Part I — Situation overview

Three threads ran together at once around the Hungarian fuel supply in July 2026. István Kapitány, minister for the economy and energy, announced on 18 July at the Pétfürdő oil storage facility that the domestic petroleum reserve had risen from the March level of 44 days to 87 days, approaching the 90-day level that serves as the international benchmark — according to him stockpiling is “not a political but a professional priority”, which reduces the country’s foreign exposure. In parallel, the Association of Independent Filling Stations fears a halt in imports: the purchase price of imported fuel has exceeded the domestic retail price, which practically makes imports impossible, while the low water level of the Danube also hinders shipping. As a third thread, the Fidesz parliamentary group raised a conflict of interest: it called on the minister to sell his Shell shares, because he decides on the regulation of a market in which he has a private-wealth interest.

Behind the figures lies a conceptual clarification, without which the debate goes astray. The “enough for how many days” indicator measures how long the reserves would cover consumption if both domestic refining and imports stopped completely — according to the clarification by the secretary-general of the Hungarian Petroleum Association. The 87-day figure, however, refers to crude oil; for finished products — petrol and diesel — expert estimates indicate a substantially lower coverage. The minister’s oil-industry background is not in itself an objection but a fact: he spent 37 years at Shell, from 2014 as the company’s global retail vice-president — it is precisely this expertise that made him suitable for the post, yet it is also what generates the conflict of interest now raised, since his June asset declaration contains a share portfolio in the billions.

MIAK’s reading: both questions — the real level of security of supply and the minister’s interest — trace back to the same shortage, the lack of credible, verifiable publicity. A reassuring average figure and a political accusation both feed uncertainty; according to MIAK the task is not to decide whether “there is a problem”, but for the public itself to be able to verify the answer — from type-by-type reserve data and from the transparent resolution of the decision-maker’s interest.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. In his work A hiány (Economics of Shortage) János Kornai (an economist of Hungarian origin, the author of the theory of the soft budget constraint) demonstrates that chronic uncertainty triggers self-reinforcing stockpiling: actors strive for a larger reserve the greater the uncertainty — that is, expectation itself produces shortage, independently of real physical scarcity. This directly explains the logic of the filling-station panic: the news of an import halt can in itself push up demand. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook 2025 report illuminates the situation from the other side: raw-material price spikes — from geopolitical tensions — hit especially raw-material-importer countries, amid narrow fiscal room; Hungary, as an energy-import-dependent country, falls precisely into this vulnerable group, which makes the strategic reserve not a luxury but a shock-absorbing tool. And Corruption and Government by Susan Rose-Ackerman (an American jurist-economist, a leading researcher of the political economy of corruption) systematises the international toolkit for handling conflict of interest — asset declaration, blind trust, recusal rule —, and fixes that the yardstick is not proven abuse but already the avoidance of appearance. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures, which transform the debate of trust into verifiable data and a party-neutral rule.

3.1 A type-by-type, regular and public reserve dashboard (from the next quarter)

MIAK proposes that the data of the Hungarian Hydrocarbon Stockpiling Association (MSZKSZ — the organisation managing the mandatory security crude-oil and product reserve) be published not in a single aggregated “87 days” form, but broken down by product type — separately crude oil, petrol, diesel —, expressed in days and tonnes, with regular updates, on a public, machine-readable interface. The main cause of the debate is precisely the aggregation: the 87-day crude-oil figure and the far lower finished-product coverage are two different things, and as long as only the former is stated, the government’s reassurance and the filling-station operators’ concern talk past each other. This is the transparency supplement to the K7 energy-market shock-resilience programme point, the application of the logic of the A1 public-money dashboard to the energy sector. The unexplained reserve fall flagged by the filling-station operators (according to the Association, nearly 59 thousand tonnes of diesel in ten days at the end of June) is precisely the case that a public time series would clarify on its own: who, when, on what legal ground used from the strategic reserve.

3.2 Resolution of the minister’s oil interest: sale, blind-trust management or recusal (immediately, as a uniform rule)

MIAK treats the Kapitány case not in the daily party dispute but at the level of principle: the question is not whether abuse occurred — there is no evidence for that, and the presumption of innocence applies here too —, but that the direct private-wealth interest of an active decision-maker in a market he regulates is in itself a structural risk to be handled. Within the Rose-Ackerman frame (see 6.4.3) any of the three established international responses fits: the sale of the shares, placing the wealth in independent blind-trust management (blind trust — a form of custody in which the owner does not dispose over the composition of the portfolio, so that his decisions cannot serve his own interest), or the minister’s formal recusal from those specific decisions that affect the situation of Shell or the wider oil market. The essence is party-neutrality: the same yardstick should apply to every decision-maker of every government — this is what distinguishes the principled integrity rule from political character assassination. The machine-readable, cross-checkable asset declaration of the A3 programme point makes the resolution verifiable even after the fact.

3.3 A predictability rule for petrol-price policy: targeted, income-proportional compensation (in the autumn energy package)

The recurring dispute around the protected fuel price (the 595-forint petrol and 615-forint diesel price introduced, then phased out, by the previous government in March 2026) shows that a general price cap is a bad tool: the richest and the poorest motorist receive the same subsidy, while the artificially low price causes import tension and reserve depletion. MIAK — in line with its earlier energy-price analyses — proposes that the response template be not a general price freeze but targeted, income-proportional compensation for those genuinely in need, with clear eligibility criteria, while the price stays at the real market level. This is in line with the G19 radical economic transparency programme point: behind every such decision there should be a public, quantified justification — how many people it affects, how much it costs, how long it lasts —, so that the intervention is not a campaign tool but a measurable social-policy step.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: security of supply and integrity are both questions of trust, and trust is built not from rhetoric but from verifiable data. By Kornai’s lesson, shortage is born of uncertainty — all three of MIAK’s proposals reduce the same uncertainty: about the reserve, about the decision-maker’s interest, and about the logic of price policy alike.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Economy the type-by-type reserve data breaks the panic-stockpiling spiral; targeted compensation is cheaper than a general price freeze the real market price means higher fill-up costs in the short term; the import tension may persist if the purchase price stays durably above the retail price
Society targeted protection of those in need; decision-maker integrity is restored, the crisis of trust eases the eligibility system of targeted compensation may bring administrative burden and delimitation disputes
Public administration the public reserve dashboard and the blind-trust rule set a precedent; verifiable asset declaration because part of the strategic reserve data is sensitive, the extent of publicity must be carefully calibrated (security versus transparency consideration)

The main question of judgement is the balance between publicity and security sensitivity. The precise, real-time, storage-site-level data of the strategic reserve may justifiably qualify as sensitive — but the publication of the aggregated coverage level per product type, expressed in days, carries no such risk, yet resolves precisely the uncertainty that now feeds the panic. The other tipping point is the form of handling the minister’s interest: the sale is the cleanest, but blind-trust management or recusal is also acceptable if it is transparent and verifiable — the only bad solution is a conflict of interest left unresolved, because that undermines the credibility of the decisions even if every decision is otherwise professionally correct.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following key performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Reserve transparency: regular (at least monthly) public publication of the security reserve data broken down by product type — yes/no, and the frequency of updating;
  • Product coverage: the coverage level of the petrol and diesel reserve expressed in days, separately — goal: the finished products too durably near the international recommendation;
  • Integrity resolution: whether the resolution of the decision-maker’s oil-industry interest has taken place (sale / blind-trust management / documented recusal) — yes/no, publicly verified;
  • Targeting of price policy: if there is a fuel-price intervention, its income-proportional targeting and public impact assessment — the share of the supported group and the estimated cost published.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request to the decision-maker is twofold and concrete: the security reserve data should appear broken down by product type, regularly and publicly; and the economy minister’s oil-industry interest should be resolved by a transparent, party-neutral procedure — sale, blind-trust management or documented recusal. The proposal attaches to two MIAK foundational values: to transparency — because the real level of the reserve and the decision-maker’s interest can be judged only from public, verifiable data, not from government reassurance or opposition accusation —, and to accountability — because the integrity rule is credible only if it applies equally to every government. Together these two lift the question out of the daily party quarrel and make it a lasting institution of public trust.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The economic and public-affairs band carried the factual side: Portfolio presented the ministerial statement (reserve enough for 87 days of consumption, “no supply problem”), while 24.hu and HVG put the filling-station operators’ concern and the conceptual clarification at the centre — HVG explicitly pointed out that the 87-day figure refers to crude oil, whereas the finished-product reserve is lower than this, and quoted an expert estimate on the days of petrol and diesel coverage. 24.hu highlighted the unexplained strategic reserve fall and the impossibility of imports.

The pro-government-conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) carried the conflict-of-interest thread into the headline: it linked the minister’s Shell share portfolio, the estimate of the exchange-rate gain achieved on the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the rise in the petrol price, and demanded the reinstatement of the petrol price freeze. This band also gave the most detailed biographical background on the minister’s Shell past. MIAK deliberately does not adopt the difference in framing in either direction: it treats the factual dispute (the real level of the reserve) and the question of principle (the handling of the interest) with the same data-driven yardstick, regardless of which side happens to voice the objection — in the present case the opposition against the government’s minister, earlier in reversed casting.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Petroleum reserve: according to the government communication enough for 87 days of consumption, compared with 44 days in March; the international benchmark level is 90 days (statement by István Kapitány, ministerial statement — 24.hu, Portfolio).
  • The “enough for how many days” indicator measures the coverage amid a complete halt of domestic refining and imports (Hungarian Petroleum Association, HVG).
  • The breakdown of the reserve by type is disputed: according to an expert estimate the crude-oil coverage and the finished-product coverage (petrol, diesel) differ, the latter being lower — the government and expert communication diverge on this point (HVG). The blog deliberately does not fix the exact daily values from a single source, because it is precisely their public, authenticated publication that is the subject of the proposal.
  • Strategic diesel reserve: according to the Association of Independent Filling Stations it fell by nearly 59 thousand tonnes between 30 June and 9 July, without explanation and without naming the beneficiaries of the use (24.hu).
  • The minister’s background: 37 years at Shell, from 2014 global retail vice-president; his June asset declaration contains a share portfolio in the billions (Magyar Nemzet).
  • Protected fuel price: 595 HUF petrol, 615 HUF diesel per litre, introduced by the previous government on 9 March 2026, phased out by the current government (Magyar Nemzet).

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Environment and climate (programme points) — the shock tolerance of the energy supply: K7 energy-market shock resilience (strategic reserve at 90-day import equivalent, source diversification);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — decision-maker integrity and public-money transparency: A3 publicity of asset declarations, A1 public-money dashboard, A10 independent corruption-investigation framework;
  • Economy (programme points) — regulatory capture and decision transparency: G19 radical transparency in economic decision-making, G6 programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 János Kornai: A hiány (Economics of Shortage)

In his analysis of the shortage economy Kornai demonstrates that chronic uncertainty triggers self-reinforcing stockpiling behaviour: economic actors try to guarantee the security of supply by forming additional reserves, and the greater the uncertainty, the larger the reserve they strive for. The essence of the mechanism is that expectation itself produces shortage — the fear of shortage pushes up demand and buying-up, independently of actual physical scarcity. Translated to today’s fuel situation: the news of an import halt and the lack of trust can in themselves trigger panic-like filling-up and stockpiling, causing real but artificially generated tension. The lesson for MIAK is direct: the key to security of supply is not merely the size of the physical reserve, but credible, verifiable information — the type-by-type, public reserve data breaks precisely the uncertainty that feeds the stockpiling spiral.

📖 Source: János Kornai: A hiány (Economics of Shortage)

6.4.2 IMF: World Economic Outlook 2025

The report’s risk chapter emphasises that raw-material price spikes — whether their source is geopolitical tension or climate shocks — hit especially raw-material-importer countries, which, amid narrow fiscal room, are burdened by heightened inflationary pressure. The document also ranks the energy-market effects of the Middle East conflict among the main risks. Hungary, as an energy-import-dependent, raw-material-importer country, falls precisely into this vulnerable category — this gives the macroeconomic justification of the K7 energy-market shock-resilience programme point: the strategic reserve and source diversification are not a costly luxury but a means of reducing shock exposure. Within the report’s frame the 87-day reserve target is thus the right direction — the open question is not the target but whether the coverage extends to every product type, and whether this is publicly verifiable.

📖 Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook 2025

6.4.3 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman systematises the international toolkit for handling conflict of interest: most developed countries bar public officials from decisions in which they have a financial interest, many oblige them to make a public asset declaration, and the most senior must place their wealth in blind-trust management (blind trust). A key thesis of hers is that the yardstick is not proven abuse but already the avoidance of the appearance of a breach of the law — the official must avoid the appearance even if his conduct technically complies with the rules. This frame applies precisely to the present situation: the question is not whether the economy minister abused his powers, but that the coincidence of the decision-making authority and the Shell share portfolio is in itself a structural risk that must be handled institutionally. The party-neutral response — sale, blind-trust management or recusal — is not an accusation but a general rule of public trust that applies equally to every decision-maker of every government.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

6.5 International comparison

The yardstick for the publicity of security petroleum reserves is the system of the International Energy Agency (IEA): member countries hold a mandatory 90-day net import-equivalent reserve, and report the reserve levels regularly, broken down by product type — this is the model to which the Hungarian publication practice should align. In the handling of decision-maker conflict of interest, the United States’ presidential blind-trust tradition and the mandatory asset-declaration and recusal systems of numerous EU member states provide a template: for high-ranking former industry executives entering an economic decision-making position, resolving the interest is a routine step, not a scandal-driven one. These examples show that MIAK’s proposal is not extraordinary strictness but the base level of developed governmental practice — the shortage is not in the existence of the yardstick but in its consistent domestic application.

Environment and climate

  • K7 — Energy-market shock resilience

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office

Economy

  • G19 — Radical transparency in economic decision-making
  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture

Proposed new programme point: Decision-maker conflict-of-interest handling protocol — the mandatory resolution of the private industry interest of economic decision-makers (sale / blind-trust management / documented recusal), by a uniform, party-neutral rule — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 19 July 2026 — topic 5):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 János Kornai: A hiány (Economics of Shortage)
  • 📖 IMF: World Economic Outlook 2025
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Note: the local file path of the books does NOT appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Environment and climate (programme points; programme point ID: K7)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A3, A1)
  • MIAK press monitor, 19 July 2026 — topic 5, score: 79/100

Additional public data sources:

  • International Energy Agency (IEA) Oil Market Report and reserve reports; Hungarian Hydrocarbon Stockpiling Association (MSZKSZ) publications

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