ownership transparency is the first, technical condition of dismantling the extractive structure.

The shared principle of the three proposals is that accountability is irreversible when it is embedded in an institution and a public rule, not in the political will of a single government — this is confirmed by all three authors of the scholarly frame.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy The retreat of hidden-ownership structures, cleaner competition, potential asset recovery for the budget Investor uncertainty, legal disputes if the rules are unpredictable or retroactive
Society / rule of law The restoration of public trust in accountability, the strengthening of the “everyone is equal before the law” principle If it looks like political revenge, the new cabinet’s credibility is damaged and division deepens
Public administration Institutionalised, measurable anti-corruption capacity (independent office, register) Capacity shortage, an overburdened authority if too many cases are opened at once without adequate resources

The main judgement question is the tension between thoroughness and speed. The “priority” label is politically understandable, but the quality of asset screening depends on legal soundness: an investigation prepared quickly and incompletely can collapse in court, and then the assets concerned can slip definitively out of the state’s hands. The proposal tips to the risk side if deadline pressure overrides procedural guarantees; and it works if the independent body, the public methodology and judicial control stand together.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

On the basis of the following performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) it will be possible to judge in 12–24 months whether institutionalised accountability has succeeded:

  • whether an independent asset-screening body was created with a politically neutral leadership selection and judicial remedy (yes/no);
  • in what percentage of the launched reviews a final decision was reached that holds up in court;
  • the forint value of the assets actually recovered for the budget;
  • the improvement of Hungary’s World Bank control-of-corruption indicator from the current level of −0.17.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message is simple: we support accountability, but we ask the government to institutionalise it — with an independent office, a public methodology and guaranteed remedy — rather than carry it out as individual, politically motivated acts. We ask the decision-maker that the 15 June legislative package create not lists of names but a general, statutory procedural frame. This request stems from two MIAK foundational values: from transparency, because the actual-ownership register and the public set of criteria make the process verifiable; and from accountability, because only a depoliticised institution operating under judicial control can turn responsibility into a real, enforceable legal consequence. Without these two values, accountability comes dangerously close to the very exercise of power it seeks to eliminate.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The liberal and public-affairs lane (Telex, 444.hu, 24.hu) presented the government decisions focusing on the technical details of making NER-era assets transparent: Telex emphasised the hidden beneficiaries behind the private-equity funds and the 4iG example, while 444.hu highlighted the review list running “from private-equity funds to the TEK”. The economic lane (Portfolio) analysed the legal-regulatory aspect of screening hidden assets and the investor consequences. ATV placed the political arc of accountability (“a busy week lies ahead for the government”) at the centre. The conservative lane (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) did not raise the topic to its top focus on this day, reflecting rather on the economic risks of the concession move. Népszava brought a concrete case of concession involvement (the Győr casino) — with a title-level reference. The common point of the differing framings is that no lane disputed the facts (the government decisions that appeared); the difference lies in emphasis: legal cleanliness, investor impact, or political intent.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The Hungarian state channelled an estimated more than HUF 2,600 billion into the hands of friendly business circles through government-aligned private-equity funds (press estimate, Telex, 26 May 2026).
  • The 4iG group obtained tens of billions of forints in public money through private-equity funds before it acquired Vodafone’s Hungarian company in 2022, and state-owned defence companies in 2025 (Telex, 26 May 2026).
  • The legislative deadline given to the finance minister: 15 June 2026 (Magyar Közlöny, 26 May 2026).
  • Hungary’s control-of-corruption indicator according to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) was −0.17 in 2024 — a weak value in EU comparison (World Bank WGI 2024).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — casting the review into institutional form: A10 (independent office), A3 (publicity of asset declarations), A2 (public-procurement transparency), A1 (public-money dashboard);
  • Economy (programme points) — G6 (rent-seeking and regulatory capture): concessions and private-equity funds as instruments of regulatory capture; G1 (data-driven budget): the public tracking of recovered assets;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the administrative capacity of the review procedure and the operation of the actual-ownership register.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman argues that anti-corruption action is credible if it is itself transparent: the investigation must be public and accountable, otherwise the “clean-up” can become a new form of abuse of power. As a member of the founding board of Transparency International, the author derives from international practice that the success of asset recovery depends not on severity but on institutional integrity. In the case of screening private-equity funds this means: the review gains legitimacy if its every step proceeds according to public criteria, under judicial control — not as a closed, political decision.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.2 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

The authors argue that an extractive political institutional system builds extractive economic institutions that make a few rich at the expense of many: “Extractive political institutions lead to the creation of extractive economic institutions that make a few rich — at the expense of many.” The wealth thus accumulated becomes a self-defence machine that buys courts and manipulates elections. The screening of NER-era assets and private-equity funds is, in this frame, not revenge but the institutional dismantling of the extractive structure — provided that the screening itself takes place in an inclusive, rule-of-law procedure, not as an instrument of another concentration of power.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.4.3 Daniel Kaufmann and co-authors: Governance Matters

The study by World Bank researchers introduced six aggregate governance indicators and showed that “there is a strong causal relationship running from better governance to better development outcomes”. The control of corruption is one of these: not a moral category but a measurable dimension that can be tracked over time. The success of Hungarian accountability can therefore be measured not by rhetoric but by the actual improvement of the control-of-corruption indicator — which is why MIAK proposes this yardstick among the 5.1 KPIs.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

6.5 International comparison

The actual-ownership register is not a Hungarian novelty: the European Union’s anti-money-laundering directives (AMLD) already prescribe beneficial ownership registers, and several member states operate publicly searchable registers. The model for the independent corruption-investigation office is Singapore’s CPIB, which has operated for decades separate from the government with direct legal authority — this model provides the basis for the A10 programme point. These international practices illustrate the theoretical thesis of Rose-Ackerman and Kaufmann: screening produces real results when it is embedded in an institution and a measurable indicator.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)
  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A1 — Public-money dashboard

Economy

  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G1 — Data-driven budget

Suggested new programme point: Beneficial ownership register — a mandatory, publicly searchable register for private-equity funds and state contractual partners — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 27 May 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

Note: the visible text of the blog does not show the books’ local file path — only the author and title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A10, A3, A2, A1)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G6, G1)
  • MIAK press monitor, 27 May 2026 — topic 1, score: 91/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank — Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024, control of corruption
  • European Union — anti-money-laundering directives (AMLD), actual-ownership register

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