Part I — Situation overview

Diesel sales stopped at several Hungarian filling stations on 24 July 2026. According to Portfolio’s report, tension had built up on the Hungarian fuel market: wholesale (procurement) prices are rising steeply while retail prices paid at the pump barely move — this gap corners the independent, non-network stations in particular. The paper also names concrete players: one operator suspended diesel sales at its stations in Dunaújváros and Székesfehérvár, while another station in Újszász can now obtain fuel only from much more expensive Austrian imports. In Portfolio’s phrasing, some filling stations are “no longer set up to make a profit, but purely to survive.” Mandiner describes the same process from the side of the small stations: the smaller businesses began to suspend diesel sales because of the retail prices kept low for political reasons, while others now operate only from expensive Austrian imports.

The domestic disruption is part of a broader, international picture. According to Portfolio’s foreign-policy analysis, the Russian government is weighing an extension of the diesel and petrol export ban after its late-July expiry — by one month for diesel, by half a year for petrol. This affects Hungary all the more, because the country relies heavily on diesel imports, and the domestic refinery, according to the paper, is operating at reduced capacity; a prolonged Russian export ban could thus foreshadow further price rises and supply disruption. Meanwhile in the neighbourhood, in Croatia the two large chains simultaneously limited the quantity of fuel that can be filled at one time — regional “fuel tourism” could thus place further strain on Hungarian stations. On ATV’s Egyenes Beszéd programme, the secretary-general of the Hungarian Petroleum Association also spoke of the faltering supply, and Prime Minister Péter Magyar too warned that summer fuel tourism could cause problems at the domestic stations. Magyar Nemzet highlighted the open letter of a small filling-station owner who has been driven to the brink of bankruptcy and addressed his complaint to Péter Magyar and to Minister of Economy and Energy István Kapitány.

In MIAK’s reading, the story is not simply a “diesel is getting more expensive” type of price news — and precisely for this reason it is important to distinguish it from the axis of earlier fuel analyses, which were about the price level and the strategic reserve. Here the stake is security of supply and the competitive conditions at once. The disruption consists of three superimposed layers. The first is one of security of supply: Hungarian diesel supply depends heavily on a single external source (Russian imports) and on a concentrated refining-wholesale chain — it is this dependence that turns into vulnerability the instant news of a Russian export ban breaks. The second is competition policy: if the wholesale price rises but the price paid at the pump stays low for political reasons, then the margin of the small, independently sourcing stations turns negative, while the large, integrated network (holding everything from refinery to pump in one hand) can redistribute the loss within its own chain. The third is climate policy: all of this is made possible in the first place by dependence on fossil energy carriers — diesel exposure is itself the source of the risk. The character of the problem is thus not a bad price, but a fragile structure that cracks at several points at once under an external shock.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the theoretical frame. In his book 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism, Ha-Joon Chang (an economist of South Korean origin, professor of development economics at Cambridge and later at SOAS in London) reminds us that the disciplining force of the market stems precisely from competition: “the shopkeeper will not cheat us if there is a competitor on the corner.” From this it follows that if a market structure squeezes out the small competitors, it weakens the very mechanism that protects the consumer — competition is not a stage prop but a condition of the market’s functioning. At the same time, Chang also stresses that “a bigger and more active state can support economic dynamism, instead of merely cooling it down” — that is, the right answer is not non-intervention but smart, structure-protecting intervention. In his work Warming the World, William Nordhaus (the Yale economist who received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2018 for his work in climate economics) provides the frame for pricing fossil dependence: the basic dilemma of climate policy is “the choice between present and future consumption,” and the essence of “climate investment” is precisely “reducing the consumption of fossil fuel or switching to low-carbon fuels.” In Nordhaus’s frame, therefore, diesel dependence is not only a supply risk but also an unpriced future cost. The detailed treatment, backed by quotations, can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures which together address the security-of-supply, competition-policy and climate-policy layer — without the crisis leading to a further concentration of market structure.

3.1 Security-of-supply stress test and diversified diesel procurement (within 90 days)

MIAK proposes that the government immediately carry out a public security-of-supply stress test on the diesel supply chain: what happens to the domestic station network if the Russian diesel export ban persists, if the domestic refinery operates at permanently reduced capacity, and if regional demand (fuel tourism) grows further? On the basis of the test’s results, procurement must be diversified: increasing the share of crude oil arriving via the Adria oil pipeline (the route running from the Croatian port to the domestic refinery, capable of replacing the Russian source), importing refined diesel from several sources, and topping up a genuine — not merely paper — strategic reserve. This is the direct implementation of the K7 energy-market shock-resilience programme point: strategic reserves and diversified sources without the preponderance of a single supplier. The aim is not the illusion of self-sufficiency, but that closing a single external tap should not be able to paralyse domestic supply within days (broader theoretical basis: see 6.4.2).

3.2 Monitoring and protection of the competitive conditions of the independent stations (by 2027)

According to MIAK, the acute intervention must protect the consumer from prices in such a way that it does not, meanwhile, squeeze out the small players. For this, the competition authority (the Hungarian Competition Authority) must operate continuous, public margin monitoring: how large is the gap between the wholesale procurement price and the price permitted at the pump, and does this gap regularly force the independent stations into a loss while the integrated network can offset it within its own chain? If, as a side effect of price regulation, the small stations drop out one after another, that means less competition and higher prices in the medium term — the very opposite of what price protection sets as its goal. This is the logic of the G5 competition-policy and anti-monopoly programme point: the systematic monitoring of barriers to market entry and to remaining in the market, and the prevention of oligopolistic concentration. Where price protection hits the small player, targeted, temporary compensation (for example the levelling-out of wholesale procurement conditions) may be warranted — not the switching-off of the market, but the preservation of the structure of competition (in more detail: see 6.4.1).

3.3 Reducing diesel dependence by phasing the energy transition (from 2027)

The third layer is the long-term one. As long as transport and agriculture are built on diesel, every Russian export decision or refinery shutdown ripples straight through to the Hungarian stations. MIAK therefore proposes that acute crisis management be linked to the K2 energy-transition plan: the phased electrification of the electrifiable transport segments (urban public transport, short-distance fleets) and support for gradual alternatives to agricultural and heavy-haulage diesel demand reduce the exposure itself. This is not the solution to the acute problem — the crisis is handled by 3.1 and 3.2 — but the guarantee that in ten years’ time we will not be standing in the same place. The sequence matters: the transition must proceed in such a way that security of supply is not harmed in the meantime, and the players of the fossil sector (including the small stations) do not become the one-sided losers of the process.

The three proposals are bound together by a single principle: resilience as a structural property. A supply chain is secure if it depends neither on a single source nor on a single player — neither abroad (on Russian diesel) nor at home (on a single integrated network). This data-driven approach is also theoretically underpinned by the literature foundation (see 6.4 Literature in detail).

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Economy Diversified procurement and a genuine strategic reserve reduce the vulnerability of domestic supply to an external export ban Diversification (alternative routes, several sources) may be more expensive in the short term, which can temporarily appear in the price paid at the pump too
Competition / market structure Margin monitoring and the protection of the small stations maintain competition, which over the long term moderates the price and improves coverage If price protection is left without monitoring, the independent stations drop out and the market concentrates towards the integrated network — a process hard to reverse
Climate / energy Phasing the transition reduces diesel dependence itself, so future shocks hurt less A transition that is too rapid and poorly sequenced can itself create supply tension or social resistance

The main deliberative question is the tension between immediate price protection and the durability of market structure. A retail price kept low for political reasons protects the consumer in the short term, but if the wholesale price rises freely, the gap grinds down the smallest, independently sourcing players first. The proposal works if price protection goes hand in hand with the levelling-out of procurement conditions and the diversification of the chain — and it tips into risk if the crisis in the end only strengthens the integrated network, at the expense of the independent stations. Concentration advances quietly, one closing station at a time; by the time it becomes visible, competition can already be rebuilt only with difficulty.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed performance indicators)

It is proposed that the following performance indicators (KPIs, in English Key Performance Indicator) be worth tracking over 12–24 months:

  • The breakdown of domestic diesel procurement by source — the aim being that the share of a single external source (e.g. Russian imports) should decrease substantially, and that no source should be dominant.
  • The actual strategic diesel and crude oil reserve expressed in days, publicly reported — the aim being a genuine reserve above the statutory minimum.
  • The gap between the wholesale procurement price and the price permitted at the pump, and the margin of the independent stations — an alert if the gap is persistently negative for the small players.
  • The number and territorial distribution of operating independent (non-network) filling stations — the aim being that the crisis should not reduce it substantially, especially in small settlements.
  • The reduction of diesel exposure in the electrifiable transport segments (public transport, short-distance fleets).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: supply is secure if its structure is diverse — it depends neither on a single external source nor on a single domestic player. MIAK asks the decision-maker not to treat the current disruption as a simple price matter, but as a warning about security of supply and competition policy: to assess the vulnerability of the chain with a stress test, to diversify procurement, and to preserve the competitive conditions of the independent stations — while also reducing diesel dependence itself by phasing the energy transition. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values together: resilience, because it puts the system on several legs against an external shock, and fair competition, because it achieves the protection of the consumer not by squeezing out the small players but by preserving the structure of the market. These two are decisive precisely here because the stake is not the movement of a single week’s diesel price, but whether domestic fuel supply weathers the next shock too.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The economic band (Portfolio) approached from the side of the market mechanism: the price scissors (rising wholesale price, retail price kept in place) and the loss-making situation of the independent stations were at the centre, while the international analysis highlighted the connection between the Russian export ban and domestic import dependence. This band treated the phenomenon primarily as a problem of security of supply and market structure.

The conservative-pro-government band (Mandiner, Magyar Nemzet) framed the story from the side of the small, family-run stations: according to Mandiner the “new fuel-price policy” could destroy the independent filling stations, and Magyar Nemzet highlighted the open letter of a filling-station owner driven to the brink of bankruptcy. This frame holds the government’s price policy responsible — for MIAK it is important that this contention, precisely because it comes from the other side, points to the same real competition-policy risk as the present analysis: as a side effect of price protection, the small players may be squeezed out.

The public-affairs-television band (ATV) brought in the expert, sectoral voice: the secretary-general of the Hungarian Petroleum Association spoke of the faltering supply, and the programme also recalled the prime minister’s warning (fuel tourism). This frame concentrated on the sectoral facts and figures and on the short-term risks.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value / claim Source
Halt of diesel sales at independent stations Several stations (Dunaújváros, Székesfehérvár, Újszász examples) Portfolio, 24 July 2026
The procurement constraint of the small stations Some stations operate only from more expensive Austrian imports Portfolio; Mandiner, 24 July 2026
Weighing of the Russian export ban Diesel: +1 month; petrol: +half a year (after the late-July expiry) Portfolio (global), 24 July 2026
Domestic refinery capacity Operating at reduced capacity Portfolio (global), 24 July 2026
Regional restriction In Croatia the two large chains limited the quantity that can be filled at one time Mandiner (foreign), 24 July 2026
Prime-ministerial warning Fuel tourism could cause problems at the domestic stations ATV Egyenes Beszéd, 24 July 2026

Some of the numerical details (exact price levels, reserve days, import shares) did not appear unambiguously in the public press sources — where the source did not report an exact value, MIAK deliberately uses paraphrase and refrains from presenting estimated figures as fact.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Economy (programme points) — competition policy and the protection of market structure form the backbone of the proposal: preventing the squeezing-out of the small players and margin monitoring;
  • Environment and climate (programme points) — energy-market shock-resilience (strategic reserve, diversification) and the phasing of the energy transition are the frame for reducing diesel dependence;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — securing diversified procurement and alternative routes is also a task of economic diplomacy: negotiation with supplier and transit partners is part of domestic security of supply.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

Chang places competition at the centre of the market’s functioning: the market is able to shape self-interest into a socially useful outcome because competition sets a limit on abuse. As he writes:

“the shopkeeper will not cheat us if there is a competitor on the corner; the workers will not slack off if they know that someone else could easily take their place.”

For MIAK it follows from this that the independent stations are not merely “small players” but the carriers of competitive discipline: if they disappear, the mechanism that protects the consumer weakens. At the same time, Chang sharply criticises the assumption that the state always only worsens the market — in his view “a bigger and more active state can support economic dynamism, instead of merely cooling it down.” In the present matter this means: the right answer is neither non-intervention nor leaving price regulation to its own devices, but smart, structure-protecting state action that defends competition and not a single large player. In Chang’s frame the current disruption is not “the iron law of the market” but the consequence of regulatory decisions — and it could therefore also be decided differently.

📖 Source: Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

6.4.2 Nordhaus: Warming the World

With the DICE/RICE family of models Nordhaus examines the cost-benefit structure of climate policy, and frames the essence of the decision as a choice over time:

“the fundamental trade-off that society faces is the choice between present and future consumption.”

And he pinpoints the content of “climate investment” concretely in the reduction of fossil dependence: it means “reducing the consumption of fossil fuel or switching to low-carbon fuels.” For MIAK this frame illuminates that diesel dependence carries two kinds of cost: an immediate one (the vulnerability of supply to an external export ban) and an unpriced future one (the climate cost of fossil energy carriers). The two point in the same direction: reducing dependence is at once a resilience gain and a climate-policy gain. Nordhaus’s warning that, because of long and uncertain delays, decision-makers tend to postpone costly steps holds here too — the crisis is precisely the moment when the price of postponement becomes visible.

📖 Source: William Nordhaus: Warming the World — Economic Models of Global Warming

6.5 International comparison

The vulnerability of diesel supply is not a Hungarian peculiarity: since 2022 export restrictions on Russian refined products have regularly moved the European diesel market, because the EU is import-dependent for this product. The common denominator of resilience-strengthening practices is diversification: several procurement sources, alternative transport routes and genuine strategic reserves. The regional dynamic is double-edged — the current Croatian refuelling restriction shows well that a neighbouring country’s defensive step (curbing fuel tourism) indirectly places pressure on Hungarian stations too. The lesson: security of supply is worth planning in a regional, not a purely national, frame, and economic diplomacy (consultation with supplier and transit partners) also has a role in it.

Environment and climate

  • K7 — Energy-market shock-resilience
  • K2 — Energy-transition plan
  • K5 — Just transition programme

Economy

  • G5 — Competition policy and anti-monopoly
  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G25 — Energy-price shock preparedness plan

Foreign policy

  • KP8 — Economic diplomacy integration

Proposed new programme point: Fuel supply-chain resilience monitor — a public, regular report on the source breakdown of diesel procurement, on strategic reserve days and on the margin of the independent stations — for the Economy and the Environment and climate areas.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 25 July 2026 — top-10 topics):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism
  • 📖 William Nordhaus: Warming the World — Economic Models of Global Warming

Note: the local file path of the book does NOT appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G5)
  • MIAK policy area: Environment and climate (programme points; programme point ID: K7)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP8)
  • MIAK press monitor, 25 July 2026 — topic 2, score: 83/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Hungarian Petroleum Association — sector information on fuel supply

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