Part I — Situation overview

The European Union’s migration and asylum pact (the Pact on Migration and Asylum) — a comprehensive reform package made up of several legal acts of the EU’s asylum and border-management rules — entered into force in all 27 member states on 12 June 2026. According to the AP News summary the package is the result of years of difficult negotiations, replacing the earlier, widely deemed failed system; the European Commission itself acknowledged that not a single member state is fully ready with the transposition of the legislation, the training of staff and the border infrastructure. A few days later, on 17 June 2026, the European Parliament voted by 418 to 218 for the stricter return regulation (the Returns regulation), which contains the cooperation obligation of expelled third-country nationals, detention to prevent absconding, and the application of a model outside the EU — including the return hub, that is, a return centre in a third country.

The background reaches back to 2020, when the Commission put forward the new pact to break the years-long stalemate over the distribution of asylum-seekers among member states. The old system was based on the Dublin Regulation, which usually shifted the examination of the application to the country of first entry, placing a disproportionate burden on the border states. The present entry into force is topical from a Hungarian point of view because the package is not a recommendation: its elements are mandatorily applicable in every member state, so aligning Hungarian asylum and border-policing regulation with the EU frame, and the decision on the solidarity contribution, require concrete legislative and budgetary steps. Here an important legal-technical clarification, which is regularly blurred in the public debate: the pact consists of several legal acts, and these do not all work the same way. An EU regulation is directly applicable — automatically part of Hungarian law, even without a separate act — while a directive must be transposed into Hungarian law, and for this Parliament must legislate.

In MIAK’s reading the real question is not whether we should fulfil the obligation — a country operating within a rule-of-law frame must fulfil it — but how this can be done without violating the fundamental-rights minima, above all the prohibition of refoulement (in legal terms non-refoulement: no one may be sent back to a country where persecution or serious harm threatens them). The stake of the pact is therefore not a symbolic sovereignty battle but a question of implementation and guarantee quality.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals it is worth fixing the doctrinal frame within which the topic can be understood. The European Union’s 2016 global foreign and security policy strategy (Shared Vision, Common Action, better known as the EU Global Strategy), in its dedicated section “A More Effective Migration Policy”, describes the management of migration as standing on four legs: development, diplomacy, legal mobility and — with emphasis — readmission and return; at the same time it establishes that the asylum system must uphold the right to seek asylum, and that responsibility must be borne shared with international partners, along a line of solidarity. The OECD’s 2021 EU economic survey (Economic Surveys: European Union 2021) is more concrete than this: it analyses the new pact directly, welcomes that the Dublin Regulation is replaced by a more flexible responsibility-sharing built on “mandatory but flexible” member-state participation, and points out that in the field of return, readmission and reintegration cooperation with countries of origin has so far not been efficient enough. The two sources together give MIAK’s reading: fulfilling the obligation and the fundamental-rights guarantee are not each other’s opposites but together make the EU asylum system credible. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that together ensure that Hungary fulfils its EU obligation in such a way that the fundamental-rights minima are not harmed.

3.1 An implementing legislative package and a regulation–directive separation (within 90 days)

MIAK proposes that within 90 days the Government submit to Parliament the implementing legislative package that itemises the separation of the pact’s directly applicable regulations (which need no domestic legislation, only institutional preparation) from the directives requiring transposition. The package should clearly assign each task to the correct competence: border control, the asylum procedure and immigration policing are a policing task, within the competence of the police and the Ministry of the Interior — not a defence, military question. This distinction is not a formality: it determines what legal guarantees (judicial review, right of complaint, requirement of proportionality) apply to the procedure. The proposal links to the KP17 — issue-based coalition-building in the EU programme point, because it represents the Hungarian position by fitting it into the EU legislative frame, not outside it.

3.2 The transparency and human-rights minimum conditions of the return centres

In connection with the return hub model MIAK proposes that Hungary join or conclude only such a third-country agreement as meets pre-fixed and publicly verifiable human-rights minimum conditions. These are: the guarantee of the prohibition of refoulement, a time limit on detention (avoiding holding people in legal uncertainty), the possibility of an effective remedy, and mandatory, independent external monitoring — in practice with the involvement of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), as the EU migration commissioner also indicated. Access for parliamentary and civil oversight must also be ensured — the case of the Gjadër centre in Albania (where members of the European Parliament were obstructed in on-site inspection) shows what happens when this guarantee is missing. The public, auditable frames of the policing procedure must be shaped in the spirit of the KB6 — police code of ethics and accountability programme point.

3.3 A measurable plan for the solidarity contribution and reception capacity

The pact’s “mandatory but flexible” solidarity mechanism allows a member state to fulfil its share through relocation, a financial contribution or operational support. MIAK proposes that the Government prepare an itemised, public plan on the form and amount by which it fulfils the Hungarian contribution, avoiding improvisation and legal dispute. For this the reception and integration capacity must also be assessed: who is entitled to protection, what care is due, how integration proceeds. This is the intersection of social policy and asylum, and therefore links to the SZ12 — national action plan of the European Pillar of Social Rights programme point, which prescribes measurable implementation according to the EU methodology.

The common principle of the three proposals: the obligation must be fulfilled, but the quality of implementation — transparency, the clean separation of competences and the fundamental-rights guarantee — decides whether this will be rule-of-law or arbitrary. This is precisely the difference which the EU Global Strategy formulates as the requirement of a migration policy “faithful to values in a legal and ethical sense too”.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Law / institution A predictable asylum procedure consistent with EU law; a clean competence delimitation Protracted transposition, legal uncertainty; the blurring of the policing and defence task
Budget A plannable solidarity contribution; the availability of EU co-financing The hidden, uncontrolled costs of the contribution or the return hub model
Fundamental rights / society The guaranteed observance of the prohibition of refoulement; a verifiable procedure Crowded, long-term detention centres; the hollowing-out of the remedy

The main consideration stretches between efficiency and the fundamental-rights guarantee. The return rate really is low — according to Balkan Insight it was only 28 percent in 2025, and this was the highest value of the preceding ten years — so the effectiveness of the system is a real problem. The proposal tips to the risk side if increasing efficiency comes at the expense of the guarantees: if the return hub becomes a closed, uncontrolled camp, if detention becomes open-ended in time, or if parliamentary and civil oversight — as in Gjadër — is obstructed. The proposal works if the procedure becomes faster and more effective, but every step meanwhile remains challengeable before a court and verifiable by an external actor.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

The following performance indicators (KPIs, in full: Key Performance Indicator) help to judge in 6–24 months whether the direction is good:

  • The adoption of the pact’s implementing legislative package in Parliament, with the regulation–directive separation explicitly fixed — suggested target: by the end of 2026.
  • Let every return hub agreement concerning Hungary be accompanied by a public, IOM/UNHCR-certified human-rights assessment — suggested target: 100 percent.
  • The average duration of the first-instance asylum procedure should not increase relative to the pre-pact level (the goal of acceleration should not turn into a procedural backlog).
  • The form and amount of the Hungarian solidarity contribution itemised and published in advance — suggested target: an annual public report.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s main message: the EU migration and asylum pact is an obligation, not a choice — the task is not to seek a loophole but rule-of-law-quality implementation. MIAK asks the decision-maker to adopt the implementing legislation with a clean competence delimitation, the return hub model with verifiable human-rights minimum conditions, and to plan the solidarity contribution in advance, publicly. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values: transparency — because the verifiability of the return agreements and the contribution is the chief protection against becoming arbitrary — and the rule of law and accountability — because asylum is that sensitive area where the clean order of competences and judicial review separate the policing procedure from a deprivation of rights.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The sources of the topic are international papers, so here we analyse not the party-political bands of the Hungarian press but the differences in the foreign correspondents’ framing. AP News (a neutral, factual American news agency) presents the pact in an explanatory-informative frame: a “what to know”-type summary that matter-of-factly signals both the earlier failure of the system and the concerns of human-rights organisations, without taking a stance. The AP article on the return centres centres on the reassuring message of the EU commissioner, Magnus Brunner (verification by IOM/UNHCR), but the text quotes with equal weight the sceptics, who hold that the centres may become overcrowded, long-term detention facilities of people “stuck in legal uncertainty”.

Balkan Insight (a regional site with a Central and Southeast European focus) highlights the practical side of implementation: it shows how Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece and Romania “scramble” to introduce the rules, while the right demands tightening and rights defenders signal danger. Its report on the return regulation puts the concrete parliamentary numbers and the 28 percent return rate at the centre — that is, the efficiency frame. EUobserver (an EU-critical Brussels portal with a rights-protection sensibility) is the most problem-revealing: its article on the obstructed inspection at the Gjadër centre directs attention to the transparency deficiencies of implementation and the limits of institutional oversight. The three bands together give a full picture: AP the logic of the system, Balkan Insight the pressure of implementation, EUobserver the rule-of-law risk.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Entry into force of the pact 12 June 2026 AP News, 12 June 2026
EP vote on the return regulation 418:218 (in favour), 17 June 2026 Balkan Insight, 17 June 2026
EU return rate, 2025 28% (the highest of the preceding 10 years) European Commission / Balkan Insight
Member states concerned 27 (all) AP News
The Gjadër-centre inspection obstruction 29 June 2026 EUobserver, 30 June 2026

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the representation of the Hungarian EU position in an issue-based, rule-of-law frame; the EU legislative context of the pact;
  • Public security and policing (programme points, background material) — border policing as a policing (not defence) task, in a public and auditable procedural frame;
  • Social policy (programme points) — the reception and integration capacity for those entitled to protection, according to the EU methodology.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 EU Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action (2016)

The EU’s 2016 global strategy devotes a separate section to a more effective migration policy, and in it the demand for the effectiveness of return and the requirement of upholding the right to asylum appear at once. According to the document, irregular flows must be stemmed in a way that meanwhile also keeps the channels of legal mobility open:

„We must stem irregular flows by making returns more effective as well as by ensuring regular channels for human mobility. […] working on a more effective common European asylum system which upholds the right to seek asylum by ensuring the safe, regulated and legal arrival of refugees seeking international protection in the EU."

The strategy also establishes, in the democracy chapter, that in every field from migration to asylum domestic, European and international law must be respected — “living up to our values is a matter of legal, ethical and identity nature at once”. In the case of Hungarian pact implementation this means that the return hub model and the solidarity contribution cannot be separated from the fundamental-rights guarantees: within the frame of the strategy the two are the two sides of the same credible migration policy.

📖 Source: EU Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (2016)

6.4.2 OECD: Economic Surveys — European Union 2021

The OECD’s 2021 EU survey analyses directly the new pact put forward at the time, and points to the structural flaw of the old system: the Dublin Regulation often shifted responsibility to the country of first entry, placing a disproportionate burden on the border states. The report welcomes the essence of the reform:

„the main element of which is to replace the Dublin Regulation by a more flexible framework for a fairer sharing of responsibility built on mandatory but flexible participation by Member States."

The OECD also highlights that in the field of return, readmission and reintegration cooperation with countries of origin has so far not been efficient enough, and therefore the pact plans a common EU return system, an EU return coordinator and a voluntary return strategy. Translated to the Hungarian situation: the “mandatory but flexible” mechanism gives precisely that room for manoeuvre which MIAK’s proposal exploits — the member state may choose the form of the contribution (relocation, money, operational support), but participation itself is not optional.

📖 Source: OECD: Economic Surveys — European Union 2021

6.5 International comparison

The books’ theoretical thesis — that efficiency and the fundamental-rights guarantee together make the system credible — can be measured in practice on the Italian–Albanian model. Italy originally created the Gjadër centre in Albania for the asylum procedure, but according to EUobserver’s report it currently operates as a detention facility for persons awaiting expulsion, and the inspection of members of the European Parliament was restricted. This is a negative example: it shows how the guarantee is hollowed out if institutional oversight is not accessible. A positive direction, by contrast, is indicated by the Balkan “scramble” presented by Balkan Insight: the legislative transposition and border preparation of Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece and Romania shows that implementation is technically solvable if it is started in time — and it is precisely this preparation advantage that Hungary should aim for.

Foreign policy

  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU

Public security and policing

  • KB6 — Police code of ethics and accountability

Social policy

  • SZ12 — National action plan of the European Pillar of Social Rights

Suggested new programme point: EU asylum and border-management compliance framework — for the Public security and policing area, which would fix the transparency and fundamental-rights minimum conditions of the pact’s implementation.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 1 July 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 EU Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (2016)
  • 📖 OECD: Economic Surveys — European Union 2021

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP17)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and policing (programme points; programme point ID: KB6)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ12)
  • MIAK press monitor, 1 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 87/100

Additional public data sources:

  • European Commission — migration dashboard, return statistics (2025 return rate)
  • Frontex annual report; UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) observations

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