Part I — Situation overview

By a decree published on the afternoon of Friday 4 September 2026, the government extended until 31 December 2026 the “crisis situation caused by mass immigration” that was due to expire on 7 September. The Prime Minister justified the announcement by saying that the cabinet is not softening the legislative environment against illegal migration, and cited as an example the Ceuta border crisis in July. There, following a Spanish supreme court decision, a legal gap opened up which people-smuggling networks exploited within days. According to the head of government, the rules in force would have permitted a six-month extension as well, yet the cabinet chose the narrow, barely four-month period running to the end of the year — with the aim that by then the new Hungarian regulation agreed with the EU institutions should be ready. On the same day a spokesperson for the European Commission confirmed that they are consulting “closely and very constructively” with the Hungarian authorities on settling the matter of the fine, while emphasising that this is a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, so the solution has to be found by Hungary and the Court.

The background goes back eleven years. The crisis situation was declared in 2015, and has been extended without interruption every six months since. Meanwhile the price of the legal dispute has accumulated: the Court of Justice of the European Union imposed on Hungary a lump-sum penalty of 200 million euros and a periodic penalty payment of one million euros a day because of elements of its asylum regulation contrary to EU law; according to press reports the amount of the penalty payment has by now exceeded 900 million euros, and the total item is approaching one billion euros. The legal basis of the periodic penalty payment is Article 260(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, under which, if in the Commission’s view the member state has not taken the measures necessary to comply with the court’s judgment, the Court may impose a lump sum or a penalty payment. The new government inherited this legal dispute. The negotiating situation is shaped by two circumstances: the European Union’s new Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into force in the summer of 2026, so the legal environment has changed substantively since the disputed Hungarian rules were made. And according to press reports, Brussels and Budapest are examining whether phasing out two temporary Hungarian migration laws — without softening border policy — could be enough for the fine to be lifted. One such provision is precisely the crisis situation rolled over since 2015. This week the Prime Minister received António Costa, President of the European Council, in Budapest, and asked for the suspension of the fine as soon as possible.

MIAK’s reading: the extension is not in itself a policy mistake, but the absence of an exit condition is. An extraordinary legal category is legitimate if three things can be demonstrated about it: that there is a real danger, that the ordinary rules are not sufficient, and that it is known in advance when it will end. The first two are debatable professional questions, in which the responsibility for the decision is the government’s. To the third, however, there has been no written answer for eleven years — there is no public document that would say in what measurable situation the crisis situation would end. This is the point at which a “temporary” category quietly turns into a permanent legal state, and where the present extension, cut to four months — which the government itself calls a transition — offers an exceptional opportunity to make good the omission.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

The interpretive frame is given by three sources. The Fundamental Law of Hungary states, among the common rules on the special legal order, that such a legal order is terminated by the organ entitled to introduce it once the conditions for its declaration no longer obtain — that is, according to constitutional logic, terminating an extraordinary state is not a question of discretion but of obligation. Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights sets out the same principle at international level: a contracting state may derogate from its obligations only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”, and is obliged to inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe also when the measures have ceased to operate — derogation, that is, the temporary suspension of an international obligation, is therefore by definition a reversible state. In his volume of essays The Authority of Law, Joseph Raz (Israeli-British legal philosopher, one of the leading authors of legal positivism) defines the rule of law as a formal virtue: law fulfils its function if it is capable of guiding the conduct of those to whom it is addressed, and for that it has to be knowable in advance, clear and relatively stable. The three sources together lead to the same place: the problem is not that an extraordinary legal category exists, but that the condition of its termination is undefined, because then the “temporariness” of the category remains merely formal. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary; European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe); Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. None of them aims at the immediate termination of the crisis situation: assessing the asylum situation is a professional and political responsibility exercised by the government. The proposals concern what is missing whichever direction the decision takes — the procedural framework.

3.1 A public set of exit criteria for the crisis situation (by 31 December 2026)

In the present period running to the end of December, the government should publish a numerical set of exit criteria consisting of at most five indicators, saying in what situation the crisis situation ends. The suggested range: the monthly number of illegal border crossing attempts registered on the southern border section, the occupancy of reception places, the monthly number of asylum applications, the average duration of adjudication, and the utilisation of border policing capacity. Each should have a threshold value and a time horizon: if the indicators stay below the threshold for a set period — for example over twelve consecutive months — the government terminates the crisis situation. The double benefit of the system is that it simultaneously makes domestic law enforcement verifiable and lends credibility to the negotiating position in Brussels: it signals that Hungary does not cling to the extraordinary framework on grounds of principle, but responds with it to a concrete, measurable situation. This is a joint concretisation of MIAK’s programme points I3 (Legislative impact assessment) and I10 (Constitutional “stress test”).

3.2 Mandatory written reasons for every further extension (from the next extension decision)

If the crisis situation remains in force after 31 December, every extending government decree should come with a statement of reasons of at most two pages, published at the same time as the decree. It should contain the current values of the indicators under 3.1, why the instruments of the ordinary legal order are not sufficient, and the reason for the length of the extension. This is not a new legal institution: under the order of legislation, a statement of reasons is prepared in any case for the preparation of legislation — the proposal merely adds that in the case of this extraordinary category it should be public as a matter of obligation and on a regular basis. Raz’s requirement of stability (see 6.4.3) is directly applicable here: regular, public reasons are the only mechanism that prevents extension from becoming routine. The proposal is the domestic legislative counterpart of programme point KP3 (Transparent foreign policy).

3.3 A negotiating mandate briefing on the matter of the fine (before the agreement is signed)

On the consultations under way with the European Commission, the government should publish a short, itemised briefing on which elements of Hungarian legislation it is considering phasing out, on what deadline, and what it expects in return. The briefing should not contain negotiating tactics, but it should name the legal provisions and the expected dates. The reason for this is practical: the daily one-million-euro fine is public money, and the public needs a factual picture of its accumulation and of the chances of ending it; the briefing also forestalls the situation in which the content of the agreement — what the Hungarian side gave up — only becomes clear after signature. Under the logic of programme point KP17 (Issue-based coalition building in the EU), issue-based negotiation works if the Hungarian position is legible from outside; and KP4 (Principled pragmatism doctrine) prescribes precisely that the position should be realistic but transparent.

The three proposals are bound together by a single principle: an extraordinary legal framework remains extraordinary if its termination is written down in advance. If it is not written down, then the category adjusts not to the situation but to negotiating or political convenience — and this can be checked neither by domestic law enforcement nor by the negotiating partner in Brussels. All three sources of the literature frame support the same conclusion: the Fundamental Law adds the obligation of termination, the Convention the necessity and proportionality test, and Raz the requirement of predictability.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Law enforcement The temporal limit of the extraordinary framework becomes predictable; official procedure gets a verifiable yardstick Drawing up the set of criteria ties up legislative capacity and generates disputes about the threshold values in the short term
Budget The ending of the daily periodic penalty payment is an item of several hundred billion forints a year; the credibility of the negotiating position brings this closer If publishing the set of criteria looks like a negotiating concession, the Hungarian side’s bargaining position may temporarily weaken
Public security and border policing The publicity of the indicators improves capacity planning and professional debate The rigidity of the thresholds may slow the response in an extreme situation (a sudden rearrangement of routes)
External relations An itemised, measurable position strengthens Hungarian negotiating credibility in the multiannual EU budget debate too Partners may treat the set of criteria as a commitment even though it is only self-restraint

The main question for consideration is to what extent the publicity of the exit criteria reduces the executive’s room for manoeuvre in a rapidly changing situation. The Ceuta case shows exactly this risk: there the migration routes were rearranged within a few days. That is why the proposal does not prescribe automatic, immediate termination, but a continuous twelve-month period below the threshold — that is, the system closes slowly, and the government retains reaction time in the event of a sudden deterioration. The proposal tips to the risk side if the threshold values are set in a political bargain rather than on a professional basis: a threshold deliberately set out of reach is worse than nothing, because it now legitimises the permanence in writing as well. It is therefore crucial that the indicators be compiled by the border policing and asylum administration, and that the raw data series also be public.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

The performance indicators (KPIs) below are proposals, not government decisions — MIAK considers them suitable for judging, in 6, 12 and 24 months’ time, whether the procedural framework works:

  • The existence of a set of exit criteria: a document containing numerical threshold values published by 31 December 2026 — yes or no.
  • The proportion of reasoned extensions: what percentage of the extending decrees issued from 2027 onwards were accompanied by public reasons backed by indicators. Suggested target: 100 per cent.
  • The state of the periodic penalty payment: the accumulated amount broken down by month, and the date of suspension or termination. Suggested target: the ending of the daily fine by the first half of 2027.
  • The actual duration of the crisis situation: for how many months it has been continuously in force. This indicator speaks for itself: in September 2026 it is in its eleventh year.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request can be summed up in a single sentence: during the transitional period running to 31 December, the government should write down in what measurable situation the crisis situation would end. This is not a weakening of border protection, nor a change in asylum policy — it is the recording of the fact that the extraordinary framework adjusts to the situation and not the other way round. The cost of the proposal is small, its benefit double: at home it strengthens the predictability of law enforcement, and in Brussels it makes verifiable the Hungarian argument that the regulation responds to a real need.

Two MIAK foundational values are in play here. Transparency, because the extraordinary legal framework is one of the least verifiable state instruments: the citizen cannot judge its necessity if there is no public yardstick against which to measure it. And accountability, because without an exit condition extension is not a decision but a default — and nobody bears responsibility for a default. The argument that “the previous government started it” cannot be used on the question of responsibility: the present extension was issued by the present government, and it is likewise in its power to write the exit criteria.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 The framing of the press by spectrum

The liberal-left and public affairs band interpreted the decision primarily in the context of the Brussels negotiations. Telex highlighted the internal logic of the announcement: according to the head of government, EU lawyers have so far been unable to propose a solution guaranteeing effective official action, and the cabinet therefore shortened the extension from six months to four. 24.hu supplemented this with the Hungarian negotiating antecedents — the 16.4 billion euros of recovered EU funds and the Costa meeting — and recalled its own earlier reporting on the Ceuta border crisis to which the Prime Minister referred. HVG based the text of the announcement almost entirely on the head of government’s communication, but carried as a separate thread Euronews’s information that phasing out two temporary Hungarian laws could be enough for the fine to be remitted. 444.hu gave the briefest factual report, adding that the solution “is not there yet”.

The economic band sharpened the focus on the financial item. Portfolio put the total cost of the legal dispute (“already approaching 1 billion euros”) at the centre of its report, and separately highlighted that the government deliberately chose the narrower, four-month time frame, and that the head of government would also request EU financial support for the protection of the Schengen external border. This framing places the greatest emphasis on measurability: the portal read the decision as a budget item, not as a symbolic gesture.

The conservative band ran two different narratives. One Magyar Nemzet article set out the decision factually, and emphasised that in the background negotiations Brussels is asking for the termination of the crisis situation and the restoration of the possibility of lodging asylum applications at the border — that is, the paper placed the possibility of Hungarian concessions at the centre. The other piece, entitled “Is Péter Magyar giving way to Brussels?”, framed the same thing as a bargain, indicating, citing experts, that phasing out two laws “may be too little for the EU court”. Mandiner highlighted the statement of the Commission’s spokesperson and read from it that “so far not much has happened” — that is, the promised result in the matter of the fine is not yet available. The actual substantive difference between the two bands therefore lies not in the facts but in whether the extension is a sign of maintaining strictness or of preparing a concession to Brussels. For MIAK both readings lead to the same place: both make the absence of an exit condition visible.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
First declaration of the crisis situation 2015 press reports on the extension practice, 4 September 2026
Earlier rhythm of extension every six months HVG, following Euronews, 4 September 2026
The deadline now expiring 7 September 2026 Magyar Közlöny, 4 September 2026
The new deadline 31 December 2026 Magyar Közlöny, 4 September 2026
Maximum extension permitted by the legislation 6 months Portfolio, 4 September 2026
Lump-sum penalty 200 million euros Telex and Portfolio, 4 September 2026
Periodic penalty payment 1 million euros a day Telex, 24.hu, Portfolio, 4 September 2026
Order of magnitude of the accumulated fine over 900 million euros; the total item is approaching 1 billion euros Magyar Nemzet and Portfolio, 4 September 2026
Recovered EU funds 16.4 billion euros 24.hu, 4 September 2026 (prime ministerial communication)
Entry into force of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum summer 2026 Magyar Nemzet, 5 September 2026

Two notes on the data. First, the papers do not give the same figure for the accumulated fine: Magyar Nemzet writes a sum exceeding 900 million euros, while Telex and Portfolio write “almost 1 billion euros” including the 200-million-euro lump sum. The two figures do not contradict each other, but the distinction matters: the lump-sum penalty is a one-off item, while the periodic penalty payment grows daily. Second, the 16.4 billion euros of recovered funds is a prime ministerial communication, not a figure that has undergone independent verification — the blog therefore cites it with attribution, as a claim.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — linking the negotiation on the fine with the multiannual EU budget debate; the public legibility of the Hungarian negotiating position (programme point ID: KP3, KP4, KP17);
  • Administration of justice (programme points) — the impact assessment of the extraordinary legal category and the annual test of checks and balances (programme point ID: I3, I10);
  • Public security and law enforcement (background material) — the connection between border policing capacity and measurable border situation indicators.

One conceptual delimitation deserves separate emphasis, because it is regularly conflated in the press: the “crisis situation caused by mass immigration” is not a special legal order under the Fundamental Law, but an extraordinary category regulated at statutory level and declared by government decree. The practical consequence is not negligible: the Fundamental Law’s common rules on the special legal order — including the obligation of termination — are not directly applicable to this category. It is precisely for that reason that it is warranted for the legislator voluntarily to supply, for the statutory-level category, what the constitutional level prescribes as a guarantee.

6.4 Literature in detail

The Fundamental Law lays down common rules for every form of the special legal order. Of these, the most important for the present topic is the obligation of termination: maintaining an extraordinary state does not depend on the free discretion of the introducing organ, but on whether the conditions of its declaration obtain. The same article also records that an extraordinary situation does not affect the operation of constitutional review.

“The special legal order shall be terminated by the organ entitled to introduce the special legal order if the conditions for its declaration no longer exist.” (Article 53(3))

“Under a special legal order, the application of the Fundamental Law may not be suspended, and the operation of the Constitutional Court may not be restricted.” (Article 53(2))

In the case of the crisis situation caused by mass immigration this yardstick is not directly applicable, since that is not a special legal order at constitutional level. This, however, is not an argument for dispensing with the guarantee but exactly the opposite: the self-restraint prescribed for the constitutional-level category shows what minimum can be expected of the legislator in the case of a permanently subsisting extraordinary framework. MIAK’s proposal 3.1 transposes precisely this yardstick to the statutory level — with the difference that it ties “the existence of the conditions” to quantifiable indicators, so that the assessment does not remain within the decision-maker’s internal deliberation.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force as of 17 April 2026)

6.4.2 European Convention on Human Rights: the derogation test of Article 15

Article 15 of the Convention authorises a contracting state to derogate from its obligations under the Convention in time of war or other public emergency. The authorisation, however, comes with a strict, threefold limit: the limit of extent, the requirement of consistency with international law and — most importantly for the present topic — the obligation to notify the cessation of the measures.

“In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” (Article 15(1))

“It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.” (Article 15(3))

The structural message of the second quotation is what matters: the Convention regards derogation as a state that by definition has an end, and whose end has to be notified. The Hungarian crisis situation is formally not a derogation under the Convention, but the logic of the yardstick is the same: an extraordinary framework may last to the extent and for the time required by the situation. MIAK’s proposal 3.2 — mandatory, public reasons for extension — is the domestic, administrative counterpart of this test: it creates a regular compulsion to state whether the situation still requires the measure.

📖 Source: European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe)

6.4.3 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

Raz defines the rule of law deliberately narrowly, as a formal virtue: he identifies it neither with democracy, nor with justice, nor with human rights. The basic idea is simply that law must be capable of guiding the conduct of those to whom it is addressed — and from this most of the traditional requirements of the rule of law can be derived.

“All laws should be prospective, open, and clear. […] Laws should be relatively stable. They should not be changed too often.”

“The making of particular laws (particular legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules.”

The Hungarian crisis situation is an interesting borderline case in this frame. The rule itself is stable — it has been in force practically unchanged for eleven years — yet in form it is nonetheless temporary, to be renewed every six months. Raz’s third principle illuminates precisely this tension: particular legal acts (here: the extending government decrees) should be guided by open, stable and general rules. If a “temporary” category lives for eleven years but there is no general rule saying when it ends, then formal temporariness does not increase but reduces predictability: the addressee does not know how long the framework will last, only that so far it has always been extended. MIAK’s proposals — the exit criteria and the public reasons — would make good this missing general rule.

📖 Source: Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

6.5 International comparison (where relevant)

Several European solutions exist for limiting an extraordinary legal framework in time. The most frequent technique is the sunset date — a point fixed in legislation at which a measure automatically ceases unless the legislator amends it beforehand — which places the burden of proving the case for maintenance not on the executive but on the legislature. The derogation practice of the European Convention on Human Rights shows the same logic at international level: contracting states’ notifications are typically for a fixed period, and a separate notification has to be sent about their cessation. In EU law the institution of the periodic penalty payment (Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) is likewise built on this pattern: it is not retribution for a past failure but a continuously operating incentive for the future — which is exactly why it ceases at the moment the infringing state of affairs ends. The peculiarity of the Hungarian situation is not that it applies an extraordinary framework — several EU member states have done so in the past decade — but that no measurable, public exit condition has accompanied the maintenance of the framework. The introduction of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum also transforms the negotiating situation: within the new framework there is a regulated, lawful route for most member state deviations — that is, the Hungarian interest is precisely to use the instruments within the Pact instead of the extraordinary category.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Principled pragmatism doctrine
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition building in the EU

Administration of justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I7 — Legislative simplification programme
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Suggested new programme point: A set of exit criteria for every lasting extraordinary legal category — for the Administration of justice area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 5 September 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge base references (specialist books):

  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force as of 17 April 2026)
  • 📖 European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe)
  • 📖 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law
  • 📖 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 260)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3, KP4, KP17)
  • MIAK policy area: Administration of justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3, I7, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and law enforcement (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 5 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 93/100

Supplementary public data sources (where used):

  • Magyar Közlöny — the government decree extending the crisis situation
  • The Court of Justice of the European Union — the judgment in Case C-123/22 and its enforcement documentation

Generation metadata