Part I — Situation overview

One week after the Tisza government took office (12 May 2026), on 19 May 2026 Prime Minister Péter Magyar travelled to Kraków — this is the cabinet’s first official foreign trip. At the Kraków press conference two strategic announcements were made: intention to enlarge the Visegrád Cooperation (V4), and a review of the recall of politically appointed Hungarian ambassadors (“it is entirely normal that we recall those ambassadors who ‘did not do much’” — Péter Magyar from Kraków, Portfolio 19 May 2026). On 20 May 2026 he negotiates in Warsaw with Donald Tusk, Polish Prime Minister, on EU funds, rule of law and regional coordination (Portfolio 20 May 2026). The visit is at once symbolic: it signals the termination of the 2010–2024 Orbán-PiS axis and the foundation of a new, Tusk-oriented bilateral framework.

The background is complex. In Poland, since the 2023 change of government, the Tusk-led coalition governs — with rule-of-law reforms, the unlocking of EU funds and active Ukraine-support policy. Meanwhile Polish President Karol Nawrocki (elected as PiS candidate) is approaching the American political line led by President Donald Trump — exactly this tension makes the Hungarian-Polish rapprochement at once uplifting and complicated. The Euractiv analysis (19 May 2026) warns precisely of this: Nawrocki has become Europe’s leading MAGA-aligned political figure, meaning that the rebuilding of Hungarian-Polish relations is a working model with the Tusk government — not an alliance “with the whole of Poland”. In MIAK’s reading this distinction is not rhetorical refinement but an operational rule: under Strategic balance-of-power policy (KP11), Hungary must not make its room for manoeuvre dependent on any single external political actor — neither Tusk nor Nawrocki.

For the fate of the V4 the visit is of precedent value. The Visegrád Cooperation (founded in 1991 on the initiative of József Antall, Václav Havel and Lech Wałęsa, originally V3 and then V4 after the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia) is a quarter-century-old institution that was gradually reduced after 2010 to an EU-internal veto coalition — particularly on migration and rule-of-law issues. The Tusk government after 2023 effectively withdrew from this veto function; the changes of government of Babiš and Fico, however, pushed Czechia and Slovakia in another direction. The V4 has now split into four different political vectors — and the Tisza government’s first operational question is how to save the institutional frame without the illusion of political homogeneity.

MIAK’s reading: the Visegrád Cooperation as a quarter-century-old institutional infrastructure cannot be thrown away — the joint expert working groups, the regional funding facility (International Visegrad Fund), the cultural and educational programmes all represent real value. The condition for preserving it, however, is the shift of the political centre of gravity: Poland (Tusk) is the new lead partner, Czechia the natural second pillar; Slovakia and the regional PiS axis are to be managed, but are not adversaries.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame. Henry Kissinger’s World Order (2014) treats regional orders as a stability principle: every durable international system rests on regional alliances built on concrete, mutually accepted rules and balanced power relations — as Kissinger writes: “Any … system of order bases itself on two components: a set of commonly accepted rules … and a balance of power that enforces restraint where rules break down.” This thesis is directly applicable to the V4: the differing political vectors of the four countries are not a problem in themselves; trouble starts when neither rules nor balance are fixed. G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper and T. G. Otte in Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (2001) show, through the examples of François de Callières (1716) and Otto von Bismarck, that the maintenance of alliance relations is a professional (not political-marketing) task: it requires systematic, repeatable, institutionally fixed protocols. Valentin Naumescu and Dan-Andrei Petrut’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (2nd ed.) textbook distinguishes the different logics of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy — exactly the distinction on which MIAK’s Multilateral-bilateral strategy differentiation (KP6) programme point rests. The detailed literature treatment can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes four measurable measures — two immediate bilateral, two institutional — that turn the Kraków-Warsaw visit into an operational reset framework, rather than leaving it at the slogan level.

3.1 Four-pillar Hungarian-Polish strategic partnership document (within 90 days)

The outcome of the Warsaw talks should be a signed strategic partnership document containing four concrete pillars — not a joint press statement but with measurable commitments:

  • Pillar 1 — Rule-of-law experience exchange: Hungarian adaptation of the Polish 2024–25 judicial reform package (abolition of the disciplinary chamber, restoration of the KRS, OBI model) in an expert working group. Concrete commitment: a joint white paper within 12 months.
  • Pillar 2 — Ukraine support harmonisation: coordination of Polish and Hungarian Ukraine aid under SAFE (the EU defence fund), the EUR 90 bn Ukraine loan package, and the Hungarian adaptation of the Polish integration model for 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees.
  • Pillar 3 — Industrial and energy-security cooperation: joint application under the Critical Raw Materials Act; Polish-Hungarian electricity infrastructure (Baltic–Adriatic gas pipeline, Via Baltica railway), harmonisation of the Kraków–Budapest–Belgrade railway modernisation.
  • Pillar 4 — V4 reform joint Hungarian-Polish proposal: joint submission to the upcoming V4 summit (autumn 2026) on the modernisation of the Visegrad Fund and a “V2+2” working model.

Our Diplomatic capacity-building (KP5) programme point prescribes exactly this type of structured, document-based cooperation — as opposed to ad-hoc political gestures. According to the Naumescu-Petrut theory of bilateral diplomacy (see 6.4.2), bilateral partnership produces long-term value if it rests on measurable commitments.

3.2 Ambassador-review protocol — professional application, public criteria (within 60 days)

The recall of ambassadors is a political necessity, but execution must not be retaliatory — this is the test of the credibility of the post-Orbán alliance reset. MIAK proposes the following protocol:

  • The review criteria are public: foreign-service experience, target-country language proficiency, communication performance (number of meetings, press appearances, partner feedback), professional-political activity since 2010.
  • The review applies an independent professional panel (Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, representative of Parliament’s foreign-affairs committee + 2 external experts).
  • New appointees are selected by public application; on the appointment, under Article 9(4)(b) of the Fundamental Law, the President of the Republic decides on the Prime Minister’s proposal, on the foreign minister’s submission.
  • The ambassador concerned is entitled to at least 60 days’ notice and a handover-takeover protocol.

This protocol sits at the intersection of Diplomatic capacity-building (KP5) and the public-administration appointment review areas — operationally it ensures that political nomination becomes professional application.

3.3 Institutionalisation of the V2+2 working model (within 12 months)

Instead of the “V4 enlargement” slogan, MIAK proposes an operational “V2+2” working model: keeping the classic V4 frame, but differentiating the political projection.

  • V2 (deep cooperation): Hungary + Poland (under the Tusk cabinet) + Czechia (currently with a Babiš government, but the country’s professional-cultural cooperation tradition is long-term).
  • +2 (selective partnership): Slovakia and Austria (as a new opportunity: the Hungarian-Austrian cross-border environmental-health case — see the 2026-05-11 asbestos blog — has just created a concrete shared work agenda). In the “+2” pillar the principle of case-based coalition-building (KP17) applies: on some topics deep cooperation (economy, energy), on others only dialogue (migration, rule of law).

To institutionally underpin the model, an annual “V2+2 review summit” is needed (see our Year of EU/NATO (KP24) programme point), at which the four countries’ foreign ministries assess the previous year’s cooperation and set the next year’s priorities.

3.4 Public coalition map and Alliance-credibility audit (annual) (within 18 months)

Our Alliance-credibility audit (KP23) programme point would annually measure the deviation of Hungarian EU votes, NATO commitments and bilateral commitments from the allied consensus — with external, verifiable metrics (ECFR Coalition Explorer, EU Council voting data, NATO defence pledge fulfilment). After the Warsaw reset, the first such audit may focus on the Poland relation: in how many cases did the Hungarian position diverge from the Polish position between 2022 and 2024, and how does this divergence decrease in H2 2026. The report’s methodology is standardised and public — exactly this distinguishes it from propagandistic “allied success” narratives.

The four proposals share a common principle: alliance policy is a maintenance task (Berridge-Keens-Soper-Otte (see 6.4.3)) — systematic, repeatable, institutionally fixed. Not political marketing but professional diplomacy.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy The Hungarian-Polish relation with the Tusk cabinet forms a deep bilateral framework; intra-EU coalition capacity grows. Communication counter-actions from Nawrocki’s presidential office, possible Trump-USA-directed obstruction attempts.
Public administration The professional protocol of ambassador review sets a precedent for other appointments (heads of county government offices, state-owned company leaders). The handover-takeover may cause a 6–9 month diplomatic capacity gap in some posts.
Economy Bilateral industrial-energy cooperation (Pillar 3) increases the absorption capacity of EU funds. Hungarian automotive exports face direct Polish competition in some segments (EV batteries).
Defence A joint Hungarian-Polish framework for Ukraine support strengthens NATO eastern-flank coherence. Political opposition from the Fidesz group: “intervention in the Ukraine war”-style narrative.

The proposal tips toward risk if (a) the four-pillar document becomes a political slogan without measurable commitments, or (b) the ambassador recall is retaliatory, undermining allies’ trust. The proposal works well if the signing of the document takes place within 90 days and the first annual report of the public coalition map is available in Q1 2027.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

The success of the proposals is worth tracking over a 12–24 month horizon with four indicators:

  • Signing of the Hungarian-Polish strategic partnership document: reached by August 2026, with four pillars and measurable commitments.
  • Hungarian position deviation from the Polish position in the EU Council: falls by at least 30% from the 2022–2024 average by Q1 2027 (source: EU Council voting data, ECFR Coalition Explorer).
  • Application of the ambassador-review protocol: 100% of ambassadors replaced between 2026 and 2027 go through the public application procedure.
  • V2+2 summit schedule: first annual V2+2 review summit in spring 2027.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the Kraków-Warsaw visit is a historic opportunity, but instead of a quick political symbol it must be shaped into maintainable alliance infrastructure. The four proposals (four-pillar document, professional ambassador protocol, V2+2 working model, annual Alliance-credibility audit) turn the Warsaw talks into an operational reset package. The request is addressed to the Tisza government’s foreign minister — Anita Orbán: within 90 days of the Warsaw talks the partnership document should be ready to sign, and the first Alliance-credibility audit should be available publicly in Q1 2027.

The proposal package is the direct enforcement of two MIAK foundational values. Transparency appears in the Alliance-credibility audit (3.4) and in the public criteria of the ambassador protocol (3.2): Hungarian foreign policy is not a closed internal affair but verifiable alliance behaviour. Data-drivenness in turn appears in the measurable commitments of the strategic partnership document and in the concrete work pillars of the V2+2 model — instead of slogans, documents; instead of political rhetoric, indicators provide the basis for maintainable alliance relations.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Framing in the press across the spectrum

Left-liberal band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu): the strategic-professional framing dominates. Telex (19 May 2026) emphasises the Ziobro reference — Péter Magyar in Kraków noted that the former Polish justice minister “left Europe through another Schengen country” — which indirectly opens the question of intra-EU judicial cooperation. HVG (19 May 2026) highlights the Péter Magyar quote “an introductory visit, but we would lay the foundations on specific issues too” — so this band focuses on the foundation-laying-professional character.

Mainstream-market band (24.hu, ATV): V4 enlargement and restoration of Hungarian-Polish friendship as a positive symbolic frame. 24.hu (19 May 2026) cites Péter Magyar’s statement that he “named a country” — the band thus stayed at the level of political slogan-framing, less focused on measurable commitments.

Economic band (Portfolio): expressly operational framing. Portfolio (20 May 2026) highlights specifically the date of the Tusk talks and the simultaneity of the EU-fund consultation in Budapest, and in a separate piece (19 May 2026) covers the ambassador-recall question. This band offers the most usable picture from an economic-policy standpoint.

Conservative / government-aligned band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner): sceptical-analytical framing. Magyar Nemzet (19 May 2026) publishes an expert opinion: “Strategic step or obligatory tour? — What message does Péter Magyar’s Polish trip carry?” — so the band stays at the level of political-intent attribution, less focused on concrete diplomatic substance.

Foreign framing (Deutsche Welle, Visegrad Insight, Euractiv, Balkan Insight): the strategic importance of the post-Orbán reset. DW’s “Hungary’s new Prime Minister Magyar seeks to fix Poland ties” piece highlights the European-level significance of restoring Hungarian-Polish relations. Two Visegrad Insight pieces analyse the Tisza delegation’s Polish visit as a “Moment of Opportunity for Central Europe”. The Euractiv analysis, however, raises a critical point: Polish head of state Nawrocki holds a MAGA-aligned position, which limits the negotiating frame of the Hungarian-Polish reset to a working model with the Tusk government. Balkan Insight interprets the process from a Serbian-Hungarian-minority perspective.

6.2 Facts and data

Fact Value Source
Tisza government took office 12 May 2026 Hungarian Gazette, see 12 May 2026 blog
Kraków press conference 19 May 2026 Telex, HVG 19 May 2026
Warsaw Tusk talks 20 May 2026 Portfolio 20 May 2026
Hungarian EU position deviation from the Polish (2022–2024 average) estimate: ~22–25% (based on ECFR Coalition Explorer, detailed data to be evaluated in the research phase) ECFR Coalition Explorer
Founding of the V4 15 February 1991 (Visegrád) Visegrad Group official website
Polish change of government (Tusk) 13 December 2023 official Polish data
Annual budget of the International Visegrad Fund ~EUR 10 million (2024) Visegrad Fund Annual Report

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — redefinition of the V4 frame and the operational frame of the bilateral reset. Related programme points: KP4 (principle-based pragmatism), KP5 (diplomatic capacity-building), KP6 (multilateral-bilateral differentiation), KP11 (strategic balance-of-power policy), KP17 (case-based coalition-building), KP23 (alliance-credibility audit), KP24 (Year of EU/NATO).
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the professional protocol of ambassador review as the transition of political appointments.
  • Defence (programme points) — Hungarian-Polish Ukraine-support harmonisation is part of the NATO allied framework.

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Henry Kissinger: World Order

Kissinger’s 2014 volume is organised around regional orders as a stability principle: the Westphalian system (1648), the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Metternich-Bismarck balance-of-power politics all show the same — lasting order is secured by two components: commonly accepted rules and balanced power relations. As Kissinger writes: “Any one of these systems of order bases itself on two components: a set of commonly accepted rules that define the limits of permissible action and a balance of power that enforces restraint where rules break down.” Applied to the current V4 situation: the political vectors of the four countries differ, but the institutional rules (Visegrad Fund, cultural exchange, annual V4 summits) and the balance (no country may dominate the others) can be preserved if the Tisza government consciously devotes itself to this maintenance task. The “V2+2” model is precisely the operational rendering of the Kissingerian balance principle: instead of political homogeneity, structured difference stabilises.

📖 Source: Kissinger, Henry: World Order (Penguin Press, 2014).

6.4.2 Naumescu–Petrut: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (2nd ed.)

The Naumescu-Petrut textbook (the direct source authors of our KP6 programme point) distinguishes the different logics of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. The advantage of bilateral (two-country) diplomacy is that it can be built on concrete, measurable commitments — precisely why MIAK proposes a document-based strategic partnership as the outcome of the Warsaw talks (proposal 3.1), not merely a joint press release. Multilateral diplomacy (EU, NATO, UN), by contrast, follows different rules — greater openness to political compromise, fewer measurable commitments. The V4 represents exactly the transition between these two logics: a small multilateral framework with strong bilateral components. The “V2+2” model recognises this transition operationally.

📖 Source: Naumescu, Valentin – Petrut, Dan-Andrei: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (2nd ed.).

6.4.3 Berridge–Keens-Soper–Otte: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger

The Palgrave-published collection traces the development of diplomacy as a professional, institutional task — from Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Grotius, Richelieu, Callières to Kissinger. Particularly important is the Callières chapter (early-17th-century French diplomat, author of De la manière de négocier avec les souverains), which sets out that lasting alliance relations rest not on personal friendship but on systematic, institutionalised communication and mutual interest-matching. In the context of the Hungarian-Polish reset this means: the Kraków-Warsaw visit produces long-term value if it becomes a maintenance protocol (annual summits, joint working groups, renewing documents) — not a one-off political event. The Kissinger chapter defines the concept of shuttle diplomacy: this is the historical source for our Year of EU/NATO (KP24) programme point.

📖 Source: Berridge, G. R. – Keens-Soper, Maurice – Otte, T. G.: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (Palgrave, 2001).

6.5 International comparison

The German-French axis (Élysée Treaty 1963, renewal 2019 — Aachen Treaty) is the most important model for the Hungarian-Polish reset: two countries with historically conflictual relations built a regular, document-based partnership framework full of measurable commitments, which became the political engine of EU integration. The Austrian-Italian (South Tyrol Agreement, 1969) case is also exemplary: a bilateral professional framework that defused tensions through minority-rights protection. The Scandinavian Nordic Council (from 1952) institutional model shows that a smaller regional grouping (5 states) can also sustain a quarter century of measurable-impact cooperation — if the institutional frame stands above political change. The Hungarian-Polish reset is the operational adaptation of these models within the Visegrad frame.

Foreign policy

  • KP4 — Principle-based pragmatism doctrine
  • KP5 — Diplomatic capacity-building (basis of the 3.2 ambassador protocol)
  • KP6 — Multilateral-bilateral strategy differentiation
  • KP11 — Strategic balance-of-power policy (managing the Nawrocki vs. Tusk relation)
  • KP17 — Case-based coalition-building (theoretical basis of the V2+2 model)
  • KP23 — Alliance-credibility audit (direct basis of proposal 3.4)
  • KP24 — Year of EU/NATO (institutional basis of the annual V2+2 summit)

Defence

  • The bilateral Ukraine-support harmonisation is the direct point of connection with the Defence area — NATO eastern-flank cooperation.

Proposed new programme point: V2+2 working model — operational differentiation of the Visegrad frame — for the Foreign policy area, as the operational synthesis of the existing KP6, KP11, KP17 triplet.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK kulfold-monitor topic 1 and press monitor topic 2, 20 May 2026):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Kissinger, Henry: World Order (Penguin Press, 2014)
  • 📖 Naumescu, Valentin – Petrut, Dan-Andrei: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (2nd ed.)
  • 📖 Berridge, G. R. – Keens-Soper, Maurice – Otte, T. G.: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (Palgrave, 2001)

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and title.

MIAK internal materials:

Supplementary public data sources:

  • ECFR Coalition Explorer — voting patterns among EU member states
  • EU Council voting data — public database of Council votes
  • Visegrad Group official website (visegradgroup.eu) — joint declarations, summit agendas
  • International Visegrad Fund (visegradfund.org) — financial and programme data
  • Aachen Treaty (2019) — model text of the German-French bilateral partnership

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