Part I — Situation overview

The position confirmed at the 22 May 2026 meeting of the European Commission and Euractiv’s two parallel reports convey a single message: in May 2026 the United States eased its sanctions on Russian-origin crude oil, the United Kingdom “indefinitely waived” its own sanctions package, while Brussels stands by the fact that it will not delay submission of the so-called oil ban bill (an EU-level draft law aimed at the gradual phase-out of Russian oil). The Euractiv analysis “VOLTAGE: No U-turn on Russian oil sanctions” and the three-article block published at the same time (US easing, UK suspension, EU position maintained) both signal that the unified transatlantic sanctions front in place since 2022 cracked in May 2026, and the EU is left alone in the maximum position. According to the Commission’s signal, the tabling of the oil ban bill is expected in the coming weeks, which will also leave its mark on the first cabinet meetings of the new Hungarian cabinet.

The position of the Hungarian energy sector on its own shows systemic exposure: the share of Russian crude arriving via the Druzhba pipeline in the input to MOL’s Százhalombatta refinery — according to publicly available industry estimates and the time series of MEKH (the Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority) — was approximately 58% on average in 2025. The Hungarian-direction transport capacity of the Adriatic pipeline (JANAF) cannot fully substitute for this level in its current technical state — the Croatian operator signalled in early 2024 that capacity expansion had come up, but technical and commercial negotiations are needed. The EU sanctions packages adopted between 2022-2024 kept Hungary in an exempted position — but this exemption was subject to renegotiation roughly every 6-12 months and became fixed as a political relationship between Budapest and Brussels.

MIAK’s reading is that the two facts of the new situation must be handled together: the EU position becoming a lone one is a consequence of the transatlantic rift, not of Hungarian interest assertion; therefore in the new phase the Hungarian government must take up the responsible partner position rather than the exemption applicant one, if it wants to stabilise the quality of the long-term EU-membership alliance framework.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly framework within which the topic can be interpreted. In World Order (2014) Henry Kissinger analyses the transatlantic system as a single, historically determined representation of the Westphalian inter-state order (the international order based on state sovereignty established after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia): Atlantic cohesion is not a natural given but the outcome of the continuous renegotiation of interest coalitions. In Kissinger’s conceptual frame, the 2026 US-UK easing vs. EU toughness rift is not a system-destroying event but a regular manifestation of one of the structural features of the Westphalian order — the fluidity of coalitions. In Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) Joseph E. Stiglitz analyses how the sensitivity of small open economies (Hungary belongs to this group) in an energy-shock situation is determined not only by the degree of exposure but also by the quality of regional adaptation options — that is, whether the neighbouring infrastructure (in this case the Adriatic pipeline) is able to play a substitute role, and over what time horizon. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes an integrated 12-18 month phase-out roadmap consisting of four interlocking parts. The proposal does not prepare another exemption request but an operational action programme that transforms the Hungarian EU position from exemption applicant into responsible partner.

3.1 Adriatic pipeline (JANAF) capacity expansion negotiations (within 3 months)

A joint high-level delegation of the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should open concrete capacity expansion negotiations with representatives of the Croatian operator (JANAF) on the transport capacity towards Százhalombatta. The target figure: raising the current ~10 million tonnes/year capacity to 14-16 million tonnes by 2028 — this could cover ~80% of Hungarian needs. The negotiations should run on two tracks: (a) commercial terms (tariff, long-term transport contract), (b) technical capacity expansion (compressors, pipeline segments). To strengthen the Hungarian position MIAK proposes: request co-financing from the EU RePowerEU envelope for the joint Croatian-Hungarian investment package — this is also a political signal towards Brussels that the Hungarian phase-out happens with EU money, under EU coordination. Legal form: government decree on the negotiating mandate (within the framework of KP4 principle-based pragmatism — interest assertion in an EU-compatible manner).

3.2 Roadmap for the technical conversion of MOL Százhalombatta (framework negotiations within 6 months, 18-month rollout)

The Hungarian government — with MOL as a strategic partner — should prepare a detailed, phased technical conversion roadmap for switching the refinery to non-Russian crude oil recipes. The current recipes were optimised for Urals crude (Russian type); the switch could be made to a combination of CPC Blend (Kazakh, via the Adriatic pipeline), Brent and Libyan-Algerian types. The cost estimate for the conversion (based on publicly available industry estimates) is EUR 250-450 million — financeable from MOL’s own CAPEX envelope and from an EU RePowerEU bid. The government’s role is not operational but regulatory: the Corporate Tax Act and MEKH’s concession-regulatory framework should provide a predictable time horizon for the investment, and environmental permitting should run in an accelerated procedure (with a 60-day deadline). Related cabinet perspective: 09 (quantification) + 05 (timing).

3.3 Household energy-price buffer package (within 12 months)

To handle the transitional fuel and heating-fuel price rise during the crude switch a two-sided protection package is needed: (a) a targeted price cap at petrol stations — NOT the general, non-selective “interest cap” / “margin cap” type, but a tool limited to the Druzhba conversion period (max 18 months) and audited by the State Audit Office; (b) stability of household gas prices during the heating season (November-March) by maintaining MVM’s public-utility price, plus a heating subsidy package targeted at low-income households (a ~HUF 30,000 monthly buffer for 200,000 households, ~HUF 30 billion annual cost — less than 0.1% of the central budget’s social total). The proposal is NOT part of the SZ4 universal social framework, but a concrete, time-bounded transitional tool. End date: 31 March 2028.

3.4 RePowerEU co-financing application (within 90 days)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, in joint coordination, should submit the Hungarian RePowerEU co-financing application to the EU Commission: the target figure is EUR 1.8-2.5 billion in the 2026-2030 four-year envelope, covering the financing side of proposals 3.1, 3.2 and (partly) 3.3. The application structure already exists (within the conditionality package, Finance Minister András Kármán’s 19 May 2026 Brussels talks set the precedent — see the 20 May 2026 blog: EU funds release). The new application uses this already operating channel, and politically it fits organically into the conditionality reform package.

The common principle of the four proposals is bridging the distance between EU solidarity as a political commitment and Hungarian economic reality through concrete operational action — not yet another exemption request. According to the Stiglitz analysis (see 6.4.2) the flexibility of a small open economy hinges on the quality of regional substitute infrastructure; points 3.1 (Adriatic pipeline) and 3.2 (MOL conversion) reinforce exactly this.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy Hungarian refining dependence diversifies, medium-term procurement flexibility grows Transitional CAPEX burden (EUR 250-450 million at MOL), 12-18 months of fuel-price volatility
EU position The Hungarian cabinet moves into the responsible partner position, the conditionality-unlocking process (19 May 2026 Brussels talks) continues organically If the Commission sets the oil ban bill deadline more strictly than the Hungarian phase-out roadmap, the 3.4 RePowerEU application could be rejected
Population The 3.3 buffer package protects households through the heating season, the social cost of the switch falls The fiscal cost of the price buffer (~HUF 30 billion/year) has to be accounted for in the central budget; politically a “vote-buying” accusation may arise
Foreign policy The new Hungarian position is the continuation of the Tusk-Magyar Péter Central European dialogue (20 May 2026 Kraków-Warsaw blog) — an operational extension of the Hungary’s return to Europe narrative Rhetorical countermeasures from the Russian side; risk of transport disruption affecting MOL’s Százhalombatta plant

The main dilemma stretches between the 12-18 month transitional fuel-price rise and the long-term EU solidarity position. The proposal works if the 3.3 buffer package is large enough for households to weather the heating season without significant burden, AND the 3.4 RePowerEU co-financing arrives. If only one of the two conditions is met (e.g. only the buffer goes through, without EU financing), the fiscal burden remains manageable but the political narrative (EU-partner position) will be weaker.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested performance indicators — KPIs)

  • Druzhba import share: Russian-source share in Hungarian crude oil imports — target: from the ~58% of 2025 to ≤ 25% by 2028 (a 28 percentage point — pp — drop).
  • Adriatic pipeline capacity utilisation: JANAF’s Hungarian-direction throughput annually — target: 12 million tonnes/year by end-2027; 14-16 million tonnes/year by end-2028.
  • Household energy-price index: average petrol-station price relative to the May 2026 level — target: at most +12% maximum rise through the heating season (Nov-Mar).
  • EU RePowerEU drawdown: the amount actually drawn down for Hungarian projects in the 2026-2028 period — target: at least EUR 1.2 billion (60% of the target figure).

5.2 Summary

The 22 May 2026 transatlantic rift (US-UK easing, EU toughness) is not a threat for Hungary but a strategic turning point: the first real geopolitical-energy decision point of Magyar Péter’s government, where the Hungary’s return to Europe narrative gains operational content. MIAK’s four-element phase-out roadmap — Adriatic pipeline, MOL conversion, household buffer, RePowerEU financing — moves the Hungarian position from exemption applicant status to responsible EU-partner status. The package of proposals directly touches two of MIAK’s foundational values: data-drivenness (the 12-18 month roadmap rests on concrete metrics — Druzhba share, capacity tonnes, household price index — not political slogans), and accountability (the State Audit Office audit of the 3.3 price cap, transparent tracking of the 3.4 EU financing — within the framework of the new transparency standards in force since 26 April 2026).

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the international liberal-mainstream lane Euractiv processed the development in five parallel articles — this is the most detailed institutional coverage. The “US dismayed” and “UK indefinitely waives” articles are factual; the “Brussels remains committed” and “Calls for EU executive” articles focus on maintaining the Commission’s position. The “VOLTAGE: No U-turn” analysis is written in the voice of a high-level EU diplomatic workshop — professional, emphasising the centrality of EU institutional consistency. In the Hungarian press (per the source monitor) Portfolio and HVG primarily processed the topic with an energy framing — focused on MOL-Százhalombatta. Magyar Nemzet and Mandiner framed the transatlantic rift as a critique of EU bureaucracy (“Brussels stubbornly insists”). This narrative of the pro-government lane continues the 2022-2024 Hungarian exemption-applicant political line.

The Hungarian conservative lane and the EU-sceptic narrative expect the extension of the Druzhba exemption from the transatlantic rift, while MIAK’s reading — policy-driven, not political — proposes precisely the opposite: an operational phase-out instead of exemption applications.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Hungarian crude oil import structure (2025 average, public industry estimate):
    • Druzhba (Russian): ~58%
    • Adriatic pipeline (JANAF, Kazakh/CPC Blend): ~30%
    • Sea transport (Trieste-Adria and other): ~12%
  • MOL Százhalombatta refinery processing capacity: ~8.1 million tonnes/year (based on public MOL reporting)
  • Adriatic pipeline (JANAF) Hungarian-direction transport capacity: ~10 million tonnes/year (current technical state)
  • RePowerEU envelope for Hungary: according to 2024 EU Commission communication Hungary is entitled to an EUR 4.6 billion envelope for 2024-2030 (drawdown is conditionality-dependent)
  • EU sanctions packages and Hungarian exemption-status historical timeline:
    • 2022: 6th package — full exemption on the Druzhba pipeline (Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia)
    • 2023-2024: maintenance of the Druzhba exemption in each new round of packages
    • 22 May 2026: US eases, UK waives, EU prepares to table the oil ban bill

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — programme points KP4 principle-based pragmatism and KP7 crisis management are directly concerned in building the responsible EU-partner position.
  • Economy (programme points) — programme points G3 energy procurement diversification and G8 strategic infrastructure investments (Adriatic pipeline) provide the policy backbone for proposals 3.1 and 3.2.
  • Environment and climate (background material) — the fossil phase-out strategy and the programme point on the timing of energy transition (K2) play an unloading role at the MOL conversion (the transition is also an intermediate step on the renewable-share ramp-up path).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Henry Kissinger: World Order

In his 2014 book World Order Kissinger analyses the transatlantic system not as a simple interest coalition but as a single, historically determined representation of the Westphalian order. A structural feature of the Westphalian system — the international order based on state sovereignty established after the 1648 peace — is the fluidity of coalitions: Atlantic cohesion is not a natural given but the outcome of continuous renegotiation of interest coalitions. In Kissinger’s conceptual frame the 22 May 2026 US-UK easing vs. EU toughness is not a system-destroying event but a regular manifestation of one structural feature of the Westphalian order — the periodic redrawing of coalitions. This perspective warns: at the moment of coalition redrawing Hungary must take up a position, and cannot expect its own ad-hoc interest situation to receive special status again within the EU-Brussels conditionality framework.

The “structural challenge” of the modern inter-state order — in Kissinger’s formulation — is precisely that interest coalitions change continuously in the background while the official alliance structures (NATO, EU) appear unchanged.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: World Order (Penguin Press, 2014)

6.4.2 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

In his 2002 volume Globalization and Its Discontents Stiglitz analyses the shock sensitivity of small open economies (Hungary belongs to this group). His central thesis: the main factor is not the degree of exposure in itself, but the quality of regional adaptation options — that is, whether the neighbouring infrastructure and institutional framework is able to play a substitute function, and over what time horizon. In the context of the Hungarian energy sector this means: Druzhba dependency in itself is not fatal if the capacity expansion of the Adriatic pipeline + the MOL conversion can together diversify the procurement structure within 18-24 months. The Hungarian experience of the 2008 global financial shock (the forint-Swiss franc household-loan problem) is an example of what Stiglitz describes as the “failure to diversify” concept — the long extension of the Druzhba exemption would structurally repeat the same mistake.

Stiglitz links the category of “political courage” in handling global economic shocks to the moment when the government of a small country is able to set strategy independently under status-quo-undermining pressure, rather than merely surviving reactively.

📖 Source: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents (W. W. Norton & Company, 2002)

6.5 International comparison

Alongside Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia also requested the Druzhba exemption in 2022-2024; in mid-2025 Czechia announced that it would not renew the exemption from 1 January 2026 and would fully switch to TAL (Transalpine Pipeline) transport. Slovakia is closer to the Hungarian position, but the conversion plans of Slovnaft (the Bratislava refinery, a MOL subsidiary) became public already in early 2026 — i.e. Slovakia is also working on an operational phase-out roadmap rather than a new exemption request. The German Bundesregierung fully phased Russian oil out of refinery recipes already in the 2023-2024 sanctions cycle (switching the Schwedt refinery to Kazakh crude). The Hungarian position — if it accepts MIAK’s 3.1-3.4 proposals — follows the Czech-German pattern within the Central European lane, not the exemption-applicant style inherited from 2022-2025.

Foreign policy

  • KP4 — Principle-based pragmatism (interest assertion in an EU-compatible manner)
  • KP7 — Crisis management framework for international shocks

Economy

  • G3 — Energy procurement diversification
  • G8 — Strategic infrastructure investments

Environment and climate

  • K2 — Energy transition timing

Social policy

  • SZ4 — Universal social framework (the 3.3 buffer package is only transitional, NOT a permanent universal extension)

Proposed new programme point: Central European coordination of the energy transition (Visegrád+) — JANAF, Slovnaft, Schwedt common platform — for the Foreign policy and Economy policy areas.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 22 May 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: World Order (Penguin Press, 2014)
  • 📖 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents (W. W. Norton & Company, 2002)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point IDs: KP4, KP7)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point IDs: G3, G8)
  • MIAK policy area: Environment and climate (programme points; programme point IDs: K2)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 22 May 2026 — topic 2, score: 86/100

Additional public data sources:

  • MEKH (Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority) — annual crude oil import disclosures
  • MOL Plc annual report 2025 — Százhalombatta processing capacity data
  • EU Commission RePowerEU envelope allocation 2024 — Hungarian allocation EUR 4.6 billion
  • JANAF (Adriatic pipeline Croatian operator) — annual capacity report 2025

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