Part I — Situation overview

Exactly one week after the Tisza government took office (12 May 2026), on 19 May 2026 Finance Minister András Kármán negotiated in Budapest with the European Commission’s delegation — President Ursula von der Leyen’s team — on the release of EU funds frozen since 2022 (Portfolio, 19 May 2026). According to Portfolio, an official Brussels assessment is expected “within hours” (Mandiner, 20 May 2026: “Verdict on Hungary within hours: good news may come from Brussels”); HVG went through in detail what the Tisza government has to deliver (HVG, 19 May 2026: “What exactly does Péter Magyar need to deliver for the EU money to come? — we went through Orbán’s commitments”). The background can be summarised in three points:

  • Frozen amount: in 2022 and 2023, under the conditionality procedure and the RRF (Recovery and Resilience Facility), the Commission froze approximately EUR 28 billion of cohesion and recovery funds — a substantial share of Hungary’s 2021–2027 EU multi-annual budget. (The exact figure is expected in the forthcoming Brussels assessment.)
  • Status of commitments: the previous (Orbán) government undertook 27 rule-of-law milestones, some points of which were met (creation of the Integrity Authority in 2022, public-procurement amendments in 2023–2024), others partially (judicial-independence package), and others not at all (EPPO accession, substantive prosecution reform).
  • The Tisza government’s new commitments: according to the 15 May 2026 first-measure-package blog, the cabinet is launching EPPO accession, and in the 16 May 2026 blog András Kármán already mentioned to HVG a concrete release package of EUR 34 billion.

In MIAK’s reading, the question now is not “will the amount be released” — this is very likely to happen, because the political will exists on both sides (Tisza government and Commission). The question is rather: will the deal lead to system-level institutional reform or to technical compliance? The difference is not rhetorical. With technical compliance, in the first half of the new cycle (from 2028) the flaws will return and the dispute will restart — exactly what Hungary experienced between 2022 and 2024. With system-level reform the institutions continue to work even when political leadership changes. MIAK’s proposals are therefore focused on the latter: strengthening institutional structures, not repeating political will.

A Népszava front page also mentions an additional, complementary fact: the EU would extend the deadline for renewing the Russia sanctions after Orbán’s departure (title-level reference only) — this signals that the Commission treats the Hungarian change of government as a strategic point of trust, and is not deciding solely on financial terms. Trust, however, is a two-way resource: after release, the new cabinet must credibly demonstrate that the commitments are not made for the political moment of transition only.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, in their founding 1999 study Governance Matters (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196), compressed the quality of governance into six aggregate indicators — voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption — and on data from 150+ countries demonstrated the strong causal link between better governance and better development outcomes. The methodology is the basis of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and is used directly by the European Commission in its conditionality assessment. Susan Rose-Ackerman, in her Yale monograph Corruption and Government (1999), shows along the principal-agent-client model that political patronage is a structural phenomenon: the solution is not the removal of “bad apples” but the rewriting of institutional incentives. Robert Klitgaard’s Controlling Corruption (1988) formula — C = M + D − A (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability) — provides the theoretical frame for the institutional reform of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, EPPO accession and cohesion accountability: it does not narrow government powers but strengthens ex-post accountability. The three authors share a common thesis: institutional reform is measurable and durable when embedded in the right incentive structure. The detailed literature treatment can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes four measurable measures that turn the moment of EU-fund release into system-level institutional reform.

3.1 Expanding the mandate of the Integrity Authority — legislative amendment package (within 90 days)

The Integrity Authority was created as a 2022 commitment of the previous government, but its substantive powers are limited (risk analysis, reporting, but no investigative power and no direct standing to bring proceedings). MIAK’s proposal: a legislative amendment package should expand the mandate with the following:

  • Investigative power in cases of public-procurement abuse — not just ex-post reporting but the right to initiate proceedings and to request evidence from the bodies under investigation.
  • Direct standing to bring proceedings in cases of irregular use of cohesion funds (currently this is only possible via the Prosecution Service, causing 12–18 month delays in the administrative cycle).
  • Mandatory annual parliamentary report to the Audit Committee — to which government departments are obliged to provide public responses.
  • The Integrity Authority’s president would be selected by a bound application procedure (5-member independent nominating committee) and elected by the National Assembly with a two-thirds vote — this two-thirds guarantee ensures that no single party can swap the president for political appointees.

This is the operational realisation of our Strengthening checks and balances (A6) programme point in the EU conditionality framework. In the Klitgaard C = M + D − A framework (see 6.4.3) this directly strengthens the A (accountability) component.

3.2 Operational roadmap for EPPO accession — ratification + integration working group (within 12 months)

Joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is a cornerstone of the Tisza government’s programme, and was formally launched in the first measure package of 15 May 2026. MIAK proposes the following operational schedule:

  • 0–90 days: the National Assembly ratifies accession to the enhanced cooperation regulation (2017/1939/EU). Cardinal law, two-thirds vote.
  • 3–9 months: integration working group (Ministry of Justice + Prosecutor General + EPPO European Chief Prosecutor) carries out the organisational alignment of prosecution services — IT systems, procedural harmonisation, appointment of Hungarian EPPO prosecutors.
  • 9–12 months: operational start of the EPPO in Hungary — the first substantive investigations in cases of misuse of EU funds.

The 5 May 2026 EU funds / EPPO accession blog discusses the details. The new element in this blog: the milestones and quantitative performance indicators of the 12-month operational schedule.

3.3 Enactment of cohesion accountability into law — introduction of programme point A8 (within 18 months)

Our Cohesion-policy accountability (A8) programme point prescribes 100% project monitoring, cost-benefit analysis and reclaim mechanism for the use of EU cohesion and RRF funds. Operational introduction:

  • New cohesion-accountability act (cardinal, within 18 months): every EU-funded project above EUR 1 million is required to publish a quarterly performance report on the public-money dashboard (A1).
  • Reclaim mechanism: if an ex-post audit finds irregularity, the beneficiary must repay within 90 days — the cover is the beneficiary’s assets (or security), not the domestic budget. Currently this risk falls back on Hungarian taxpayers.
  • Data-driven audit priorities: based on the Rose-Ackerman (see 6.4.2) principal-agent model, risk-based auditing subjects 10% of projects to more frequent and deeper controls (those where the principal-agent information asymmetry is greatest: single bidder, repeat winner, related interests).

3.4 Public roadmap dashboard and WGI tracking (within 24 months)

The spending of released funds should be available at project-level detail on the public-money dashboard (A1) — instead of the current banded system (cohesion fund, RRF, sectoral breakdown) it should be at concrete project level (beneficiary, amount, milestones, completion status). In parallel, the annual Worldwide Governance Indicators report should be followed by a mandatory parliamentary debate: the Tisza government should set publicly an annual target for each of the six WGI indicators — particularly for control of corruption (current value: −0.17 in the 2024 World Bank WGI; target: positive value by 2030). The WGI benchmark is not an arbitrary political target but the basis of the EU Commission’s own assessment tool (see 6.4.1).

The four proposals share a common principle: turning the political moment (the deal) into institutional infrastructure. In Klitgaard’s terms: discretion is necessary and legitimate, but without accountability degrades into corruption or patronage; the four elements proposed here do not narrow government powers but order the ex-post auditability of existing powers.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Economy ~EUR 28 bn (~HUF 11–12 thousand bn) into the domestic economy; deficit path may improve; pressure for new-tax introduction decreases. Pressure to spend released funds quickly (absorption pressure) may produce rushed, less-considered projects.
Public administration Operational capacity of the Integrity Authority and the EPPO strengthens; precedent for other cohesion-financed countries. The new control protocol places a bureaucratic burden on municipalities and SMEs; proportionality is critical.
Foreign policy Trust capital with the Commission turns into a negotiating position in the next EU MFF cycle (from 2028). In the new cycle the Commission may set stricter conditions if Hungarian performance regresses.
Society The new control system reduces the risk of misuse of public funds; on the public-money dashboard the flows are traceable at project level. Public expectation may demand faster visible results than the time-scale of institutional reform.

The proposal tips toward risk if, under rapid spending pressure, funds flow to irregular or ineffective projects — exactly the problem that led to 2022. The proposal works well if (a) the Integrity Authority’s new mandate is operational within 6 months, (b) the EPPO ratification takes place within 90 days, and (c) the project-level breakdown of the public-money dashboard is available by Q1 2027 at the latest.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

The success of the proposals is worth tracking over a 12–36 month horizon with four indicators:

  • WGI Control of Corruption indicator for Hungary: rise from the current −0.17 (2024) to a positive value by 2030 (source: World Bank WGI annual update).
  • EPPO operational start in Hungary: the first substantive EPPO investigation in the first half of 2027.
  • Investigative activity of the Integrity Authority: at least 50 public-procurement abuse investigations per year (currently ~10 reports).
  • Project-level coverage of the public-money dashboard: 100% of released EU funds appear at project level by Q2 2027.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the release of the EUR 28 billion EU package is a strategic moment, but it is the system-level institutional reform that decides whether this resource serves the long-term interest of Hungarian citizens. The four proposals (expanded Integrity Authority A6, operational EPPO roadmap, enactment of A8, project-level A1 dashboard + WGI tracking) together form an institutional framework that will endure into the next EU cycle (from 2028). The request is addressed to the Tisza government’s finance minister (András Kármán) and justice minister (Márta Görög): within 90 days of the announcement of the deal, the legislative amendment package should be submitted to the National Assembly.

This proposal package is directly connected to two of MIAK’s foundational values. Transparency appears in each of the four proposals (public Integrity Authority report, operational EPPO investigations, public cohesion-act dashboard, annual WGI tracking) — precisely because conditionality is not a political slogan but a question of visibility. Accountability is the direct enforcement of the Klitgaard C = M + D − A frame: we do not create new powers but settle, at system level, the ex-post auditability of existing constitutional and EU powers.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Framing in the press across the spectrum

Left-liberal band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu): the conditionality framing dominates. HVG (19 May 2026) in its “Eurologus” desk presents a detailed inventory of commitments under the title “What exactly does Péter Magyar need to deliver for the EU money to come? — we went through Orbán’s commitments” — so this band reinforces the institutional-substantive framing.

Mainstream-market band (24.hu, ATV): the topic was less of a lead item this day; the Mága-Krausz and NKA threads took priority. Portfolio (19 May 2026) articles (three different pieces) analyse the operational details of the talks — by band, Portfolio is closer here to economic professional monitoring.

Economic band (Portfolio): expressly operational framing. The articles “András Kármán is already negotiating in Budapest with Ursula von der Leyen’s team” and “Hungarian government: ever closer to the release of Hungarian EU funds” give concrete financial-process details. This band offers the most usable economic-policy picture.

Conservative / government-aligned band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner): selective-positive framing. Mandiner (19 May 2026), under the title “Verdict on Hungary within hours: good news may come from Brussels”, expressly emphasises the credit of the previous government — the argument is that the 2022 commitments already laid the ground for success, and the new cabinet is only “harvesting the crop”. This framing pits the political position of the Tisza government against this view but implicitly accepts the probability of release.

Népszava (front-page fallback): highlights the extension of the Commission’s sanction-renewal schedule — this is a complementary strategic frame which neither the government-aligned nor the government-critical band emphasised.

6.2 Facts and data

Fact Value Source
Frozen EU funds (estimated, 2022–2024) ~EUR 28 bn (~HUF 11–12 thousand bn) EU Commission official cohesion + RRF data
Tisza government took office 12 May 2026 Hungarian Gazette, see 12 May 2026 blog
Kármán negotiation in Budapest 19 May 2026 Portfolio 19 May 2026
Status of Hungary’s 27 rule-of-law milestones partially fulfilled (exact figure in the official assessment of 20 May 2026) EU Commission rule of law report
Hungary’s WGI Control of Corruption (2024) −0.17 (z-score, EU average: +0.7) World Bank WGI
Hungary’s WGI Rule of Law (2024) +0.35 World Bank WGI
Hungary’s WGI Government Effectiveness (2024) +0.42 World Bank WGI
EPPO founding regulation 2017/1939/EU (enhanced cooperation) EU Council

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Economy (programme points) — the absorption framework for the released funds, macro-fiscal stability, prioritisation of cohesion investments. Related programme points: G1 (data-driven budget), G9 (strategic industrial policy — sectoral allocation of released funds), G10 (state development bank).
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the central thematic pillar: every element of conditionality belongs here. Related: A1 (public-money dashboard), A2 (public-procurement transparency), A6 (strengthening checks and balances — expanded Integrity Authority mandate), A8 (cohesion-policy accountability — basis of proposal 3.3), A10 (Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office — synergistic with EPPO accession).
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the bilateral relationship with the Commission and the conditionality negotiating position. Related: KP4 (principle-based pragmatism), KP23 (alliance-credibility audit).

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

The 1999 World Bank study by the three authors (Policy Research Working Paper 2196) compressed 300+ governance indicators into six aggregate clusters, and on cross-sectional data from 150+ countries showed that better governance indicators correlate strongly with better development outcomes (higher GDP/capita, lower infant mortality, higher literacy). The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) were born this way — and the European Commission uses this directly in its conditionality assessment. Projected onto the Hungarian situation: the 2024 WGI “control of corruption” value (−0.17) is below the EU average (+0.7), and this is the direct cause of structural conditionality pressure. MIAK’s proposal (3.4) — annual WGI tracking with mandatory parliamentary debate — is not an arbitrary political target but the institutionalisation of conditionality’s own metric.

📖 Source: Kaufmann, Daniel – Kraay, Aart – Zoido-Lobatón, Pablo: Governance Matters (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196, 1999).

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

In her 1999 Yale monograph, Rose-Ackerman shows along the principal-agent-client model that transparency is not a virtue for its own sake but a tool against the principal-agent information asymmetry: the principal (the citizen, the EU Commission) can hold the agent (the institution) accountable only if the information is available on which to evaluate that behaviour. It follows that proposal 3.3 (cohesion-accountability act) is not an abstract “transparency package” but a concrete information architecture: project-level performance reports, risk-based audit priorities, and the reclaim mechanism all target the reduction of asymmetry. Rose-Ackerman’s thesis fits exactly the EU-Hungarian relationship: it is not the EU Commission’s “stepmother” attitude that causes conditionality, but the fact that, given the information asymmetry, the principal’s (the European taxpayers’) accountability right can only be enforced through institutionalised information channels.

📖 Source: Rose-Ackerman, Susan: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Yale University Press, 1999).

6.4.3 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard’s 1988 classic gave the structural analysis of integrity risk by introducing the C = M + D − A (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability) formula. In the case of Hungarian EU funds: the allocation of cohesion funds is a monopolistic competence (beneficiary-selection is a government prerogative), discretion is wide (project prioritisation, weighing of local circumstances), but accountability is weak (ex-post controls are rare, reclaim is incidental). Klitgaard’s solution is not to reduce the M and D components (this would damage government effectiveness) but to strengthen A — exactly what the four proposals together do: expanding the Integrity Authority’s mandate, EPPO operational activity, enactment of cohesion regulation into law, project-level dashboard. The Hong Kong ICAC and Singaporean CPIB examples Klitgaard cites show that strengthening the A component works if the control body is (1) independent, (2) has substantive investigative powers, (3) has parliamentary and public reporting obligations — the 3.1 Integrity Authority package realises all three conditions.

📖 Source: Klitgaard, Robert: Controlling Corruption (University of California Press, 1988).

6.5 International comparison

The Romanian cohesion experience (2007–2020 cycle) is a negative precedent: after rapid absorption of funds, system-level corruption abuses came to light, making the country the field of the EPPO’s first substantive investigations. The Polish example (the Tusk government’s 2024–25 rule-of-law package) is a positive model: within half a year of the agreement with the Commission, control mechanisms were codified in a legislative amendment package, and their Worldwide Governance Indicators “control of corruption” indicator rose to +0.5 in 2024 (against the Hungarian value of −0.17). The Estonian e-government model shows that a project-level digital dashboard (X-Road infrastructure) combined with active civic use (Tunne Linna) reduces, at system level, the abuse risk of cohesion funds. The Hungarian proposal synthesises these three models: the Romanian lesson (the danger of rapid spending pressure), the Polish model (legislative amendment package within 6 months), and the Estonian toolset (project-level digital dashboard).

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard (infrastructure basis of proposal 3.4)
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances (3.1 Integrity Authority package)
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability (3.3 enactment into law)
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (synergistic with EPPO accession)
  • A14 — International institutional participation and accountability

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budget
  • G9 — Strategic industrial policy (sectoral allocation of released funds)
  • G10 — State development bank

Foreign policy

  • KP4 — Principle-based pragmatism doctrine
  • KP23 — Alliance-credibility audit

Proposed new programme point: Annual Worldwide Governance Indicators tracking with mandatory parliamentary debate — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area, as the operational synthesis of the existing A1, A6, A8 triplet.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 20 May 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Kaufmann, Daniel – Kraay, Aart – Zoido-Lobatón, Pablo: Governance Matters (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196, 1999)
  • 📖 Rose-Ackerman, Susan: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Yale University Press, 1999)
  • 📖 Klitgaard, Robert: Controlling Corruption (University of California Press, 1988)

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and title.

MIAK internal materials:

Supplementary public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) — info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
  • European Commission annual Rule of Law Report
  • EU Council Regulation 2017/1939/EU — EPPO founding document
  • Official RRF milestones fulfilment list (EU Commission, Hungarian RRP)
  • OLAF annual report

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