Part I — Situation overview

The preparatory talks for the inaugural sitting of the new National Assembly are taking place on 28 April 2026. The outgoing Minister for the Cabinet Office Gergely Gulyás announced that 25 of Fidesz–KDNP’s 42 list MPs did not take up their mandates — those entering in their place were on the next positions of the electoral list. Viktor Orbán (the outgoing prime minister, head of government in 1998–2002 and 2010–2026) is not taking his seat in parliament. Instead, Balázs Orbán — on a transitional basis, continuing as an MEP from 1 July — leads the faction’s work; in the new Fidesz–KDNP faction, Péter Szijjártó, Máté Kocsis and János Lázár have entered; László Kövér and Antal Rogán have left. According to 24.hu’s summary, the new faction includes an Olympic champion, a megaphone propagandist and failed ministers; HVG highlights: there are more women in the parliament than there are Fidesz MPs.

Context of the topic: in the election of 12 April 2026, the Tisza party won 141 mandates (70.85% of the 199-seat National Assembly), 7 mandates above the 134-seat two-thirds threshold. Our final two-thirds analysis of 19 April 2026 raised the question “what should the new majority do with itself”; the Tisza faction sitting and procedural dashboard blog of 24 April 2026 proposed a self-limitation framework with ten measurement points. Today fits a new dimension into the picture, on account of Orbán’s mandate-renunciation and the 25 list-mandate refusals: the physical absence of the leader of the main opposition force from parliament.

MIAK’s reading: Orbán’s mandate-renunciation is a political gesture, fully lawful (Hungarian electoral and parliamentary law does not require the acceptance of a won mandate); the 25 list-mandate refusals are, procedurally, a matter for the National Election Office (NVI). The constitutional question is not about lawfulness but about culture: alongside a 141-mandate two-thirds majority, with the leader of the main opposition force physically absent, what self-limiting procedural guarantees are needed so that the constitutional process does not start at within-90-days speed.

Part II — Scholarly grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly framework. Mihály Bihari (political scientist, Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungarian constitutional-law and political-science researcher) in Alkotmányos rendszerváltás (Constitutional regime change) analyses the 1989 Hungarian constitutional regime change as the process of cultural appropriation of two-thirds guarantees: the author’s thesis is that constitutional culture forms not from the existence of the rules but from their institutionalised, self-limiting use. H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law (1961, in Hungarian translated by Csaba Pléh) introduced the rule of recognition, which directly affects the procedural legitimacy of mandate transfer: the parliamentary system operates on the basis of a “rule of recognition” jointly accepted by every actor — governing party, opposition, individual MP; if this common base is damaged (e.g. the minority withdraws or does not get a real opportunity to participate), the validity of the legal system is weakened on the factual level too. According to Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s Why Nations Fail (2012), the self-limiting use of a two-thirds majority is the basic condition of an inclusive institutional order: the new majority builds inclusive institutions if it uses its strength less than its measure. The detailed scholarly treatment is in section 6.4 Scholarly grounding.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes two measurable measures — a self-limitation protocol and a parliamentary calendar order — and records one substantive principle. None of them is the creation of a new institutional actor; all are procedural forms of the use of a two-thirds majority.

The new Tisza faction should make a public, written commitment that before parliamentary tabling of every constitutional-character amendment (Fundamental Law amendment, cardinal laws), it maintains at least a 6-month professional consultation protocol: civil organisations, opposition factions, legal-academic experts, Venice Commission consultation, and a public commenting platform (with a duration of at least 60 days). This commitment is not a new piece of legislation — under MIAK’s I10 (Constitutional stress test) and A6 (Strengthening checks and balances) programme points, it can be formalised as a faction-level rule, or as a new annex to the parliamentary House Rules. The proposal builds on Bihari’s constitutional-culture concept (see 6.4.1): a two-thirds majority is measured not by how many constitutional amendments it adopts, but by the processes through which it reaches consensus.

3.2 Parliamentary calendar — first 90 days on a policy, not constitution-making, focus (9 May 2026 → 7 August 2026)

In line with MIAK’s KI3 (Measurable bureaucracy reduction) programme point, MIAK proposes that during the first 90 days of the new parliament, the Tisza-faction agenda should not include Fundamental Law amendment or cardinal legislation. The focus of the 90-day period: meeting the 27 super-milestones of the RRF conditionality framework (see 27-point EU-list blog), strengthening of the AML toolkit on NER asset flight (see NER asset-flight blog), and a fiscal impact assessment of the Tisza programme’s first package (see Tisza programme blog). After 90 days, the two-thirds amendments can be put on the agenda — under the 3.1 protocol. This is not a constitutional obligation but a political self-limitation; its interpretive frame is Acemoglu–Robinson’s inclusive-institutions theory (see 6.4.3).

3.3 Substantive principle — guaranteeing respect for voter intent in list-mandate refusals

MIAK records a principled position: the mandate refusals of the 25 Fidesz–KDNP list MPs are settled by the official NVI procedure (the next person on the list enters), and this is procedurally lawful. From a constitutional-culture perspective, however, respect for voter intent also means: voters cast their votes for the 25 names they saw at the top of the list; the retroactive reshuffling is the political nominating organisation’s internal decision. MIAK therefore proposes — within the A11 (Civil-society partner programme) framework — that, at the 2027 review of the electoral system (which can be a thematic application of the I10 Constitutional stress test), the procedural question of list-mandate refusal be put on the agenda (e.g. should the reason for refusal be made public; is there sense in a formalised measurement of divergence from voter intent).

The three proposals are linked by a common principle: self-limiting use by the new majority is not a political loss but the structural strengthening of the two-thirds mandate. In Bihari’s language: the building of constitutional culture; in Acemoglu–Robinson’s language: the basic condition of the inclusive institutional order.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Economy Strengthening of legal predictability; improvement of investor confidence together with the RRF accession process The corporate sector might enter a 90-day “wait-and-see” mode in the absence of the new legal framework
Society Substantive participation of civil organisations and opposition factions in constitutional processes Political neutralisation of the language of “inclusive institutional order” (e.g. “Tisza does not dare to govern” framing)
Public administration Clear priorities of the new parliamentary calendar (RRF accession, AML strengthening, fiscal impact assessment) Political-urgency argumentation for two-thirds amendments (e.g. “immediate correction of the Fidesz legacy”)

The main dilemma below the table: the 3.1 six-month protocol and the 3.2 90-day calendar focus together prescribe substantial time-discipline, which can give a basis for the political framing “the Tisza two-thirds is not effective”. The counter-argument: according to the Hungarian experience of the 1989 constitutional regime change (Bihari), a hasty constitution-making process produces a long-run legitimacy deficit; time-discipline is therefore not a cost but a structural investment. If the two-thirds culture is not built in the 2026–2028 cycle, the new majority falls into precisely the structural error practised by the outgoing cabinet since 2010.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

  • Number of constitution-character amendments tabled in the first 90 days — proposed target: 0 (under 3.2). Among the key performance indicators (KPIs) this is the most immediately measurable from the parliamentary calendar.
  • Average parliamentary debate time on constitution-character proposals — worth tracking the 60-day average (stricter than the minimum of the 6-month protocol): this is the dividing line between urgent and normal procedural mode.
  • Documented share of consultation with civil society, opposition and Venice Commission on constitutional-character amendments — proposed target: 100% (full application of the 3.1 protocol).
  • Parliamentary activity indicators of Balázs Orbán (and the Fidesz–KDNP faction) — number of speeches, amendments, questions per month; quantifies the substantive extent of opposition work.

5.2 Summary

The preparation of the inaugural sitting of the new National Assembly brings to the surface three interrelated constitutional questions: Viktor Orbán’s mandate-renunciation, the refusal of 25 Fidesz–KDNP list MPs, and the use of Tisza’s 141-mandate two-thirds majority. None of these elements is a legal irregularity — all are lawful electoral and parliamentary procedures. MIAK’s request to the new parliamentary majority (the Tisza faction): do not use the two-thirds mandate at within-90-days speed for constitution-making, but along self-limiting procedural protocols; from the opposition: continue substantive parliamentary work despite the leader’s physical absence. The proposal is a direct enforcement of the MIAK foundational values of transparency, accountability and openness: the structural strengthening of the two-thirds mandate is realised when the process is public, verifiable, and proceeds with real opposition participation.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing across the spectrum

In the centre-left/public-affairs band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu, 24.hu) the main framing topos was “the unimaginable has happened” — Orbán’s mandate-renunciation as a political symbol. 444.hu’s front page was built on this. Telex detailed Gulyás’s announcement of the 25 list-mandate refusals; HVG carried the faction roster and the female-ratio analysis. 24.hu chose a characterisation of the faction (“Olympic champion, megaphone propagandist and failed ministers”), which is narrative-strong but obscures the structural question.

In the conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) the topic received a “new era in parliament” framing (Mandiner) and, respectively, a neutral-procedural presentation of the negotiation process (Magyar Nemzet). Mandiner emphasised the assembly of the Fidesz–KDNP faction, conveying a “managed transition” message.

In the economic band (Portfolio) the topic did not enter the day’s top focus on this date — the political agenda gave dominant treatment to the Tisza programme package, NER asset flight, and the von der Leyen negotiation. On a 24–48-hour horizon, this band too is likely to engage with an investor risk analysis of the constitutional processes.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Tisza party’s mandate count: 141 (70.85% of the 199-seat National Assembly) — NVI finalisation of 19 April 2026, according to the ground-truth file.
  • Fidesz–KDNP list MPs: 42, of which 25 did not take up their mandates — Gergely Gulyás announcement of 28 April 2026 (Telex).
  • Viktor Orbán: born on 31 May 1963; at the end of the prime-ministerial cycle scheduled until 30 April 2026, he is not taking his seat in parliament (444.hu / Telex, 28 April 2026).
  • Inaugural sitting of the new National Assembly: 2 May 2026 (expected) / 9 May 2026 (planned swearing-in of the new prime minister).
  • Two-thirds threshold: 134 mandates in the 199-seat National Assembly (66.84%) — under Act CCIII of 2011.
  • Main faction changes in Fidesz–KDNP: Péter Szijjártó, Máté Kocsis, János Lázár take seats; László Kövér, Antal Rogán leave (Telex, 28 April 2026).
  • Balázs Orbán: takes a seat in parliament; from 1 July becomes an MEP (Telex, 28 April 2026).

6.3 Policy angles

  • Justice (programme points) — I3 (Legislative impact assessment), I10 (Constitutional stress test) — directly the basis of the 6-month protocol and the 90-day calendar.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A6 (Strengthening checks and balances), A11 (Civil-society partner programme) — framework points for inclusive use of a two-thirds majority.
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — KI3 (Measurable bureaucracy reduction), KI9 (Local participatory budgeting) — MIAK framework points for parliamentary calendar priorities and participatory-consultative practice.

6.4 Scholarly grounding

6.4.1 Mihály Bihari: Alkotmányos rendszerváltás

Bihari (political scientist, Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) analyses in the volume the Hungarian 1989 constitutional regime-change process as an attempt to lay the foundations of constitutional culture: the author’s thesis is that beyond the existence of the rules of the constitutional system, it is the institutionalised, self-limiting use of those rules that makes the system work. The 1989–1994 Hungarian period proves that the introduction of two-thirds guarantees is not enough on its own; the process of culture-building runs over a 5–10-year horizon, and the self-limitation of every new political actor decides whether constitutional quality improves or deteriorates. The 2026 situation — Tisza’s 141-mandate two-thirds majority — is, in Bihari’s framework, the start of a new cycle: if the new majority does not use the two-thirds tools to the measure of its strength but concentrates on building culture, it continues the original message of the 1989 regime change. If, however, it repeats the post-2010 “we govern in two-thirds mode” pattern, the structural deficits carry over to the new cycle.

📖 Source: Mihály Bihari: Alkotmányos rendszerváltás

6.4.2 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

Hart in his 1961 classic introduces the concept of the rule of recognition: the validity of the legal system rests not on the order of a higher authority but on a factual rule that the actors of the system — courts, MPs, citizens — recognise through a common practice of acceptance. In the case of the Hungarian National Assembly, the rule of recognition consists partly of the written Fundamental Law and partly of institutionalised parliamentary practice: if the minority (in this case the Fidesz–KDNP faction and Viktor Orbán) systematically withdraws from parliamentary debate, the basis of the rule of recognition is weakened — the majority’s formally valid decisions lose factual legitimacy in Hart’s sense. This risk is particularly strong in the case of two-thirds amendments: the consultation of the Venice Commission, the civil-partner programme, and the substantive participation of opposition MPs together ensure that the integrity of the rule of recognition can be preserved in the political-procedural processes too.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (Hungarian: A jog fogalma, 1961)

6.4.3 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

According to Acemoglu and Robinson’s thesis, the source of long-run economic and political prosperity is the inclusive institutional order — as opposed to extractive institutions, where a small group of the elite extracts rent at the expense of other actors. The key question of the Hungarian 2026 transition: does the new Tisza two-thirds majority build in an inclusive or an extractive direction? The authors’ explicit argument is that self-limiting use of a two-thirds mandate is the basic condition of an inclusive institutional order: if the new majority uses it less than its strength would allow, and leaves substantive participation by the opposition open, the institutional order remains predictable and provides equal access to all actors. If, however, it starts at within-90-days constitution-making speed (repeating the post-2010 pattern), the new majority steps in precisely the extractive direction and reproduces its own structural risk. Proposals 3.1 and 3.2 are therefore not political gestures but structural choices: the difference between inclusive institution-building and extractive pattern-repetition.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail (Hungarian: Miért buknak el a nemzetek?)

6.5 International comparison

Poland (2015–2023, PiS period): the Law and Justice party in 2015 won a one-third parliamentary majority (not two-thirds), and within one year carried out the rapid restructuring of the Constitutional Court, the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS) and the public media. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) between 2018 and 2021 found rule-of-law violations in several rulings; the Venice Commission’s recommendations critically commented on every step of the process. The PiS experience is the closest negative reference for the Hungarian 2026 situation: the rapid constitution-making process produces a 5–8-year rule-of-law conflict whose economic and institutional cost far exceeds the political-symbolic benefit.

Germany (Bundestag-Hausordnung): the German parliamentary House Rules prescribe detailed consultation guarantees for every constitution-amendment proposal: the mandatory 60-day public-opinion-formation period, committee hearing and Bundesrat consultation together ensure that the 2/3 amendment is at least a 6-month process. The Hungarian 3.1 protocol can be formalised on this model.

EU Venice Commission consultation practice: the Commission’s advisory-opining role is not mandatory but is an informal expectation in the constitutional-amendment process of every EU member state; the absence of a Venice consultation in the Hungarian 2010 adoption of the new Fundamental Law was critically assessed by the Commission.

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A11 — Civil-society partner programme

Public administration and e-government

  • KI3 — Measurable bureaucracy reduction
  • KI9 — Local participatory budgeting (analogous to parliamentary participation)

Proposed new programme point: Two-thirds-mandate procedural self-limitation protocol — for the Justice or Transparency and anti-corruption policy area, as an extension of the I10 Constitutional stress test programme point.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 28 April 2026 — topic 6):

  • [444.hu] Bekövetkezett az elképzelhetetlen – Orbán Viktor nem ül be a Parlamentbe — https://444.hu/2026/04/28/orban-viktor-nem-ul-be-a-parlamentbe (article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Telex] Orbán Balázs beül a parlamentbe, de júliustól EP-képviselő lesz — https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/04/28/orban-balazs-parlament-ep-kepviselo (article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Telex] Gulyás Gergely bejelentette, hogy 42 listás képviselőből 25-en döntöttek úgy, hogy nem veszik fel a mandátumukat — https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/04/28/gulyas-gergely-fidesz-listas-kepviselok-mandatum (article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Telex] Hivatalos: Szijjártó Péter és Kocsis Máté is beül a parlamentbe, Kövér László és Rogán Antal búcsúzik — https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/04/28/hivatalos-fidesz-frakcio-szijjarto-kocsis-kover-rogan (article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [HVG] Itt a névsor, ők lesznek a Fidesz képviselői az új Országgyűlésben — https://hvg.hu/itthon/20260428_fidesz-frakcio-nevsor-orszaggyules (article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [444.hu] Lázár és Szijjártó marad, Rogán és Kövér távozik, egy megafonos pedig érkezik a Fidesz-frakcióba — https://444.hu/2026/04/28/lazar-szijjarto-rogan-kover-fidesz-frakcio (article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [24.hu] Olimpiai bajnok, megafonos propagandista és bukott miniszterek – ők alkotják mostantól a Fidesz parlamenti frakcióját — https://24.hu/belfold/2026/04/28/fidesz-frakcio-olimpiai-bajnok-megafon-bukott-miniszterek (article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Magyar Nemzet] Folytatódnak az Országgyűlés alakuló ülését előkészítő tárgyalások — https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/2026/04/orszaggyules-alakulo-ules-targyalasok (article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [Mandiner] Új korszak a parlamentben: összeállt a Fidesz és a KDNP frakciója — https://mandiner.hu/cikk/20260428_uj-korszak-parlament-fidesz-kdnp-frakcio (article was not publicly downloadable)
  • [HVG] Több nő lesz a parlamentben, mint ahány fideszes — https://hvg.hu/itthon/20260428_parlament-no-fidesz-arany (article was not publicly downloadable)

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Mihály Bihari: Alkotmányos rendszerváltás
  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (Hungarian: A jog fogalma, 1961)
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail (Hungarian: Miért buknak el a nemzetek?)
  • 📖 Hungarian Fundamental Law (text in force on 2026-04-17, 12th amendment)
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators — background to the structural-abuse pattern of two-thirds majorities

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme-point ID: I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme-point ID: A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme-point ID: KI3)
  • MIAK policy area: Legal foundations — Typical jurisdictional and institutional errors (gyakori_hibak.md, 15 typical bad/good example pairs)
  • MIAK press monitor, 28 April 2026 — topic 6, score: 69/100

Additional public data sources (where used):

  • Venice Commission opinions 2011/2013 on the Hungarian Constitution
  • Court of Justice of the European Union, ruling C-156/21 on Hungarian rule-of-law
  • Act CCIII of 2011 (on the structure of the 199-seat National Assembly)
  • Hungarian Fundamental Law, Article 6 (right of veto), Article 9 (powers of the head of state)

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