Part I — Situation overview

On 25 May 2026 Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced that the Tisza government will review the concessions concluded during the previous system (the political-economic network commonly referred to as NER) — among them motorway operation and the waste-market role of MOHU (the Hungarian waste-management concession company) — and will amend the battery-industry regulation. In a further interview he also indicated from when the Asset Recovery Office could become operational. According to the analysis of G7 (Telex’s economics desk), “if it cannot be done by negotiation, the concessions can also be wound up by force”; Péter Oszkó (former finance minister, economist) compared the process to surgery, saying the NER must be “operated out” of the economy.

The topic is timely because the review of concessions and state contracts, together with the establishment of the Asset Recovery Office, have become the central economic instruments of accountability. The background is familiar: MIAK’s earlier analyses documented the size of the stakes over the past weeks on several threads (public-procurement concentration, NER asset flight, the plan to set up the Asset Recovery Office). The present announcement is new in that it places on the agenda the concrete review of the concession markets (motorway, waste) and battery-industry regulation, as well as the timing of the office’s operation.

In MIAK’s reading the stake is not whether there should be accountability — MIAK supports the review of privileged, competition-free positions — but whether it happens in a rule-of-law framework that also holds up in court. The danger of the “can be wound up by force” rhetoric is that it swaps one unpredictable state intervention for another; the aim, by contrast, must be the lasting restoration of competition and transparency.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly framework. Robert Klitgaard (American economist, corruption researcher) describes corruption in his work Controlling Corruption with the formula C = M + D − A: corruption flourishes where monopoly (M) and discretion (D) meet the absence of accountability (A) — a competition-free concession is precisely such a situation. The work Corruption and Government by Susan Rose-Ackerman (American legal scholar–economist, a researcher of the institutional economics of corruption) treats the institutional conditions of rent-seeking (the competitive but value-free acquisition of resources through state protection) and the reform logic of dismantling it. And Elinor Ostrom (American political scientist–economist, awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2009) shows in her book Governing the Commons a third way of managing common resources akin to concessions: not wild privatisation and not central state hands-on control, but accountable institutions operating with clear rules and boundaries. The detailed literature treatment can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that place accountability in a rule-of-law, predictable frame.

3.1 Transparent, lawful review of the concessions (a uniform procedure from the opening of the review)

MIAK proposes that the review of the concessions (motorway, MOHU waste management) take place under a uniform, public procedure, with reasoned and documented decisions — not on an ad hoc, politically announced basis. In the logic of G5 (competition policy and anti-monopoly) and G6 (programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture), for every concession the question to examine is: was it created through competition, at market price, to manage a public good or externality, or did it cement a privileged position? Where the latter, the modification or termination of the contract is justified — but with compensation rules fixed in advance, so that the decision also holds up in court. In the Klitgaard-style C = M + D − A frame (see 6.4.1) the aim is to dismantle monopoly (M) and increase accountability (A) — not to reallocate discretion (D) to a new circle.

3.2 An independent Asset Recovery Office, under judicial control

MIAK supports the establishment of the Asset Recovery Office, but insists on its independence and on judicial control. In the principles of A10 (Independent Corruption Investigation Office), the office should receive a statutory mandate to uncover and recover unlawfully acquired assets, but every asset confiscation should ultimately rest on a judicial decision — with the guarantees of fair procedure and property rights. In the spirit of A5 (whistleblower-reporting system), the office should rely on protected reporting channels. In this way asset recovery becomes not a political instrument but a rule-of-law institution.

3.3 A predictable, environmentally and competition-minded rethinking of battery-industry regulation

MIAK would carry out the amendment of battery-industry regulation in a predictable, pre-communicated frame — while preserving investor confidence. The aim is the tightening of environmental, water-management and occupational-safety requirements and transparent permitting, not the after-the-fact, unpredictable obstruction of already operating investments. In the logic of A6 (strengthening checks and balances), regulation should be general and knowable in advance, not a case-by-case act tailored to a single actor.

These three proposals are bound by a single principle: accountability strengthens the economy when it is about restoring competition and transparency, not about a new form of unpredictable state intervention. According to the Klitgaard and Rose-Ackerman frames (see 6.4.1 and 6.4.2), the lasting solution is the institutional guarantee, not a show of force.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy Restoring competition lowers motorway and waste costs, improves efficiency Unpredictable contract termination harms investor confidence and can lead to litigation
Society Recovering unlawful assets restores the sense of justice Accountability can be distorted into political revenge if there is no judicial control
Justice An office operating under judicial control strengthens the rule of law Circumventing judicial guarantees would undermine fair procedure

The main judgement question is the balance of resolve and lawfulness. The proposal tips to the risk side if the “can be wound up by force” rhetoric leads to unpredictable, case-by-case decisions — which, according to Rose-Ackerman’s warning (see 6.4.2), can open precisely a new round of rent-seeking. The proposal works if the review proceeds along pre-fixed, general rules and judicial control.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

The following suggested performance indicators (KPIs, i.e. verifiable metrics that measure success) are worth tracking for the quality of accountability 12–24 months out:

  • The share of reviewed concessions for which a public, reasoned decision and compensation rule were produced.
  • The share of the Asset Recovery Office’s procedures that rest on a judicial decision (target: 100%).
  • On the concession markets (motorway, waste) the share of competitively tendered contracts and the change in the price level.
  • Investor-confidence indicators (country-risk premium, investment volume) — whether they deteriorate because of accountability.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers: the review of concessions and asset recovery are the right direction, but the manner decides whether accountability strengthens the economy or creates new uncertainty. Concretely, it calls for a transparent, lawful concession review, an independent and judicially controlled Asset Recovery Office, and predictable battery-industry regulation. Two MIAK foundational values move directly here: accountability — because recovering unlawful assets and dismantling privileged positions strengthen the institutions of holding to account — and transparency — because only a public, reasoned procedure that also holds up in court makes the intervention rule-of-law-based. These two values stand at the centre precisely because the credibility of accountability is proved not by force but by lawfulness.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The economic–public-affairs lane focused on the content of the measure and the professional assessment: Portfolio highlighted Péter Magyar’s concession and battery-industry announcement, while 24.hu and ATV brought out Péter Oszkó’s “the NER must be operated out” analogy — framing accountability as a necessary but painful intervention. Telex’s G7 desk analysed the legal-business consequences of the “can be wound up by force” scenario.

The currently opposition, formerly governing lane (Mandiner) put on the front page the timing of the Asset Recovery Office becoming operational, asking about the practical and legal questions of setting up the office. On this day the liberal lane brought the concession thread less into the top focus — there other aspects of accountability dominated. MIAK measures both framings by the same yardstick: the content of the intervention is decided by the quality of the rule-of-law guarantee.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Time of the announcement: 25 May 2026; concession markets affected: motorway operation, MOHU waste management.
  • On the Hungarian public-procurement market the high share of single-bidder procedures is documented — a sign pointing to the absence of competition (based on CRCB data cited in MIAK’s earlier analyses).
  • Hungary’s “control of corruption” indicator according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2024) is -0.17 — that is, accountability has measurable room for improvement (World Bank WGI 2024).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — checks and balances (A6), the independent corruption investigation office (A10) and the whistleblower-reporting system (A5) provide the institutional frame of asset recovery;
  • Economy (programme points) — competition policy (G5) and the programme against rent-seeking (G6) frame the review of concessions;
  • Justice (background material) — judicial control and fair procedure are the guarantee of asset confiscation.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard’s famous formula states that corruption is the sum of monopoly and discretion, reduced by accountability: as he puts it, “CORRUPTION = MONOPOLY + DISCRETION − ACCOUNTABILITY”. Corruption flourishes where someone decides on the allocation of scarce resources from a monopoly position, with wide discretion, without accountability. A concession awarded without competition is exactly such a structure — which is why MIAK’s proposal aims at dismantling the monopoly (competition) and increasing accountability (a public, reasoned, judicially reviewable decision), not merely at reallocating the discretion.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman analyses corruption as an institutional distortion arising at the boundary of private and public interest, and treats rent-seeking separately: when resources are devoted not to value creation but to gaining an advantage from distribution through state protection. Her argument is that reform is not a one-off punitive action but the joint institutional treatment of the supply and demand sides — transparent rules, competition and independent oversight. In this frame the Hungarian concession review succeeds if it does not open a new round of rent-seeking but builds a lasting institutional guarantee, with asset recovery operating under judicial control.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Elinor Ostrom: Governing the Commons

Ostrom describes a third way of managing common resources (common pastures, watersheds, but more broadly long-term use concessions): successful systems are characterised not by wild privatisation or central state hands-on control but by clear rules known to all. Among her design principles, “clearly defined boundaries” and “nested enterprises” (interlocking, multi-level institutions) are a direct lesson for concessions: the review must create unambiguous boundaries of entitlement and responsibility, not another opaque, bargain-based relationship. In this way concession markets become predictable and accountable.

📖 Source: Elinor Ostrom: Governing the Commons

6.5 International comparison

The established international practice of asset recovery is the independent agency model operating under judicial control: Ireland’s Criminal Assets Bureau and the United Kingdom’s Unexplained Wealth Order (a court order regarding unexplained wealth accumulation) link efficiency to the rule of law in such a way that every asset confiscation ultimately rests on a judicial decision. For the competitive tendering of concession markets the EU public-procurement directives provide a model, and the OECD integrity framework provides the standard of transparent, conflict-of-interest-free contracting — all of which reinforce that accountability and predictability are not opposites but conditions of one another.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)
  • A5 — Whistleblower-reporting system

Economy

  • G5 — Competition policy and anti-monopoly
  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 26 May 2026 — topic 7):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Elinor Ostrom: Governing the Commons

Note: the visible text of the blog does not show the books’ local file path — only the author and title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A5, A6, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G5, G6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 26 May 2026 — topic 7, score: 79/100

Additional public data sources:

  • EU public-procurement directives; OECD integrity framework
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — control of corruption

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