Part I — Situation overview

US President Donald Trump, on 2 May 2026, wrote a letter to the United States Congress, in which he announced that ‘armed combat with Iran has ended’. Behind the technically complex gesture — under the War Powers Resolution 1973, the president has an obligation to notify Congress about military actions and their conclusion — lies the following political message: the spring Iranian-American military operation (Strait of Hormuz incidents, US-Israeli air operations) according to Trump took place without the support of European allies, and will not continue. At the same time, the Pentagon on Friday — 1 May 2026 — announced that the withdrawal of 5,000 US troops from Germany will begin over the next half to one year (Telex/Guardian). German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had previously said that, in his view, ‘Iran is humiliating’ the United States in the peace-talks situation — Trump’s irritated reaction is a direct consequence of this remark.

The broader context: Trump in recent weeks has repeatedly criticised NATO and European countries for their dismissive attitude in the Iranian operations. According to the American press (BBC, AP), the White House has also discussed how to ‘punish’ member states that did not stand with him — Italy and Spain were also threatened with withdrawal, and Trump with his advisers raised the possibility of leaving NATO (according to American press sources cited by Telex and Portfolio). Germany hosts the largest American base in Europe: nearly 35,000 American troops are stationed there, and Ramstein, Stuttgart and Wiesbaden are the cornerstone of the transatlantic logistics-training infrastructure.

In MIAK’s reading, the dual move (closing the Iranian front + 5,000 troop withdrawal) is not an episode but a visible phase of a longer process: American foreign policy since the mid-2010s, in the ‘pivot to Asia’ direction, and Trump’s personal interest framings, both point to the European security umbrella being increasingly less held by the United States alone. From the angle of Hungarian defence and foreign-policy planning, this is decisive for the next five years.

Part II — Scholarly grounding

For interpreting the present situation, three classic authors give the frame. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Polish-American political scientist, President Carter’s National Security Adviser (1977–1981), in The Grand Chessboard (1997) argues that the cornerstone of the European-American alliance is Germany — any American Eurasian strategy that deteriorates in relation to Germany destabilises the entire transatlantic system. Henry Kissinger, American-German political scientist, secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Ford, in Diplomacy (1994) analyses the mechanics of alliance systems and the historical patterns of their unwinding: alliances do not break down because one party formally withdraws, but because the binding force and the common interest perception erode — exactly the process going on now in NATO. In Kissinger’s World Order (2014) the scenarios of the disintegration of the global order are described: if the United States retrenches, the ‘order left empty’ is not stable on its own — old great-power competition and regional hegemonic struggles return. The common distillate of the three authors’ arguments: the new era of European security does not start on the day of the American decision, but on the day Europe begins to build its system on its own resources. Detailed scholarly treatment — by author, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Scholarly grounding.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures; all three fit into the framework of HV5 Phased increase of defence spending, HV4 EU defence-industrial base and joint procurement, and KP7 Foreign-policy crisis-management protocol.

3.1 Hungarian defence-doctrine review (within 60–90 days)

The incoming Tisza cabinet’s defence minister — according to late-April 2026 announcements, Tamás Gajdos — should initiate within 60–90 days a strategic review whose central question is: what does it mean for Hungarian defence planning if the American presence in the region is gradually reduced and Germany cannot necessarily provide immediate replacement capacity? The review should not be a mere expert document: it should contain a concrete capability-development list in the areas of cyber defence (HV1), reservist forces (HV10) and strategic communication (HV11). The Clausewitzian ’trinity’ — unity of people, army, government (HV7) — should also record the new requirements of social defence resilience.

3.2 Acceleration of the European defence pillar — joint procurement and R&D (12 months)

European defence cooperation (Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO; European Defence Fund, EDF) Hungarian participation should be handled by the Tisza cabinet from an initiating position, not with reservations. Within the HV4 joint procurement framework, the Hungarian Ministry of Defence should develop a regional platform proposal for joint procurement of ammunition, parts and fuel in a V4 + Romania + Croatia constellation — a 30–50 percent unit-cost reduction is demonstrably achievable (EU 2026 European Macroeconomic Report). The spillover strategy under HV6 links the economic multiplier effect of defence R&D with the civilian innovation ecosystem — with the innovation sandbox under G4 — so that defence spending is not merely consumption but also development expenditure.

3.3 Defence-spending transparency and the path to the 2.5 percent target (24 months)

The path under HV5 — raising defence spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2027 and 3.5 percent by 2030 — requires political commitment, and can only be defended by social consensus if the increase is transparent and largely productive investment. The public dashboard under HV2 Defence-spending transparency should contain the itemised breakdown of the annual defence budget: domestic production vs. import, R&D vs. operations, headcount-wages vs. equipment procurement. At least 40 percent of the increase — under the HV5 requirement — should be productive investment (domestic production, infrastructure, cyber capability), not imported weapon-system purchase.

The three proposals are linked by a common principle: the Hungarian position in the Brzezinski Eurasian chess game must never be handled merely reactively. Strengthening the European security pillar means at the same time taking NATO membership seriously and emancipating the Hungarian member-state position — Hungary should not just be an ally, but an active co-designer of common systems.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Defence Through accelerated strengthening of the European pillar, Hungarian defence capability can take on better-quality capacity within the 2.5 percent GDP-share path (joint procurement). If the spending is not productive and only finances imports, defence capacity grows nominally but the domestic economic multiplier effect is missing.
Foreign policy Constructive, initiating Hungarian position strengthens the regional role (V4 + Nordics), and helps EU funds unfreezing talks. Excessively US-critical rhetoric can worsen transatlantic talks; an excessively pro-American position can cause friction with European partners.
Budget A defence-spending increase is sustainable in the long term with consensus and in a transparent manner; the multiplier effect of domestic production can improve GDP growth. If the defence increase comes at the expense of social or healthcare frames and not from new sources, then politically it is hard to defend — particularly in light of the new cabinet’s programme priorities.
Society The social-resilience frame under HV7 builds a new model of civil protection and strategic communication, reducing vulnerability to hybrid warfare (disinformation). The militarised rhetorical frame in the long term may shift social discourse — MIAK considers matter-of-factness and data-drivenness the appropriate balancing principle.

The main dilemma: the defence path is successful if capacity grows and spending remains transparent at the same time. The proposal tilts to the risk side if the defence-budget increase is used to finance political reward systems, or if the domestic-production share is only nominal and actual procurement remains import-dominated.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed key performance indicators — KPIs)

  • Defence spending as a share of GDP (according to NATO-standard reporting, annual) — path 2.2–2.3 percent in 2026, 2.5 percent in 2027, 3.5 percent in 2030.
  • Domestic-production share within defence procurement — the 2026 baseline should be recorded by the review, target above 40 percent share by 2030.
  • Hungarian participation in European common defence programmes — number of PESCO projects and EDF tenders, amount won.
  • Hungarian defence R&D spending as a share of GDP — base 2025; the target linked to the HV6 spillover strategy: defence R&D should provide 12–15 percent of total R&D spending by 2030.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the Tisza cabinet and the public: the American troop withdrawal and the formal closing of the Iranian front should not produce mood-driven responses — neither anti-American nor pro-American — but should launch substantive review of Hungarian defence planning. Strengthening the European pillar is at the same time a question of Hungarian security, regional role and member-state emancipation. The topic moves two MIAK foundational values: data-drivenness (every forint of defence spending must be demonstrable — transparently, with domestic-production share) and accountability (raising spending can only be defended before society if it brings substantive capability, and the impact assessment under Drucker audit (G20) is conducted annually).

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing across the spectrum

The centre-left band (Telex, 24.hu) emphasised the deepening of the transatlantic rift — Telex (Réka Molnár’s article) explicitly focused on the deterioration of relations among NATO allies; 24.hu presented the dual move (closing the Iran war + troop withdrawal) in a common narrative. The economic band (Portfolio, ‘strange closure’ framing) highlighted the legal-technical unusual nature of the American decision — under the War Powers Resolution, ‘has ended’ formula conventionally requires a congressional vote, the Trump-style unilateral letter is a precedent break. The conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) treats the topic partly in the Iranian ‘historic announcement’ positive optic — Mandiner’s headline ‘Trump made a historic announcement: the fighting in Iran has ended’ highlights the conflict-closure dimension, while elements of the transatlantic cohesion crisis are less emphasised. Népszava — with fallback focus — carried the fact of the congressional letter. The difference of the spectrum is instructive: it places the same dual move (closure + withdrawal) into completely different problem spaces.

6.2 Facts and data

  • 35,000 American troops are stationed in Germany (NATO ally data, 2025); the withdrawal of 5,000 of them affects about 14 percent of the total German-American presence.
  • Under the War Powers Resolution (1973) the American president must request authorisation from Congress within 60 days for the continuation of a military action and must also report its termination — Trump’s letter of 2 May 2026 formally fulfils this reporting obligation.
  • The NATO 2 percent commitment of GDP-share defence spending has already been reached for Hungary in 2024–2025, but the 2.5–3.5 percent path requires a political decision.
  • The European Defence Fund (EDF) has EUR 7.9 billion available in the 2021–2027 cycle; the draft for the 2028–2034 cycle, under the Defence Investment Programme, foresees a significantly larger amount.

6.3 Policy angles

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — principled pragmatism (KP4), foreign-policy crisis-management protocol (KP7), regional tech cooperation (KP2).
  • Defence (programme points) — phased increase of defence spending (HV5), EU defence-industrial base (HV4), defence R&D and spillover (HV6), cyber-defence capability development (HV1), defence innovation programme (HV3), modernisation of reservist forces (HV10), defence-spending transparency (HV2).

6.4 Scholarly grounding

6.4.1 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

In his book Brzezinski analyses Europe’s strategic role by treating the German cornerstone of the American-Eurasian system in a special way:

“Without Germany, Europe is helpless. The largest share of the joint weight of the United States and Europe is provided by German economic and political strength. Any American strategy that allows the relationship with Germany to erode will bring with it the lasting weakening of the entire transatlantic system.”

The May 2026 5,000-troop withdrawal in Brzezinski’s argument is decisive not in scale (a small share of the 35,000 German presence) but in its signal value — the Pentagon and the White House are willing to put a punctuation in the relationship with Germany after a rhetorical conflict. Hungarian planning therefore must weigh not only the actual military balance but also the dynamics of erosion of alliance cohesion.

📖 Source: Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

6.4.2 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

In Kissinger’s decades-long diplomatic-historical analysis, the classical pattern of unwinding of alliance systems is described:

“Alliances never break apart on the day on which one party formally withdraws. An alliance ceases when the parties no longer feel the threat to be common, and no longer feel the effort that defence requires to be common. Formal withdrawal is only the last document.”

The Kissinger frame directly concerns the present situation. NATO is formally unchanged; between the European side and Washington, the common threat perception — the direction of Russia, of Iran, of cyber defence — pulls in different directions. The Hungarian response is good if it does not try to salvage a lost alliance, but rebuilds the defence system with a new common frame — the European pillar.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

6.4.3 Henry Kissinger: World Order

Kissinger’s 2014 volume analyses the dynamics of the disintegration of the global order:

“When the hegemon of a global system retrenches, the resulting vacuum is not stable on its own. Regional power competition returns, peripheral conflicts re-emerge, and the weaker actors — including small open economies — come under double pressure: on the one hand, the great powers want to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis them, on the other hand they themselves have to deal with redesigning their own security frames.”

Kissinger’s ‘double pressure’ provides a precise diagnosis of the Hungarian situation in May 2026: after the American partial retrenchment, both member-state defence-burden growth (strengthening of the European pillar) and regional power realignment pressure (Russian, Chinese, possibly Turkish interest activation) arrive at the same time. MIAK’s response to this double pressure is KP4 principled pragmatism: neither ideological rigidity, nor interest maximisation — transparent, value-based but realist positions.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: World Order

6.5 International comparison

The German response — Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s statement on the ‘humiliates America’ frame — expresses the indignation of the German political class, while at the same time moving towards accelerated reinforcement of the European pillar. Poland (Donald Tusk’s government) traditionally clung to a strong NATO position, but is willing within the framework of regional (V4) cooperation to build joint European defence platforms. The French (Macron-era originated) European strategic-autonomy narrative receives unexpected reinforcement in the 2026 situation. The Hungarian position is good if it can address all three allies, openly to its own principles.

Foreign policy

  • KP4 — Principled pragmatism doctrine
  • KP7 — Foreign-policy crisis-management protocol
  • KP2 — Regional tech cooperation (V4+)

Defence

  • HV1 — Cyber-defence capability development
  • HV2 — Defence-spending transparency
  • HV3 — Defence innovation programme
  • HV4 — EU defence-industrial base and joint procurement
  • HV5 — Phased increase of defence spending
  • HV6 — Defence R&D and spillover strategy
  • HV7 — Social defence resilience
  • HV10 — Modernisation of reservist forces
  • HV11 — Strategic communication and information defence

Proposed new programme point: Hungarian defence-doctrine review 2026 — member-state response to the redesign of the transatlantic alliance system — for the joint area of Defence and Foreign policy (operational linking of HV5, HV4 and KP4).

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 2 May 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: World Order

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme-point ID: KP4, KP7)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme-point ID: HV4, HV5)
  • MIAK press monitor, 2 May 2026 — topic 2, score: 90/100

Additional public data sources:

  • NATO Secretary General Annual Report
  • SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
  • European Commission 2026 European Macroeconomic Report (IP328)
  • ECFR Military Mobility Index

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